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FOREWORD
The Tenth Circuit is presently experiencing an evolution. As the area
in which it sits undergoes rapid economic and population expansion, the
Circuit's caseload is increasing in size and sophistication. The diverse nature
of the cases appealed to the Circuit has recently ranged from such matters as
an alleged violation of a Muslim prisoner's civil rights because of the sup-
posed use of pig fat in prison soap, to a case that involved a city's regulation
of cable television and required consideration of complex and subtle anti-
trust and First Amendment issues. Keeping current with the opinions of the
court is a formidable task for members of both the bench and the bar. Nev-
ertheless, the effort is vital to the consistent and efficient administration of
justice.
The value of staying abreast of the latest court opinions is painfully
illustrated by the experience of one defense counsel appearing before the
Tenth Circuit. He was vigorously arguing a position that had been ap-
proved in several other circuits when he was asked by a member of the court
if he was familiar with a recent Tenth Circuit opinion. The attorney
stopped short and responded: "No, Your Honor, but if it says what I'm
afraid it says, I'm in trouble." It did, and he was.
The Denver Law Journal's Annual Tenth Circuit Survey aids both
practitioners and courts in their efforts to discover recently decided cases and
apply them to the issues at hand. The capsule case summaries and critiques
help to ensure that new and relevant Tenth Circuit decisions will not be
overlooked in the flood of opinions emanating from the court. The Journal
is to be commended for this substantial contribution to the legal community.
STEPHANIE K. SEYMOUR
October 23, 1981

THE JUDGES OF THE UNITED STATES COURT
OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
CHIEF JUDGE OLIVER SETH
Judge Seth was born in New Mexico in
1915 and grew up in Santa Fe. He received
his A.B. degree from Stanford University in
1937 and his LL.B. from Yale in 1940.
During World War II he served as a Major
in the U.S. Army and was decorated with the
Croix de Guerre. Judge Seth has been a
director of the Santa Fe National Bank, chair-
man of the Legal Committee of the New Mex-
ico Oil and Gas Association, and counsel for
the New Mexico Cattlegrowers' Association.
He has also been a regent of the Museum of
New Mexico and a director of the Santa Fe
Boy's Club. In 1962 he was appointed to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit by President John F. Kennedy. He
has been Chief Judge since 1977.
JUDGE ROBERT H.
McWILLIAMS
Judge McWilliams was born in Salina,
Kansas in 1916 and moved to Denver in 1927
where he has lived ever since. He received his
A.B. and LL.B. degrees from the University of
Denver. In 1971, he was awarded an Honor-
ary Doctor of Law degree from the
University.
During World War II, Judge McWilliams
served in the United States Army and was
with the Office of Strategic Services. He has
served as a Deputy District Attorney, a Colo-
rado district court judge, and was a member
of the Colorado Supreme Court for nine years
prior to his appointment to the Court of
Appeals.
Judge McWilliams is a member of the Judi-
cial Conference Committee on the Adminis-
tration of the Criminal Law, Phi Beta Kappa,
Omicron Delta Kappa, Phi Delta Phi, and
Kappa Sigma. He was sworn in as a Judge of
the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit in 1970.
JUDGE WILLIAM J.
HOLLOWAY, JR.
The son of a former Oklahoma governor,
Judge Holloway was born in Hugo,
Oklahoma, in 1923. He and his family moved
to Oklahoma City in 1927. He served as a
First Lieutenant in the Army during World
War II. He then returned to complete his
undergraduate studies at the University of
Oklahoma, receiving his B.A. in 1947. He
graduated from Harvard Law School in 1950.
In 1951 and 1952, Judge Holloway was an
attorney with the Department of Justice in
Washington, D.C. Afterwards, he returned to
private practice in Oklahoma City where he
was appointed to the Tenth Circuit by Lyn-
don B. Johnson. He is a member of Phi Beta
Kappa and Phi Gamma Delta.
JUDGE JAMES E. BARRETT
The son of the late Frank A. Barrett, who
served as Wyoming's Congressman, Governor,
and U.S. Senator, Judge Barrett was born in
1922 in Lusk, Wyoming. He attended the
University of Wyoming for two years prior to
his service in the Army during World War II.
After the War, he attended Saint Catherine's
College at Oxford University. He received his
LL.B. from the University of Wyoming in
1949. In 1973 he was given the Distinguished
Alumni Award from his alma mater.
Prior to his appointment, Judge Barrett
had been involved in private practice in Lusk
and had served as County and Prosecuting
Attorney for Niobrara County; Town Attor-
ney for the towns of Lusk and Manville; and
attorney for the Niobrara County Consoli-
dated School District. In 1967 he was
appointed by Governor Stanley K. Hathaway
to serve as Wyoming Attorney General and he
remained in that position until 1971.
Judge Barrett is a member of the Judicial
Conference Subcommittee on Federal Juris-
diction, the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveil-
lance Court of Review, and is a trustee of
Saint Joseph's Children's Home. He was
appointed to the Court in 1971.
JUDGE WILLIAM E. DOYLE
Judge Doyle was born in Denver in 1911
and received his A.B. from the University of
Colorado in 1940. He obtained his LL.B. and
J.D. degrees from George Washington Uni-
versity. He served as Deputy District Attor-
ney for Denver from 1938 until 1941, a
Colorado district court judge in 1948 and
1949, and Chief Deputy District Attorney
from 1949 until 1952. During 1959-61 he was
a Justice on the Colorado Supreme Court.
Judge Doyle has been a Visiting Professor
of Law at the University of Colorado and a
Professor of Law at the Westminster College
of Law (University of Denver College of Law)
in Denver. He is a former Chairman of the
Judicial Conference Committee to Implement
the Magistrates' Act and is presently a mem-
ber of the Judicial Conference Committee on
the Administration of the Bankruptcy System.
He is a member of the Order of the Coif, the
Order of Saint Ives, Pi Sigma Alpha, and Phi
Alpha Delta.
He was appointed to the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals in 1971 following ten years
as a United States District Judge for the Dis-
trict of Colorado.
JUDGE JAMES K. LOGAN
Judge Logan was born in Quenemo, Kan-
sas, in 1929. He received his A.B. from the
University of Kansas in 1952 and was gradu-
ated magna cur tau&e from Harvard Law
School in 1955. He went on to be U.S. Cir-
cuit Judge Walter Huxman's law clerk in
1956 and then practiced with the Los Angeles
firm of Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher. He
became Dean of the University of Kansas
Law School in 1961 and served in the capac-
ity until 1968.
Since 1961 he has been a visiting professor
at Harvard Law School, The University of
Texas Law School, Stanford University, and
the University of Michigan. He was a com-
missioner for the U.S. District Court from
1964 until 1967 and was a candidate for the
U.S. Senate in 1968.
Judge Logan is a Rhodes Scholar, a mem-
ber of Phi Beta Kappa, Order of the Coif,
Beta Gamma Sigma, Omicron Delta Kappa,
Pi Sigma Alpha, Alpha Kappa Psi, and Phi
Delta Phi. He has co-authored numerous
books on estate planning and administration.
In 1977 he was appointed to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
JUDGE MONROE G. McKAY
Judge McKay was born in Huntsville,
Utah, in 1929 and lives in Provo. He gradu-
ated from Brigham Young University in 1957
with high honors. He received his J.D. from
the University of Chicago and became the
law clerk for Justice Jesse A. Udall of the Ari-
zona Supreme Court in 1960. From 1961 to
1974, Judge McKay was with the firm of
Lewis and Roca in Phoenix, taking two years
out to serve as Director of the United States
Peace Corps in Malawi, Africa. He was a law
professor at Brigham Young University from
1974 until he was appointed to the Tenth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals in 1977.
JUDGE STEPHANIE K.
SEYMOUR
Judge Seymour was born in Battle Creek,
Michigan, in 1940. She graduated from
Smith College, mana cum laude, in 1962 and
earned her J.D. from Harvard Law School in
1965. She was admitted to the Oklahoma bar
in 1965.
Judge Seymour has practiced law in Bos-
ton, Massachusetts, 1965-1966; in Tulsa,
Oklahoma, 1967; and Houston, Texas, 1968-
1969. Most recently, she has practiced with
the Tulsa firm of Doerner, Stuart, Saunders,
Daniel &Anderson from 1971 to 1979. Judge
Seymour is a member of Phi Beta Kappa, and
the American, Oklahoma, and Tulsa County
Bar associations. She served as a bar exam-
iner from 1973 through 1979.
Judge Seymour was appointed to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit by President Carter in 1979.
SENIOR JUDGE JOHN C.
PICKETT
Judge Pickett was born in Ravenna,
Nebraska, in 1896. He received his LL.B.
degree from the University of Nebraska in
1922. In 1920, he was a pitcher for the Chi-
cago White Sox. During World War I, he
served as a Second Lieutenant.
From 1935 until 1949, Judge Pickett was
Assistant United States Attorney for the Dis-
trict of Wyoming; in 1949, he was United
States Attorney. He is a past member of the
Judicial Conference and has served as Chair-
man of the Judicial Conference Advisory
Committee on the Administration of the
Criminal Law.
Judge Pickett was appointed to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
in 1949 and has been a Senior Judge since
January 1, 1966.
SENIOR JUDGE JEAN S.
BREITENSTEIN
Judge Breitenstein was born in Keokuk,
Iowa, in 1900. His family moved to Boulder,
Colorado, in 1907. After graduation from the
University of Colorado, where he received his
A.B. in 1922 and LL.B. in 1924, he served as a
Colorado Assistant Attorney General from
1925 until 1929. He was an Assistant United
States Attorney from 1930 until 1933.
Between 1933 and 1954, he practiced law in
Denver. In 1954, he became a United States
District Judge.
Judge Breitenstein has served as Chairman
of the Judicial Conference Committee on
Intercircuit Assignments and is a past presi-
dent of the Denver Law Club.
A member of Phi Beta Kappa, Order of the
Coif, and Phi Alpha Delta, Judge Breitenstein
holds LL.D. degrees from the University of
Colorado and the University of Denver. He
was appointed to the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals in 1957 and became a Senior Judge
on July 31, 1970.
SENIOR JUDGE DAVID T.
LEWIS
Judge Lewis was born in Salt Lake City,
Utah, in 1912. He received his B.A. degree
and his J.D. from the University of Utah. In
1971, he was awarded an Honorary Doctor of
Laws degree from his alma mater. During
World War II, Judge Lewis served in the
Criminal Investigation Division of the Army
and in 1947-48 he was a member of the Utah
Legislature. He was a Utah district judge
from 1950 to 1956.
Judge Lewis has been a member of the
Judicial Conference of the United States since
1970 and was elected Chairman of the Con-
ference of Chief Circuit Judges in 1974. He
was voted the "Judge of the Year" in 1974 by
the Utah State Bar Association.
Judge Lewis is a member of the Order of
the Coif and Phi Delta Phi. He was
appointed to the Tenth Circuit in 1956 by
President Dwight D. Eisenhower. He became
a Senior Judge on December 3, 1977.
SENIOR JUDGE DELMAS C.
HILL (Retired)
Judge Hill was born in Wamego, Kansas,
in 1906. He received his LL.B. from Wash-
burn College in 1929. From 1929 to 1943 he
practiced law in Wamego, serving as an Assis-
tant U.S. Attorney from 1934 to 1936. He
was general counsel for the Kansas State Tax
Commission from 1937 to 1939 and Chair-
man of the State Democratic Committee from
1946 to 1948. During World War II he was a
Captain in the U.S. Army. In 1945, he
assisted in the prosecution of General
Yamashita in Manila. He was a U.S. District
Judge from 1949 until 1961 when he was
appointed to the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals. Judge Hill became a Senior Judge
on April 1, 1977.
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
OVERVIEW
Recently, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued a large number of
decisions concerning appeals from various administrative agencies and inter-
pretations of agency rules. Some of the decisions are important, not only for
the legal principles enunciated, but also because they deal with topics of
current public discussion. For example, the Tenth Circuit reversed the con-
troversial convictions of eighty-six protesters of the Rocky Flats nuclear
plant. This decision, however, was awaiting rehearing as of the date this
article was published.
The Tenth Circuit's discussions of administrative law include disserta-
tions on rulemaking procedures, the right to a pre-termination hearing, the
proper standard for judicial scrutiny of administrative decisions, and the ex-
haustion of remedies doctrine. Provisions of several major acts were inter-
preted. Constitutional guidelines for agency action were delineated,
including standards for obtaining administrative search warrants, for post-
hearing modifications of penalties against corporations violating safety stan-
dards, and for inspection of corporate minutes. Finally, the Tenth Circuit
examined the ever-present question of the standing requirements that parties
challenging agency action must fulfill.
I. RULEMAKING PROVISIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE ACT
Two cases considered by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals involved
the interpretation and application of section 553 of the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act (APA).I Section 553 contains the notice and publication require-
ments which must be followed for a substantive administrative rule to be
valid. 2 The rulemaking provisions of section 553 were designed to ensure
that administrative rules be enacted fairly and that mature consideration be
given to rules of general application. 3 As one court noted, the main purpose
of the section is to permit concerned parties to comment on the rule before
any official action is taken.
4
In Beime v. Secretag of Agriculture,5 the Tenth Circuit ruled that a mere
change in wording does not require an agency to comply, for a second time,
with the rulemaking procedures mandated by section 553. The court noted
that administrative agencies are permitted to make changes in a proposed
I. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976).
2. Section 553 prescribes three requirements for rule making: publication of notice in the
Federal Register; an opportunity for persons to participate in the rulemaking procedure; and,
after the rule is established, publication in the Federal Register not less than thirty days before
its effective date. Id. § 553(b)-(d).
3. NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759 (1969).
4. Saint Francis Memorial Hosp. v. Weinberger, 413 F. Supp. 323 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
5. 645 F.2d 862 (10th Cir. 1981).
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rule after the comment period without entering into a new round of hear-
ings,6 when the changes are in character with the original rule and are "fore-
shadowed in proposals and comments advanced during the rulemaking."
7
Because the changes in Beirne were insubstantial and were for purposes of
clarity only, the court held that the rulc was lawfully promulgated.8
In another, well-publicized case, United States v. Seward,9 the court re-
versed the convictions of eighty-six individuals found guilty of trespassing at
the Rocky Flats nuclear generating plant (Rocky Flats). After passing signs
marked "no trespassing" and being warned to leave, the defendants were
arrested and subsequently found guilty of trespass. ' 0 On appeal, the defend-
ants argued that their convictions were invalid because the designation of
boundaries in the Federal Register failed to comply with section 553 of the
APA. I I
In 1965, the Atomic Energy Commission had designated the Rocky
Flats site as subject to trespass restrictions. 2 This designation, however, in-
cluded only the area enclosed by the original chain link fence and security
system. Further, no public hearing was held concerning this designation.
13
In 1975, additional property was added to the Rocky Flats plant and,
6. 645 F.2d at 865 (citing American Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 568 F.2d 284 (3d Cir.
1977)).
7. 645 F.2d at 865 (quoting South Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646, 658 (Ist Cir.
1974)).
8. 645 F.2d at 865. The challenged regulation, 7 C.F.R. § 271.3(c)(1)(iii) (1974), deals
with the question of which educational expenses can be deducted from the gross income of a
food stamp applicant to determine the applicant's net income. The regulation reads in part:
Deductions for the following household expenses shall be made (this list is inclusive
and no other deductions from income shall be allowed):
() Tuition and mandatory fees assessed by educational institutions (no deductions
shall be made for any other education expenses such as, but not limited to, the
expense of books, school supplies, meals at school, and transportation).
7 C.F.R. § 271.3(c)(1)(iii) (1974). (current version at 7 C.F.R. § 273.9(c)(3) (1981)).
This regulation was preceded by a proposed regulation which the court considered in addi-
tion to the later versions, and which read:
Deductions for the following household expenses shall be made:
(e) Educational expenses which are for tuition and mandatory school fees. This in-
cludes those tuition and mandatory school fees which are covered by scholar-
ships, educational grants, loans, fellowships, and veterans' educational benefits.
39 Fed. Reg. 3644 (1974).
The challenged regulation was also preceded by a properly promulgated 1971 regulation
which read:
Deductions for the following household expenses shall be made:
(0 Educational expenses which are for tuition and mandatory school fees, including
such expenses which are covered by scholarships, educational grants, loans, fel-
lowships, and veterans' educational benefits.
7 C.F.R. § 271.3(c)(iii)( 0 (1972) (current version at 7 C.F.R. § 273.9(c)(3) (1981)).
9. No. 79-1711 (10th Cir. Jan. 5, 1981), reheart'ng granted en ban', (10th Cir. May 5, 1981).
10. Id., slip op. at 3-4.
11. The defendants actually contended that the designation was in violation of 5 U.S.C.
§ 551-76 (1976), 42 U.S.C. § 7191-95 (1976), 10 C.F.R. § 860 (1981), and internal Department
of Energy standards published in 44 Fed. Reg. 1032 (1979). The decision, however, turned on
section 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976).
12. 30 Fed. Reg. 13,289 (1965), as annded by 32 Fed. Reg. 5382 (1967) and 40 Fed. Reg.
38,187 (1975).
13. No. 79-1711, slip op. at 8.
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sixteen days before the defendants were arrested, the Department of Energy
(DOE) designated the additional property as being part of the 1965 trespass
area. 14 Again, no public hearing was held concerning the extension of the
trespass boundaries. Thus, the defendants argued that the designation was
invalid because the agency did not comply with the thirty-day notice and
other rulemaking requirements contained in the APA. In response to this
argument, the Government maintained that the extension of the boundaries
did not change substantive rights and was therefore not subject to the notice
and comment provisions of the APA. In addition, the Government con-
tended that the defendants had actual notice of the extension and that the
defendants therefore could not plead non-compliance with the APA as a
defense. 15
The court, to find that section 553 did not apply to the boundary exten-
sion, would have had to rule that the regulation was interpretative rather
than legislative.16 As one authority has noted, "[t]he law about the distinc-
tion between interpretative and legislative rules is quite troublesome,...",7
However, a few generalizations can be made. A substantive or legislative
rule has statutory force upon enactment while interpretative rules only guide
an administrative agency in the performance of its duties.' 8 An interpreta-
tive rule, like a general policy statement, does not create any rights or obli-
gations,' 9 and it has no independent binding effect.2 0 Further, an interpre-
tative rule is a declaration issued without lawmaking authority 2 l or without
any intent to exercise that authority, and it is not determinative of the rights
or issues it addresses.
22
The DOE was granted the authority "to issue regulations relating to
entry upon .. .any facility, installation, or real property"123 subject to that
agency's jurisdiction. There was no law against trespass on the property ac-
quired in 1975 until the DOE promulgated a rule to that effect. This was
not an agency interpretation of law or a general policy statement, but rather
the creation of a new law. Thus, the boundary designation constituted sub-
stantive rulemaking. As such, it was subject to the requirements of the APA,
and a failure to comply with the requirements rendered the rule invalid.
2 4
The court also dismissed the Government's second argument, that the
defendants' actual knowledge of the entry restrictions barred the defendants
14. 44 Fed. Reg. 22,145 (1979).
15. No. 79-1711, slip op. at 9.
16. 5 U.S.C. § 553(d)(2)(a) (1976) excepts interpretive rules and general statements of pol-
icy from the publication requirement.
17. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TEXT § 5.03 at 126 (3d ed. 1972).
18. Comptroller of Treasury v. M.E. Rockhill, Inc., 205 Md. 226, 234, 107 A.2d 93, 98
(1954).
19. Str Texaco v. FPC, 412 F.2d 740, 744 (3d Cir. 1969).
20. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org. v. Simon, 506 F.2d 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
21. See Joseph v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 554 F.2d 1140, 1153-54 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
22. Set Pacific Gas v. FPC, 506 F.2d 33, 38 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 2278(a) (1976). See also, S. REP. No. 2530, 84th Cong. 2d Sess., repritedin
[1956] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4426, 4430.
24. No. 79-1711, slip op. at 16. See NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 763-65
(1969).
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from pleading the notice requirements as a defense. 25 Section 553(b) re-
quires notice before rulemaking, not after, 26 because the main purpose of the
section is to permit concerned parties to comment on the rule before any
official action is taken. The court noted that "notice of a final rule, by publi-
cation or actual notice, does not cure improper notice and commcnt procc-
dures." 2 7 Thus, the rule was invalid even though the defendants had actual
notice that the area was restricted.
Chief Judge Seth dissented and would have affirmed the convictions of
the Rocky Flats protestors. The Chief Judge felt that the actual regulation
restricting access to the plant had been properly promulgated in 1963-it
was only the effective date of the regulation that was postponed.2 8 The
Chief Judge argued that the regulation as to all facilities, then existing and
future, was adopted in 1963. Thus, "the regulation was the rulemaking un-
der Skidmore v. Swi? and Co. ",29 As such, this was the initial rule which al-
lowed the DOE to make rules of general application that did not have to be
promulgated pursuant to section 553 of the APA.
30
A review of section 553 of the APA and decisions promulgated thereun-
der indicates that the majority's analysis is the better of the two. The regula-
tion enacted on April 13, 1979, must be considered substantive lawmaking
because it imposed rights and obligations where none had existed before. As
a substantive rule, the enactment was subject to the notice and comment
procedures of the APA.
3 1
II. RIGHT TO A HEARING BEFORE TERMINATION
OF MEDICAID FUNDING
In two similar cases the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals denied a pre-
termination hearing concerning the non-renewal of Medicaid provider
agreements to nursing homes which participated in the Medicaid program
and to the patients in the homes. In Geritrics, Inc. v. Harr', 32 the court held
that because the purpose of limiting the term of a provider agreement to one
year was to assure that only facilities which comply with Medicaid regula-
tions were involved in the program, a nursing home had at most a "unilat-
eral hope" that the one year agreement would be renewed. 33 Citing Board of
Regents v. Roth,34 the court held that the home had no right to a hearing
because a "unilateral hope cannot constitute a protected 'property' interest
[which would] require a pre-termination hearing."
'3 5
25. No. 79-1711, slip op. at 17.
26. Wagner Elec. Corp. v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 1013, 1019 (3d Cir. 1972).
27. No. 79-1711, slip op. at 18.
28. No. 79-1711, Seth: C.J., dissenting op. at 6.
29. Id. at 7; Skidmore v. Swift & Co, 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
30. No. 79-1711, Seth, C.J., dissenting op. at 7 (citing Batterson v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416
(1977); General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976)).
31. At the time of this article's publication a rehearing of the Seward case was pending in
the Tenth Circuit Court. No. 79-1711 (10th Cir. May 5, 1981).
32. 640 F.2d 262 (10th Cir. 1981).
33. Id. at 265.
34. 408 U.S. 564 (1971).
35. 640 F.2d at 265. Se- also Paramount Convalescent Center Inc. v. Department of
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The court also noted that although the home would encounter operat-
ing difficulties because of the termination, it still was not entitled to a pre-
termination hearing. Eventide of Lakewood Nursing Home, the plaintiff,
was not the intended beneficiary of the Medicaid program. Thus, the diffi-
culties which would be encountered by the home were "not of constitutional
significance."
'3 6
In disposing of the patients' claims, the court relied on O'Bannon v. Town
Court Nursing Center,3 7 which specifically held that the residents of a nursing
home were not entitled to a hearing before the government could suspend
the home from participation in the program.38 Although a pre-termination
hearing would be required if the benefits received by the patients were with-
drawn, the decertification of a nursing home does not deprive the residents
of their direct benefits. Thus, no constitutional rights are involved.
39
In Lomond View Nursing Homes, Inc. v. Cakfano ,40 the issue addressed was
slightly different from that in Geriatrics but the conclusion was the same.
Geriatrics involved the question of whether an operating home could have its
Medicaid provider agreement terminated before a hearing on the matter. In
Lomond View, however, the termination came after an extension period which
was granted so that the nursing home corporation could build new facilities
in compliance with the Life and Safety Code.4 ' After the extension time
had run, however, the homes were still not in compliance with the Code.
Based on the reasoning in Geriatrics, the court held that there was no right to
a pre-termination hearing regardless of whether an extension had been
given.
4 2
III. SCOPE OF REVIEW
Between 1980 and 1981, the Tenth Circuit addressed the question of
judicial review of administrative decisions. The proper scope of review was
considered under section 706 of the APA;43 with regard to an Agency's inter-
pretation of its own rules; under the Mine Safety and Health Act; 44 and
where a postmaster was terminated for insubordination.
A. Informal Administrative Decisions
In CF&I Steel Corp. v. Economic Development Administration 4 5 the court
considered the standard of judicial review of an informal administrative de-
cision under section 706 of the APA. Citing Citizens to Preserve Overton Park,
Health Care Servs., 15 Cal. 3d 489, 542 P.2d 1, 125 Cal. Rptr. 265 (1975), cert. &nued, 425 U.S.
992 (1976).
36. 640 F.2d at 265.
37. 447 U.S. 773 (1980).
38. I. at 785.
39. 640 F.2d at 264.
40. 639 F.2d 674 (10th Cir. 1981).
41. 42 C.F.R. §§ 442.321-.323 (1980).
42. 639 F.2d at 676.
43. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1976).
44. 30 U.S.C. §§ 801-960 (1976).
45. 624 F.2d 136 (10th Cir. 1980).
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Inc. v. Volpe,4 6 the court noted that when dealing with informal agency ac-
tion, the function of judicial review is threefold. First, the court must deter-
mine the authority of the agency. Second, the court must be certain that the
agency complied with prescribed procedures. Finally, the reviewing court
must determine whether the challenged action was arbitrary, capricious, or
an abuse of discretion.
4 7
While this review might seem broad, "the ultimate standard of review is
a narrow one,"48 and neither the substantial evidence test nor de novo re-
view apply. Under Seatrain International v. Federal Maritime Commission,49 the
court, before substituting its judgment for the agency's, must decide if the
action has a rational basis on the facts. 50 If the facts supporting the agency's
action are adequately adduced and rationally applied, then the court may
not substitute its judgment for that of the agency.
5 '
CF&I Steel Corporation challenged the dismissal of a declaratory judg-
ment action which claimed violations of the Public Works and Economic
Development Act of 1965,52 of regulations implementing the Act, 53 and of
the Steel Industry Lending Guidelines.54 CF&I claimed that the Economic
Development Administration (EDA) unlawfully guaranteed a $63.5 million
loan to the Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel Corporation. Extensive studies were
entered into by the EDA before approval of the loan guarantee, and the
agency felt that the guarantee was proper.
5 5
CF&I, however, attacked the decision of EDA, arguing that the studies
made were incorrect and not thorough enough. CF&I's objections went to
the weight of the evidence, however, and the court could not change the
judgment because the EDA study and decision were "adequately adduced
and rationally applied."' 56 Further, CF&I could not show any fraud, bad
faith, or bias on the part of the EDA.5 7 Thus, given the limited scope of
review with regard to informal agency action and CF&I's failure to show
bad faith, the court was correct in affirming the EDA decision.
B. Review of An Ageny's Interpretation of Its Own Regulations
In Morrson & Morrison, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor,58 the court considered the
standard for reviewing an administrative agency's interpretation of its own
regulations. Morrison & Morrison, Inc., a real estate brokerage firm, sought
to employ an alien in its business and offered to pay the alien $600 per
46. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
47. 624 F.2d at 139 (quoting Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. at
415-17).
48. 624 F.2d at 139 (quoting Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. at
416).
49. 598 F.2d 289, 292-93 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3121-3246 (1976).
53. 13 C.F.R. § 301 (1981).
54. 43 Fed. Reg. 16,360 (1978).
55. 624 F.2d at 138-40.
56. Id. at 140.
57. Id. at 141.
58. 626 F.2d 771 (10th Cir. 1980).
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month plus commissions. Based on this offer, Morrison & Morrison, Inc.,
petitioned the Secretary of Labor to employ Tom Kite, a resident of Eng-
land, pursuant to section 1182(a)(14) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act.
59
For a domestic employer to comply with the Act, the employer must
show, among other things, that he has attempted to fill the position, recruit-
ing at the prevailing wage within the United States. 60 Further, an employer
must advertise the position in a professional publication calculated to reach
interested nationals. 6' The Secretary of Labor interpreted section
656.21(b)(4) as requiring the guaranteed wage for commission-compensated
employment to be the prevailing wage or, in this case, $1200. In addition,
the Secretary construed section 656.21(b)(9)(i) as requiring a more extensive
publication than was provided by Morrison & Morrison, Inc.
62
Citing United States v. Laronoff,63 the court noted that "[t]he standard for
reviewing an administrative agency's interpretation of its own regulations is
'plainly erroneous or inconsistent.' "64 Because the Secretary's construction
of the regulation was not plainly erroneous or inconsistent with prior inter-
pretations, the court had little choice but to affirm the lower court's decision.
C. Judicial Review Under the Mine Safety and Health Act
In American Coal Co. v. United States Department of Labor,65 the Tenth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals interpreted a provision of the Mine Safety and Health
Acts6 as implicitly providing for the review of actions taken by a coal mine
inspector. According to the court, this review would initially be within the
administrative agency, subject to final consideration by the court of
appeals.
6 7
A Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) inspector inspected
a coal mine owned by the Utah Power and Light Company after a portion
of the mine collapsed. The inspector concluded that the roof control plan
was inadequate, and issued an order temporarily closing a large section of
the mine. 68 American Coal responded to the order by filing suit in the
United States District Court for the District of Utah alleging that the inspec-
tor was not authorized to issue such an order. 69 The suit in the federal dis-
trict court was, however, dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
70
American Coal appealed this dismissal, contending that the Act did not
provide for administrative review. Therefore, according to American Coal,
any order made pursuant to the statute was properly reviewable in a federal
59. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(14) (1976).
60. 20 C.F.R. § 656.21(b) (1981).
61. 20 C.F.R. § 656.21(b)(9)(i) (1981).
62. 626 F.2d at 773.
63. 431 U.S. 864 (1977).
64. 626 F.2d at 773 (citing United States v. Larionoff, 431 U.S. at 872).
65. 639 F.2d 659 (10th Cir. 1981).
66. 30 U.S.C. § 813(k) (Supp. 1II 1979).
67. 639 F.2d at 661.
68. Id. at 660.
69. Id.
70. Id.
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district court and not, as the lower court ruled, first reviewable by the
MSHA review board and then by the court of appeals.71
The Tenth Circuit noted that while section 813(k) of the Act does not
explicitly provide for administrative review, review can be implied from a
reading of the entire Act along with its legislative history. 72 Thus, initial
jurisdiction to review the action taken by the inspector was properly vested
in the MSHA review board, with final review in the court of appeals. As
support for this proposition, the court cited Whitney Bank v. New Orleans
Bank 73 in which the Supreme Court stated "where Congress has provided
statutory review procedures designed to permit agency expertise to be
brought to bear on particular problems, those procedures are to be exclusive.
• . .To permit a district court to make the initial determination of a plan's
propriety would substantially decrease the effectiveness of the statutory
design."
'74
D. The Substantial Evidence Test
Substantial evidence has been defined as "such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." '7 5 Sub-
stantial evidence is "something less than the weight of the evidence and the
possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does
not prevent an administrative agency's finding from being supported by sub-
stantial evidence." '76 This test was applied by the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals in Henkle v. Campbell.77 Henkle had been fired from his job as post-
master after a finding of insubordination by the Civil Service Commission.
Although removal for insubordination is permissible under federal law, 78 the
court was concerned whether the appellant's responses to an order from his
supervisor constituted insubordination.
In applying the substantial evidence test to the facts, the court noted
that the appellant's refusal to refrain from calling the local police chief a
"chicken shit son of a bitch" after a direct order from his superior to cease
using such language and the appellant's failure to report to a fitness for duty
examination clearly constituted a rational basis for the Commission's ac-
tion. 79 Thus, the holding was supported by substantial evidence and the
decision of the Commission to dismiss Henkle was affirmed.
IV. EXHAUSTION OF REMEDIES
In two similar cases, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals considered the
exhaustion of remedies doctrine in the context of state parole board deci-
71. Id.
72. Id. at 661-62.
73. 379 U.S. 411 (1965).
74. 639 F.2d at 662 (quoting Whitney Bank v. New Orleans Bank, 379 U.S. at 420).
75. Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938).
76. Consolo v. FMC, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966).
77. 626 F.2d 811 (10th Cir. 1980).
78. 5 C.F.R. § 752.104(a) (1977) (current version at 5 C.F.R. § 752.301 (1981)) (incorpo-
rating 5 U.S.C. § 7513 (Supp. III 1979)).
79. 626 F.2d at 813.
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sions. Under federal law,8 0 a state inmate's petition to a federal court for a
writ of habeas corpus will be dismissed unless the prisoner has exhausted all
available state remedies. 8' If there are no adequate state remedies available,
however, the statute provides that a prisoner need not attempt to exhaust
state remedies before petitioning for relief in federal court.
8 2
In Schuemann v. Colorado Slate Board ofAdull Parole,8 3 the Tenth Circuit, in
following a previous decision,8 4 noted that the standard of review for parole
board decisions is whether the action was "arbitrary, capricious or an abuse
of discretion."
8 5
Because there were no state remedies available to Schuemann, who was
confined in the Colorado State Penetentiary, the petition was properly
before the court. Schuemann contended, for various reasons, that the parole
board's decision to deny him parole was a denial of due process.8 6 The
court, however, found that the parole board's decision was neither arbitrary
nor capricious, nor was there any abuse of discretion.8 7 Thus, Schuemann's
petition was denied.
In a similar case, Shea v. Hegg'e,a8 the court of appeals reversed the lower
court's invocation of the exhaustion doctrine. The district court held that
inmates in the Colorado State Penetentiary had remedies which could have
been pursued.8 9 However, the Colorado Supreme Court, in answering a cer-
tified question from the federal court of appeals, 9° held that the decision to
deny parole is discretionary and not subject to judicial review in the state
courts. Thus, the invocation of the exhaustion doctrine was improper and
the court remanded the case for reconsideration based on its decision in
Schuemann v. Colorado State Board of Adult Parole. 9 '
80. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1976) reads as follows:
(b) An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursu-
ant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears that the
applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, or that there
is either an absence of available State corrective process or the existence of circum-
stances rendering such process ineffective to protect the rights of the prisoner.
81. Slayton v. Smith, 404 U.S. 53 (1971); Shea v. Heggie, 624 F.2d 175 (10th Cir. 1980);
Watson v. Patterson, 358 F.2d 297 (10th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 876 (1966). See In re:
Question Concerning State Judicial Review of Parole Denial, 610 P.2d 1340 (Colo. 1980).
In two unpublished decisions, the Tenth Circuit dismissed petitions for writs of habeas
corpus because state remedies had not been exhausted. Raine v. Warden, No. 80-1265 (10th
Cir. Feb. 27, 198 1) (not for routine publication); Ford v. Griffin, No. 79-2084 (10th Cir. June 30,
1980) (not for routine publication).
82. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1976).
83. 624 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980).
84. Dye v. United States Parole Comm'n, 558 F.2d 1376 (10th Cir. 1977).
85. 624 F.2d at 173.
86. Id. For an excellent discussion of the due process clause and parole board decisions see
Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 8-16 (1979).
87. 624 F.2d at 175.
88. 624 F.2d 175 (10th Cir. 1980).
89. Gomez v. Colorado State Parole Bd, 470 F. Supp. 778 (D. Colo. 1979), rev'd, 624 F.2d
175 (10th Cir. 1980).
90. In re: Question Concerning State Judicial Review of Parole Denial, 610 P.2d 1340
(Colo. 1980).
91. 624 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980).
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V. RATE CHANGES UNDER THE FEDERAL AVIATION ACT OF 1958
In Frontier Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 9 2 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
interpreted the Federal Aviation Act of 195893 as allowing for individual
adjustment of subsidy awards under certain conditions. Frontier Airlines
sought review of its subsidy allotment from December 2, 1969 to June 30,
1971, awarded under the Act 94 which empowers the Civil Aeronautics Board
(CAB) to "fix . . . fair and reasonable rates of compensation for the trans-
portation of mail by aircraft," 95 taking into consideration the needs of each
carrier. Frontier sought an increase in its subsidy because it was operating at
a significant loss in an attempt to maintain service on small, unprofitable
runs under the class rate system set up by the CAB.
96
The CAB, however, denied an individual subsidy increase to Frontier
Airlines and emphasized its policy of favoring the class rate system in setting
subsidy awards. 97 The CAB noted that the class rate system was favorable
because it was simple and it increased incentives toward carrier efficiency. 98
It also noted that carriers who remain in the class system are more motivated
to "pare costs in order to maximize profits in good times, and to minimize
losses in bad times." 99 Further, the CAB held that for a carrier to show need
and therefore be entitled to an individualized rate, "its ultimate survival
[must be] in jeopardy."' ° Thus, because Frontier Airlines was not in dan-
ger of bankruptcy, the individualized rate was denied.
On appeal, the decision turned on the court's interpretation of "need"
under section 1356 of the Act. The court noted that under the statute, a
"carrier must be permitted to leave the Class System and seek an individual-
ized rate, when it can show that the. . . class rate does not adequately take
into consideration its "need," and that it is operating under 'honest, econom-
ical, and efficient management.' "101 Need, however, does not mean an air
carrier must be faced with bankruptcy. Rather, the carrier must show that it
is being denied a fair profit under the class rate system.' 0 2 Thus, the CAB
was incorrect in its interpretation of the statute.
The court also held that the CAB erroneously considered profits made
by Frontier outside of the challenged time period.'0 3 The court noted that
in determining need, the CAB should have reviewed only profits and losses
92. 629 F.2d 643 (10th Cir. 1980).
93. 49 U.S.C. § 1301 (1976).
94. Id. § 1376.
95. Id. § 1376(a).
96. This system was created as a means "of just compensation for services rendered to the
Government by requiring that fair and reasonable rates be fixed from time to time for carrying
of the mail." Capital Airlines v. CAB, 171 F.2d 339, 340 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 961
(1948). Airlines receive subsidies from the government as an incentive to maintain what would
otherwise be unprofitable routes to small communities. Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB, 280 F.2d
636 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 870 (1960).
97. Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 1376(b).
98. 629 F.2d at 646.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 648.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 649.
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incurred during the period in question and should not have reached into the
closed rate period as set forth in the Act,1° 4 because profits earned during
closed rate periods are not to be diminished by refusing to adjust losses dur-
ing an open rate period.' 0 5
VI. THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT
A. Due Process
In Garcia v. Caifano,10 6 the Tenth Circuit affirmed the decision of the
New Mexico District Court and the Secretary of Health, Education and
Welfare (HEW), which denied Garcia's claim for social security disability
benefits. Garcia's application for disability listed sciatica arthritis as his ail-
ment and, in addition, he submitted two medical histories and disability re-
ports which buttressed his allegation of disability due to arthritis.107
The HEW Secretary denied his claim and, subsequently, Garcia ob-
tained a hearing before the Social Security Administration examiner. Gar-
cia received a notice of hearing which advised him of his right to
representation; 10 8 how. ver, he appeared at the hearing pro se. The hearing
examiner did not re-advise him of the right to counsel; rather, the examiner
questioned him about his back, his previous drinking problem, and his work
history.
On appeal, Garcia contended that he was denied due process because
first, he was not advised at the hearing of his right to be represented by
counsel. Secondly, the hearing examiner did not inquire about his condition
of depression as a cause of his alleged disability. The Tenth Circuit rejected
both arguments, holding that the applicable statute' 0 9 and regulation" ,0 did
not require the hearing examiner to advise the plaintiff of his right to repre-
sentation by an attorney. The court distinguished Brooks v. Califano,iii
which had held that a hearing examiner should make certain a claimant for
disability benefits is cognizant of the possible availability of free legal serv-
104. 49 U.S.C. § 1376(b) (1976).
105. 629 F.2d at 649 (citing Transatlantic Final Mail Rate Case, Reopened, 23 C.A.B. 307,
323 (1956)).
106. 625 F.2d 354 (10th Cir. 1980).
107. Id. at 355.
108. Id.
109. 42 U.S.C. § 405(b) (1976), provides that:
The Secretary is directed to make findings of fact, and decisions as to the rights of any
individual applying for a payment under this subchapter. Upon request by any such
individual . . . who makes a showing in writing that his or her rights may be
prejudiced by any decision the Secretary has rendered, he shall give such applicant
... reasonable notice and opportunity for a hearing with respect to such
decision....
Cf Muenich v. United States, 410 F. Supp. 944 (N.D. Ind. 1976); Lonzollo v. Weinberger, 387
F. Supp. 892 (N.D. Il1. 1974), rev on oher growzd, 534 F.2d 712 (7th Cir. 1976).
110. 20 C.F.R. § 404.923 (1980) (current version at 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.936-.938):
The presiding officer shall fix a time. . . for the hearing, written notice of which,.
shall be mailed to the parties ... not less than 10 days prior to such time .... The
notice of hearing shall include the time and place of the hearing, and a statement of
the specific issues to be determined, and matters on which findings will be made and
decision reached. The parties shall be informed of their right to representation. ...
i11. 440 F. Supp. 1341 (Del. 1977), afdmein., 586 F.2d 834 (3d Cir. 1978).
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ices. The court found, however, that the Brooks holding was applicable only
if "the claimant's record at the hearing was not fully developed or. . .there
were serious gaps therein which could have been filled if counsel had been
present .... 112
Garcia's second contention was held to be without merit because the
subject of depression was never raised prior to the hearing or during the
hearing. As a result, the examiner, in denying the claim, made no findings
with respect to depression. The court held that Garcia was responsible for
raising the issue of his depression if he intended to base his disability claim
on depression.'" 3 The court denied his request that the cause be remanded
to the Secretary for further proceedings." 
4
B. Judicial Review under the Social Security Act
Two cases necessitated the Tenth Circuit's consideration of standards
for judicial review. In Clements v. Caifano," 5 the court, utilizing the substan-
tial evidence standard, affirmed the district court's decision denying dis-
ability benefits. In Kroenke v. Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare," ' 6 the
court upheld the district court's finding that additional evidence submitted
by the plaintiff, in an effort to overturn an earlier denial of benefits, merely
duplicated the previous evidence and contained no new information.'17
In the Clements case, the plaintiff-appellant applied for disability bene-
fits alleging that he had contracted emphysema and rheumatoid arthritis. " 18
He was granted a hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ). During
the hearing the plaintiff, his ex-wife, and his daughter testified with respect
to his alleged disability."' 9 Additional evidence included medical reports
from five doctors who had examined the plaintiff. Two of the doctors con-
cluded that the plaintiff could not engage in gainful work, while two doctors
determined that he could return to work.' 2 0 The ALJ found that the claim-
ant's alleged maladies were of limited severity; consequently, the claimant
was able to engage in gainful employment.'
2'
Pursuant to the applicable law, 122 the claimant filed suit in the district
112. 625 F.2d at 356.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 356-57.
115. No. 79-1566 (10th Cir. April 16, 1981) (not for routine publication).
116. No. 79-1565 (10th Cir. Jan. 8, 1981) (not for routine publication).
117. No. 79-1565, slip op. at 7.
118. No. 79-1566, slip op. at 2.
119. Id., slip op. at 2-3. The plaintiff attested to the fact that he had a tenth grade educa-
tion and had been trained as a beautician. He worked in that capacity until the onset of his
alleged disability. Id., slip op. at 3.
120. Id., slip op. at 4. One doctor was noncommittal and made no determination with
respect to the plaintiff's ability to work. Id.
121. Id., slip op. at 5.
122. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1976) (amended 1980) provides that:
Any individual, after any final decision of the Secretary made after a hearing to which
he was a party, irrespective of the amount in controversy, may obain a review of such
decision by a civil action commenced within sixty days after the mailing to him of
notice of such decision or within such further time as the Secretary may allow. Such
action shall be brought in the district court of the United States for the judicial district
in which the plaintiff resides . ...
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court alleging, among other matters, that the facts did not support the denial
of benefits. The district court affirmed the ALJ's decision, holding that if the
Secretary's decision was supported by substantial evidence, then that deci-
sion must be affirmed.
1 23
The Tenth Circuit agreed and affirmed the lower court's decision deny-
ing the claimant's application for disability benefits. The appellate court
rejected the claimant's contention that he was psychiatrically disabled and
that, therefore, the ALJ's finding was in error. Relying on Kelbach v. Har-
rs,t2 4 the court held that the burden of proof was on the claimant to estab-
lish disability.1 25 In addition, when the court is reviewing the record, the
court is restricted by the Secretary's determination. 26 However, the court
can determine whether the Secretary's decision was arbitrary, capricious, or
an abuse of discretion.' 2 7 Moreover, the court upheld the district court's
determination that the Secretary's decision was supported by substantial evi-
dence. The court relied on Richardson . Perales,128 and held that regardless of
123. No. 79-1566, slip op. at 6. See Brown v. Harris, No. 80-1201 (10th Cir. Feb. 27, 1981)
(not for routine publication); Gardner v. Bishop, 362 F.2d 917 (10th Cir. 1966).
124. 634 F.2d 1304 (10th Cir. 1980).
125. No. 79-1566, slip op. at 8. Disability is defined as "inability to engage in any substan-
tial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment
which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a
continuous period of not less than twelve months." 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i)(1), 423(d)(l)(A) (1976).
See Osteen v. Califano, No. 80-2233 (10th Cir. April 30, 1981) (not for routine publication).
In Biffle v. Harris, No. 79-2074 (10th Cir. Jan. 19, 1981) (not for routine publication), the
Tenth Circuit elucidated a tripartite test to determine whether a claimant qualified for disabil-
ity benefits. Tommie J. Biffle, a forty-six year old woman with a ninth grade education, applied
for disability insurance alleging that she suffered from "neuritis, reflex dystrophy in her shoul-
ders, ulcers, and other stomach problems." Id., slip op. at 4. Prior to submission of this applica-
tion, Biffle had worked as a waitress, cotton picker, and beautician.
Setting forth the applicable standard by which the Bffje case would be adjudicated, the
court held:
First, the burden is upon the claimant to establish that she is suffering from physical or
mental impairment of such severity that she is unable to perform her former work,
considering her age, education, and work experience. If this is established, the burden
shifts to the Secretary to establish by competent evidence that the claimant, consider-
ing her impairment, age, education, and work experience, is nevertheless able to en-
gage in other types of substantial gainful employment that exist in significant numbers
in the national economy. Under the third prong, the burden shifts back to the claim-
ant to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that she could not engage in
those types of employment the Secretary has shown to be available for persons suffer-
ing from impairments similar to claimant's.
Id., slip op. at 4-5. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
Applying this test to the facts, the court affirmed the Secretary's ruling that, taking into
account the claimant's background, Biffle could work as a "sales person, cashier, sewing
machine operator, and alteration seamstress or similar occupation." No. 79-2074, slip op. at 6.
Biffie failed to demonstrate her inability to engage in employment. See Van Natter v. Secretary
of HEW, No. 79-1439 (10th Cir. Jan. 8, 1981); Valentine v. Richardson, 468 F.2d 588 (10th Cir.
1972); Keating v. Secretary of HEW, 468 F.2d 788 (10th Cir. 1972).
126. No. 79-1566, slip op. at 9. See also Mandrell v. Weinberger, 511 F.2d 1102 (10th Cir.
1975); Johnson v. Finch, 437 F.2d 1321 (10th Cir. 1971).
127. No. 79-1566; slip op. at 9-10; Edwards v. Califano, 619 F.2d 865, 868 (10th Cir. 1980)
(quoting Sabin v. Butz, 515 F.2d 1061, 1066-67 (10th Cir. 1975)).
128. 402 U.S. 389 (1971). The Supreme Court held that reports of physicians who had
examined the plaintiff constituted substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is "more than a
mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion." Id. at 401 (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197,
229 (1938)).
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the fact that two doctors determined the claimant was disabled and two
doctors arrived at the opposite conclusion, nevertheless, substantial evidence
existed. As a result, the Secretary's determination could not be considered
arbitrary and capricious.
129
in Cagle v. Cafifano,' 30 the plaintiff Cagle sought relief from thc decision
of the HEW Secretary denying his application for disability benefits. Cagle
had applied for disability benefits alleging that he suffered from back pains
which affected his ability to work as a welder. The ALJ denied Cagle's ap-
plication and the district court affirmed, holding that the ALJ's decision was
supported by substantial evidence. 13' On appeal, the plaintiff requested
that the case be remanded to the Secretary for the consideration of new and
material medical evidence 132 pursuant to section 4 05(g) of the Social Secur-
ity Act. 133 The plaintiff alleged that the new evidence, which consisted of
reports stating that the plaintiff was unemployable, was not available prior
to the initial administrative determination.'
34
The court had to consider whether this information fell under the ru-
bric of cumulative or new information. The court was persuaded by a
Fourth Circuit decision' 35 which defined new evidence as evidence that
might reasonably have changed the Secretary's decision "had that (new) evi-
dence been before him when his decision was rendered."'1 36 The Tenth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals affirmed the ALJ's decision that the applicant was not
disabled. The court, however, remanded the case to the district court for
consideration of the new medical evidence.
13 7
C. Interpretation of Social Security Act Provisions
In Hammond v. Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare,' 38 a mother of
two disabled' 39 children challenged the Secretary's decision to terminate the
benefits of her minor sons, William H. Ross and Richard R. Ross. The Sec-
retary's determination was based on the ground that the children's stepfa-
ther's income was attributable to them. Consequently, the children were no
longer eligible to receive Supplemental Security Income (SSI). The Secre-
tary reached this determination after reviewing the applicable statute 40 and
129. No. 79-1566, slip op. at 11.
130. 638 F.2d 219 (10th Cir. 1981).
131. 638 F.2d at 220. See text accompanying note 127, supra.
132. 638 F.2d at 221.
133. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1976) as amendedby Social Security Disability Amendments of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-265, § 307, 94 Stat. 458.
134. 638 F.2d at 221.
135. King v. Califano, 599 F.2d 597 (4th Cir. 1979).
136. 638 F.2d at 221 (quoting King v. Califano, 599 F.2d at 599); see Kroenke v. Secretary
of HEW, No. 79-1565 (10th Cir. Jan. 8, 1981).
137. 638 F.2d at 221.
138. 646 F.2d 455 (10th Cir. 1981).
139. For a definition of disability, see note 125 supra and accompanying text.
140. 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(0(2) (1976) states in pertinent part:
For purposes of determining eligibility for and the amount of benefits for any individ-
ual who is a child under age 21, such individual's income and resources shall be
deemed to include any income and resources of a parent of such individual (or the
spouse of such a parent) who is living in the same household as such individual,
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the agency regulation enforcing the statute.' 4'
Counsel for the plaintiff focused his argument on the last sentence of the
applicable statute 42 and interpreted this sentence as requiring the Secretary
to make an ad hoc determination of whether the income of a parent, or step-
parent, is actually available to the disabled child.' 43 The district court
agreed with this interpretation and remanded the case to the Secretary, or-
dering the Secretary to decide whether the stepfather's income was actually
available in this case.
The Tenth Circuit emphatically rejected this stance holding that:
To interpret the statutory language "except to the extent deter-
mined by the Secretary to be inequitable under the circumstances"
as meaning that income of a stepparent is chargeable to the dis-
abled child only if such income is actually available to the stepchild
would render meaningless the prior statutory language that such
income is deemed income of the child "whether or not available to
such individual." The "except" language in the statute . . . can-
not be read to excise from the statute the prior clause providing
that income of the parent, or stepparent, is chargeable to the child
"whether or not available." To interpret the statute in the manner
suggested by counsel would require this Court to give a meaning to
statutory language that is at least somewhat nebulous in nature
which would totally negate other statutory language which is crys-
tal clear in its meaning. This we decline to do.' 44
In addition, the court relied heavily on Kolleti o. Hams, 4 5 a First Cir-
cuit decision, which also rejected the argument that the Secretary must de-
termine the actual availability of a parent's income to a disabled child.' 46 In
Kolett, disabled children who were eligible for SSI benefits brought an ac-
tion against the HEW Secretary, challenging the constitutionality of section
1382c(f)(2) of the Social Security Act. 147 The First Circuit held that the
statute was constitutional; however, the court affirmed in pa(t, reversed in
part, and remanded the case to the district court because the 1974 regula-
tions were procedurally defective.'
48
Although the Tenth Circuit relied on Kollet, the court noted that the
whether or not available to such individual, except to the extent determined by the
Secretary to be inequitable under the circumstances.
141. 20 C.F.R. § 416.1185(b) (1980) provides that:
In the case of an individual who is a child (as defined in § 416.1050) and under age 21,
such child's income shall, subject to the succeeding sentences of this paragraph and to
paragraph (c) of this section, be deemed to include (except as otherwise provided in
this section), any income (as defined in § 416.1102(a)) of a parent of such individual
(or the spouse of such a parent) who is not eligible for benefits under this part and is
living in the same household as the child whether or not such income is available to
the child.
142. 42 U.S.C. § 1382c()(2) (1976).
143. 646 F.2d at 457.
144. Id.
145. 619 F.2d 134 (1st Cir. 1980).
146. Id. at 139 n.4.
147. 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(0(2) (1976) (amended 1980).
148. 619 F.2d at 145-46.
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constitutional issue slightly differentiated Kolleti and other cases'
49
from the Hammond case. The court reversed and remanded the case ordering
the trial court to affirm the Secretary's decision.
150
The Tenth Circuit's decision in Kimmes v. Harris 15' concerned the sensi-
tive subject of senior citizens subsisting on a fixed income. The appellee in
Kimmes was a sixty-year-old widow suffering from a heart condition who
received monthly welfare payments of $187.80.152 In addition, Kimmes re-
sided, rent free, in a small one bedroom trailer owned by her daughter.
Kimmes paid the cost of maintaining the trailer. The ALJ determined that
since the rental value of the trailer was $150 per month, Kimmes received in-
kind income of eighty dollars per month.1
53
Faced with these facts, the district court was required to determine
whether this rental arrangement between Kimmes and her daughter consti-
tuted in-kind income. The district court reversed the Secretary's determina-
tion, holding that Kimmes had not received in-kind income. After reviewing
the apposite statute 54 and regulation,' 55 the lower court reasoned that since
no income was "actually available"' 56 to Kimmes, the extent to which the
rental value of the mobile home exceeded the maintenance payments could
not be counted against Kimmes' disability benefits.1'
5 7
Chief Judge Seth, speaking for the appellate court, reversed the district
court and held that Kimmes' living arrangement did provide her with in-
kind income. The Tenth Circuit, relying heavily on cases from other dis-
tricts that encompassed similar circumstances, 158 concluded that the ration-
149. Termini v. Califano, 464 F. Supp. 797 (W.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 611 F.2d 367 (2d Cir. 1979).
See also Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960).
150. 646 F.2d at 459.
151. 647 F.2d 1028 (10th Cir. 1981).
152. Id. at 1030.
153. Id. The ALJ arrived at this figure by subtracting the maintenance costs of $70 from
the rental value of $150. Id.
154. 42 U.S.C. § 1382a(a) (1976) provides in relevant part:
Income; definition of earned and unearned income; exclusions from income; and...
(1) earned income means only
(A) wages...
(B) net earning from self employment . . .and
(2) unearned income means all other income, including . . .
(A) support and maintenance furnished in cash or in kind; except that
(i) in the case of any individual . . .living in another person's house-
hold and receiving support and maintenance in kind from such person,
the dollar amounts otherwise applicable to such individual . . .shall
be reduced by 331/3 percent in lieu of including such support and main-
tenance in the unearned income of such individual ...
155. 20 C.F.R. § 416.1102 (1980) provides:
(a) Meaning ofincome. The term "income" ... means the receipt by an individual of
any property or services which he can apply, either directly or by sale or conver-
sion, to meeting his basic needs for food, clothing and shelter.
(c) Unearned income. The term "unearned income" means all income that is not included
in the definition.
See 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.1102, .1110, .1120 (1981).
156. Kimmes v. Califano, 472 F. Supp. 474, 476 (D. Colo. 1979), rev'd, 647 F.2d 1028 (10th
Cir. 1981). In addition, the lower court relied on decisions dealing with welfare programs, id. at
476, which the appellate court found inapposite. Kimmes v. Harris, 647 F.2d at 1033 n.4.
157. 472 F. Supp. at 476.
158. 647 F.2d at 1033. See Antonioli v. Harris, 624 F.2d 78 (9th Cir. 1980). Antomoh" in-
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ale utilized in the other cases was relevant to the Kimmes case. The Tenth
Circuit held that Kimmes' living arrangement constituted in-kind income
which was actually available to her. "The fact that such benefit is not in
cold hard cash is of no moment. We are dealing here with unearned income
in-kind."
15 9
VII. WORKERS' COMPENSATION
A. Independent Contractors and Parent Corporations
In a significant line of cases, the Tenth Circuit examined the exclusive
remedy provisions of state and federal Workers' Compensation Acts as ap-
plied to employees who attempt to sue a principal employer or parent corpo-
ration for injuries sustained in the course of employment. The court also
addressed various ancillary issues dealing with the accrual of a cause of ac-
tion against the United States as well as with the scope of the Federal Tort
Claims Act. 160
The issue in Arrington v. W'sconszn-Mzchzgan Pipeline Co. 161 was whether
the employees of an independent contractor could recover amounts in excess
of those received under workers' compensation, when suing the independent
contractor's employer as the third party tortfeasor under the Oklahoma
Workers' Compensation Act (Compensation Act).' 62 The plaintiffs, employ-
ees of an independent contractor, brought common law tort actions against
Wisconsin-Michigan Pipeline Company, the principal employer, after sev-
eral workers were killed or injured in an explosion while performing con-
struction work on Wisconsin-Michigan's pipeline. The explosion occurred
when, after the independent contractor's workers built a fire to keep warm,
an employee of Wisconsin-Michigan negligently turned on a valve releasing
natural gas. The natural gas combusted when it reached the flames.163
The plaintiffs sought actual and punitive damages against Wisconsin-
volved an SSI recipient who lived in a house owned by his father. Although the recipient paid
no rent, he did pay the property taxes and maintenance expenses. The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that this living arrangement constituted in-kind support from the recipient's fa-
ther. Styles v. Harris, 503 F. Supp. 125 (D. Md. 1980), concerned a supplemental security
income recipient who rented an apartment from her son for $80 per month. The market value
of the apartment was $100 per month. As a result, the district court held that the recipient had
in-kind income of $20. In Wynn v. Harris, 494 F. Supp. 878 (W.D. Tenn. 1980), the recipients
resided rent-free in a home owned by their children. Once again, the district court held that the
living arrangement constituted in-kind income. In Buschmann v. Harris, No. 78-622 (D. Or.
March 11, 1980), the recipient lived in a dwelling owned by his son. The recipient paid $80 per
month for a dwelling that had a current market value of $145 dollars. The district court held
that the difference between the rent actually paid and the market value constituted in-kind
income. As Kmzmes pointed out, "an SSI recipient who obtains shelter at less than the fair rental
value does have money available which otherwise would be spent on shelter, and . . . accord-
ingly, such savings represents money 'actually available' to the recipient." Kimmes v. Califano,
647 F.2d at 1032.
159. 647 F.2d at 1033-34.
160. Ch. 753, Title IV, 60 Stat. 842 (1946) (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
161. 632 F.2d 867 (10th Cir. 1980). This decision was later cited in an unpublished deci-
sion, Nezhadian v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., No. 78-2059 (10th Cir. Dec. 3, 1980), as con-
trolling in the disposition of that case.
162. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85, § 44 (West Supp. 1979).
163. 632 F.2d at 868.
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Michigan for gross, wanton, and willful negligence in the instruction and
supervision of its employees. The action was dismissed on the ground that
the sole remedy available to plaintiffs was afforded under the Compensation
Act. 164 The workers appealed, claiming that the language of the Compensa-
tion Act preserved their right to sue third parties. 
16 5
In rejecting the appellants' arguments, the court cited a consistent line
of authority holding that a worker's exclusive remedy as the employee of an
independent contractor arises under the Compensation Act.1
66  In
Oklahoma, there is no recourse under ordinary tort theory against the prin-
cipal employer where the independent contractor's employees were injured
while performing labor that was "an integral part of the principal em-
ployer's business."'
167
The appellants also failed to persuade the court that allegations of gross
negligence would bring the claims outside the purview of the Compensation
Act, on the rationale that the Compensation Act applies only to "accidental"
personal injuries, not willful or intentional acts committed by the employer.
The court cited cases holding that willful acts may be characterized as "acci-
dents" 168 if they incorporate an element of chance, that is, if they are unu-
sual or unexpected events. 169 The explosion resulting in the lawsuits against
Michigan-Wisconsin was deemed to be accidential. Further, the court re-
fused to characterize the Michigan-Wisconsin employee's act of turning the
wrong valve on as "willful," because it was not a deliberate act.'
70
In concluding, the Tenth Circuit interpreted the Oklahoma Workers'
Compensation Act as "barring all common law actions against the principal
employer based upon the negligence of its employee.'
7 ' The court also re-
jected the plaintiffs' argument that Michigan-Wisconsin should remain in
the litigation because an inherently dangerous activity was involved, in
which case the principal contractor should be held liable for an independent
contractor's torts. Since no such situation had been alleged in the plaintiffs'
complaint, the court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the action.
172
The court expanded upon these conclusions in Love o. Flour Mills of
America.173 Some employees of Flour Mills were seriously injured in a series
of dust explosions at Flour Mills' grain elevator. The workers alleged gross,
wanton, and willful negligence on the part of the defendants-Flour Mills,
its parent corporation Chickasha Cotton Oil Company, and an insurance
company Houston General Insurance Company-in the maintenance and
inspection of the plant. The court was called upon to resolve three issues:
1) whether the Compensation Act's exclusive jurisdiction can be sidestepped
by allegations of gross, willful, and wanton negligence on the employer's
164. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85, § 44 (West Supp. 1979).
165. 632 F.2d at 869.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 870.
169. Id. (citing Stasmas v. State Indus. Comm'n, 80 Okla. 221, 222, 195 P. 762, 763 (1921)).
170. 632 F.2d at 871.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. 647 F.2d 1058 (10th Cir. 1981).
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part; 2) whether an employer's insurance carrier, joined in the action as de-
fendant for alleged failure to inspect adequately and to warn, may claim as a
defense the employer's immunity from common law tort actions; and
3) whether the employee of a subsidiary may sue the parent corporation for
injuries resulting from the parent corporation's negligence.
174
The court reiterated the doctrine of the Arrrngton case, that claims of
negligence against an employer, no matter the degree of aggravation, are
barred by the Oklahoma Workers' Compensation Act.' 75 The insurance
carrier, here viewed as an alter ego of the employer for the purpose of tort
immunity, could also claim the "exclusive remedy" defense against common-
law tort liability. 176 The Tenth Circuit concluded that Oklahoma does not
recognize any cause of action against an employer's insurer for negligent
inspection. '
77
The court then discussed at length the immunity available to parent
corporations in each jurisdiction. Louisiana considers the parent corpora-
tion to be a statutory employer in workers' compensation cases, 178 and thus
immune from common-law tort liability, if the subsidiary is merely an oper-
ating division of the parent corporation. However, most jurisdictions attri-
bute a separate and independent identity to parent corporations. ' 79 Thus,
in the majority of jurisdictions, a parent corporation will not be immune
from tort liability to its subsidiary's employees. There is one exception: torts
committed by the parent in a representative or managerial capacity are the
liability of the subsidiary alone.1'0 Chickasha, the parent corporation,
would have been liable at common law if its negligence were unrelated to
the management of its subsidiary, Flour Mills. However, Chickasha's negli-
gence involved acts connected with the operation of Flour Mills. The plain-
tiff had alleged Chickasha failed to perform the employer's duty of providing
a safe workplace, or to enforce this duty on the employer. The Tenth Circuit
was unwilling to extend liability for an employer's nondelegable duty of
maintaining the work premises to a shareholder, even a controlling share-
holder such as a parent corporation.18 ' Chickasha was held to be immune
from tort liability under the Compensation Act, and the action's dismissal
was affirmed.
The Workmen's Compensation Act of Kansas 182 was examined in
Fowler v. Interstate Brands Corp. ,i83 to determine when an independent con-
tractor's employee may bring a common law tort claim against a principal
174. Id. at 1059.
175. Id. at 1060 (quoting Arrington v. Michigan-Wisconsin Pipeline Co., 632 F.2d 867, 871
(10th Cir. 1980)).
176. 647 F.2d at 1061.
177. Id.
178. Coco v. Winston Indus., Inc., 330 So. 2d 649 (La. App. 1975), revldon othergrwunds, 341
So. 2d 332 (La. 1976).
179. See, rg., Boggs v. Blue Diamond Coal Co., 590 F.2d 655 (6th Cir.), cert. denid, 444 U.S.
836 (1979); Latham v. Technar, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 1031 (E.D. Tenn. 1974); Foley v. New York
City Omnibus Corp., 112 N.Y.S.2d 217 (1952).
180. 647 F.2d at 1062.
181. Id.
182. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-501 (Supp. 1980).
183. No. 79-1538 (10th Cir. Dec. 22, 1980) (not for routine publication).
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employer. The issue was similar to that raised in Arrington 18 4-whether re-
covery against a principal is limited to the remedies in the Compensation
Act-but the Fowler court's analysis, using a two-prong test under Kansas
law, is more exacting. 185
When a member of the principal employer's maintenance crew short-
circuited the plant's electrical system, the plaintiff, employee of an independ-
ent contractor, was called in to assist the principal employer in making re-
pairs. Before the plaintiff could complete his work, the main electrical
distribution plant exploded, injuring him. 186
The trial court granted summary judgment in the principal employer's
favor. The plaintiff appealed on the ground that a principal employer is
protected from suit under the Compensation Act only if the work performed
by the independent contractor was part of the principal employer's trade or
business.' 8 7 The plaintiff maintained that repairing the plant's electrical
system was not an integral part of the principal employer's business or
trade. "8
The court concluded that under the facts of this case, plant repair was
part of the principal employer's regular activity. Therefore, the independent
contractor's employee and the principal employer stood in a statutory em-
ployee/employer relationship, and the employee's sole remedy arose under
the Kansas Workmen's Compensation Act. 189 The court's conclusions were
buttressed by the fact that the plant's operation required complex machin-
ery and that consequently, the principal employer's staff included a full-
time, twenty-five member maintenance and engineering crew, for routine
upkeep and repair services necessary to production. 90 These factors satis-
fied the two-pronged test that the court set forth to determine whether the
principal employer stood as a third party or as the statutory employer of the
184. See text accompanying notes 160-67 supra.
185. The Kansas Supreme Court had announced a two-pronged test for determining
whether a worker will be considered a statutory employee. If either part of the test is met, the
worker's sole recourse is the Compensation Act. Under the test of Hanna v. CRA, Inc., 196
Kan. 156, 409 P.2d 786 (1966):
1. The work being performed by the independent contractor and the injured em-
ployee must have been necessarily inherent in and an integral part of the principal's
trade or business, or
2. that work must have been such as would ordinarily have been done by an em-
ployee of the principal.
No. 79-1538, slip op. at 6 (citing Hanna v. CRA, Inc., 196 Kan. at 159-60, 409 P.2d at 789).
186. No. 79-1538, slip op. at 4.
187. Id., slip op. at 2. The applicable provision was KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-503(a) (Supp.
1980), which provides:
(a) Where any person (in this section referred to as principal) undertakes to execute
any work which is a part of his trade or business or which he has contracted to perform
and contracts with any other person (in this section referred to as the contractor) for
the execution by or under the contractor of the whole or any part of the work under-
taken by the principal, the principal shall be liable to pay to any workman employed
in the execution of the work any compensation under the workmen's compensation act
which he would have been liable to pay if that workman had been immediately em-
ployed by him ....
See a/so Hanna v. CRA, Inc., 196 Kan. 156, 409 P.2d 786 (1966).
188. No. 79-1538, slip op. at 7.
189. Id., slip op. at 8.
190. Id., slip op. at 4.
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worker.'91 The court affirmed the district court's ruling that both tests were
met, and that the principal employer was immune from common-law tort
liability. 192
B. Workers' Compensation and the Federal Tort Claims Act
Employees of independent contractors hired by the federal government,
as well as individuals entering into the service of the federal government,
may come within the ambit of the exclusive remedy provisions of Compensa-
tion Acts.
The availability of the exclusive remedy provision of the Kansas Work-
men's Compensation Act 19 3 as a defense to a negligence claim against the
United States was determined in Grz/lm v. United States. 194 An employee of a
contractor for a federal agency brought suit pursuant to the Federal Tort
Claims Act (FTCA) 195 for injuries sustained in the course of employment.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judg-
ment. Under the FTCA, the United States stands in the same position as a
private citizen in the suit, and may pursue the same defenses as any private
party under state law.196 The court recognized that in theory, the protec-
tions afforded a worker is substantially undercut because a state may not
require the federal government to obtain workmen's compensation insur-
ance. 19 7 However, the agency contract in this instance required the contrac-
tor to obtain the insurance; thus, the court was satisfied as to the worker's
ability to obtain compensation for his injuries. 198 Since the United States
indirectly paid for the insurance, the court felt that the policies of the FTCA
and the Kansas Workmen's Compensation Act were fulfilled by allowing the
United States to assert the "exclusive remedy" defense. The Tenth Circuit
declined to extend this holding to the situation in which insurance had not
been purchased.' 99
The court then examined the factual issue previously discussed in Fowler
v. Interstate Brands Corp. ,200 whether the contractor's work was integral to the
191. See note 185 supra. The court commented that isolated events not constituting the
business of the principal employer, such as the erection of a building, would not give the princi-
pal employer status as a statutory employer of the independent contractor's employees. No. 79-
1538, slip op. at 9-11.
192. No. 79-1538, slip op. at 12. The plaintiff also argued that his technical expertise pre-
cluded his labor from being an integral part of the principal employer's business, as his work
normally would not have been performed by the plant's own employees. Id., slip op. at 8. The
court dismissed this argument on the facts, namely, that the plaintiff was not called in for his
expertise, but to relieve the plant's employees. Id., slip op. at 9. The court also rejected the
argument that the business conducted must be the employer's main or primary business in order
to be immune from tort liability. Id., slip op. at 11-12.
193. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-501 (Supp. 1980).
194. 644 F.2d 846 (10th Cir. 1981).
195. Ch. 753, Title IV, 60 Stat. 842 (1946) (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
196. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2674 (1976). See Scoggin v. United States, 444 F.2d 74, 75 (10th
Cir. 1971); Gov't Employees Ins. Co. v. United States, 349 F.2d 83, 85 (10th Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 1026 (1966).
197. 644 F.2d at 847-48.
198. Id. at 848.
199. Id.
200. No. 79-1538 (10th Cir. Dec. 22, 1980) (not for routine publication).
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business of the principal employer, in this case "a hypothetical private party
in the position of the GSA."'20 The United States was found to have stood
in the same position of liability as an independent contractor, on the basis of
affidavits and a deposition presented as evidence, and was thus entitled to
raise the "exclusive remedy" defense.
20 2
In Hudburgh v. United States ,203 the Tenth Circuit ordered the trial court
to abate further consideration of an action under the FTCA,2 0 4 pending de-
termination of the issue of whether a Reserve Officers Training Corps
(ROTC) trainee must seek relief under the Federal Employees Compensa-
tion Act (FECA)20 5 first. The plaintiff, enrolled in the ROTC, was seriously
injured during a drill session.
20 6
The court ordered the action to be abated because it agreed with the
district court that the complaint presented the possibility of FECA's applica-
bility.2 0 7 The plaintiff was directed to adopt the procedure prescribed by
the Fifth Circuit 20 8 pending final resolution of his remedies under FECA.
VIII. PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT, AS
APPLIED TO UNITED STATES AGENCIES
In Reynolds v. United States,20 9 the Tenth Circuit addressed itself to the
sufficiency of a complaint stating a claim against the federal government.
The plaintiffs' neighbors had received financial assistance through the Farm-
ers Home Administration (FmHA) to construct a residence. 210 In accord-
ance with federal regulations, 21' the FmHA county inspector visited the
residence several times during construction to inspect and approve the struc-
ture. After completion, the plaintiffs' son was watching the house while the
owners were away, and was poisoned by carbon monoxide gas, suffering se-
vere brain damage. The plaintiffs sought to recover damages from the gov-
ernment for negligent inspection of the house's furnace system.
212
The district court dismissed the action, finding the FmHA owed no
duty of ordinary care to FmHA borrowers' invitees.213 The Tenth Circuit
201. 644 F.2d at 848. Like the Fowter court, the court in Grtffm reiterated the Hanna test. See
note 185 supra and accompanying text.
202. 644 F.2d at 848.
203. 626 F.2d 813 (10th Cir. 1980).
204. 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (1976).
205. 5 U.S.C. § 8101 (1976). See Reep v. United States, 557 F.2d 204 (9th Cir. 1977), which
holds that if a plaintiffs injuries may be compensable by the FECA, the plaintiff cannot sue
under the FTCA.
206. 626 F.2d at 814.
207. Id. The court also agreed with the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiff's petition for a
writ of mandamus, since "mandamus is not intended to be used for unliquidated money dam-
ages." Id.
208. Concordia v. United States Postal Service, 585 F.2d 731 (5th Cir. 1978).
209. 643 F.2d 707 (10th Cir.), cert. denid, No. 80-2064 (Oct. 5, 1981).
210. Id. at 708. The court pointed out that the statutory objective of FmHa assistance is
"the realization ... of the goal of a decent home and a suitable living environment for every
American family. ... 643 F.2d at 710 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (1970)).
211. 7 C.F.R. §§ 1804.3(d)(1), 18 04.4(g)(3) (1980) (current version at 7 C.F.R. §§ 1804.64,
1804.73 (1981)).
212. 643 F.2d at 708.
213. 643 F.2d at 708-09.
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affirmed the decision on other grounds. In avoiding the issue of whether any
duty was owed to the plaintiffs, the court focused on a specific statutory
exception to the FTCA: misrepresentation. 21 4 The Supreme Court, in
United States v. Neustadt,21 5 had held that an inaccurate FmHA inspection
and appraisal is the basis for a claim for misrepresentation, and thus is not
actionable under the FTCA.2 1 6 This position has been followed in several
circuits. 2 7 Finally, the court noted that sovereign immunity waivers must
be construed in favor of the government. 2 "1  The misrepresentation excep-
tion is deemed to include "false representations of any type."'2 19 Conse-
quently, the plaintiffs had no claim against the government, since the court
considered their claim to be one of misrepresentation by the FmHA, and not
of negligence.
22 0
Strict construction under the FTCA also extends to the two-year statute
of limitations. 22 ' In Robbins v. United States ,222 the court determined when a
cause of action would accrue under the FTCA. The test, announced by the
Supreme Court in United States v. Kubrick,22 3 establishes that the plaintiff's
cause of action accrues once he knows "both the existence and the cause of
his injury." 224 This test expressly overrules prior decisions holding that a
cause of action accrues once a claimant knows that medical malpractice may
have occurred.
225
Robbins had developed a skin condition and, as the dependent of an
Air Force officer, contacted a base physician. The drug prescribed for him
caused an additional skin disorder. After consultation with another physi-
cian, he was advised to discontinue use of the drug. Four years later, he was
told the condition could become permanent. He then filed an administra-
tive claim under the FTCA.
226
The court determined that the claimant's cause of action accrued
shortly after his awareness that the drug caused his injury.22 7 The running
of the two-year statute of limitations was not tolled by the minority of the
claimant. 228 "[A] legally cognizable injury will begin the running of the
statutory period . . .even though the ultimate damage is unknown or un-
predictable; '229 hence, Robbins' ignorance of the permanency of his injury
214. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1976).
215. 366 U.S. 696 (1961).
216. Id. at 708.
217. &e, e.g., Moon v. Takisaki, 501 F.2d 389 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v. Longo, 464
F.2d 913 (8th Cir. 1972); Edelman v. FHA, 382 F.2d 594 (2d Cir. 1967).
218. 643 F.2d at 713 (citing Hurley v. United States, 624 F.2d 93 (loth Cir. 1980)).
219. 643 F.2d at 712. See Hall v. United States, 274 F.2d 69 (10th Cir. 1959).
220. 643 F.2d at 712. Set Irzyk v. United States, 412 F.2d 749 (10th Cir. 1969).
221. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (1976). This provision imposes a two-year statute of limitations on
actions against the government.
222. 624 F.2d 971 (10th Cir. 1980).
223. 444 U.S. 111 (1979).
224. Id. at 113.
225. 624 F.2d at 972.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 973.
228. Id. at 972.
229. Id. at 973.
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did not delay the running of the limitations period. 230
IX. OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH AGENCY
In reviewing four actions brought by employers against the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Agency (OSHA), the Tenth Circuit twice affirmed
and twice reversed the agency's decisions. None of the decisions evinces the
level of deference normally accorded agency action.
The Tenth Circuit reversed the Occupational Safety and Health Re-
view Commission (Commission) in Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co.
v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'sst'on,231 determining that the
agency acted arbitrarily232 in finding Mountain Bell liable for a serious vio-
lation of a safety regulation. 233 The reversal on review was based upon the
agency's erroneous allocation of the burden of proof with regard to safety
violations.
234
Mountain Bell sent two employees, a supervisor and an apprentice, to
install telephone lines on a utility pole. During the installation the supervi-
sor, who had not worn the protective rubber gloves required when exposed
to high voltage lines, was fatally electrocuted. Because of this accident,
Mountain Bell was cited for a serious violation of OSHA safety standards.
The ALJ vacated the citation, finding that Mountain Bell did not know of
the violation. The Commission reversed on the ground that the knowledge
of a supervisory employee is imputed to the employer.235 In effect, the Com-
mission shifted the burden of proof so that Mountain Bell had to demon-
strate that the accident was unpreventable.
The court found the shift of the burden of proof to be untenable in light
of the Commission's rule concerning the allocation of the burden of proof.
236
It is reasonable to impute to an employer a supervisory employee's knowl-
edge of subordinate employees' safety violations, if the supervisory employee
has been entrusted with the task of ensuring compliance with safety stan-
dards.23 7 However, imputing a supervisory employee's knowledge of his own
wrongdoing to his principal, for the purposes of demonstrating a violation of
a safety standard, would allow OSHA to establish a prima facie case against
the principal merely by showing that a violation occurred.238 The Tenth
Circuit aligned itself with the Fourth Circuit in rejecting such an allocation
of the burden of proof.
239
In R.A. Pohl Constructzn Co. v. Marshall ,24 the Tenth Circuit partly re-
230. Id.
231. 623 F.2d 155 (10th Cir. 1980).
232. Arbitrary action is defined under the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1976).
233. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.132(a) (1980).
234. 623 F.2d at 157-58.
235. Id. at 157.
236. Id. (citing Commission Rule 73(a), 29 C.F.R. § 2200.73(a) (1980)). This rule requires
the Secretary to prove all elements of a violation. See Brennan v. Occupational Safety & Health
Review Comm'n, 511 F.2d 1139 (9th Cir. 1975).
237. 623 F.2d at 158.
238. Id.
239. Id See, e.g., Ocean Elec. Corp. v. Secretary of Labor, 594 F.2d 396 (4th Cir. 1979).
240. 640 F.2d 266 (10th Cir. 1981).
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versed an order of the Commission and took issue with an unsupported de-
termination by an ALJ of the soil conditions at an accident scene. The
determination became part of the record on the day the decision was ren-
dered, not prior to or during the hearing, and concerned a fact which neither
the agency nor the petitioner had addressed. On the basis of the determina-
tion, one of the charges against the employer was amended after the decision
was handed down. 241' The issue on review was whether the amendment of
the agency citation from violation of one standard to violation of another,
after the hearing had concluded, was valid if not expressly or impliedly con-
sented to by the employer.
242
The Tenth Circuit found that without the express or implied consent of
an employer, no additional standard of violation could be used to sustain
any sanctions against that employer. Such consent is present where the em-
ployer had the opportunity to adequately address the allegations of the
amended citation.
243
The court determined that the ALJ had gone beyond the scope of the
litigation in changing the charge against the employer to one not raised in
the Commission citation.244 An agency's citation must be considered in the
same light as a citation for a criminal offense: it must clearly convey the
charges against the employer so that an adequate defense may be prepared.
A case cannot be "tried on one regulation or standard and decided on an-
other." 24 5 The only amendment permissible is that to which the employer
has consented by reason of having had an adequate opportunity to address it
during the proceedings.
246
In contrast to the Pohl case, the court in P.A.F Equipment Co. v. Occupa-
tional Safety &Health Review Commission247 affirmed the amendment of a cita-
tion upgrading the charge from a willful to a serious violation. The ALJ had
determined the amendment was improper. The Commission reversed the
ALJ's decision on review. In upholding the increase in penalty, the court
emphasized its previous decisions in Clarkson Constructon Co. v. Occupational
Safety & Health Review Commission24 8 and Savina Home Industries v. Secretay of
Labor. 249
241. The employer was deemed to have violated 29 C.F.R. § 1926.652(b) (1980), rather
than 29 C.F.R. § 1926.652(c) (1980), as previously alleged. Both pertain to violations of trench-
ing standards in certain types of soil. 640 F.2d at 267.
242. 640 F.2d at 267. Rule 15(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits amend-
ments to the pleadings to include issues not raised therein if the issues were addressed by the
parties during trial. The amendments are considered to have received the implied or express
consent of the parties. Ellis v. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co., 609 F.2d 436 (10th Cir. 1979). This
rule is adopted under the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 661(o (1976).
243. 640 F.2d at 267.
244. Id. at 268.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 267.
247. 634 F.2d 741 (10th Cir. 1981).
248. 531 F.2d 451 (10th Cir. 1976). The Carkson court held that the commission may in-
crease penalties so long as there is no vindictiveness and the right to judicial review remains
intact. Id. at 456.
249. 594 F.2d 1358, 1366 (10th Cir. 1979) (the Commission's penalty-modifying power does
not constitute a violation of due process).
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In Marshall u. Horn Seed Co., 250 the Tenth Circuit considered the grounds
for the issuance of an administrative warrant to inspect. 25 I An OSHA com-
pliance officer petitioned the district court for a search warrant based upon
unverified complaints from anonymous sources. The district court granted
the application. The respondent company refused to honor the warrant, and
the agency obtained an order to show cause why the company should not be
held in contempt. After a hearing, the district court quashed the warrant,
finding no probable cause sufficient to sustain it.252 The Tenth Circuit
agreed, and proceeded to discuss the level of probable cause necessary to
sustain an administrative search warrant.
253
Neither of the sections in the Occupational Safety and Health Act au-
thorizing inspection of the workplace for occupational hazards requires a
search warrant. 25 4 The Supreme Court imposed the search warrant require-
ment on nonconsensual OSHA inspections in Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.
255
The Barlow's, Inc. decision affirmed previous Supreme Court holdings256 that
administrative probable cause requires a standard less stringent than that
applied to criminal cases. The Tenth Circuit followed these holdings, and
ruled that OSHA inspections require a showing of administrative probable
cause.25 7 Under the Barlow's, Inc. standard, the Secretary of Labor can
demonstrate probable cause by presenting specific evidence of an existing
violation.
258
In determining the level of scrutiny required for an administrative
search warrant based on evidence of a safety violation, the Tenth Circuit
imposed an intermediate standard:
[Tihe magistrate need not have a reasonable belief that a violation
wi/I be found. Nor need he even find it more probable than not that a
violation will be uncovered. . . . [T]here must be some plausible
basis for believing that a violation is h'ce/y to be found.
259
In essence, the court requested that the magistrate assure that the com-
plaint and the resulting search warrant do not rely entirely upon an un-
250. 647 F.2d 96 (10th Cir. 1981).
251. The Occupational Health and Safety Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 657(0 (1976) authorizes
an inspection when an employee believes "that a violation of a safety or health standard exists
that threatens physical harm .... Id.
252. 647 F.2d at 98.
253. Id. at 98-104.
254. 29 U.S.C. § 657(a), (0(1) (1976).
255. 436 U.S. 307 (1978). In Barltowr, Inc., the Supreme Court distinguished the level of
probable cause necessary in criminal proceedings from that in administrative proceedings. The
Court found:
For purposes of an administrative search .. probable cause justifying the issuance of
a warrant may be based not only on specific evidence of an existing violation but also
on a showing that 'reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting
. . . an inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular [establishment].'
Id. at 320 (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538 (1967) (footnote omitted)).
This requirement is different from the showing of probable cause necessary in a criminal con-
text. See Marshall v. W.W. Steel Co., 604 F.2d 1322, 1326 (10th Cir. 1979).
256. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538-39 (1967); See v. City of Seattle, 387
U.S. 541, 545 (1967).
257. 647 F.2d at 102.
258. Id. at 103 (citing Barlowt's, Inc., 436 U.S. at 320).
259. 647 F.2d at 102 (emphasis in the original).
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named source whose credibility cannot be challenged. 26° The Horn Seed
search warrant was deemed insufficient because the affiant simply stated
that a complaint was received and detailed the alleged unsafe conditions.
She did not identify the source of the complaint 26 1 or describe the underly-
ing facts and circumstances surrounding the complaint.
262
In dicta, the court explained that a warrant may also be sought to con-
duct inspections pursuant to a general administrative plan, where no specific
violation is alleged. Such a warrant need not be questioned as to the relia-
bility of its source or the probability of a violation. It needs merely to be
reasonable and to conform to guidelines designed to protect individuals from
arbitrary agency action.
26 3
X. THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION
The Tenth Circuit published two unrelated decisions affirming the In-
terstate Commerce Commission (ICC) in its exercise of authority. In gen-
eral, the decisions upheld the reasonable actions of the agency in any good
faith undertaking to fulfill its congressional mandate.
264
In Graves Truck Line, Inc. v..* ICC, 2 6 5 the Tenth Circuit rendered a narrow
opinion on the jurisdiction, under the revised Interstate Commerce Act
(ICA),266 of federal and state licensing authorities over intrastate carriers.
The Act provides that an intrastate carrier, upon receipt of a state certificate
of public convenience and necessity, may apply to the ICC for registration to
enable it to handle goods moving in interstate commerce.2 6 7 A Kansas car-
rier, Winters Truck Line, Inc., became certified and registered under this
provision, then sought additional certification through the Kansas Corpora-
260. Id. at 103.
261. Id. The source need not be identified specifically, but information should be given as
to whether the source is an employee, competitor, customer, visitor, etc. Id.
262. 647 F.2d at 103.
263. Id. at 100-01.
264. The Tenth Circuit also decided two ICC cases dealing with standards of reviewing
ICC interpretations and grants of certificates of public convenience and necessity to carriers.
Missouri, Kansas, and Oklahoma Coach Lines, Inc. v. ICC, No. 80-1535 (10th Cir. November
10, 1980) (not for routine publication); Pack Transport, Inc. v. United States, No. 77-1967 (10th
Cir. Sept. 12, 1980) (not for routine publication).
265. 637 F.2d 757 (10th Cir. 1980).
266. 49 U.S.C. § 10101 (Supp. III 1979).
267. Id. § 10931 provides:
(a) A motor common carrier may provide transportation subject to the jurisdic-
tion of the Interstate Commerce Commission under subchapter II of chapter 105 of
this title without a certificate issued by the Commission under section 10922 of this
title, when-
(1) the carrier provides transportation entirely in one State;
(2) the carrier is not controlled by, controlling, or under common control
with a carrier providing transportation outside the State;
(3) the carrier has applied for, and has been issued, a certificate of public
convenience and necessity by the State authority having jurisdiction to issue such
a certificate, permitting the carrier to provide intrastate transportation by motor
vehicle; and
(4) the intrastate certificate was issued after, and the certificate states
that-
(A) notice was given to interested parties through publication in the
Federal Register of the filing of the application by the carrier and the desire
of the carrier to provide transportation otherwise under the jurisdiction of
19821
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
tion Commission (KCC) several years later, in order to extend its intrastate
authority and to have the extension applied to the transportation of inter-
state shipments. The petitioners, Graves Truck Lines, Inc. and Santa Fe
Trail Transportation Co., challenged the application on the basis that Win-
ters did not operate entirely intrastate, as required by the ICA provision26R
under which Winters registered with the ICC, and that "public convenience
and necessity" was not served by allowing Winters to transport interstate
shipments. 26 9 The KCC rejected the petitioners' contentions and granted
Winters' application. Based on the KCC's grant, the ICC gave Winters a
certificate of registration, again over the petitioners' objections.
270
The petitioners appealed on the basis that Winters' original ICC regis-
tration included "commercial zones" 2 71 extending outside the state, which
precluded Winters from valid KCC registration as an intrastate carrier. The
ICC, however, maintained that any possible defect in the original ICC certif-
icate was cured by a restrictive order issued shortly before Winters applied to
the KCC for extension of its authority. This restrictive order eliminated
the Commission within the limits of the certificate issued by the State au-
thority;
(B) reasonable opportunity to be heard was given; and
(C) the State authority considered and found that the public conven-
ience and necessity require that the carrier be permitted to provide transpor-
tation under the jurisdiction of the Commission within limits that do not
exceed the scope of the certificate issued by the State authority.
(b) An interested party that opposed issuing the certificate to a motor common
carrier in a proceeding before a State authority may petition the Commission for re-
consideration of a decision of the State authority. On reconsideration, the Commis-
sion, based on the record before the State authority, may affirm, reverse, or change
that decision, but only with respect to the transportation subject to Commission juris-
diction.
(c) The Commission may require, before a motor common carrier provides
transportation authorized under this section, that-
(I) a certified copy of the carrier's intrastate certificate and other appropri-
ate information be filed with the Commission; and
(2) the carrier comply with applicable requirements established by the
Commission.
(d)(1) The Commission shall issue a certificate of registration to a motor com-
mon carrier authorizing the carrier to provide transportation under this section. The
authority granted under the certificate is subject to all other applicable provisions of
this subtitle. Except as otherwise provided in this subsection and subchapter III of
chapter 113 of this title, the certificate of registration may be transferred if it is trans-
ferred with the intrastate certificate. Transfer of the intrastate certificate without the
certificate of registration revokes the certificate of registration.
(2) The certificate of registration issued by the Commission is valid as long as
the motor common carrier provides transportation entirely in the State from which it
received its intrastate certificate and is not controlled by, controlling, or under com-
mon control with, a carrier providing transportation outside the State.
(e)(1) On the 180th day after the termination, restriction in scope, or suspension
of the intrastate certificate, the authority granted under this section to provide trans-
portation is revoked or likewise restricted unless the intrastate certificate is renewed or
reissued or the restriction is removed by that 180th day.
(2) Transportation authorized under this section may be suspended or revoked
by the Commission under section 10925 of this title.
268. d.
269. 637 F.2d at 759.
270. Id.
271. A "commercial zone" is defined as a zone "adjacent to, and commercially a part of" a
municipality. 49 U.S.C. § 10526(b)(1) (Supp. III 1979). ICC regulations determine the extent
of the zone according to the population of the municipality. 49 C.F.R. § 1048.101 (1980).
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from Winters' ICC registration any territories outside Kansas. 272 Addition-
ally, Winters argued that its single-state status was intact as it in fact never
engaged in transport outside Kansas.
2 73
The court concluded that the ICC's intervening restrictive order re-
solved all doubt as to Winters' qualification for intrastate registration under
the ICA.2 74 Thus, the KCC and the ICC had properly exercised jurisdiction
in granting Winters' applications for registration.
275
In Midwestern Transportation, Inc. v. ICC,2 7 6 the court considered the
ICC's application of regular route versus alternative route criteria in the
grant of a certificate of public convenience and necessity. 2 77 The applicant,
Graves Truck Line, Inc., had been issued a certificate of authority for use of
a circuitous route between two cities, and sought certification for an addi-
tional direct route. The certificate was granted in view of the substantial
cost savings which would accrue to Graves in terms of driver time and fuel
expenditures. The petitioners, two of the other twelve carriers authorized on
the direct route, brought an action claiming the application, filed as a regu-
lar route application, was improperly prosecuted and treated as an alternate
route application and could not be sustained under the decisional criteria
adopted by the ICC for proving the need for a direct route.278 Further, the
petitioners asserted that the ICC's decision was arbitrary and capricious and
could not be sustained even if the correct criteria had been applied. 279 The
272. 637 F.2d at 759.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 760.
275. Id.
276. 635 F.2d 771 (10th Cir. 1980).
277. Such a grant is pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 10922 (Supp. I1 1979), which provides:
(a) Except as provided in this section and 10930(a) of this title, the Interstate Com-
merce Commission shall issue a certificate to a person authorizing that person to pro-
vide transportation subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission under subchapter II
or III of chapter 105 of this title as a motor common carrier or water common carrier,
respectively, if the Commission finds that
(1) the person is fit, willing, and able
(A) to provide the transportation to be authorized by the certificate; and
(B) to comply with this subtitle and regulations.of the Commission; and
(2) the transportation to be provided under the certificate is or will be requir-
ed by the present or future public convenience and necessity.
Regular route and alternative route criteria were distinguished in Cooper's Express, Inc.,
51 M.C.C. 411 (1950):
We have consistently recognized a distinction between the measure of proof required
to sustain the granting of an application seeking authority to improve an existing and
competitively effective service and one seeking authority to institute a new service. In
determining these so-called alternate route applications, the essential issue presented is
whether applicant actually engaged in the transportation of traffic, in substantial
volumes, between the termini of the proposed alternate or direct route and is at pres-
ent in a position effectively to compete with other carriers for such traffic, or whether
the new route will enable applicant either to institute a new service not theretofore
conducted, or to institute a service so different from that theretofore provided as mate-
rially to alter the competitive situation to the injury of existing carriers. In the case of
the former, we are justified in granting the authority sought solely upon proof that the
proposed operation would result in operating economies, which, although primarily a
benefit to the applicant, result in an indirect benefit to the public through the medium
of more efficient service.
Id. at 414.
278. 635 F.2d at 773-74.
279. Id. at 775.
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ICC contended that it applied the correct criteria in granting Graves' appli-
cation, and that its decision benefitted the public.
28 0
The court agreed that the application, although filed as a regular route
service application, was prosecuted as an alternative route certification.
However, the court decided that Graves fulfilled the criteria required for a
regular route certificate. 28 ' In affirming the Commission, the Tenth Circuit
relied upon the criteria for regular and alternative route certification, 28 2 as
well as the impact of the National Transportation Policy 28 3 on the regula-
tory powers of the ICC. The court also looked to an ICC policy statement
28 4
that eliminated as a criterion the adequacy of existing services such as those
provided by the petitioners, Graves' competitors. Final rejection of the peti-
tioners' position28 5 was based on the Supreme Court's pronouncement in
Bowman Transportation, Inc. v. Arkansas Best Freight System, Inc.,286 where the
Supreme Court found that the purpose of the ICC, in granting certificates of
public convenience and necessity, is to promote the needs of the public while
balancing the competing interests.
28 7
XI. THE DEFINITION OF "CONSUMER PRODUCT"
In Bell Enterprises, Inc. v. Consumer Product Safety Commission ,288 the Tenth
Circuit considered whether an amusement park ride is a "consumer prod-
uct" within the meaning of the Consumer Product Safety Act.2 8 9 The court
held that an amusement park "Skyride" is not a "consumer product" as de-
fined in the Act.
The case resulted from an accident involving an amusement park ride
280. Id.
281. Id. at 777.
282. See note 277 supra.
283. 49 U.S.C. § 10101(a)(Supp. III 1979) provides:
(a) To ensure the development, coordination, and preservation of a transportation
system that meets the transportation needs of the United States, including the United
States Postal Service and national defense, it is the policy of the United States Govern-
ment to provide for the impartial regulation of the modes of transportation subject to
this subtitle, and in regulating those modes
(1) to recognize and preserve the inherent advantage of each mode of trans-
portation;
(2) to promote safe, adequate, economical and efficient transportation;
(3) to encourage sound economic conditions in transportation, including
sound economic conditions among carriers;
(4) to encourage the establishment and maintenance of reasonable rates for
transportation without unreasonable discrimination or unfair or destructive com-
petitive practices;
(5) to cooperate with each State and the officials of each State on transpor-
tation matters; and
(6) to encourage fair wages and working conditions in the transportation
industry.
(b) this subtitle shall be administered and enforced to carry out the policy of this
section.
284. 44 Fed. Reg. 60,296 (1979).
285. 635 F.2d at 777.
286. 419 U.S. 281 (1974).
287. 635 F.2d at 777 (quoting Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419
U.S. at 283).
288. 645 F.2d 26 (10th Cir. 1981).
289. 15 U.S.C. § 2051 (1976).
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in Texas, which sparked an investigation of such rides. The "Skyride" in-
volved in the case was an aerial cable tram of a type in general use in amuse-
ment parks. The Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) sent a
letter to Bell Enterprises in Tulsa, Oklahoma, requesting information about
a "Skyride" Bell Enterprises was operating in its amusement park. The let-
ter warned that a failure to provide information could subject Bell Enter-
prises to penalties up to $500,000, and also could subject individuals to
criminal penalties. 290 Bell Enterprises then sought a declaratory judgment
that the Consumer Product Safety Act was unconstitutional in regard to the
investigatory authority it bestowed on the CPSC, and inapplicable to amuse-
ment parks and to their rides since, according to Bell Enterprises, the rides
were not "consumer products" over which the CPSC had jurisdiction.
29 '
The lower court held that the Skyride was a consumer product over which
the CPSC had jurisdiction, and that Bell Enterprises' constitutional rights
had not been violated. Bell Enterprises appealed.
292
The court of appeals listed several cases where courts had reached dif-
ferent results on the issue of whether Skyrides or similar rides were "con-
sumer products" within the meaning of the Act, 293 and then looked to the
Act itself for the definition of "consumer product."
The term 'consumer product' means any article, or component
part thereof, produced or distributed (i) for sale to a consumer for
use in or around a permanent or temporary household or residence,
a school, in recreation, or otherwise, or (ii) for the personal use,
consumption or enjoyment of a consumer in or around a perma-
nent or temporary household or residence, a school, in recreation,
or otherwise; but such term does not include-
(A) any article which is not customarily produced or distrib-
uted for sale to, or use or consumption by, or enjoyment of, a
consumer .... 294
The legislative history of the Act indicated that clause (i) was the origi-
nal clause, defining articles produced or distributed for sale to consumers,
and that clause (ii) was added later to include articles dispensed to consum-
ers by gift, promotional samples, or other non-sale distributions. 295 The
court, pointing out that clause (ii) was added solely to cover all manner of
distribution and not to expand the class of articles defined in clause (i),
maintained that the language of clause (i), not the term "enjoyment" in
290. 645 F.2d at 27.
291. Id.
292. Id Se Bell Enterprises, Inc. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 484 F. Supp. 1221
(N.D. Okla. 1980), retvd, 645 F.2d 26 (10th Cir. 1981).
293. 645 F.2d at 27; See State Fair of Texas v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 481 F.
Supp. 1070 (N.D. Tex. 1979), mat.ifd, 650 F.2d 1324 (5th Cir.), vcatd mnn., 102 S. Ct. 560
(1981); Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. Chance Mfg. Co., 441 F. Supp. 228 (D.D.C. 1977);
Walt Disney Prods. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, No. 79-0170-LEW (Px) (C.D. Cal.
April 18, 1979), vcaed ent, 649 F.2d 870 (9th Cir. 1981).
294. 15 U.S.C. § 2052(a)(1) (1976).
295. The court added that no significance was to be attached to the term "personal" in
clause (ii), and that "personal" use in clause (ii) is equivalent to "to a consumer for use" in
clause (i). 645 F.2d at 28.
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clause (ii), determined the definition of a "consumer product. ' 296 The court
disagreed with the CPSC's interpretation, which would have defined a "con-
sumer product" so broadly as to include "any article which the consumer
enjoys."' 29 7 In support of its position that clause (ii) does not broaden the
clause (i) definition of a consumer product, the court cited a District of Co-
lumbia Circuit case, ASG Industries v. Consumer Product Safety Commission ,298 for
the proposition that both clauses, read together, were designed to ensure that
the definition of a "consumer product" does not depend on the mode of
distribution by which an article reaches a consumer.
2 99
The Bell Enterprises court then pointed out that another aspect of this
definition lay in the places and purposes stated in the Act. Thus, a consumer
product is one purchased or distributed for use, generally, in the places and
for the purposes stated in clauses (i) and (ii), 1'e., for use in households, resi-
dences, or schools, for purposes of recreation "or otherwise.
' 3° °
The definition is clarified further by the exclusion in subdivision (A) of
articles "not customarily produced or distributed for sale to, or use or con-
sumption by. . .a consumer." 30 1 Therefore, a product customarily sold "to
an industrial or commercial enterprise which had the exclusive control and
possession of the article in its use" is not a consumer product under the
Act. 30 2 The District of Columbia Circuit had considered this exception
clause in Consumer Product Safety Commission v. Anaconda Co.3°3 Like the Ana-
conda court, the Tenth Circuit in Be/lEnterprses deemed the "separately-sold-
to-consumers" aspect to be a factor in determining whether a Skyride was a
consumer product.
304
Another factor considered was whether the article, when used, is under
the control and direction of the user. The court inferred this requirement
from the inclusion of articles for use in household, residences, or schools, in
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. 593 F.2d 1323 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Flat Glass Ass'n of Japan v. Consumer
Prod. Safety Comm'n, 444 U.S. 864 (1979).
299. Id. at 1328.
300. 645 F.2d at 28-29. The court observed that much thought went into the definition of
"consumer product" in the Act:
It should be noticed that in (i), as well as in (ii), the description changes within each
phrase from one directed top/ace of use to how the article is- used. Since this division or
contrast is evident and was repeated, it is of importance. The "where" element-any
article produced or distributed for use "in or around a ... household, or residence,"
and the "how" element-for use "in recreation, or otherwise," are separately stated.
Thus the articles are those produced or distributed for use (ordinarily) at the places
stated although they may be used elsewhere from time to time. They are articles
produced (ordinarily) for the purposes or uses stated.
Id. at 28-29.
301. 15 U.S.C. § 2052(a)(l)(A) (1976).
302. 645 F.2d at 29 (emphasis in original).
303. 593 F.2d 1314, 1322 (D.C. Cir. 1979). The Anaconda court had held that "consumer
products" are those "customarily sold or otherwise distributed to consumers." They require
more than an occasional sale: "there must be a significant marketing of the product as a distinct
article of commerce for sale to consumers or for the use of consumers before the product may be
considered as 'customarily' produced or distributed in that manner." The Anaconda case was
remanded to the trial court for a determination of whether the article in question was purchased
separately by consumers. Id.
304. 645 F.2d at 29.
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recreation "or otherwise." 30 5
The trial court in Bell Enterprises had decided that the Skyride was a
consumer product because it was used for recreational purposes. In deter-
mining this, the trial court relied on Consumer Product Safety Commission v.
Chance Manufacturing Co.,306 which also involved an amusement park ride,
and on State Fair of Texas v. Consumer Product Safety Commission ,37 where an
aerial tramway was held to be a consumer product. The appellate court
cited a contrary holding, Walt Disney Productions v. Consumer Product Safety Com-
mission,308 where another approach was taken in holding that a Skyride was
not a consumer product. The Walt Disney court had looked to the sections of
the Act 30 9 which require that free samples of the products be provided to the
CPSC, and that the CPSC be able to purchase the product at cost. This
could not apply to a Skyride; thus, the Skyride could not be subject to the
Act.
31 0
The Tenth Circuit in Bell Enterprises agreed that the Skyride was not a
consumer product, but its rationale was different from that used in Walt Dis-
ney Productions. The court looked to several considerations implied in the
section of the Act defining "consumer product:" 1) a "consumer product" is
defined in clause (i) of the section, and clause (ii), referring to "personal use,
consumption, or enjoyment" of a product, is not an expansion of clause
(i);3 1 1 2) a "consumer product" is one used at the places--that is, house-
holds, residences, or schools--and for the purposes stated in the Act, al-
though the latter consideration is not absolute;312 3) a "consumer product"
is one customarily produced or distributed for sale or distribution to a con-
sumer, or for his "use, consumption, or enjoyment; '3 13 4) a "consumer prod-
uct," when used, must ordinarily be in the control and possession of the
user. 3 14 After taking these factors into account, the Tenth Circuit concluded
305. Id.
306. 441 F. Supp. 228 (D.D.C. 1977). The Chance court held that a user's exposure to dan-
ger was an important factor in determining whether an article is a consumer product. The
Tenth Circuit in BellEnterprtses rejected this test, as it is not implied in the statutory definition
of a consumer product. 645 F.2d at 30.
307. 481 F. Supp. 1070 (N.D. Tex. 1979), modifed, 650 F.2d 1324 (5th Cir.), vacatedmem., 102
S. Ct. 560 (1981). The State Fair court concluded that the ride was a consumer product because
it was produced "for the personal use . . . or enjoyment" of consumers "in recreation." This
court, like the Chance court, also held that in the statutory section defining "consumer product,"
the term "in recreation" did not modify the preceding phrase "in or around . . . a household."
Id. at 1077.
308. No. 79-0170-LEW (Px) (C.D. Cal. April 18, 1979), vacatednem., 649 F.2d 870 (9th Cir.
1981).
309. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2066(b), 2076(o (1976).
310. 645 F.2d at 30. The Tenth Circuit Court went on to mention two cases not involving
rides where articles were held to be consumer products. In Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp.
v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 574 F.2d 178 (3d Cir.), cert deuid, 439 U.S. 881 (1978),
aluminum wiring was found to be a consumer product because it is an article produced or
distributed for the personal use or enjoyment of consumers. In Southland Mower v. Consumer
Prod. Safety Comm'n, 619 F.2d 499 (5th Cir. 1980), lawn mowers were held to be governed by
CSPC safety standards if they were customarily produced or distributed for sale to, or use or
consumption by, or enjoyment of, a consumer. 645 F.2d at 30.
311. 645 F.2d at 30.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. Id.
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that a Skyride was not a consumer product, and remanded the case to the
district court for entry of judgment in favor of Bell Enterprises.3 15
Judge Weinshienk of the United States District Court for the District of
Colorado, sitting by designation, dissented. She stated her belief that the
legislative intent of adding clause (ii) to the definition was to expand the
coverage of clause (i).
Citing the Report of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce on CPSA,3 1 6 Judge Weinshienk asserted that the express intent
of the legislators in amending the definition was to extend the Act's coverage
to products principally sold to industrial or institutional buyers, so long as
they were produced or distributed for the use of consumers t.3 7 Even though
true industrial products were not intended to be covered by the Act and,
therefore, are specifically excluded from the definition of a consumer prod-
uct because they are not customarily produced or distributed for sale to or
use of consumers, 31" there are exceptions. The Committee report pointed
out that "[i]f the manufacturer or distributor of an industrial product fosters
or facilitates its sale to or use by consumers, the product may lose its claim
for exclusion if a significant number of consumers are thereby exposed to
hazards associated with the product. '3 1 9 Thus clause (ii), which covers arti-
cles for the use of consumers even though such articles may not be sold to
consumers, adds quasi-industrial products sold for consumer use to the defi-
nition of a "consumer product." Judge Weinshienk concluded that manu-
facturers and distributors selling products to industrial buyers should be
liable under the Act when the products are intended solely for consumer use,
or when consumers are exposed to hazards associated with the product.
3 20
Bell Enterprises was such an industrial buyer "because it [was] engaged in
the recreation industry and it purchased the Skyride from the Swiss manu-
facturer for the ultimate recreational use of consumers.
3 21
The dissent also differed with the majority's interpretation of the statu-
tory language designating the place and purpose of use as a criterion in de-
termining whether an article is a "consumer product. '322 Judge Weinshienk
agreed with the ASC Industries court, which held that the "enumeration of
locations and activities in which a consumer product may be used is not a
limitation on jurisdiction, but rather an assurance of comprehensiveness.
'3 23
315. Id.
316. H.R. Rep. No. 92-1153, 92 Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
317. 645 F.2d at 30-31(Weinshienk, J., dissenting).
318. Id. at 31-32.
319. H.R. Rep. No. 92-1153 at 27.
320. 645 F.2d at 32 (Weinshienk, J., dissenting).
321. Id. Judge Weinshienk did not believe that the court in ASG Industries v. Consumer
Prod. Safety Comm'n, 593 F.2d 1323 (D.C. Cir.), cert. deniedsub na. Flat Glass Ass'n of Japan v.
Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 444 U.S. 864 (1979), rejected the CPSC's position that clause
(ii) expands the clause (i) definition of a consumer product, since the ASG Industries court stated
that clause (ii) covers "products purchased by an institution for consumer use." 645 F.2d at 32
(quoting ASG Industries v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 593 F.2d at 1328). Se text accom-
panying notes 298-99 supra.
322. See text accompanying note 300 supra.
323. 645 F.2d at 32 (Weinshienk, J., dissenting) (quoting ASG Industries v. Consumer Prod.
Safety Comm'n, 593 F.2d at 1328).
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She also pointed out that Chance Manufacturing Co., which the majority opin-
ion cited, stood for the proposition that the term "in recreation or otherwise"
contemplated the use of consumer products in locations other than house-
holds, residences, and schools. 324 Hence, an amusement park could be a
place where a consumer product is used, if it is used for recreational pur-
poses. Also, because the statute used the term "or" rather than "and," Judge
Weinshienk rejected the majority's view that both the "place" and the "pur-
pose" requirements in the definition must be met, that is, that a consumer
product must be used at home or at school and for recreation or otherwise:
"I would hold that the phrase 'in recreation or otherwise' establishes an in-
dependent basis for Commission jurisdiction, and that plaintiff's aerial tram-
way meets this definitional criterion. 32 5
In light of her conclusion that the Skyride is a consumer product within
the meaning of the Act, Judge Weinshienk reached the question of the con-
stitutionality of the Act's apparent authorization of warrantless 'constructive
searches' and of the CPSC's investigative efforts. 326 She noted that the
United States Supreme Court in Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc. held that the fourth
amendment generally requires an administrative agency to obtain a warrant
before entering the premises of one refusing consent to a warrantless entry.
Even if a statute authorizes a warrantless search, an agency still must con-
form to certain procedures to avoid fourth amendment violations: "if the
agency actually obtains process which satisfies the Fourth Amendment, the
searches under the statute are permissible."
3 2 7
Judge Weinshienk felt that neither the Act nor the CPSC's investigative
efforts pursuant to the Act violated Bell Enterprises' fourth amendment
rights, since the subpoena enforcement proceedings "provide[d] the same
check on abuse of agency power as [would] an administrative search war-
rant."'3 28 Like the usual search warrant proceeding, the CPSC's proceeding
incorporated an opportunity for judicial review prior to entry, and the stan-
dard for enforcing the subpoena did not differ substantially from that re-
quired before a search warrant is issued.
329
Finally, Judge Weinshienk stated she would affirm the district court's
ruling that Bell Enterprises lacked standing to challenge the constitutional-
ity of the statutory provisions authorizing civil and criminal sanctions.
330
She commented that the CPSC letter's reference to possible sanctions "[did]
not constitute a threat of imminent and immediate prosecution and hence,
[did] not establish 'real and immediate' injury or threat of injury"' 33' that
would give Bell Enterprises standing to challenge the constitutionality of the
provisions.
324. 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
325. 645 F.2d at 32 (Weinshienk, J., dissenting).
326. Id.
327. Id. at 33 (quoting Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 325 n.23 (1978)).
328. 645 F.2d at 33 (Weinshienk, J., dissenting).
329. Id
330. Id
331. Id
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XII. STANDING AND MOOTNESS
In Mountain States Legal Foundation v. CoSile,332 the Tenth Circuit dis-
missed a petition challenging the constitutional and statutory authority of
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to disapprove portions of the
Colorado air quality control implementation plan. The petition was filed by
Mountain States Legal Foundation (Mountain States), described as a non-
profit public interest law center, 333 and twenty-seven named members of the
Colorado legislature. Mountain States also claimed to represent the sover-
eign interest of the State of Colorado in an ex relatione capacity. 334 Neverthe-
less, the court ruled that in a lawsuit challenging an EPA ruling of this type,
the real party in interest is the state, by and through its attorney general.
The Colorado attorney general did not agree with most of the plaintiffs' con-
tentions; in fact, he intervened in the action and filed a brief "in direct,
absolute conflict with the contentions raised by Mountain States, '335 in
which he attacked Mountain States' standing to represent the state in an ex
re/atione capacity. Hence, the court dismissed the petition for want of stand-
ing. In so doing, the court addressed the issues of mootness and standing,
and refused to extend standing to parties lacking a personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy.
336
When the Clean Air Act 337 was amended in 1977, the 1972 Colorado
State Implementation Plan (SIP), designed to implement EPA-established
ambient air-quality standards for various pollutants, had to be revised. The
amendments to the Act dealt with "nonattainment areas," .e., areas within
states that fail to meet air quality standards.338 Under these amendments,
states with nonattainment areas had to submit revised SIP's by January 1,
1979. States that appeared unable to conform to air quality control stan-
dards in the nonattainment areas by December 31, 1982, also were required
to implement an automobile emission inspection and maintenance (I/M)
program. 339 The EPA claimed the Act34° authorized it to ban new con-
struction in nonattainment areas, and to withhold federal grants and high-
way funds, if a state failed to comply with the air quality control
standards.
34 '
The EPA's ruling on Colorado's revised SIP approved it only in part. 342
The ruling stated that the Colorado Senate Bill establishing an I/M pro-
gram and commissioning a study of the effectiveness of various I/M pro-
grams was defective because it did not create "adequate enabling
authority." 343 The EPA ruling established deadlines with which the Colo-
332. 630 F.2d 754 (10th Cir. 1980), cart. denied, 450 U.S. 1050 (1981).
333. Id. at 756 n. 1.
334. Id. at 757.
335. Id. at 759.
336. Id. at 760-72.
337. 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (Supp. III 1979).
338. Id. §§ 7501-7508.
339. Id. § 7502(b)(11)(B).
340. Id. §§ 7410(a)(2)(I), 7506(a), 7616(b).
341. 630 F.2d at 757.
342. Id.
343. Id. at 758. See id. for a list of the specific deficiencies in the legislation.
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rado legislature and governor were to comply in creating an acceptable I/M
program.
3 4 4
On the deadline date, March 1, 1980, the EPA announced to the court
its intention to disapprove the carbon monoxide and ozone portions of the
Colorado SIP, to impose moratoriums on new construction of stationary
sources of these pollutants in the nonattainment areas, and to limit federal
funds.345 Mountain States then filed its petition for review, challenging the
EPA's actions as "coercive action designed to achieve specific state legislative
action," 346 and as violations of the APA, 347 the first, fifth, and tenth amend-
ments to the United States Constitution, and article IV, section 4 of the
Constitution, which guarantees a republican form of government. 348
The Colorado attorney general, representing the state, disagreed with
most of Mountain States' contentions, intervened in the lawsuit, and filed an
opposing brief. The attorney general maintained that the EPA administra-
tor acted within his statutory authority in conditionally approving Colo-
rado's SIP; that neither the first nor tenth amendments nor the due process
provisions of the fifth amendment, nor the guarantee of a republican form of
government, had been violated; and that Mountain States lacked standing
to represent the state in an ex relali'one capacity. 349 The attorney general did
argue, however, that the EPA's action in withholding federal funds before
final adjournment of the 1980 Colorado General Assembly Session would be
"arbitrary and capricious . ..because the General Assembly was making
reasonable efforts to cure the deficiencies.
' '3 5 °
The court stayed the EPA's enforcement of sanctions until after May 1,
1980, and ordered Mountain States to submit its petition for review. After
the injunction expired, the EPA administrator again imposed the funding
and construction restrictions. Five days later, the state legislature adopted
I/M legislation, which Governor Richard Lamm signed into law on May 23,
1980.35 1 The EPA notified the court that it tentatively deemed this I/M
legislation to be adequate, and that it proposed the legislation's approval as
part of the Colorado SIP.352 On May 29, 1980, the court, upon its own
motion, ordered the parties to show cause why Mountain States' appeal
should not be "dismissed for mootness. '353 The Colorado attorney general
took no position on the mootness question; the EPA urged that the action be
dismissed as moot;354 and Mountain States argued that the issues were not
344. The final deadline, however, was self-imposed by the Colorado legislature. 630 F.2d at
758.
345. 630 F.2d at 758-59.
346. Id. at 759.
347. 5 U.S.C. § 551 (1976).
348. 630 F.2d at 759.
349. Id.
350. Id.
351. Id.
352. Id.
353. Id.
354. Id. at 760. The agency pointed out that although the case would be moot technically
only after the EPA finally approved the I/M legislation, the EPA would act promptly. The
EPA added that it anticipated lifting all sanctions so that no action would be taken under
sections 176(a) and 316 of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7506(a), 7616 (Supp. III 1979).
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moot and "demanded judicial resolution. '3 55
The court first addressed the threshold issue of standing. It agreed with
the EPA and with the attorney general that Mountain States did not have
standing to sue either in its own right or on behalf of its officers, members,
and supporters.356 The critical question was whether any of the petitioners
were "aggrieved persons entitled to judicial review of final agency ac-
tion, ' 357 or had presented a sufficient case or controversy in fulfillment of
article III requirements. 35 8 The court cited Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environ-
mental Study Group359 for the proposition that "injury in fact" is the "one
constant element in judicial statements concerning standing. '360 The Tenth
Circuit's interpretation of "injury in fact" is "concrete and certain harm," 36 '
whether that harm be out-of-pocket costs to a business because of a new
governmental rule, or some other unwanted result of a governmental rule,
which result may or may not include pecuniary loss.
36 2
To have standing, a plaintiff must allege some particularized injury that
"sets him apart from the man on the street," 363 unless a specific statutory
grant of a right of review exists. 36 4 The injury must result from the defend-
ant's conduct, and "must constitute concrete and certain harm. '365 Addi-
tionally, a litigant representing the interests of third parties must
demonstrate that the agency's conduct has adversely affected him or has in-
jured those he represents.
366
The court decided that under these tests, Mountain States lacked stand-
ing because first, it lacked standing to sue in its own right. Mountain States
failed to show that the challenged EPA actions would impair its functions
and activities. 36 7 The organization did not allege it would suffer from di-
minished membership, financial losses, or other consequences due to the
EPA's actions. Also, the court ruled Mountain States could not fulfill the
requirement of section 10(a) of the APA,36 8 which grants a right of judicial
review to persons "suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or ad-
versely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a rele-
355. 630 F.2d at 760.
356. Id. at 767.
357. Id.
358. Id. at 764.
359. 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
360. 630 F.2d at 764.
361. Id.
362. Id. at 764-65 (citing Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Comm'r, 432 U.S. 333
(1977), and Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977)).
363. 630 F.2d at 765 (citing United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974)).
364. 630 F.2d at 765.
365. Id. (citing National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Califano, 622 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir.
1980)).
366. 630 F.2d at 765 (citing Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972) and Data Process-
ing Serv. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970)). The court then examined the standing issue with
reference to the statutory provisions under which the EPA's actions were challenged, and found
that the Clean Air Act calls for exclusive review in the courts of appeals of EPA grants or
denials of waivers to companies unable to meet clear air standards. Citizens' suits, then, are
authorized under the Act when-but only when-the EPA administrator allegedly fails to per-
form a non-discretionary duty. 630 F.2d at 765-66.
367. Id. at 767.
368. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976).
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vant statute . ,,"69 Mountain States had not shown "a sufficient
'personal stake' in the outcome of the controversy" to enable it to sue in its
own behalf as an "aggrieved person."
370
Second, even if Mountain States raised constitutional claims on behalf
of its "officers, members, supporters, and the State of Colorado," T37 ' this did
not give the organization standing. The court quoted Sierra Club v. Morton
372
for the proposition that an organization claiming to "vindicate [its] own
value preferences through the judicial processes" 3 73 must itself have "a di-
rect stake in the outcome." 374 Mountain States, however, could show noth-
ing more than "an indirect stake in the action. ' 375 This did not fulfill the
standing requirement of "an injury in fact bringing the party within the
zone of interests protected by the Clean Air Act."
'3 76
The Tenth Circuit held that Mountain States also lacked standing to
sue on behalf of its officers, members, and supporters. Nothing in the record
indicated that they had "that necessary 'personal stake' demonstrating in-
jury in fact, ' '3 77 since the only resources at stake were membership fees or tax
payments, which in themselves are not enough to confer standing. Nor was
there any showing that their activities within the organization were or would
be affected by the challenged EPA actions. It is necessary, under the APA,
for members of organizations to demonstrate that the statute or regulation
they challenge possesses "some articulable 'cause-and-effect' relation to an
identifiable 'injury' which, in fact, affects them."
'378
Mountain States had requested a court order setting aside the EPA ac-
tions as unconstitutional and punitive toward the State of Colorado. Moun-
tain States had invited Governor Lamm to order the attorney general to
"represent the state's interest in this grave constitutional matter, '3 79 and an-
nounced its intent to represent the state ex relatione, since the attorney general
had manifested no desire to do so. 380 The court described Mountain States'
statements as an acknowledgement that their challenges directly affected the
interests of the State of Colorado; such challenges may be advanced only by
the attorney general who, in this case, refused to equate the state's interests
with those alleged by Mountain States.
38'
The petitioners included twenty-seven named members of the Colorado
369. Id.
370. 630 F.2d at 767 (citing United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (F973) and Sierra Club
v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972)).
371. 630 F.2d at 767.
372. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
373. 630 F.2d at 767 (quoting 405 U.S. at 740).
374. 630 F.2d at 767 (quoting 405 U.S. at 740).
375. 630 F.2d at 767.
376. Id.
377. Id.
378. Id. at 768.
379. Id.
380. Id.
381. Id. The court then cited two cases standing for the proposition that neither citizens,
nor taxpayers, nor other "private attorney generals" have standing to bring derivative actions
on behalf of state or public interests, unless a private injury is alleged. Gallagher v. Continental
Ins. Co., 502 F.2d 827 (10th Cir. 1974); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 481
F.2d 116 (10th Cir. 1973).
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General Assembly. Mountain States claimed the legislators had standing on
the ground that the EPA actions, compelling passage of certain legislation,
infringed upon the legislators' freedom of speech and first amendment right
to vote according to their constituents' wishes.
38 2
The court ruled that the legislators lacked standing to raise these claims,
and cited Lamm v. Volpe 383 as precedent. In Lamm, the court had denied
standing to the plaintiff who sought-as a citizen, taxpayer, and legislator-
a declaratory judgment that a Highway Beautification Act provision 384 was
unconstitutional because it violated the tenth amendment by intimidating
the Colorado legislature into passing certain bills without due considera-
tion. 385 A private citizen, whether a legislator, a citizen, or a taxpayer, must
demonstrate a personal stake in a lawsuit, and show "that he is the proper
party to request adjudication of the particular issue," 386 in order to have
standing.
The Mountain States court concluded by affirming that the State of Colo-
rado was the real party in interest, and the only one with standing to chal-
lenge the EPA action. 387 It also observed that the Colorado Supreme Court
had held that Colorado law38 8 grants the attorney general the exclusive
right, absent a contrary statute, to represent the state in lawsuits to protect
state interests.389 The attorney general, then, is "the exclusive legal repre-
sentative of the state in all [public interest] litigation. '" 3 9 0 Mountain States
lacked standing to represent the state in an ex relatz'one capacity.
The court declined to rule on Mountain States' constitutional and stat-
utory challenges, since the petitioners were deemed to be without standing,
and the state did not advance such challenges.
39 1
Finally, the court ruled that all the contentions raised by the State of
Colorado, as intervenor, were moot, because while the lawsuit was pending,
the EPA finally approved Colorado's I/M program for inclusion in its SIP,
and removed the restrictions on federal funding and stationary source con-
truction. 392 Thus, the petition for review was dismissed.
XIII. AGENCY INVESTIGATIVE AUTHORITY
In CAB v. Frontier Airlines, InC., 393 the issue was whether the CAB had
the authority toinspect all minutes of Frontier Airlines directors' meetings
382. 630 F.2d at 769-70.
383. 449 F.2d 1202 (10th Cir. 1971).
384. 23 U.S.C. § 131 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
385. 449 F.2d at 1203-05.
386. 630 F.2d at 770.
387. Id. at 771.
388. CoLO. REv. STAT. § 24-31-101(1)(a) (1973 & Supp. 1980).
389. 630 F.2d at 771 (citing State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Hallett, 88 Colo. 331, 296 P. 540
(1937)).
390. 630 F.2d at 771.
391. Id. at 772.
392. Id.
393. No. 79-1584 (10th Cir. April 17, 1981), rehearing granted en bane (10th Cir. June 18,
1981).
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without showing that the minutes sought were relevant to a proper investiga-
tory purpose.
Frontier Airlines, a regulated air carrier, is subject to CAB control over
its fares and accounting standards, in relation to the government subsidies
the airline receives. The CAB is authorized under the Federal Aviation Act
of 1958394 to "prescribe the forms of any and all accounts, records, and
memoranda to be kept by air carriers . ..and the length of time such ac-
counts, records, and memoranda shall be preserved. '395 The CAB is also
permitted access, at all times, "to all accounts, records, and memorandums
• . . required to be kept by air carriers. . . and it may employ special agents
or auditors, who shall have authority .. .to inspect and examine any and
all such . . .accounts, records, and memorandums.
' 396
During a routine examination of Frontier Airlines' records, CAB audi-
tors requested access to all the minutes of directors' meetings and other com-
mittee meetings within the corporation. Frontier Airlines refused to allow
CAB to inspect the records until CAB showed "that its request was reason-
ably definite and relevant to a proper investigative purpose." 39 7 The CAB
responded only that its auditors were noting "the occurrence of all major
transactions approved since the period of the last audit. ' 398 Frontier Air-
lines agreed to submit to CAB the minutes relating to records of accounts or
other information reported to the agency, as well as board-and-committee-
approved resolutions.
399
The CAB petitioned the Federal District Court for the District of Colo-
rado, requesting that the court order Frontier Airlines to allow the CAB to
inspect the corporate minutes requested. The district court agreed with
Frontier Airlines' assertion that the CAB's inspection authority should be
limited to the parts of the record directly relevant to the area under investi-
gation. 4° ° The district court stated that to rule otherwise would give the
CAB "unlimited power of inspection equivalent to a general warrant, pow-
ers which .. .the CAB does not have." 4 1
The court of appeals reversed in an opinion written by Judge Logan,
and remanded the case on the ground that no precedent existed to support
limitations on the statutory authority of CAB and other agencies "to inspect
the business records they properly require to be kept. ' '4°2 The court held
that administrative agencies may inspect records reasonably required to be
kept, not only in order to obtain information needed for regulatory purposes,
but also to determine "whether or not such records are being kept, and
394. Section 407(d), 49 U.S.C. § 1377(d) (1976).
395. Id. The Tenth Circuit Court noted that the CAB had exercised its authority under
§ 407(d) to issue "regulations requiring carriers to preserve permanently the minutes of meet-
ings of directors and of the executive and other directors committees." No. 79-1584, slip op. at
2. See 14 C.F.R. § 249.13 (1981).
396. Section 407(e), 49 U.S.C. § 1377(e) (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
397. No. 79-1584, slip op. at 3.
398. Id.
399. Id.
400. Id., slip op. at 3-4.
401. Id., slip op. at 4.
402. Id., slip op. at 7.
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whether or not they are being kept in such a way as to make available the
specified information. '40 3  The question before the Tenth Circuit was
whether the CAB could examine the minutes in their entirety, including ir-
relevant items, or whether it must specify beforehand the portions sought
and the reasons therefor, with investigatory power limited to "portions...
relevant to a proper purpose."
4 °4
The Tenth Circuit Court first expressed its belief that the CAB could
not require air carriers under its jurisdiction to keep certain records, and
subsequently enjoy unlimited access to those records. The intent behind the
relevant Federal Aviation Act provisions was to permit CAB prescription of,
and access to, records "likely to produce material relevant to [CAB's] proper
regulatory and investigative authority."'4 0 5 Directors' minutes, which are
among "the most basic corporate records," 4° 6 do contain material properly
required by an agency that determines amounts a corporation can charge for
its principal activity.4 0 7 Hence, the court concluded that the CAB rule 4° 8
requiring regulated airlines to maintain and preserve corporate minutes was
within the scope of CAB's authority under the Federal Aviation Act. 4° 9
Having thus concluded, the court next asked whether there was an im-
plicit limitation on the CAB's power to examine these records. No such limi-
tation was expressed in the Federal Aviation Act.
4 10
The court observed that Congress had modeled the authority given to
the CAB under the Federal Aviation Act 4 11 on a provision in the Interstate
Commerce Act, 4 12 which had given the ICC similar authority over the rail-
roads.4 13 Cases delineating the boundaries of the ICC's investigatory powers
thus apply as well to an analysis of the CAB's authority. The court noted
that the United States Supreme Court had considered the ICC's right to
inspect railroad records in United States v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad.
4 14
The Supreme Court had indicated that the ICC was not limited in its power
to examine "records it properly required to be kept, including corporate
minutes. ' 4 15 Thus, an administrative agency may inspect records it reason-
ably requires to be kept, not only for regulatory reasons, but also to make
certain the records are being properly kept.
4 16
403. Id., slip op. at 6-7 (quoting Fleming v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 114 F.2d 384, 391
(7th Cir.), cati. den'ed, 311 U.S. 690 (1940)).
404. No. 79-1584, slip op. at 3. The parties stipulated that some material in the minutes
sought was relevant to the CAB's regulatory purpose, but that it was probable there were also
irrelevant items. Id.
405. Id., slip op. at 4.
406. Id.
407. Id.
408. 14 C.F.R. § 249.13(o (1981).
409. 49 U.S.C. § 1377(d) (1976); No. 79-1584, slip op. at 5.
410. 49 U.S.C. § 1377(e) (1976 & Supp. III 1979); No. 79-1584, slip op. at 5.
411. 49 U.S.C. § 1377(e) (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
412. 49 U.S.C. § 20(6) (repealed 1978).
413. No. 79-1584, slip op. at 5.
414. 236 U.S. 318 (1914).
415. No. 79-1584, slip op. at 5.
416. Id., slip op. at 6-7 (citing Fleming v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 114 F.2d 384, 391 (7th
Cir.), ftn. drnied, 311 U.S. 690 (1940)).
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Judge Breitenstein dissented from the majority holding. He believed
that the information sought by the agency must be "reasonably relevant to a
proper investigative purpose within [the agency's] jurisdiction '4 17 in order
for the agency to have authority to inspect corporate minutes. Judge Brei-
tenstein argued that CAB now enjoyed an "administrative fiat" of a type
"odious in both English and American history. '4 18
The majority had distinguished CAB v. United Airlines, Inc.4 19 on the
basis that in United Airlines no regulation required the keeping of the records
sought by the CAB, whereas in the Frontier Airlines case, the records sought
were mandated by law. Judge Breitenstein disagreed with this distinction.
The question, he maintained, was not whether the records were required,
but "whether the information sought is relevant to a proper investigative
purpose. '420 Judge Breitenstein maintained that the CAB sought "unquali-
fied access, an impermissible general warrant."
42 1
XIV. THE AUTHORITY OF THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR TO
CHANGE TRIBAL ROLLS
In Sac &Fox Tribe of Indians of Oklahoma v. Andrus,422 the Tenth Circuit
held that the Secretary of the Interior had no authority to change the tribal
status of certain individuals upon appeal from a tribal committee decision,
four years after a tribal roll became final.
42 3
In 1967 or 1968, the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) began urging the
Sac and Fox tribe to prepare a roll of tribal members by reviewing and cor-
recting the 1937 roll. The roll was to be used in the distribution of Indian
claim settlement funds to the Sac and Fox tribe. 424 The tribe revised the
roll, removing the names of those who lacked the requisite one-quarter Sac
and Fox blood. This requirement was set by the tribe's constitution.
42 5
Among the names removed was that of Susan Nawashe, who, according
to the tribe's business committee, was not a tribe member but was, instead, a
Shawnee married to a Sac and Fox tribe member.426 The tribe's business
committee then reduced the quantum of Sac and Fox blood attributed to
the offspring of those removed from the roll, resulting in the further removal
of the names of several descendants, including the intervenors, Susan
417. No. 19-1584, dissenting op. at I (citing United States v. Morton Salt Co., 388 U.S. 632,
652 (1949)).
418. No. 79-1584, dissenting op. at 2 (quoting Oklahoma Press Publ. Co. v. Walling, 327
U.S. 186, 207 (1945)).
419. 542 F.2d 394 (7th Cir. 1976). In this case, the court held that the CAB did not have
the right of unconditioned access to airline records without specifying an investigative purpose
and making a reasonably definite demand.
420. No. 79-1584, dissenting op. at 2.
421. M. (citing CAB v. United Airlines, Inc., 542 F.2d 394 (7th Cir. 1976)).
422. 645 F.2d 858 (10th Cir. 1981).
423. The roll determines who can participate in the distribution of federally-derived funds.
It does not make those on the roll tribe members for any other purpose. Id. at 860.
424. Id. at 859.
425. Id.
426. Id.
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Nawashe's great-grandchildren, who no longer were deemed to meet the
one-quarter blood requirement.4 27 The committee then sent notices to those
who were disenrolled or who had their status changed, and advised them of
the changes and their right to appeal within a designated time.
42 8
The BIA, through a letter from its acting deputy commissioner, ap-
proved the updated roll in May 1968, in accordance with federal law.
4 2 9
The revised 1937 roll then became final, as did the disenrollment of several
former tribe members, including Susan Nawashe and her great-
grandchildren.
In 1971, however, the issue was revived. The tribe's business committee
passed a resolution affirming the 1968 disenrollment. In September 1972,
the BIA deputy commissioner sent the tribe a letter reaffirming the prior
approval of the roll, but permitting appeals by the heirs. Susan Nawashe's
heirs appealed and, in June 1974, an associate solicitor of the Interior de-
cided that Susan Nawashe was a Sac and Fox tribe member, since she had
been adopted into the tribe, and BIA policy dictated that those who were
recognized as tribe members because of marriage, adoption, or other formal-
ity, before the firm establishment of membership rights, were to be regarded
as "possessing the blood of the tribe with which they affiliated.
'430
The tribe's request for reconsideration was granted. The acting Secre-
tary of the Interior affirmed the Associate Solicitor's decision. The tribe then
sought review in the Federal District Court for the Western District of
Oklahoma, 43 i which affirmed the Secretary's decision.
The Tenth Circuit reversed on the basis that the Secretary's approval of
the revised 1937 role was "final and conclusive."'432 Those whose tribal sta-
tus was changed had been notified in 1968, and had not appealed. Hence,
the approved roll "became the final roll and was conclusive as the the quan-
tum of Sac and Fox blood of the intervenors. ' '433 The Secretary thus pos-
sessed no authority to change the tribal status of individuals upon appeal
four years after the roll became final. 434 The court set the Secretary's deci-
sion aside and declared the revised and approved 1937 tribal roll to be con-
trolling in regard to the allocation of federal funds to the Sac and Fox
tribe.
435
427. Id.
428. Id.
429. 25 U.S.C. § 163 (1976). The applicable provision authorizes the Secretary of the Inte-
rior "to cause a final roll to be made of the membership of any Indian tribe." The rolls must
contain "the ages and quantum of Indian blood," and, when approved by the Secretary, are
deemed "to constitute the legal membership of the respective tribes for the purpose of segregat-
ing the tribal funds as provided in section 162 of this title, and shall be conclusive both as to the
ages and quantum of Indian blood . I..." d.
430. 645 F.2d at 860 (citing a letter from Duard Barnes, Associate Solicitor of the Interior,
to the Sac and Fox tribe, 1974).
431. 645 F.2d at 860.
432. Id. at 861. The court based its decision on the language in 25 U.S.C. § 163 (1976).
The court also commented on the inadequacy of the administrative record in this case. Most
disturbing to the court was the omission from the record of the letter from the BIA approving
the tribal roll. 645 F.2d at 860-61.
433. 645 F.2d at 862.
434. Id.
435. Id.
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XV. AGRICULTURAL ADJUSTMENT ACT PAYMENTS
In Martin v. Bergland,4 36 the Tenth Circuit upheld the district court's
refusal to declare unconstitutional a Department of Agriculture regulation
stating that a husband and wife shall be considered as one person for pur-
poses of payments to farmers under the Agricultural Adjustment Act of
1938.
4 37
The regulation was promulgated as part of a congressional attempt "to
avoid surpluses and shortages in farm products. ' 438 Farmers taking part in
programs designed to achieve this objective receive payments based on a
formula in the Act. 4 39 Because there was public protest against "large pay-
ments received by individual farmers who kept their farms idle," 440 the pay-
ments were limited to $20,000 per "person."'44 1  The Secretary of
Agriculture, following a congressional mandate, defined the term "per-
son" 442 as including a husband and wife as one person.
44 3
Before they were married, the appellants operated separate farms lo-
cated in different counties. After marriage, they maintained their respective
farms independently. Their accumulative entitlements would have exceeded
the $20,000 limit but for the husband-wife rule.444 The appellants main-
tained the rule was unconstitutional on equal protection and due process
grounds, and because it caused a forfeiture of their contractual rights.44 5
The appellants' main argument was that the husband-wife rule denied them
equal protection of the laws under the fifth amendment, since the rule im-
permissibly interfered with the exercise of their fundamental right to
marry.446 Further, the appellants insisted that since one section of the regu-
lation" 7 adequately protected the intent to limit payments, the Secretary's
refusal to regard the two farms as separate, solely because the appellants
were married, was a denial of equal protection.
448
The court decided that the husband-wife rule was not a sufficient bur-
den on the appellants' freedom to marry to warrant strict scrutiny. The
court cited two United States Supreme Court decisions, Zablocki v. Redhai/
4 49
and Caifano v.Jobst,4 50 for the proposition that although the right to marry is
436. 639 F.2d 647 (10th Cir. 1981).
437. 7 U.S.C. § 1281 (1976).
438. 639 F.2d at 648.
439. 7 U.S.C. § 1445a (1976).
440. 639 F.2d at 648.
441. Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-86, 87 Stat. 221.
442. 7 C.F.R. § 795.3 (1981), which designated the generally applicable "conditions in ac-
cordance with which an entity will be deemed a 'person' for purposes of the payment limita-
tion." 639 F.2d at 648.
443. 7 C.F.R. § 795.11 (1981).
444. 639 F.2d at 649.
445. Id. at 648.
446. Id. at 649-50. The appellants admitted that married persons do not constitute a sus-
pect class for purposes of equal protection analysis. Id. But because a fundamental fight alleg-
edly was involved, they urged that a strict scrutiny test be applied. Id.
447. 7 C.F.R. § 795.3 (1981).
448. 639 F.2d at 649-50.
449. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
450. 434 U.S. 47 (1977).
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a fundamental one, not every regulation that interferes with it must be
strictly scrutinized. 45' The inapplicability of the strict scrutiny test in this
case placed the burden on the appellants of proving the lack of a rational
basis for the husband-wife rule. Because the appellants did not demonstrate
such a lack of rational basis, the court concluded that the rule rationally
furthered the congressional interest "in limiting farm subsidy payments to
$20,000 per 'person.' "452 Limiting each married couple to one payment
serves to reduce public hostility against large payments to farmers and farm
households for keeping land idle.453 Also, the "economic interdependency"
of married couples-even those who maintain separate farms-provides a
rational basis for the Secretary's determination that "married couples are a
single economic unit entitled to a single farm support payment. 
'454
The appellants objected to the husband-wife rule also on the ground
that it created an "irrebuttable presumption" that they constituted a single
producer, even though they operated their respective farms independently.
Such a presumption, the appellants argued, violated their due process
rights.4 55 The court rejected this claim on the ground that the irrebuttable
presumption doctrine was inapplicable to the case at hand and, in any event,
was probably "moribund. '4 56 However, even if the doctrine were viable
and applicable, the appellants could not have prevailed on it, because they
misstated the presumption of the husband-wife rule. The rule did not
merely presume that a married couple's farming interests were co-managed;
it also sought to ensure that each economically interdependent unit received
no more than $20,000. 4 5 7 The appellants' "irrebuttable presumption" argu-
ment failed because they did not challenge the presumption that their farms
were economically interdependent.
45a
Finally, the court dismissed the appellants' final challenge, that the hus-
band-wife rule operated as an unconscionable and inequitable forfeiture of
their contractual rights, since it was not brought to their attention when they
signed their agreement with the government. The rule, it was claimed,
thereby "operated as an adhesion clause rendering the agreement uncon-
scionable." '4 59 This argument was rejected on the ground that "Congress has
provided that the appearance of rules and regulations in the Federal Regis-
ter gives legal notice of their contents. ' '4 6 0 Also, case law mandates that
451. 639 F.2d at 649-50.
452. Id. at 650.
453. Id.
454. Id. at 651.
455. Id. The Supreme Court cases cited by the appellants in support of the use of the ir-
rebuttable presumption doctrine included Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632
(1974); United States v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973); and Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973).
456. Id.
457. Id.
458. Id.
459. Id. at 652.
460. Id. (citing Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 385 (1947)).
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"[tihe law in effect when a government contract is made becomes a part of
the contract."'46 1
Patricia Lawrence Barrett
Cynthia D. Jones
Jeffiey S Pagliuca
Kathleen A. Reilly
461. Id. (citing Jackson v. United States, 573 F.2d 1189, 1194 (Ct. CI. 1978)).
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ANTITRUST
OVERVIEW
There were few cases considered by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
in the area of antitrust during the past year. The court considered only three
cases, all of which applied pre-existing law. The issues considered in the
three cases decided were jurisdiction under the Sherman Act, group boycotts
and per se violations under the antitrust laws, and the applicability of the
antitrust laws to labor unions and collective bargaining agreements. These
issues will be discussed in a brief synopsis of the cases.
I. JURISDICTION UNDER THE SHERMAN ACT
In Crane v. Intermountat'n Health Care, Inc. I the court considered the issue
of subject matter jurisdiction under section 1 of the Sherman Act. The Crane
case involved a complaint by Dr. Crane alleging that the defendant, owner
and operator of Cottonwood Hospital in Murray, Utah, conspired with
others to limit competition, restrain trade, and fix prices in the practice of
pathology. More specifically, the complaint alleged that: 1) the hospital
refused to consult with Dr. Crane or to permit members of Cottonwood's
medical staff to consult with him; 2) the hospital required that all pathology
specimens of Cottonwood patients be evaluated at Cottonwood's pathology
laboratory; and 3) the hospital refused to permit Dr. Crane to use either the
hospital or his own laboratory to evaluate specimens from patients of Cot-
tonwood's physician staff members. 2 The district court, before allowing Dr.
Crane the opportunity for discovery, dismissed the complaint for lack of
Sherman Act subject matter jurisdiction. 3 The district court based its hold-
ing on the 1975 decision in Wolf v. Jane Phillips Episcopal-Memorial Medical
Center,4 in which the Tenth Circuit held that, in order to satisfy the jurisdic-
tional requirement of section 1 of the Sherman Act, one must show a nexus
between the defendant's alleged violative conduct and interstate commerce.
A three judge panel affirmed the district court's decision in Crane.5 On
the same day the panel decision was handed down, the United States
Supreme Court decided McLain v. Real Estate Board.6 The Tenth Circuit
granted a rehearing en banc7 to review the panel's decision in light of McLain.
Section 1 of the Sherman Act makes illegal "every contract, combina-
tion . . . , or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the sev-
1. 637 F.2d 715, 719 (10th Cir. 1980) (on rehearing).
2. Id. at 719-20.
3. Id. at 720.
4. 513 F.2d 684 (10th Cir. 1975).
5. 637 F.2d 715 (10th Cir. 1980). For a more complete discussion of the three judge panel
decision, see Antitrust, Seventh Annmal Tenth Cirewl Srwvq, 58 DEN. LJ. 249, 273 (1981) (hereinaf-
ter cited as Swve
6. 444 U.S. 232 (1980). For a complete discussion of the facts in McLatn, see Swrvey, supra
note 5, at 273.
7. No. 78-1346 (10th Cir. Sept. 16, 1980).
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eral states. ... 8 As so aptly put by Judge Seymour, writing for the court
on rehearing, "[i]t is now hornbook law that to satisfy interstate commerce
jurisdiction under the Sherman Act the challenged activity must occur in the
flow of interstate commerce, or, though occurring on a purely local level,
substantially affect interstate commerce." 9 The court reviewed many previ-
ous United States Supreme Court cases and concluded that "for jurisdic-
tional purposes a plaintiff must point to the relevant channels of interstate
commerce logically affected by the defendant's allegedly unlawful
conduct."' 0
Dr. Crane argued that McLain overruled the previous Supreme Court
decisions and held that the plaintiff needed only to allege that the defend-
ant's overall business has some "substantial general effect on interstate com-
merce" in order to meet the jurisdictional requirement of the Sherman
Act.I1 The court refused to accept Dr. Crane's argument and interpreted
McLain as requiring a plaintiff to establish two things in order to meet the
Sherman Act jurisdictional requirements. 12 First, the plaintiff must identify
a relevant aspect of interstate commerce. Second, the plaintiff must estab-
lish a specific relationship between the aspect of interstate commerce and the
defendant's alleged unlawful activities. Therefore, the court stated, "[i]n
sum, we do not believe McLain signals a shift in analytical focus away from
the challenged activity and towards the defendant's general or overall
business."13
Although the court of appeals held that McLain did not overrule the
previous Supreme Court decisions and the Tenth Circuit decision in Wof,
the court did hold that dismissal of Dr. Crane's complaint was premature.'
4
Citing McLain, the court reversed, stating that dismissal of a complaint
should not occur prior to giving the plaintiff ample opportunity for discovery
"unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in
support of his claim which would entitle him to relief."' 5 Applying this
standard to Dr. Crane's complaint, the court held that it could not be said
beyond doubt that Dr. Crane could prove no set of facts to show the re-
quired effect on interstate commerce.
16
Judge Holloway, dissenting, agreed with the majority's conclusion that
dismissal was improper, but disagreed with the majority's interpretation of
McLain. He agreed with Dr. Crane that McLain established that "an anti-
trust plaintiff simply need not make a particularized showing of an effect on
interstate commerce caused by the alleged conspiracy or other illegal acts,", 7
but instead, need show only that the plaintiff's activities had some general
effect on interstate commerce in order to satisfy the threshold standard for
8. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
9. 637 F.2d at 720.
10. Id. at 722.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 723.
13. Id. at 724.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 727 (Holloway, J., dissenting in part).
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jurisdiction under section 1 of the Sherman Act.' 8
Other circuits that have interpreted McLazn have adopted the view of
the Crane dissent. For example, the Seventh' 9 and Ninth 20 Circuits have
held that a plaintiff need only establish a nexus between his activities and
interstate commerce, and need not establish a more specific nexus between
the defendant's alleged unlawful activities and interstate commerce. On the
other hand, the First 2' and Fifth 22 Circuits, when faced with the interpreta-
tion of McLain, have not found it necessary to resolve the issue. Thus, the
issue of jurisdiction under the Sherman Act is still unresolved. What is
needed is a specific mandate from the Supreme Court as to the precise re-
quirements of subject matter jurisdiction under the Sherman Act.
II. GROUP BOYCOTTS AND PER SE VIOLATIONS UNDER
THE ANTITRUST LAWS
In an unpublished decision, the Tenth Circuit followed the trend of
avoiding the use and recognition of per se rules under the antitrust laws.
Consolidated Farmers Mutual Insurance Co. v. Anchor Savings Association23 involved
a suit instituted by the plaintiff insurance companies against the defendant
home mortgage lenders and mortgage purchasers. The complaint charged
that the defendants willfully conspired to boycott the plaintiffs' insurance
businesses. In 1974, defendant Federal National Mortgage Association
(FNMA) promulgated certain regulations providing that it would purchase
home mortgages only if the property subject to the mortgage had insurance
coverage written by an insurance company having a "Best's VI" or a "Class
VI" rating. In the same year, the defendant home mortgage lenders adopted
a policy of granting loans solely on properties covered by insurance policies
written by insurance companies with a "Class VI" rating.
24
The rating system was established by the A.M. Best Company in its
Best's Insurance Report. The A.M. Best Company is the only major specialized
insurance reporting and rating service in the United States. The "Class VI"
rating was assigned to insurance companies having a net worth of at least
$1,500,000.25
18. Id.
19. See Williams v. St. Joseph Hosp., 629 F.2d 448 (7th Cir. 1980).
20. See Western Waste Serv. Sys. v. Universal Waste Control, 616 F.2d 1094, 1097 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 205 (1980), in which the majority stated: "Under McLain it is
unnecessary to establish that the alleged antitrust violations substantially affected interstate
commerce .. " The dissent, agreeing with the majority's interpretation of McLain, stated:
The McLazn Court did away with the notion that a plaintiff must prove a substantial
nexus between a defendant'r untawfld conulct and interstate commerce in order to estab-
lish subject matter jurisdiction under 15 U.S.C. § 1; instead, to establish the jurisdic-
tional element of a Sherman Act violation, a plaintiff need only demonstrate a
subrtantia nexwr between ptataz.§'s busrmas actilies and interstate commerce.
Id. at 1101 (emphasis in original). See alto Bain v. Henderson, 621 F.2d 959 (9th Cir. 1980);
Program Eng'r., Inc. v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 634 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1980).
21. See Corey v. Look, 641 F.2d 32 (1st Cir. 1980).
22. See Alabama Homeowners, Inc. v. Findahome Corp., 640 F.2d 670 (5th Cir. 1981);
United States v. Realty Multi-List, Inc., 629 F.2d 1351 (5th Cir. 1980).
23. No. 79-2260 (10th Cir. July 24, 1980) (not for routine publication).
24. Id., slip op. at 1-2.
25. Id., slip op. at 2.
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The plaintiffs alleged that the policies established by the defendants
constituted a group boycott which isperse illegal under the Sherman Act. In
the alternative, they argued that if the boycott was notperse illegal, it consti-
tuted a violation of the Sherman Act under the "rule of reason." The dis-
trict court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment holding
that the evidence showed no conspiracy among the defendants and, even
assuming a conspiracy existed, there was no restraint of trade.
26
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision based upon
three findings. First, the Tenth Circuit stated that the "[a]ppellants failed to
respond to appellees' affidavits 'with specific facts showing the existence of a
genuine issue for trial.' "27 Second, the court, citing Continental T V., Inc. v.
GTE Sylvania Inc. and its progeny,28 stated that the establishment of a per se
rule of illegality is appropriate only where it relates to "conduct that is mani-
festly anticompetitive." 29 Following this standard, the court held that the
plaintiffs did not show that the "Class VI" rating was manifestly anticompe-
titive. Finally, the court held that it was reasonable for FNMA to establish
such a policy because "it would be impractical for FNMA to attempt to
examine the position of the carrier in each mortgage it considered purchas-
ing. . . . -3 Since it was reasonable for FNMA :to establish such a policy,
the court implicitly concluded that it was also reasonable for the home mort-
gage lenders to establish such a policy because FNMA was a major pur-
chaser of mortgages in the United States, with purchases in 1978 of
approximately 311,000 home mortgages with unpaid balances of over $12
billion. 12
III. APPLICABILITY OF ANTITRUST LAWS TO LABOR UNIONS AND
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
In Frito-Lay, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 7,32 the Tenth Circuit followed the
established precedent that collective bargaining agreements between unions
and management are not automatically exempt from the antitrust laws.
The decision primarily involved the court's interpretation of sections 8(b)
and 8(e) of the National Labor Relations Act (N.L.R.A.)33 and only briefly
discussed the antitrust aspect of the case.
The case involved suits by Frito-Lay, Inc. and L'Eggs Products, Inc.
against the Retail Clerks Union Local No. 7 alleging that a collective bar-
gaining agreement between Local No. 7 and the Denver Retail Grocers vio-
lated sections 8(b) and 8(e) of the N.L.R.A. and section 1 of the Sherman
Act.34 A provision in the collective bargaining agreement prohibited em-
26. Id., slip op. at 1.
27. Id., slip op. at 2 (quoting Stevens v. Barnard, 512 F.2d 876, 878 (10th Cir. 1975) (em-
phasis in original)).
28. 433 U.S. 36, 50 (1977). Seegenerally Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 7-10
(1979); Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1181 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Gough v. Rossmoor
Corp., 585 F.2d 381, 387 (9th Cir. 1978), ceri. denid, 440 U.S. 936 (1979).
29. No. 79-2260, slip op. at 2 (quoting Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433
U.S. at 50).
30. No. 79-2260, slip op. at 3.
31. Id.
32. 629 F.2d 653 (10th Cir. 1980).
33. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b), (e) (1976).
34. 629 F.2d at 656.
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ployees of suppliers, including salesmen employed by Frito-Lay, Inc. and
L'Eggs Products, Inc., from entering retail grocery stores to stock their mer-
chandise. The provision specifically exempted employees of bakery and
dairy companies, most of whom were represented by the Teamsters Union,
from its operation. This exemption from the provision was negotiated pur-
suant to a separate agreement between Local No. 7 and the Teamsters
Union. 35 In separate lower court proceedings, the district court granted
summary judgment for Local No. 7 against both Frito-Lay and L'Eggs.
36
Section 8(b)(4)(B) of the N.L.R.A. prohibits unions from forcing one
employer to "cease using, selling, handling, transporting or otherwise dealing
in the products of"3 7 another. Section 8(e) proscribes collective bargaining
agreements whereby the employer ceases "handling, using, selling, transport-
ing or otherwise dealing in any of the products of any other em-
ployer .. -38 Section 8(b)(4)(A) prohibits unions from engaging in
activities designed to force employers to enter into agreements prohibited
under section 8(e).
39
The district court held in both cases that the agreement between Local
No. 7 and the Teamsters Union and the collective bargaining agreement
between Local No. 7 and the Denver Retail Grocers were both exempt from
the antitrust laws. The Tenth Circuit pointed out that although "lawful
primary activity by unions acting in their own self interests generally may
not provide the basis of antitrust liability," the district court holding was
based on a premature finding that the provision constituted a valid primary
work preservation agreement. 4° The Tenth Circuit therefore reversed the
grants of summary judgment and remanded the cases for further findings in
accordance with the Tenth Circuit's interpretation of sections 8(b) and 8(e).
The court instructed the district court that, should it find the contract provi-
sions violative of sections 8(b) and 8(e), it should explore the possible anti-
trust liability of Local No. 7.
4 1
This holding squarely follows the United States Supreme Court deci-
sion in United Mine Workers of America v. Penningon,42 and similar cases,
4 3
which established that collective bargaining agreements which are not in the
interest of regulating management's labor relations with unions and which
impose anticompetitive restrictions upon others are subject to scrutiny under
the antitrust laws.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B) (1976).
38. Id. § 158(e).
39. Id. § 158(b)(4)(A).
40. 629 F.2d at 663.
41. Id. at 663, 665.
42. 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
43. See also Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen v. Jewel Tea Co.,
381 U.S. 676 (1965); Kold Kist, Inc. v. Meat Cutters Local 421, 99 Cal. App. 2d 191, 221 P.2d
724 (1950).
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IV. CONCLUSION
In the few antitrust cases decided by the Tenth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals during the last year, the court simply applied pre-existing precedent to
new fact situations. The issue ofjurisdiction under the Sherman Act is one
of the few issues in the forefront of antitrust law at this time. The Tenth
Circuit was presented with the dilemma of whether to interpret an unclear
United States Supreme Court decision in accord with pre-existing precedent
or to follow the lead of the Seventh and Ninth Circuits. The Tenth Circuit
opted to follow pre-existing precedent and await a clear resolution by the
Supreme Court of what is required to meet the threshold jurisdictional re-
quirement under the Sherman Act. The Tenth Circuit may be criticized for
not following the innovative lead of its sister circuits, but this Pandora's box
is best, at this time, left unopened.
Charles Feder
COMMERCIAL LAW
OVERVIEW
During the period covered by this survey, the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals selected for publication several Truth in Lending decisions along
with decisions in other areas of commercial law, including bankruptcy and
secured transactions. A discussion of the Truth in Lending cases dominates
this section.
Only opinions selected for official publication are reviewed here. Few of
the decisions in the survey period represent major developments or dramatic
changes in the law. However, a number of the decisions are noteworthy
because of the isolated application of the law or the particular facts of the
cases.
I. TRUTH IN LENDING ACT
Mean'ngful Disclosure
James v. Ford Motor Credit Co. I and its companion case, Hernandez v. O'Neal
Motors, Inc.,2 consider what constitutes meaningful disclosure under the
Truth in Lending Act.3 In these cases the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
considered whether failure to disclose the right of the seller to a returned and
unearned insurance premium is a violation of the requirement for disclosure
of a security interest pursuant to the Truth in Lending Act and Regulation
Z.4 Specifically at issue were automobile installment contracts. The Tenth
Circuit held there was no violation.
In James, the plaintiffs, Colorado residents, purchased a pickup truck
and executed an installment purchase contract, which was assigned to Ford
Motor Credit Co.5 Insurance on damage to the vehicle was part of the
credit transaction. The insurance charge was specifically noted on the face
of the contract and was included in the total amount to be repaid in
monthly installments. 6 Paragraph thirteen of the signed face page of the
contract 7 provided that the seller would have a security interest under the
Uniform Commercial Code in the property (the pickup truck) and in the
proceeds thereof to secure the payment, in cash, of the total of the install-
ment payments. Paragraph fifteen of the signed face page provided that the
terms and conditions on the reverse side of the contract were incorporated by
1. 638 F.2d 147 (10th Cir. 1980), cerl. granted, 101 S. Ct. 3134 (1981).
2. 638 F.2d 153 (10th Cir. 1980), vacated and remandedinpart, cert. denied n part, 101 S. Ct.
3134 (1981).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (1976).
4. 12 C.F.R. § 226 (1981).
5. 638 F.2d at 148.
6. Id. at 150.
7. Paragraph 13 of the contract provided: "Security Interest: Seller shall have a security
interest under the Uniform Commercial Code in the Property (described above) and to the
proceeds thereof to secure the payment in cash of the Total of Payments and all other amounts
due or to become due thereunder." Id. at 148.
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reference. 8 Finally, paragraph eighteen on the reverse side of the contract9
contained an express assignment from the buyer to the seller of insurance
proceeds, including returned or unearned premiums.
The plaintiffs-purchasers sued for the statutory liability and attorneys'
fees provided for under the Truth in Lending Act,' 0 claiming that the as-
signment of the returned and unearned portion of the insurance premium
was a security interest11 under section 4-9-102 of the Colorado Uniform
Commercial Code.1 2 Thus, the purchasers contended that the putative se-
curity interest should have been disclosed on the signed face page of the
installment purchase contract, pursuant to Regulation Z.' 3 The district
court rejected this contention. 14 The Tenth Circuit affirmed, holding that
there was no violation of the requirement for disclosure of a security interest
because the installment credit contract provided: 1) the seller had a security
interest in the pickup truck and the proceeds thereof; 2) the buyer assigned
to the seller any monies payable under the insurance policy including re-
turned or unearned premiums; and 3) the amount financed included the
insurance premium. 15
A superficial reading of James would suggest that no new principle of
law was established by this case. As Judge Doyle pointed out in a dissenting
opinion, however,James represents a distinct departure from the conclusions
of the Third,' 6 Fifth,' 7 and Seventh' 8 Circuit Courts of Appeals that the
nondisclosure of the seller's right to unearned and returned insurance premi-
ums is a violation of the Truth in Lending Act, subjecting the seller to the
8. Id.
9. Paragraph 18 of the contract provided in pertinent part:
Buyer hereby assigns to Seller any monies payable under such insurance, by whom-
ever obtained, including returned or unearned premiums, and Seller hereby is author-
ized on behalf of both Buyer and Seller to receive or collect same .... The proceeds
from such insurance, by whomever obtained, shall be applied toward replacement of
the Property or payment of the indebtedness hereunder in the sole discretion of the
Seller.
Id.
10. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1976). Failure to properly disclose the required information sub-
jects the offender to a civil liability in an amount equal to the sum of actual damages sustained
as a result of the failure plus not more than $1,000 plus reasonable attorneys' fees.
11. 15 U.S.C. § 1638(a)(10) (1976). The Truth in Lending Act requires the disclosure of
"[a] description of any security interest held or to be retained or acquired by the creditor in
connection with the extension of credit, and a clear identification of the property to which the
security interest relates." Although the Truth in Lending Act does not define "security" or
"security interest," Regulation Z provides in pertinent part: " 'Security interest' and 'security'
mean any interest in property which secures payment or performance of an obligation. The
terms include, but are not limited to, security interests under the Uniform Commercial
Code .. " 12 C.F.R. § 2 2 6 .2(gg) (1981).
12. See CoLo. REV. STAT. § 4-9-102 (1973).
13. 12 C.F.R. § 226.8(a) (1981) provides that all required disclosures be made on either:
"(1) The note or other instrument evidencing the obligation on the same side of the page and
above the place for the customer's signature; or (2) One side of a separate statement which
identifies the transaction."
14. 638 F.2d at 148.
15. Id. at 150.
16. See Gennuso v. Commercial Bank & Trust Co., 566 F.2d 437 (3d Cir. 1977).
17. See Edmondson v. Allen-Russell Ford, Inc., 577 F.2d 291 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
441 U.S. 951 (1979).
18. See Valencia v. Anderson Bros. Ford, 617 F.2d 1278 (7th Cir. 1980), rev'd sub nom. An-
derson Bros. Ford v. Valencia, 101 S. Ct. 2266 (1981).
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prescribed statutory liability. '9 The Third, Fifth, and Seventh Circuit cases
viewed the assignment of a returned or unearned insurance premium as a
security interest. Therefore, for purposes of Regulation Z and the Truth in
Lending Act, such a security interest had to be disclosed. Each of the three
circuit court cases ruled that a general provision stating that the "Seller shall
have a security interest under the Uniform Commercial Code in the Prop-
erty (the automobile] and in the proceeds thereof. ."20 was not an ade-
quate disclosure to the consumer.
Injames, the Tenth Circuit found the Third, Fifth, and Seventh Circuit
cases inapposite because enactment of the Truth in Lending Simplification
and Reform Act 2 1 amended the disclosure section of the Truth in Lending
Act.2 2 The language of the amended section calls for disclosure of the prin-
cipal property that provides the security for a loan but does not require a
listing of related or incidental interests in the property, such as insurance
proceeds or unearned insurance premiums.2 3 The Tenth Circuit relied ex-
tensively on the legislative history accompanying the amendment in reach-
ing its holding injames.
The appellate court's holding in James was also influenced by dictum in
Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milholin,2 4 a 1980 United States Supreme Court case.
The Court stated in Mi/hollin that meaningful disclosure cannot be applied
in the abstract and is not synonymous with more disclosure. 25 The Tenth
Circuit thus concluded that the Truth in Lending Act does not require, nor
did Congress intend for the Act to require, the disclosure on the face of an
installment contract of the seller's right to the return of an unearned insur-
ance premium.
It is significant that the United States Supreme Court recently reversed
the Seventh Circuit's holding that an assignment of unearned insurance pre-
miums in a consumer credit installment contract is a security interest for
purposes of disclosure under the Truth in Lending Act. 26 In a five to four
decision, the Court announced a holding identical to that of the Tenth Cir-
19. 638. F.2d at 151-52 (Doyle, J., dissenting).
20. 577 F.2d at 295.
21. Pub. L. No. 96-221, § 601, 94 Stat. 168 (1966) (to be codified in 15 U.S.C. § 1602).
22. 15 U.S.C. § 1638(a) (1976).
23. S. REP. No. 368, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 30, repr nntd t [1980] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWs 266. With reference to amendment of the disclosure requirements of § 1638(a), the Sen-
ate Report states:
The security interest disclosure is also simplified to eliminate the technical disclosure
of the type of security interest taken. When a security interest is being taken in prop-
erty purchased as part of the credit transaction, this section requires a statement that a
security interest has been or will be taken in the property purchased. When a security
interest is being taken in property not purchased as part of the credit transaction, the
Committee intends this provision to require a listing by item or type of the property
securing the transaction, but not a listing of related or incidental interests in the prop-
erty. For example, a loan secured by an automobile (not being purchased with the
proceeds of the loan) would require a statement indicating that the loan is secured by
an automobile but would not require a listing of incidental or related rights which the
creditor may have such as insurance proceeds or unearned insurance premiums, rights
arising under, or waived in accord with state law, accessions, accessories or proceeds.
24. 444 U.S. 555 (1980).
25. Id. at 568.
26. Anderson Bros. Ford v. Valencia, 101 S. Ct. 2266 (1981).
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cuit in James: an assignment of unearned insurance premiums does not cre-
ate a security interest that must be disclosed pursuant to the Truth in
Lending Act. 27 In reaching its holding, the Court pointed to the Federal
Reserve Board's revision of Regulation Z to expressly exclude "incidental
interests" such as interests in insurance proceeds or premium rebates from
the definition of a security interest.
28
Hernandez v. O'Neal Motors, Inc.29 raised the identical issue posed in
James. The Tenth Circuit held that the outcome of Hernandez was governed
by the court's decision inJames.30 Judge Doyle filed a dissenting opinion
based upon his dissent inJames.
3 1
Not all cases involving the Truth in Lending Act turn on esoteric facts
nor on latent disclosure defects. In Yazzte v. Renolds,32 a creditor endeavored
to avoid the intricacies of the Truth in Lending Act and nearly succeeded.
Despite the district court's disposition of the case on defendant's motion for
summary judgment, the Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded having found
well-defined issues of fact precluding summary judgment.
33
Suit was brought on behalf of five plaintiffs who purchased cars on an
installment payment basis from defendant Reynolds.34 The plaintiffs-pur-
chasers claimed that Reynolds violated the Truth in Lending Act 35 and
Regulation Z36 by failing to disclose a finance charge and to express it as an
annual percentage rate when, in fact, a finance charge was imposed on credit
customers.
37
Reynolds' company, Ben's Auto Sales, was engaged in the retail sale of
used cars. Nearly ninety-eight percent of the company's sales were pursuant
to installment contracts which provided for four or more payments payable
on a prearranged schedule. 38 The same printed form contract was used in
each sale to the several plaintiffs. Each contract contained the following
statement: "Buyer .. .having been quoted both a time sale price and a
lesser cash price hereby purchased from Seller on a time price basis. . . the
27. Id. at 2273.
28. Id. at 2271.
29. 638 F.2d 153 (10th Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded in part, cert. dened in part, 101 S. Ct.
3134 (1981).
30. Id. at 154-55.
31. Id. at 155 (Doyle, J., dissenting).
32. 623 F.2d 638 (10th Cir.), cert. dented, 449 U.S. 982 (1980).
33. Id. at 643.
34. Id. at 639.
35. 15 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (1976) requires the amount of the finance charge "imposed di-
rectly or indirectly by the creditor as an incident to the extension of credit" to be determined by
including any of the following:
(1) Interest, time price differential, and any amount payable under a point, discount,
or other system or additional charges.
(2) Service or carrying charge.
(3) Loan fee, finder's fee, or similar charge.
(4) Fee for an investigation or credit report.
(5) Premium or other charge for any guarantee or insurance protecting the creditor
against the obligor's default or other credit loss.
Id.
36. 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(a) (1981).
37. 623 F.2d at 639.
38. Id.
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following property . . ."39 At no time did Reynolds quote to the purchas-
ers two different prices. In fact, the prices quoted as the "cash price" and the
"deferred payment price" in the contracts were the same. Further, Reynolds
did not quote or charge any of his customers different prices according to the
payment terms. Each of the contracts in Yazzie disclosed the finance charge
and the annual percentage rate as zero.40
The Tenth Circuit concluded that Reynolds' single-price sales approach
tended to show that the defendant sought to conceal the cost of credit in
order to circumvent the Truth in Lending Act.
4 '
II. BANKRUPTCY
Retroactive application of section 522(0(2) of the Bankruptcy Reform
Act4 2 is unconstitutional, the Tenth Circuit held in Rodrock v. Security Indus-
trial Bank .43
Rodrock consolidated seven cases44 where debtors appealed from judg-
ments of the United States Bankruptcy Courts dismissing complaints for lien
avoidance under section 522(f)(2) of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978
(the Reform Act). 45 Each of the debtors claimed a personal property exemp-
tion and sought to avoid secured creditors' non-possessory, non-purchase
money security interests in the items of personal property that served as
collateral."
The principal issue in the case was whether section 522(f)(2) of the Re-
form Act applies retroactively to security interests that attached prior to the
effective date of the Reform Act,4 7 in instances where debtors instituted
bankruptcy proceedings after the effective date of the Reform Act. The
Tenth Circuit concluded that Congress intended for substantive provisions
of the Act, such as section 522(0(2), to be applied retroactively-governing
security interests that came into being before the effective date of the Reform
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 642-43.
42. 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(2) (Supp. III 1979).
43. 642 F.2d 1193 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3479 (Dec. 15, 1981).
44. Five of the seven cases were direct appeals from judgments entered in the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado. Two of the cases were direct appeals from
judgments entered in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Kansas. 642 F.2d
at 1195.
45. 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) (Supp. III 1979) provides:
Notwithstanding any waiver of exemptions, the debtor may avoid the fixing of a lien
on an interest of the debtor in property to the extent that such lien impairs an exemp-
tion to which the debtor would have been entitled under subsection (b) of this section,
if such lien is: (I) a judicial lien; or (2) a nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security
interest in any: (A) household furnishings, household goods, wearing apparel, appli-
ances, books, animals, crops, musical instruments, or jewelry that are held primarily
for the personal, family, or household use of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor,
(B) implements, professional books, or tools, of the trade of the debtor or the trade of a
dependent of the debtor; or (C) professionally prescribed health aids for the debtor or
a dependent of the debtor.
46. 642 F.2d at 1195.
47. The effective date of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 was October 1, 1979.
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Act.48 However, the Tenth Circuit was unwilling to apply section 522(0(2)
retroactively without launching a constitutional inquiry.
In reaching its holding that retroactive application of the section is un-
constitutional, the Tenth Circuit was influenced by a 1935 United States
Supreme Court case, Louz'vtlle Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford.49  The
Supreme Court held in Radford that: 1) the bankruptcy power is subject to
the fifth amendment; and 2) although Congress may, under the bankruptcy
power, discharge a debtor's personal obligation, Congress cannot take for the
benefit of the debtor rights in specific property acquired by a creditor. 50 In
Rodrock, the creditors acquired rights in specific property prior to the enact-
ment of the Reform Act, and under Radford, such vested rights cannot be
taken from the creditor for the benefit of the debtor.51 By disallowing retro-
active application of the lien avoidance provisions of the Reform Act, the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals recognized that a substantive right in spe-
cific property, such as a lien, cannot be substantially impaired by legislation
enacted after the right has been created without doing violence to the lien
holder's right to due process.
In re McCoy52 presented interesting questions under the Oklahoma auto-
mobile exemption statute53 and the Bankruptcy Act. Ted McCoy filed vol-
untary bankruptcy claiming a 1977 Cadillac as property physically exempt
from bankruptcy administration under section 6 of the Bankruptcy Act
54
and under the Oklahoma automobile exemption statute. 55 The bankruptcy
court rejected this claim holding that the Oklahoma statutory exemption
applies only to the owner's equity interest in the vehicle. 56 This holding was
not helpful to the bankrupt since McCoy's car was subject to an unperfected
security interest in favor of General Motors Acceptance Corporation
(GMAC). McCoy, GMAC, and the trustee stipulated that McCoy's indebt-
edness to GMAC exceeded the vehicle's market value, that is, that McCoy's
equity interest in the car was zero.
5 7
The district court reversed the bankruptcy court, holding that the vehi-
cle itself was exempt from bankruptcy administration because the bank-
48. 642 F.2d at 1196.
49. 295 U.S. 555 (1935). Radford involved an amendment to the Bankruptcy Act which
preserved to a defaulting mortgagor of farm property the ownership and enjoyment of his farm
and took from the mortgagee rights in specific property held as security.
50. Id. at 589.
51. 642 F.2d at 1197.
52. 643 F.2d 684 (10th Cir. 1981).
53. Id. at 685 n.2. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § I(A)(12) (West Supp. 1981-1982), provides:
§ 1. Property exempt from attachment, execution or other forced sale-Bankruptcy
proceedings A. Except as otherwise provided in this title and notwithstanding subsec-
tion B herein, the following property shall be reserved to every person residing in the
state, exempt from attachment or execution and every other species of forced sale for
the payment of debts, except as herein provided. . . . 12. Such person's interest, not
to exceed One Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($1,500.00) in value, in one (1) motor
vehicle.
54. Chandler Act, ch. 575, § 6, 52 Stat. 883 (1938) (repealed 1979) (formerly codified at 11
U.S.C. § 24 (1976)).
55. 643 F.2d at 685.
56. Id. at 686.
57. Id.
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rupt's equity interest was less than the $1,500 statutory exemption. 58 The
Tenth Circuit reversed the district court and upheld the bankruptcy court's
determination that the Oklahoma exemption statute applied only to the
bankrupt's equity interest in the car and not to the vehicle itself.59 The
Tenth Circuit relied on In re Cummings,60 a 1969 case which arose under the
Colorado exemption statute. 6 ' The Colorado statute at issue in Cummings
exempted the equity value of $750 worth of household goods owned and
used by the head of a family. The sellers of household goods in Cummings
wished to exempt certain goods from bankruptcy administration in which
the sellers had unperfected security interests. The Tenth Circuit disallowed
exempting the household goods from bankruptcy administration. The court
reasoned that to treat the exemption as extending to the household goods--
as opposed to the bankrupt's equity interest in the goods-would have the
effect of giving the lien holder a priority to which he was not entitled.
62
The Tenth Circuit therefore concluded that In re Cummings was disposi-
tive of the issue presented in In re McCqy. Thus, the Oklahoma automobile
exemption statute applies exclusively to a bankrupt's equity interest in an
automobile. If the bankrupt has no equity interest in the vehicle, then the
vehicle itself will be included in the bankruptcy estate for the benefit of gen-
eral creditors.
III. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
The importance of including a description of collateral in security
agreements is emphasized in In re Permian Anchor Services, Inc.6 3 Permian
Anchor Services, Inc. was the bankrupt. The principal issue raised was the
relative priority of two creditors, the First National Bank of Lea County (the
Bank) and Marvel Engineering (Marvel), after the sale of the bankrupt's
assets. The Bank appealed from the district court's reversal of the bank-
ruptcy court. 64 The bankruptcy judge had awarded the Bank the proceeds
on sale of collateral described as miscellaneous equipment. 6 5
The Bank based its claim on a security agreement 6 6 and financing state-
ment. While the financing statement contained a description of equipment
58. Id.
59. Id. at 687.
60. 413 F.2d 1281 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. dented, 397 U.S. 915 (1970).
61. &e CoLO. REV. STAT. § 77-2-2() (1963) (current version at CoLO. REV. STAT. § 13-
54-102(e) (1973)).
62. 413 F.2d at 1286.
63. 649 F.2d 763 (10th Cir. 1981).
64. Id. at 765.
65. Examination of the miscellaneous equipment disclosed: 6 augers, 2 belling tools, I
welder, 4 metal chairs, 2 filing cabinets, I butane bottle, I leased auger, and 4 collections of
unidentified items. Id. at 766.
66. The signed security agreement primarily covered drilling rigs and vehicles. These par-
ticular items were listed in an attachment to the security agreement entitled "Equipment List,
Permian Anchor Service, Inc." However, the equipment list failed to name a single item which
was of the same class as the miscellaneous items. Thus, the similarity of the "miscellaneous
equipment" to a drilling rig worth several thousand dollars more than any one of the items of
"miscellaneous equipment" was remote. Id. at 766-67.
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collateral, it omitted the address of the debtor.67 On the other hand, the
security agreement did list the debtor's address but was devoid of any collat-
eral description.6 The Bank urged that the signed financing statement and
the signed security agreement should be construed together in order to fulfill
the requirements of the Uniform Commercial Code.
69
The Tenth Circuit found the Bank's approach sensible. However, the
appellate court felt constrained to apply New Mexico common law, which
was contrary to the Bank's position. Jones & Laugh/'n Suppy v. Dugan Produc-
tion Corp., 7° a 1973 New Mexico case, held that where an unsigned financing
statement has a broader list of collateral than the security agreement has, the
security agreement controls.
The Bank sought to distinguishJones & Laughlin on the ground that in
the present case the financing statement was signed by the debtor. The
Tenth Circuit rejected the Bank's argument and, applyingJones &Laugh/in,
held: 1) the financing statement was invalid for lack of a debtor's address;
and 2) where the financing statement (which lacked the debtor's address)
listed equipment, but the security interest did not, the security agreement
controlled and therefore, no security agreement attached to the
equipment.
7'
An after-acquired property clause was at issue in Montoya v. Postal Credit
Union.72 Under the Truth in Lending Act 73 and Regulation Z, 74 a lender
must disclose the fact that a security interest covers after-acquired property.
The question was whether this is the extent of the obligation to disclose or if
state law variations as to the limits and effect of after-acquired property pro-
visions need also be described. The New Mexico Uniform Commercial Code
provides that a security interest including after-acquired property covers
only such property acquired by the borrower within ten days after the lender
"gives value." 75
Although the lender in Montoya stated that the security interest covered
after-acquired property, the plaintiffs brought suit alleging that the lender's
failure to disclose the ten-day limitation imposed by state law was a violation
of the Truth in Lending Act and Regulation Z. 76 The Tenth Circuit found
the plaintiffs' assertion untenable and held that in a consumer loan transac-
tion, the disclosure that "[t]he Security Agreement secures further advances
and covers after-acquired property . . .77 is sufficient. The appellate court
also pointed out that state laws are part of a contract whether or not they are
67. Id. at 765.
68. Id.
69. See N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 55-9-203 to -204 (1978).
70. 85 N.M. 51, 508 P.2d 1348 (1973).
71. 649 F.2d at 766.
72. 630 F.2d 745 (10th Cir. 1980).
73. 15 U.S.C. § 1639(a)(8) (1976).
74. 12 C.F.R. § 226.8(b)(5) (1981).
75. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 55-9-204(4)(b) (1978).
76. 630 F.2d at 746.
77. Id.
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referred to in the agreement.78
IV. CASE DIGESTS
In Solomon v. Pendaries Properties, Inc., 79 the purchasers of land in a New
Mexico development, Pendaries Village, sued the developer and its successor
for rescission of the land purchase contract. The Solomons' dissatisfaction
with their purchase of a lot arose from the failure of the developer, Pendaries
Properties, Inc. (PPI), to construct all the amenities it had represented would
be a part of the completed development.8 0 The purchasers sought rescission,
alleging fraud or intentional misrepresentation on the part of the devel-
oper. 8 ' The defendant, PPI, contended that the evidence was insufficient to
establish fraud or misrepresentation under either the Interstate Land Sales
Full Disclosure Act (the Land Sales Act)82 or the common law of New
Mexico.
Following a nonjury trial, the district court granted rescission to the
purchasers. 83 The Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that the Land Sales Act
as it existed at the time of this transaction 84 did not confer a cause of action
for the developer's failure to perform acts that, at the time of sale, it intended
in good faith to carry out.85 The appellate court also concluded that the
purchasers failed to prove a cause of action under the common law. New
78. Id. at 748 (citing Farmers Bank v. Federal Reserve Bank, 262 U.S. 649 (1923); Von
Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 535 (1866)).
79. 623 F.2d 602 (10th Cir. 1980).
80. Id. at 602. In 1973, when the Solomons purchased land in Pendaries Village, the devel-
opment had a lodge, a swimming pool with cabana, and a twelve-hole golf course. The Solo-
mons received from PPI a report, as required by the Land Sales Act, and several other
communications describing the improvements of the completed project. The district court
found that PPI had represented in the property report that by December 1975 it would build
ten new lakes and ponds, an additional nine-hole golf course, eight tennis courts, a golf course
club house and pro shop, a security system, a saddle club area, a main lodge with additional
recreational facilities including a second swimming pool, camp-grounds, a complete water sys-
tem, and streets built to certain specifications. By the end of 1975, PPI had constructed two or
three ponds, the nine-hole golf course, two tennis courts, the golf pro shop, a partial security
system, some horse-riding facilities, a partial water system, and streets not built to specifications.
Id. at 603.
81. Id.
82. 15 U.S.C. § 1703 (1976).
83. 623 F.2d at 602.
84. 15 U.S.C. § 1703 (1976), as it existed at the time of this transaction, provided:
(a). It shall be unlawful for any developer or agent, directly or indirectly, to
make use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in inter-
state commerce, or of the mails--(l) to sell or lease any lot in any subdivision unless a
statement of record with respect to such lot is in effect in accordance with section 1407
[1706] of this title and a printed property report, meeting the requirements of section
1408 [1707] of this title, is furnished to the purchaser in advance of the signing of any
contract or agreement for sale or lease by the purchaser; and (2) in selling or leasing, or
offering to sell or lease, any lot in a subdivision-(A) to employ any device, scheme, or
artifice to defraud, or (B) to obtain money or property by means of a material misrep-
resentation with respect to any information included in the statement of record or the
property report or with respect to any other information pertinent to the lot or the
subdivision and upon which the purchaser relies ....
Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, Pub. L. No. 90-448, tit. XIV, § 1404, 82 Stat. 591
(1968) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1703 (1976)).
85. 623 F.2d at 604 (emphasis in original). The appellate court's review of the record
found no evidence from which to infer a fraudulent intent on th" part of the developer at the
time of sale.
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Mexico follows the general rule that a representation of future events is not
actionable fraud except when there is a misstatement of present intent.86 In
Solomon, there was no misstatement of present intent .
7
The Tenth Circuit also discussed the 1979 Congressional amendment to
section 1703 of the Land Sales Act. Although the amended language did not
control the transaction in Solomon, it added support to the court's decision.
Congress amended section 1703 in recognition of the problems created when
developers become bankrupt before completing promised amenities. 88 The
amendment provides a contractual basis for relief when roads, utilities, and
recreational amenities are not in fact completed by developers. The legisla-
tive history accompanying passage of the amendment explained that when-
ever a developer represents orally or in writing that roads, sewers, water or
electric service, or recreational amenities will be provided or completed by
the developer, the contract of sale or lease must stipulate that such services
or amenities will be provided or completed. 89 Under the amended Land
Sales Act, purchasers of land will have a statutory basis for suing a developer
if the land purchase contract fails to reflect the representations that were
made.
Southwestern Stationeg & Bank Supply, Inc. v. Harris Corp.9° dealt with an
acceptance clause in a purchase order. Southwestern wanted to purchase a
used printing press from Harris. Following a series of pre-offer contacts,
Harris sent Southwestern several copies of a Harris purchase order and also
-supplied instructions for submitting the order. 9' Southwestern completed
the purchase order and returned four copies to Harris, with a down payment
check and an irrevocable letter of credit for the balance of the purchase
price. Subsequently, Harris notified Southwestern that the third party own-
er of the used press would not release possession. Harris returned the un-
cashed check, the letter of credit, and three copies of the purchase order,
none of which bore any Harris notation of acceptance. 92 Southwestern then
purchased a comparable new printing press and instituted an action against
Harris for breach of the sales contract.
The case turned on the meaning of the acceptance clause language
printed on the back of the Harris purchase order. 93 Southwestern argued
that the method of acceptance was not made explicit by the document and,
86. Id. at 605 (citing Telman v. Galles, 41 N.M. 56, 63 P.2d 1049 (1936); W. PROSSER,
THE LAW OF TORTS § 109, at 728-31 (4th ed. 1971)).
87. 623 F.2d at 604.
88. Id.
89. H.R. REP. No. 154, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 36, repnnnIedi'n [1979] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2317, 2351-52.
90. 624 F.2d 168 (10th Cir. 1980).
91. Id. at 169.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 169-70. The acceptance clause read:
This order is subject to acceptance by Seller at its home office written herein. There-
upon, Seller shall mail to Purchaser a signed duplicate copy hereof, and the same shall
constitute the entire contract between the parties, which shall be changed only by
written agreement of the parties.
In addition, the purchase order included, on its face, the following signature block: "This order
is hereby accepted and dated at Seller's Cleveland, Ohio, Office on - HARRIS CORPO-
RATION, a Delaware Corporation Sheet Fed Press Division, Seller By -. "
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therefore, pursuant to section 2-206 of the Uniform Commercial Code, any
"reasonable manner of acceptance" would suffice. 94
Following a jury verdict for Southwestern, the district court entered a
judgment notwithstanding the verdict for Harris.9 5 The Tenth Circuit af-
firmed, holding that the seller's purchase order, which provided that the or-
der was "subject to acceptance by Seller" and that "Seller shall mail to
Purchaser a signed duplicate copy hereof, and the same shall constitute the
entire contract between the parties" 96 unambiguously indicated the method
of acceptance, and thus, in the absence of a written acceptance by the seller
(Harris), there was no contract for sale of the printing press.
97
Harrs reaffirms the time-honored rule that parties to a contract retain
the power to require specific methods of acceptance. Moreover, as the Tenth
Circuit pointed out, any well-trained lawyer can create ambiguities in inter-
preting even the most straightforward sentences. However, ambiguity does
not exist merely because care must be exercised in reading contract provi-
sions. The appellate court concluded that the language of the contract was
susceptible to only one reasonable interpretation: the signature block of the
purchase order clearly required signature by Harris for the contract to be
accepted. Since Harris unambiguously indicated the method of acceptance,
the other party was foreclosed from pointing to evidence that would estab-
lish any other "reasonable manner of acceptance" under section 2-206 of the
Uniform Commercial Code. 98
Steven W. Sackman
94. U.C.C. § 2-206 (adopted in Oklahoma as OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 2-206 (West
1971)).
95. 624 F.2d at 170.
96. Id. at 169-70.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 170.
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OVERVIEW
During the period covered by this survey, most of the constitutional law
and civil rights cases considered by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals were
discrimination actions brought under either section 1983 of the Civil Rights
Act of 1871 or Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Some of the other
topics dealt with by the court were age discrimination, Indian rights, prison-
ers' rights, drug paraphernalia, ballot access, religious freedom, and the
supremacy clause.
I. THE POST-CIVIL WAR CIVIL RIGHTS ACTS
A. 42 US C Sections 1981 and 1982
1. The Prima Facie Case
Houston v. Benttree, Ltd I involved claims under sections 19812 and 19823
of the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1870 arising out of alleged racial dis-
crimination in the sale of a house. The Tenth Circuit reviewed the five ele-
ments of a prima facie case under the two sections: 1) the owner placed the
property on the open market; 2) the plaintiff was willing and able to buy on
the owner's terms; 3) the plaintiff so advised the owner; 4) the owner refused
to sell; and 5) there was no apparent reason for the refusal other than the
plaintiff's race.4 Because the court found nothing in the record to show that
the plaintiff was treated any differently from other prospective buyers, the
court found there was no violation.
2. Discriminatory Intent
The court in Denny v. Hutchinson Sales Corp. 5 was faced with the question
of whether discriminatory intent is necessary in an action based upon section
1982. In Chicano Police Officer's Association v. Stover6 the court had held that,
under sections 1981, 1983, and 1985, actions are not unlawful solely because
they produce a disproportionate impact; discriminatory intent is required.
In Denny, the court held that, because section 1982 is phrased in a manner
similar to section 1981 and because both statutes have a common genesis,
Congress must have intended each to incorporate the same intent
requirement. 7
1. 637 F.2d 739 (10th Cir. 1980), cert died, 101 S. Ct. 2018 (1981).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976).
3. Id. § 1982.
4. 637 F.2d at 741. See Duckett v. Silberman, 568 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1978); Bush v.
Kaim, 297 F. Supp. 151 (N.D. Ohio 1969).
5. 649 F.2d 816 (10th Cir. 1981).
6. 552 F.2d 918 (10th Cir. 1977).
7. 649 F.2d at 822.
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3. Statute of Limitations
In Denny v. Hutchinson Sales Corp., the court was also faced with the ques-
tion of the applicable statute of limitations under section 1982.8 The court
looked to the state statutes, but did not decide which statute was applicable
because none of the potentially applicable statutes would have precluded the
plaintiff's action.9
In Shah v. Halliburton Co. ,1 the court had to determine the applicable
statute of limitations for a section 1981 action in Oklahoma. Under Johnson
v. Railway Express, Inc. ," since there is no stated statute of limitations, the
controlling period would ordinarily be the most appropriate one provided by
state law. The trial court had applied the two-year statute of limitations for
tort actions, rather than the three-year statutes for actions based upon con-
tracts or actions based upon liability created by statute. The court of ap-
peals recognized that various courts have applied the three different statutes
in section 1981 actions, but held that where there is a substantial question
over which of conflicting statutes of limitations should apply, the court
should as a matter of policy apply the longer, particularly in civil rights
actions. 12
B. 42 U.SC Section 1983
1. Basis for Liability-Protected Rights
In McGhee v. Draper,'3 the defendants were past and present members of
an Oklahoma school board who had declined to renew the contract of the
plaintiff, a non-tenured teacher. The plaintiff brought suit under section
1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 187114 asserting that she had not been
granted a hearing and thus had been denied procedural due process. She
sought reinstatement with back pay, damages, and attorneys fees. The
Tenth Circuit had previously held that the plaintiff had shown no entitle-
ment to the position and hence had no protected property interest.' 5 The
court in the previous appeal had also instructed the district court to hold
new proceedings to determine whether the discharge infringed the plaintiff's
liberty interest and, if so, to consider proper equitable relief for the denial of
procedural due process. The district court, on remand, did not conduct a
new trial, but decided that the only available remedy was a hearing before
the school board. Because the plaintiff had not requested such a hearing, the
trial court dismissed the action.
In the instant appeal, the court of appeals held that, if the plaintiff
could show that the non-renewal of her contract caused or enhanced her
alleged reputational damage, she would have shown that she was entitled to
8. Id. at 816.
9. Id. at 820.
10. 627 F.2d 1055 (10th Cir. 1980).
11. 421 U.S. 454 (1975).
12. 627 F.2d at 1059.
13. 639 F.2d 639 (10th Cir. 1981).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
15. McGhee v. Draper, 564 F.2d 902 (10th Cir. 1977).
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a hearing or other reasonable opportunity to clear her name. The court held
that it is the character of the charges, not their truthfulness, that determines
whether the plaintiff was deprived of a liberty interest.' 6
In Maor v. Benton, ' 7 the court was faced with the question of whether
negligent conduct could support a section 1983 action. This action was
brought by the survivors of an Oklahoma state prisoner who died in a cave-
in of a sewer ditch. The plaintiffs alleged that the deceased was deprived of
life without due process of law because the state had not formulated proper
safety standards. At the time of this appeal, the United States Supreme
Court had twice been presented with this question, but on both occasions
had found its resolution unnecessary.' 8 The court of appeals held that the
allegation was of a simple tort, rather than a constitutional violation, and
therefore, it could not support a section 1983 action.' 9
Since Mabr was decided, the United States Supreme Court, in Parralt v.
Taylor,20 held that the negligent loss by prison officials of hobby materials a
prisoner had ordered by mail did not deprive the inmate of property without
due process of law for the purposes of section 1983. The Court stated that
other remedies, in this case state tort claims procedures, were sufficient to
satisfy the requirements of due process. 2 ' Although Justice Blackmun, in a
concurring opinion,22 stated that he did not understand the Court's opinion
to apply to deprivations of life or liberty, there is no logical reason why a
different analysis should be used in such cases. Consequently, cases such as
Major should fall under the holding in Parrall v. Taylor (in accord with the
Tenth Circuit view).
In Brown v. B'gger,23 the court in a per curiam opinion held that trivial
or frivolous invasions of personal rights are not cognizable under section
1983. The plaintiff was an inmate at the Kansas State Penitentiary who
brought suit against prison guards and officials for forcibly putting him into
bed while he was at a hospital for treatment of stab wounds. This treatment,
he argued, constituted cruel and unusual punishment. The court
disagreed.
24
Zamora v. Pomeroy2 5 involved a warrantless search of a school locker dur-
ing a general investigation that yielded marijuana. The student plaintiff
brought a 1983 action alleging that the search and the use of "sniffer" dogs
16. 639 F.2d at 643.
17. 647 F.2d 110 (10th Cir. 1981).
18. Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137 (1979); Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978).
19. 647 F.2d at 113. S&ealso Tucker v. Harper, No. 80-1350 (10th Cir. April 10, 1981) (not
for routine publication), in which the defendants were court reporters who allegedly prepared
incomplete transcripts resulting, according to the plaintiff, in a denial of due process. Because
the allegations were no more than claims of professional malpractice, the trial court's dismissal
was affirmed.
20. 101 S. Ct. 1908 (1981).
21. Id. at 1917.
22. Id. at 1918 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
23. 622 F.2d 1025 (10th Cir. 1980) (per curiam).
24. Id. at 1027. See also Bradenburg v. Maschner, No. 79-2294 (10th Cir. Oct 10, 1980)
(not for routine publication), in which the court rejected a § 1983 action claiming cruel and
unusual punishment of an inmate who had been forced to get a haircut.
25. 639 F.2d 662 (10th Cir. 1981).
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were unlawful, and that a warrant was required in order to open the locker
after discovery of the marijuana by the dogs. The plaintiff was never prose-
cuted, but he was transferred to an allegedly inferior school.
26
The court of appeals held that the case was not of constitutional magni-
tude because: 1) it did not involve a defendant versus the state, but rather
school discipline; 2) the plaintiff was not expelled; and 3) the plaintiff never
offered any kind of explanation. 2 7 Consequently, the court held, the case
differed from Goss v. Lopez.28 Moreover, there was no lack of due process
because on at least five occasions the plaintiff had appeared before persons in
authority and had never offered an explanation. Also, since the school had
assumed joint control of the locker and since the student had signed a form
at the beginning of the school year consenting to the opening of his locker,
the school had a right to search it once a probability existed that there was
contraband inside.
29
In Younger v. Colorado State Board of Law Examiners,30 the court upheld the
constitutionality of rule 214 of the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure
3 '
under which the plaintiff had been denied the opportunity to sit again for
the Colorado bar examination after having failed it three times. The rule
provides that permission must be granted before an applicant can sit for the
exam more than twice. Permission to take the exam a third time was rou-
tinely granted, and was granted plaintiff, but permission to sit a fourth time
was not routinely granted, and was denied plaintiff. As a matter of practice,
the admissions committee generally looked at what the applicant had been
doing in the time since his third attempt and generally imposed a waiting
requirement of two to three years. The district court held that the final pre-
clusion of any opportunity for re-examination violated the fourteenth
amendment because such a policy constituted an irrebuttable presumption
of incompetence.
32
The court of appeals stated that no irrebuttable presumption was in-
volved, rather a general policy undergirded by many factors. 33 The court
considered an affidavit of Justice Erickson of the Colorado Supreme Court,
which stated that the requirement of obtaining permission before a fourth
attempt was based upon the Colorado Supreme Court's conclusion that re-
peated failure proves that an individual is not competent to practice law and
that few pass on the fourth attempt, even with additional training. The ap-
peals court stated that "justifiable doubts could be felt about those taking
26. Id. at 664.
27. Id. at 667-68.
28. 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (Goss held that students who face temporary suspension from pub-
lic schools have interests which qualify for protection under the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment).
29. 639 F.2d at 671.
30. 625 F.2d 372 (10th Cir. 1980).
31. The rule states: "Any applicant in Class C who fails on examination to obtain a pass-
ing grade may take the next succeeding examination. If he then fails he will be reexamined
only by special permission of the Court en banc and for good cause shown." CoLO. R. Civ. P.
214.
32. Younger v. Colorado State Bd. of Bar Examiners, 482 F. Supp. 1244, 1247 (D. Colo.
1980).
33. 625 F.2d at 378.
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four or more examinations, despite ultimate success."
'
Key v. Rutherford35 was a section 1983 action brought by a discharged
police chief against the city of Stroud, Oklahoma, and city officials. Shortly
after assuming his position as police chief, Key became aware that members
of the police force were dissatisfied with their salaries and were considering
the formation of a Fraternal Order of Police lodge. At first he discouraged
them and tried to present their budget grievances to the city council. When
his efforts failed, Key publicly supported formation of the chapter and be-
came a member. He was fired a few days later for violating section 4.11 of
the city's employee's handbook, which provided that employees were not to
discuss complaints with the city council. The trial court ruled that the pro-
vision violated the first amendment.
36
The court of appeals reversed in part, citing Pickering v. Board of Educa-
tion ,37 which held that the state has an interest as an employer in regulating
the speech of employees different from the interest it. possesses in regulating
speech of the citizenry in general. The Pickering Court set forth a balancing
test that requires courts to balance the employee's interest in commenting on
issues of public concern against the employer's interest in promoting effi-
ciency of public services. The trial court had not balanced the two interests,
but instead had held the provision facially unconstitutional.
38
The court of appeals identified two situations in which the state can
regulate an employee's right to speak. The first situation is where the speech
is so disruptive as to impair efficiency; the second is where the speech does
not involve matters of public interest. 39 The court remanded for a determi-
nation of whether the content of Key's communication or the method of
expression significantly interfered with Key's effectiveness as police chief or
with the efficiency of the police department.
Key also alleged that his termination was due to formation of the Fra-
ternal Order of Police lodge and his public support for it. The court of ap-
peals stated that, although public employees have a constitutional right to
join a union, the right is not absolute.4° The city may prevent union mem-
bership of managers if it can show a substantial state interest. The court
instructed the district court that if the issue were to arise again on retrial it
must determine whether the chief's membership sufficiently conflicted with
the city's interest.41
In Lill/efwld v. De/and,4 2 the court affirmed a lower court holding that
the plaintiff had been unconstitutionally punished. The action arose out of
the arrest and confinement of the mentally ill plaintiff who was charged with
34. Id. at 377.
35. 645 F.2d 880 (10th Cir. 1981).
36. Id. at 882.
37. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
38. 645 F.2d at 884.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 885.
41. Id.
42. 641 F.2d 729 (10th Cir. 1981).
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disorderly conduct based on "certain bizarre but nonviolent activities '43 in a
service station. He was held in a strip cell for fifty-six days without notice or
opportunity to be heard with respect to the nature or duration of his confine-
ment. He was forced to sleep naked on a concrete floor, and to amuse him-
self he was relegated to banter with inmates in nearby cells. Occasionally
these interactions escalated to the throwing of urine and feces at each other.
Plaintiff had no means of washing his hand afterwards and had to eat with
his fingers.
The court of appeals affirmed the lower court holding that the plain-
tiff's confinement amounted to punishment and that failure to provide a
hearing violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The
court held that to determine whether the disabilities imposed on the plaintiff
during detention constituted punitive measures requiring due process or
whether they were permissible regulatory restraints, the trier of fact must
first consider whether detention facility officials expressed an intent to pun-
ish detainees.44 If they did not, under Bell v. Wo~fish 4 5 the determination
turns on whether there is a rational alternative purpose for the detention and
whether the detention appears excessive in relation to that alternative pur-
pose. The court must apply the Wofuh standard to determine whether the
policy in fact constitutes punishment.46 The district court found no clear
evidence of expressed intent to punish. The lower court did, however, find
that the circumstances of confinement were unreasonably degrading and in-
humane and could hardly have been worse if the detainee were being pun-
ished for adjudicated infractions of a serious nature.
The court of appeals found the trial court's judgment abundantly sup-
ported by the record, but did not hold that the use of a strip cell is per se
unconstitutional. The court held only "that to hold a pretrial detainee
under conditions of detention this extreme for such an excessive period as
fifty-six days is punishment and, absent a determination of guilt, cannot be
imposed in accordance with the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment."'4 7 The court noted that a determination of guilt would not have al-
tered the decision, because, even though the eighth amendment applies only
after guilt is determined, 48 it was clear that the plaintiff suffered unconstitu-
tional punishment, for whatever reason it was imposed.
2. Liability of Government
An earlier appeal 49 in McGhee v. Draper50 had determined that, because
good faith had been shown on the part of government officials alleged to
have violated the plaintiff's rights, damages were not recoverable. The court
in the present appeal held that the prior ruling must be altered in light of the
43. Id. at 730.
44. Id. at 731.
45. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
46. 641 F.2d at 731.
47. Id. at 732 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
48. Id.
49. McGhee v. Draper, 564 F.2d 902 (10th Cir. 1977).
50. 639 F.2d 639 (10th Cir. 1981).
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United States Supreme Court ruling in Owen v. City of Independence,5 which
held that government officials are liable in their official capacities for consti-
tutional violations regardless of the presence of good faith.
In Little&Ild v. Deland, 5 2 the court had to determine who was liable for
the unlawful detention of the plaintiff in a strip cell. Under Monell V. Depart-
ment of Socal Services ,'53 when the execution of a local government's "policy or
custom" 5 4 inflicts the complained-of injury, the government as an entity is
responsible under section 1983. An examination of three factors led the
court of appeals to find the local government liable in Lit/eftld. First, the
jail facilities were under the control of the county commissioners. Second,
there was a long-standing policy and custom of using strip cells for adminis-
trative segregation. Third, the commissioners had repeatedly had their at-
tention called to the inadequacy of the facilities, but had done nothing. The
court made clear that the three findings were ones of direct culpability, not
vicarious liability.'
5
3. Remedies
In McGhee v. Draper,56 the court held that if the plaintiff, a nontenured
teacher whose contract had not been renewed, could show that she was de-
prived of a liberty interest without due process, she would have a number of
possible remedies.5 7 Nominal damages would be available even if the
charges against her were true. A post-termination hearing, if requested,
might also be available. The court stated that compensatory damages and
equitable relief might also be appropriate if the damaging, publicly dissemi-
nated charges were determined to be false or improper.58 With respect to
equitable relief, the court stated that absent a property interest in continued
employment, reinstatement is not ordinarily an appropriate remedy for dep-
rivation of a liberty interest. 59 If the plaintiff can prove that she would have
been retained had full procedural due process been provided, however, she
may be reinstated. 6° Similarly, the court held, back pay would be an appro-
priate remedy if plaintiff is able to prove a direct causal link between the
denial of due process and her termination.
6
1
4. Attorneys Fees
In Guruk v. Wilson, 6 2 the court provided guidance to the trial court on
remand on the issue of the proper measure of attorneys fees under section
51. 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
52. 641 F.2d 729 (10th Cir. 1981).
53. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
54. Id. at 694.
55. 641 F.2d at 732.
56. 639 F.2d 639 (10th Cir. 1981).
57. Id. at 644.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 645.
60. Id. at 646.
61. Id.
62. 635 F.2d 782 (10th Cir. 1980).
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1988.63 In its original order setting attorneys fees, the district court consid-
ered the compensation provided to attorneys of indigent criminal defendants
under the Criminal Justice Act64 and awarded $33 per hour for lead counsel,
and $21 and $20 per hour for associate counsel. Because the policies behind
the Criminal Justice Act and section 1988 are different, the court of appeals
held that guidelines under the former statute should not apply. The court
held that an award that does not fully compensate an attorney for his time
does not meet the section 1988 standard of reasonableness.
65
The trial court had also considered that the plaintiffs had prevailed in
only about sixty percent of the matters they had presented. The court then
reduced the award by an amount proportionate to the extent the plaintiffs
did not prevail. The court of appeals cited with approval Stanford Dal# v.
Zurcher,66 in which the court noted several decisions where fees were granted
for work "reasonably calculated" to promote the client's interest even if un-
successful. The Zurcher court stated that "courts should not require attorneys
(often working in new or changing areas of the law) to divine the exact pa-
rameters of the courts' willingness to grant relief."'67 The Tenth Circuit held
that fees under section 1988 should be in line with fees traditionally received
from fee-paying clients and noted that courts rejecting the proportionate re-
covery rule have pointed out that fee paying clients do not ordinarily receive
a discount for issues upon which their attorney did not prevail. 68
In Prochaska v. Marcoux,69 the court of appeals reversed a district court
denial of attorneys fees. The plaintiff had brought suit against a wildlife
63. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976). Section 1988 provides, inter ah'a:
In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1977, 1978, 1979, 1980,
and 1981 of the Revised Statutes [42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1983, 1985, 19861, title IX of
Public Law 92-318 [20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1686], . . . the court, in its discretion, may
allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as
part of the costs.
64. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d) (1976).
65. 635 F.2d at 793.
66. 64 F.R.D. 680 (N.D. Cal. 1974), aj'd, 550 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1977).
67. 64 F.R.D. at 684.
68. 635 F.2d at 793. It could be argued, however, that the issue is not so much whether the
prevailing plaintiff's attorney should be paid for all his time, but rather who should pay. It is
not clear why a defendant who prevailed on a particular issue should have to pay the fees of the
attorney who lost on the issue. Furthermore, there are considerations present in actions where
attorneys fees may be provided for by statute that are not present in traditional litigation. In
litigation in which the client will be paying the attorneys fees, the attorney has a responsibility
to his client not to spend a great deal of time on issues on which there is little chance of success.
Where attorneys fees are provided by statute for civil rights actions, there is an incentive for an
attorney who knows he can prevail on at least some issues to pursue other issues as well in order
to try to change the law to conform to his own political and social philosophy. In traditional
litigation, an attorney's obligation to his client not to spend money unnecessarily will prevent
this kind of philosophical crusade; in civil rights actions, attorneys are now given virtually carte
blanche to tilt at windmills at the expense of defendants. It is true that the court of appeals did
state that "[o]f course, attorneys fees should not be awarded for issues that are frivolous or
asserted in bad faith." Id. at 794. It is doubtful, however, that this limitation is very meaning-
ful. In the first place, there are many issues that have little chance of success, yet would not be
characterized as frivolous. In the second place, the "frivolous or asserted in bad faith" standard
is essentially the standard used now for a prevailing defendant to be entitled to attorneys fees.
Very few prevailing defendants collect attorneys fees, and it is unlikely that unsuccessful defend-
ants will be able to exclude many issues from their fee liability.
69. 632 F.2d 848 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denmtd, 101 S. Ct. 2316 (1981).
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conservation officer who had cited the plaintiff for operating a boat on a lake
without proper safety equipment. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant's
actions were malicious, that the plaintiff had been deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process, and that his right to be free from unreasona-
ble interference by police officers had been violated.
70
According to the test set out in Morgan v. Brittany Apartments ,71 a defend-
ant is entitled to attorneys fees when "the action is clearly frivolous, vexa-
tious, or brought for harassment purposes." 72  The court of appeals
concluded in Prochaska that the district court erred in finding that the plain-
tiff's action was not "frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation" be-
cause plaintiff was convicted of violating Colorado's boating safety laws and
the conviction was affirmed before commencement of the civil action.
73
Judge Doyle dissented from the fee award, stating that in the absence of
plain error the trial court's judgment on attorneys fees should be affirmed. 
74
C. 42 U.SC. Section 1985
The Tenth Circuit in Fisher v. Shamburg7 5 decided a section 198576 ac-
tion arising out of an assault against a black man by three white men. As the
plaintiff was entering a cafe in Kansas, one of the defendants who was leav-
ing uttered a racial slur. When the plaintiff left the cafe, the defendants
were in the parking lot and made more insulting racial remarks. A fight
ensued, in which the plaintiff received minor injuries. One of the defendants
was later convicted of criminal assault.
77
The issue in Fisher was whether an allegation of a racially motivated
conspiracy, under the circumstances of the case, stated a deprivation of "the
equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the
laws"78 within the meaning of section 1985(3). In Grift v. Breckenridge,79 the
United States Supreme Court set out the following four requirements for a
valid cause of action under section 1985: 1) the defendants conspired or
went in disguise on the highway or premises of another; 2) for the purpose of
depriving a person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws or
equal privileges and immunities; 3) one or more of the conspirators per-
formed an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; 4) whereby another was in-
jured in his person or property or deprived of having or exercising any right
or privilege of a citizen of the United States.80
70. Id. at 850.
71. No. 79-1230 (10th Cir. Feb. 22, 1980) (not for routine publication).
72. Id., slip op. at 5. The Supreme Court set a similar standard for an attorneys fee award
to defendants in Title VII actions in Christianburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412 (1978).
There, the Court stated that attorneys fees are appropriate if the plaintiff's action was "frivo-
lous, unreasonable, or without foundation." Id. at 421.
73. 632 F.2d at 854.
74. Id. at 855 (Doyle, J., dissenting in part).
75. 624 F.2d 156 (10th Cir. 1980).
76. 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (1976).
77. 624 F.2d at 157.
78. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1976) (renumbered in Supp. III 1979).
79. 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
80. Id. at 102-03.
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The court of appeals in Fisher focused on the second Grtmin element. In
Grifin, the Court had stated that the necessary purpose was present if there
was a racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory an-
imus which aimed at a deprivation of the equal enjoyment of rights secured
by the law to all.8 ' Because Fisher alleged a conspiracy to deprive him of
the right to enjoy the public accommodations of the cafe, the court of ap-
peals held that he had stated a valid claim.
8 2
Holmes v. F'nneq83 involved a suit alleging that the defendants, who were
connected with the Topeka Housing Authority, had arranged a clandestine
tape recording of the plaintiffs in the office of one of the defendants. The
question in the case was whether section 1985 provides a remedy on the mere
showing of a discriminatorily motivated conspiracy, or whether the plaintiff
must also show a violation of some right protected independently of section
1985. The court concluded that section 1985 is a purely remedial statute
creating no rights itself and that a violation of an independently created
right is required.84 In the instant case, no constitutional or statutory rights
were violated. Therefore, there was no cause of action under section 1985.85
In Shafer v. Cook, 8 6 the plaintiff alleged that an Oklahoma trial judge
conspired with several attorneys to deprive the plaintiff of a fair trial in a
prior case brought by the plaintiff and dismissed by the judge. The trial
judge in the instant case had held that because the Oklahoma judge was
immune from suit a private person alleged to have conspired with him could
not be liable.8 7 Based on Norton v. Liddel,8 8 the Tenth Circuit disagreed,
holding that one who conspires with an immune person may be liable under
section 1985.89
II. TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964
A. The Prima Facie Case
In Coe v. Yellow Freight System, Inc. ,9 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that the plaintiff had not established a prima facie case of racial dis-
crimination under Title VI19 under either the disparate treatment test 92 or
the disparate impact test.93 The plaintiff alleged that he was discriminato-
rily denied promotion to the position of safety manger of Yellow Freight
System. He further maintained that although he received his college degree
in 1975 he was not offered the safety manager's position or admitted into the
company's management training program. Moreover, in June of 1975, the
81. Id. at 102.
82. 624 F.2d at 162.
83. 631 F.2d 150 (10th Cir. 1980).
84. Id. at 154. Sr Great Am. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366 (1979).
85. 631 F.2d at 154.
86. 634 F.2d 1259 (10th Cir. 1980) (per curiam), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 984 (1981).
87. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978).
88. 620 F.2d 1375 (10th Cir. 1980).
89. 634 F.2d at 1260.
90. 646 F.2d 444 (10th Cir. 1981).
91. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976).
92. 646 F.2d at 450.
93. Id. at 453.
[Vol. 59:2
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND CIVIL RIGHTS
company refused to transfer him to the night shift to allow him to attend law
school during the day.
94
The Tenth Circuit applied both the disparate treatment test and the
disparate impact test. Illegal discrimination is established under the dis-
parate treatment test when "[tihe employer simply treats some people less
favorably than others because of their race, color, religion or national ori-
gin."9 5 It is, thus, a motive-oriented test. Illegal discrimination is estab-
lished under the disparate impact test when employment practices that are
basically neutral in their treatment of different groups in fact fall more
harshly on one group than another and cannot be justified by business
necessity.
96
With respect to the disparate impact test, the court found no allegation
that the company systematically followed hiring practices that were discrim-
inatory in effect. 9 7 With respect to the disparate treatment test, the court
found plaintiff's evidence on the failure to promote to be weak on two
grounds.98 First, there was no position open, because there had been a deci-
sion not to hire anyone to fill the position of safety manager. In fact, at the
time of the appeal, seven years had passed without the position having been
filled. Second, the plaintiff was not as qualified as the safety directors who
had been assuming some of the duties of the safety manager's position. The
court also found that the company's failure to transfer plaintiff to the night
shift was justified because there were no night positions open for which he
was qualified. Moreover, with respect to the denial of admission to manage-
ment training, the court found that no trainees were admitted for several
months prior to plaintiff's application and no trainees were enrolled during
the time that Coe was seeking admission.99
The court also rejected Coe's attempt to use spurious statistics. He had
tried to buttress his case by using a statistical comparison of the number of
minority employees in the company's managerial work force in 1975 and the
total number of minority workers in the national population. He had also
compared the number of minorities in the company's managerial work force
in 1975 with the total number of minorities in the Kansas City metropolitan
area in 1970. The court held that these statistics were irrelevant. 1° °
Williams v. Colorado Springs, Colorado School District No. 1110 was an ap-
peal from a judgment in a Title VII action brought by a black teacher alleg-
ing as an individual that she was denied employment because of her race
and alleging in a class action that the school district's hiring and assignment
practices resulted in the concentration of black teachers in a few schools.
The plaintiff was originally hired to teach fourth grade at one school, but
94. Id. at 448.
95. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977); Mc-
Donnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
96. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); United States v. Lee Way Motor
Freight, Inc., 625 F.2d 918 (10th Cir. 1979).
97. 646 F.2d at 451.
98. Id. at 449.
99. Id. at 450.
100. Id. at 453.
101. 641 F.2d 835 (10th Cir. 1981).
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was subsequently reassigned to a different school because of increased school
enrollment there. The principal at her new school told her that she was not
welcome and that he would not have hired her. Four months later, the prin-
cipal told her that her contract would probably not be renewed because she
was not meeting minimum teaching standards. Her official first year evalua-
tions were also poor. After leaving the school, she got a master's degree and
sought reemployment, interviewing with a number of principals, but receiv-
ing no offers. '
0 2
With respect to the individual claim, the trial court held that she had
made a prima facie case, but that the school district successfully rebutted it
by articulating a legitimate reason for non-employment, viz., that the princi-
pals had selected other applicants for non-discriminatory reasons. The court
of appeals upheld the trial court on this point, finding rebuttal of the prima
facie case in the poor evaluations of the plaintiff and in the district's legiti-
mate reasons for hiring others.'
0 3
With respect to the class action, however, the court of appeals held that
the trial court had applied the disparate treatment standards set forth in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green 04 and Fumco Constructi'on Corp. v. Waters,10 5
when it should have applied the disparate impact standards set forth in
United States v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc. 106 The trial court had held that
after the class had made out its prima facie case, the school district had only
to articulate a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the practice in order
to rebut the claim. This was error, said the court of appeals, because the
proper test was the disparate impact test, under which the employer must
prove business necessity in order to rebut the prima facie case. The court
stated that "unlike a disparate treatment case, a rational or legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason is insufficient. The practice must be essential, the pur-
pose compelling."' 0 7 The court remanded for consideration under the
disparate impact standards and, while expressing no opinion on the merits,
stated that "the question whether hiring and promotion procedures that rely
heavily on subjective determinations are justified by business necessity has
been of great concern to courts and commentators."' 0 8
In Bauer v. Bailar, 109 the court held that the defendant had successfully
rebutted the plaintiff's prima facie case. In examining allegations of dispa-
rate impact in hiring procedures that involved a great deal of subjective
judgment, the court found that even though only 14 of 150 employees at the
Englewood Post Office were women, there was no suggestion that there was
discrimination in hiring. The court held, however, that the plaintiff had
proved a prima facie case of disparate treatment under Texas Department of
102. Id. at 838.
103. Id. at 843.
104. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
105. 438 U.S. 567 (1978).
106. 625 F.2d 918 (10th Cir. 1979).
107. 641 F.2d at 842.
108. Id.
109. 647 F.2d 1037 (10th Cir. 1981).
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Community Affairs v. Burdine."° Burdine requires a plaintiff to show that he
applied for an available position for which he was qualified, but was rejected
under circumstances which give rise to an inference of discrimination.'' I If
the plaintiff can show that the defendant's actions were more likely than not
based on a discriminatory intent, the burden of going forward then shifts to
the defendant. The burden of persuasion, however, remains with the plain-
tiff at all times. If the defendant articulates legitimate non-discriminatory
reasons for its action, the plaintiff may introduce evidence to show that the
reasons are mere pretext."
12
The Bauer court found that despite the plaintiff's showing of a prima
facie case, the post office came back with considerable proof of legitimate
reasons for its policies and that there was no basis for the argument that the
reasons given were mere pretext."
13
B. Policies That Perpetuate Pre-Act Discrimination
In Sears v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway," 4 the Atchison, Topeka
& Santa Fe Railway (Santa Fe) and the United Transportation Union
(UTU) appealed from a judgment that they violated Title VII by perpetuat-
ing the effects of prior discrimination in a non-bona fide seniority system."15
The primary question in the case was whether the seniority system was bona
fide under section 703(h).116
Train runs on the Santa Fe traditionally included passenger trains,
through freights, local freights, and mixed passenger and freight runs. Train
crews on freights included conductors, head-end brakemen, rear-end brake-
men, engineers, and firemen. In 1899, the railroad created the post of train
porter to perform the duties of head-end brakemen on passenger trains and
also to attend to passengers and care for the interior condition of passenger
cars. Most passenger trains also carried chair car attendants who performed
no braking duties. Porters and chair car attendants were always black.
From 1918 to 1959, the entry level job with Santa Fe for blacks was chair car
attendant. The entry level job for non-blacks was brakeman. Seniority
dates were figured from the earliest date of continuous service in a particular
craft within a particular district.'
7
A UTU predecessor, the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen (BRT),
made several attempts to transfer braking duties from black train porters to
white brakemen. The BRT protested that the use of porters to perform the
duties of head-end brakemen violated the contracts between BRT and Santa
Fe providing for the seniority rights and duties of brakemen. In 1959, the
National Railroad Adjustment Board held that only train porters holding a
seniority date prior to April 20, 1942 could perform head-end braking du-
110. 101 S. Ct. 1089 (1981); 647 F.2d at 1048.
111. 101 S. Ct. at 1094.
112. 647 F.2d at 1048.
113. Id. at 1044-45.
114. 645 F.2d 1365 (10th Cir. 1981).
115. Id. at 1368.
116. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976).
117. 645 F.2d at 1369.
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ties."' Others were demoted to chair car attendants.
The district court held that Santa Fe and the union had engaged in a
systematic "policy and pattern of discrimination against black employees,
that this discrimination was perpetuated by the seniority system agreed to by
both defendants, and that the disparate impact created by the seniority sys-
tem was not immunized by the section 703(h) exemption for bona fide sen-
iority systems."' 19 Santa Fe and the union argued that the seniority system
was valid under Intemational Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States. 12
0
The district court relied on a distillation of four factors from Teamsters
articulated by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.1 2 1 These factors are:
1) whether the seniority system operates to discourage all employees equally
from transferring between seniority units; 2) whether seniority units are in
the same or separate bargaining units (if the latter, whether the structure is
rational and in conformance with industry practice); 3) whether the seniority
system had its genesis in racial discrimination; and 4) whether the system
was negotiated and has been maintained free from any illegal purpose.'
22
The district court held that Santa Fe's system met the first two factors, but
failed to meet the second two.
The court of appeals disagreed with the lower court's approval based
upon the first two criteria. The appellate court distinguished Teamsters,
where the majority of city drivers and servicemen were white, from the in-
stant case, where all employees in the group discouraged from transferring
were black. Consequently, the court held that Santa Fe also failed the first
criterion. 123 Because the court of appeals found that the division into senior-
ity units was drawn along racial lines, it also disagreed with the district
court's finding that the division was rational.
124
C. The Effect of Settlements and Concih'ation Agreements
In Chicano Police Oftcer's Association v. Stover, 12 5 the Tenth Circuit held
that a stipulated judgment that did not provide for attorneys fees did not
necessarily bar an award of attorneys fees to a prevailing plaintiff. The case
arose out of an employment discrimination suit by the Chicano Police Of-
ficer's Association against the Albuquerque Police Department. The parties
stipulated to a judgment that included a monetary award and an agreement
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1370.
120. 431 U.S. 324 (1977). In Teamsters, a carrier had engaged in a pre-Act pattern of dis-
crimination by hiring minorities only in serviceman or local city driver positions instead of
higher paying line driver positions. Such discriminatory effects were perpetuated by the senior-
ity system which required employees who transferred to line driver positions to forfeit seniority
accumulated in a serviceman or local driver position. The Supreme Court held the system valid
under § 703(h), but at the same time recognized that any difference in treatment created by the
system must not be the result of intent to discriminate. Id.
121. James v. Stockham Valves & Fittings Co., 559 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1977), cer. denied, 434
U.S. 1034 (1978).
122. 645 F.2d at 1372-74.
123. Id. at 1373.
124. Id.
125. 624 F.2d 127 (10th Cir. 1980).
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by the department to change certain hiring and training procedures.' 26
The court of appeals held that the Newman v. Aiggze Park Enterprises,
Inc. 127 standard should apply to sections 1988 and 2000e-5(k).12 8 The New-
man standard is that a prevailing plaintiff "should ordinarily recover an at-
torney's fee unless special circumstances would render such an award
unjust."' 29 With respect to the effect of the stipulated judgment on the
availability of attorneys fees, the court held that the trial court, on remand,
should determine whether the cash payment specified in the stipulated judg-
ment should be construed as a settlement of all that was to be paid to the
plaintiffs and their attorneys. The trial court should conduct a hearing on
whether attorneys fees were intended to be covered, and if there was no
agreement or misleading conduct by the plaintiffs, the court should award
attorneys fees if it finds that the plaintiffs prevailed.
130
Chief Judge Seth dissented, 13' stating that if the judgment were to be
altered to the degree requested, 132 the agreement should be reopened to give
an equal opportunity to both parties to consider the new factor.'
33
The approach Chief Judge Seth favored in Chicano Police Ojier's Associa-
lion was followed in Trujillo v. Colorado ,'134 an action brought under the thir-
teenth and fourteenth amendments and sections 1981 and 1983. The
plaintiff had accepted employment as assistant coordinator of veterans af-
fairs at the Community College of Denver, pursuant to a United States Gov-
ernment civil rights conciliation agreement with the college. He
subsequently brought the suit which is the basis for this appeal. The court of
appeals stated that the public policy favoring voluntary settlements would
be thwarted if Trujillo could accept the benefits of the agreement while at
the same time retaining the right to sue, because no employer would agree to
conciliation in such a situation.' 35 The court remanded the case, however,
for a hearing to determine whether Trujillo understood that the conciliation
agreement was in full settlement of all claims. If he did not so understand,
he would have the option of either accepting the agreement as full settle-
ment or forfeiting the benefits of the agreement and maintaining the suit. '
36
126. Id. at 129.
127. 390 U.S. 400 (1968).
128. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1988, 2000e-5(k) (1976).
129. 390 U.S. at 402.
130. 624 F.2d at 132.
131. Id. (Seth, C. J., dissenting).
132. Attorneys fees claimed by the appellant were approximately $45,000, while the stipu-
lated judgment was for only $16,000. Id.
133. Id.
134. 649 F.2d 823 (10th Cir. 1981).
135. d. at 826-27.
136. If the goal of the courts is to be fair to defendants as well as plaintiffs in discrimination
suits, the same approach should have been taken in Chicaw Poie Oftr's Ass'n as in Trujillo,
allowing the plaintiff to accept the stipulated judgment as it stood or reopen the entire judg-
ment. Instead, the Ctwemo Pol ie Ofwtrs Assn court gave the plaintiff the opportunity to in-
crease almost fourfold the sum of money that the defendant must pay, without giving the
defendant the opportunity to repudiate the judgment.
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D. Remedies
In Stone v. D. A. & S Oil Well Servicing, Inc. ,'137 the court of appeals
upheld a back pay award, stating its unwillingness to hold that a jobseeker
who leaves a non-comparable part-time job and moves to a new location to
seek comparable work, thereby displays a lack of diligence.' 38 The court
stated that Title VII "should not be used to lock partially employed persons,
fearful of losing backpay awards, into long-term unproductive geographic
commitments."1
39
In EEOC v. Safeway Stores, Inc. ,140 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that in "failure to hire" cases, the proper remedy is instatement in the
next available position. The court also adopted the standards for entitle-
ment to front pay set forth by the Fourth Circuit.' 4 1 These standards are
that the claimant must prove: 1) he sought a position or would have sought
it in accordance with Teamsters; 2) he was qualified for the position; 3) he
would have accepted the position had it been offered; and 4) there was an
available position that was filled by someone else in conformity with the
discriminatory policy. 1
42
E. Attomqs Fees
In Chicano Police O ffter's Association v. Stover, 143 the court of appeals held
that a court determination on the merits is not required for a plaintiff to be
found the prevailing party and therefore entitled to attorneys fees. The ap-
peal arose out of an employment discrimination suit by the Chicano Police
Officer's Association (Association) against the Albuquerque Police Depart-
ment. The parties agreed to a stipulated judgment award of $8,000 to an
individual, $8,000 to the Association, and an agreement by the department
to change a number of its hiring and training practices. The city made no
admission of liability and the plaintiffs were not designated as the prevailing
party. '
44
The defendants argued that the plaintiffs should not be considered a
prevailing party because there was no decision on the merits or admission of
fault and because the $16,000 settlement was de minimis in view of what a
back pay award might have been. The court of appeals, however, stated
that the defendants' view of what constitutes a prevailing party was too nar-
row, and held that a court determination on the merits is not required.
1 45
The court stated that although nuisance settlements should not give rise to a
"prevailing" plaintiff, the congressional intent to encourage private enforce-
ment of civil rights will be furthered by fee awards if the settlement "pro-
137. 624 F.2d 142 (10th Cir. 1980).
138. Id. at 144.
139. Id.
140. 634 F.2d 1273 (10th Cir. 1980).
141. Hill v. Western Elec. Co., 596 F.2d 99 (4th Cir. 1979).
142. 634 F.2d at 1282.
143. 624 F.2d 127 (10th Cir. 1980).
144. Id. at 129.
145. Id. at 130-31.
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vides some benefit to plaintiffs or some vindication of their rights."' 146
Consequently, the trial court was instructed on remand to determine
whether plaintiffs' basic objectives were achieved or furthered in a signifi-
cant way as a result of bringing the action.
In Nulfv. International Paper Co. ,'1 the Tenth Circuit reversed a district
court award of attorneys fees to a prevailing defendant. The plaintiff had
been hired in 1966 as a receptionist. In 1976, a new telephone system was
installed, which required a change in her duties. She refused to perform
these new duties and was fired. She then brought a sex-discrimination ac-
tion. The trial court granted a dismissal in favor of the defendant and
awarded the defendant attorneys fees, finding that the plaintiff's action was
"unreasonable and groundless and was wholly without factual or legal ba-
sis."' 48 The court of appeals reversed the award, holding that the action was
not frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless.
149
In Salone o. United States, 150 the court of appeals held that the trial court
erred in holding that the attorneys fee recovery would be limited to one-
third of the back pay recovery. The judgment was for $15,544 in back pay
and $5,181 in counsel fees. The plaintiff argued that the attorneys fees
should be higher because there had been two appeal proceedings to obtain
relief. 15' The court of appeals stated that the Tenth Circuit has not followed
any fixed standard in setting attorneys fees in Title VII cases, 152 and con-
cluded that the standards set forth in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express'5 3
should be considered. Thus, the trial court should consider such factors as
the nature and extent of the services, the time required, the results accom-
plished, the value of the matter, and the professional skill and experience of
the attorney. 1
54
F. Statute of Lbnitations
In Shah v. Halliburton Co., 155 the court held that the statute of limitations
begins to run from the date that an employee is discharged, rather than from
the last date for which he receives compensation. Shah was fired and was
given at least two weeks' severance pay. He maintained that the statute
should not begin to run until two weeks after his discharge. The court of
appeals held that the statutory period for employment discrimination begins
to run from the date of the last alleged discriminatory practice, and in the
instant case the discharge must be treated as the last such practice. 156 The
court stated that "a discharge occurs at the latest as of the date after which
146. Id. at 131.
147. 656 F.2d 553 (10th Cir. 1981).
148. d. at 557.
149. Id. at 564.
150. 645 F.2d 875 (10th Cir. 1981).
151. Id. at 876.
152. Id. at 879.
153. 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974).
154. 645 F.2d at 879.
155. 627 F.2d 1055 (10th Cir. 1980).
156. d. at 1056.
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services are no longer accepted."' 57 The fact that Shah received pay for at
least two weeks after his discharge was of no consequence.15
8
III. THE AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT
In EEOC v. Sandia Corp. , 59 the court of appeals held that because un-
employment compensation is "purely a collateral source"' 6 and "peculiarly
the property of the claimant,"' 16 1 it would be unfair to allow the defendant
to offset amounts received against back pay awards in an action under the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).16 2 The court stated that
the deduction of unemployment benefits would result in unjust enrichment
to the employer "except to the extent that employers make contributions to
the funds."'1 63 The court did allow the deduction of severance pay because it
was a payment made wholly by the employer and thus not a collateral
benefit.
Thomas v. United States Postal Inspection Service 164 involved a claim of age
discrimination brought under the ADEA and the due process clause of the
fifth amendment. Thomas was an employee of the United States Postal
Service who was rejected for a position as a postal inspector because of a
thirty-four-year maximum age limit. The limit was set forth in Postal Serv-
ice regulations promulgated pursuant to a statute allowing heads of agencies
to fix minimum and maximum ages for law enforcement personnel.' 65 The
district court held against Thomas on the ADEA claim because the Act ex-
pressly applies only to applicants who are at least forty.'6 Thomas did not
appeal this holding, but he did appeal a holding that there was no constitu-
tional violation.
The court of appeals stated that the only constitutional issue was
whether there was a rational basis for the age limit. 167 Relying on Vance v.
Bradl '6 and Massachusetts Board of Rettrement v. Murgia,169 the court upheld
the limit. It found the limit to be not only rational, but sensible, stating that
by passage of the federal law enforcement statute Congress recognized the
need for comparatively young, strong, and vigorous personnel in law en-
forcement agencies. i 70
157. Id. (citing Payne v. Crane Co., 560 F.2d 198, 199 (5th Cir. 1977)).
158. See also Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250 (1980), which involved a college
professor who alleged that he had been denied tenure illegally. The United States Supreme
Court held that the statute of limitations began to run when he was notified of the denial of
tenure, not when his one-year terminable employment contract expired. Id. at 259.
159. 639 F.2d 600 (10th Cir. 1980).
160. Id. at 625.
161. Id.
162. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976).
163. 639 F.2d at 626. The court did not concern itself with the overcompensation to the
employee that results, or the payment by the corporation which is excessive to the extent that
the corporation also contributes to the unemployment compensation fund.
164. 647 F.2d 1035 (10th Cir. 1981).
165. 5 U.S.C. § 3307(d) (1976).
166. 29 U.S.C. § 631 (1976).
167. 647 F.2d at 1036.
168. 440 U.S. 93 (1979).
169. 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
170. 647 F.2d at 1037.
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IV. INDIAN RIGHTS
A. Preferential Treatment
In Wardle o. Ule Indian Tribe,17' the court upheld the tribe's discharge of
a non-Indian tribal policeman who was discharged because the tribe had
decided to fill the position with a tribal member. The plaintiff alleged that
he was discharged in violation of the Indian Civil Rights Act,' 72 the fifth
amendment, and various civil rights provisions. 173 The court of appeals up-
held the district court's grant of defendant's motion for summary judgment,
holding that defendants had not violated any federally protected right.'
74
The appellate court held that the allegations of the case fell squarely within
the provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.175 Plaintiff had
not brought his action under Title VII because that Act specifically provides
that "[tihe term 'employer' . . . does not include . . . an Indian tribe."'
1 76
Moreover, Title VII also states that "[n]othing contained in this subchapter
shall apply to any business or enterprise on or near an Indian reservation
with respect to any publicly announced employment practice . . . under
which a preferential treatment is given to any individual because he is an
Indian living on or near a reservation."' 77 The court noted the Supreme
Court's findings in Morton v. Mancari'7 8 that Congress recognized a unique
legal status for Indians and that such a preference for Indians in reservation-
related employment is not prohibited.
179
With respect to the fifth amendment claim, the court held that under
Mancari no federally protected right had been infringed and that the fifth
amendment serves as a limit on federal action only, not on Indian tribes. 80
With respect to civil rights claims under sections 1981 and 1983, the court
held that because there is no specific provision in these sections barring pref-
erential hiring of tribal members, the specific provisions of Title VII control
over the more general provisions of the other statutes.' 8 '
171. 623 F.2d 670 (10th Cir. 1980).
172. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1341 (1976).
173. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1988, 2000d (1976).
174. 623 F.2d at 672.
175. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976).
176. Id. § 2000e(b).
177. Id. § 2000e-2(i).
178. 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
179. 623 F.2d at 673.
180. Id. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
181. 623 F.2d at 673. It is not clear how this holding can be reconciled with the generally
accepted rule that the existence of Title VII does not preclude actions under other civil rights
statutes. For example, in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974), the United
States Supreme Court stated that "the legislative history of Title VII manifests a congressional
intent to allow an individual to pursue independently his rights under both Title VII and other
applicable state and federal statutes-" Id. at 48. Moreover, the Court quoted an interpretive
memorandum introduced by Senator Joseph Clark, which stated that "Title VII is not intended
to and does not deny to any individual, fights and remedies which he may pursue under other
Federal and State statutes." Id. at 48 n.9. Se aLro Goss v. Revlon, Inc., 548 F.2d 405 (2d Cir.
1976), in which a claimant who had not exhausted his administrative remedies before the
EEOC was permitted to bring an action based on section 1981.
The court of appeals' reliance on Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974), is misplaced.
The question in Mancan" was whether a provision in the Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C.
§ 472 (1976), granting a preference to qualified Indians in the Bureau of Indian Affairs was
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B. Tribal Sovereignty
In Dry Creek Lodge, Inc. v. Arapahoe and Shoshone Tribes, 182 the court held
that the concept of tribal sovereignty should not be applied if to do so would
deny non-Indian plaintiffs a forum in which their disputes with the tribe
could be settled. The plaintiffs' land was within the exterior boundaries of
the Wind River Reservation of the Shoshone and Arapahoe Indians in Wyo-
ming. The land was patented in 1924. There was a small road, which had
been used for some eighty years, providing access from the lodge to the prin-
cipal highway. The plaintiffs decided to build a guest lodge for hunting.
The superintendent of the reservation advised them that such projects were
encouraged in order to provide employment and that there would be no
access problem. The day after the lodge opened, the tribes closed the road at
the request of the Indian family who owned the allotment over which the
access road travelled. The tribal council directed that federal officers pre-
vent access and that the family erect a barricade. The plaintiffs sought a
remedy in tribal court, but the judge said that he would not incur the dis-
pleasure of the council, whose consent was necessary. Consent was not
given. 183
Defendants asserted that there was no remedy under Santa Clara Pueblo v.
Martinez.' 84 The court of appeals disagreed, distinguishing Santa Clara on
the basis that it involved an entirely internal affair concerning property own-
ership and tribal membership.' 8 5 The appellate court quoted the United
States Supreme Court's opinion in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe:'
86 "In-
dian Tribes are prohibited from exercising both those powers of autonomous
states that are expressly terminated by Congress and those powers 'inconsistent
with their status.' 187 Because the instant case related to a matter outside of
internal tribal affairs and involving non-Indians, the court held that Santa
Clara could not be applied to deny plaintiffs a forum in which their dispute
could be settled.18
Judge Holloway dissented, stating that the Supreme Court in Santa
Clara laid down a broad holding couched in terms of the tribes' traditional
immunity from suit and the absence in the Indian Civil Rights Act of provi-
sions subjecting the tribes to federal court jurisdiction in civil actions for
injunctive or declaratory relief. Consequently, he reluctantly concluded that
implicitly repealed by section 11 of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-16(a) (1976), which extended Title VII to federal employment. The court of appeals is
thus relying on a case that held that Title VII did not repeal another statute by implication for
the proposition that Title VII limits remedies under other civil rights statutes.
182. 623 F.2d 682 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 931 (1981). See also Dry Creek
Lodge, Inc. v. United States, 515 F.2d 926 (10th Cir. 1975).
183. 623 F.2d at 684.
184. 436 U.S. 49 (1978). Santa Clara upheld a tribal ordinance denying membership in the
tribe to children of female members who marry outside the tribe, while extending membership
to children of male members who do so. The Court noted that a tribe's right to define its own
membership for tribal purposes has long been recognized as central to its existence as an in-
dependent political community. Id. at 72 n.32.
185. 623 F.2d at 685.
186. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
187. Id. at 208 (emphasis in original).
188. 623 F.2d at 685.
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dismissal was compelled.' 8 9
C. Re/igion
In Badoni v. Hggison,190 the court of appeals upheld a lower court order
denying relief to Indian plaintiffs who argued that the religion clauses of the
first amendment apply to government management of Rainbow Bridge Na-
tional Monument and the Glen Canyon Dam and Reservoir (Lake Powell).
Rainbow Bridge National Monument is a 160-acre tract in southern
Utah surrounded by a Navajo reservation. It was set aside by executive or-
der for scientific and historic purposes. 19 1 Lake Powell has backed up so
that Rainbow Bridge now arches over water. Boats licensed by the Bureau
of Reclamation and the National Park Service bring tourists to the
monument.
The Indians claimed that the government had violated the free exercise
clause by impounding the water to form Lake Powell because the impound-
ment drowned some of their gods and denied the Indians' access to a sacred
prayer site.19 2 Also, the plaintiffs alleged that the government permitted
desecration of the site by allowing tourists to visit and that the government
denied the plaintiffs the right to conduct religious ceremonies.'
9 3
The trial court, finding for the government, held that plaintiffs had no
cognizable free exercise claim because they had no property interest in the
monument. The trial court also found that the federal government's interest
in the dam and the reservoir outweighed plaintiffs' religious interests.'
94
The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court, but used
different reasoning, rejecting the conclusion that plaintiffs' lack of property
rights in the monument was determinative.'95 Instead, the court stated that
the analysis of plaintiffs' free exercise claims involves a two-step process.'96
There must first be a determination of whether the government action cre-
ates a burden on the exercise of plaintiffs' religion.' 97 If so, the government
must establish an interest of sufficient magnitude to override the interest for
which plaintiffs claim protection under the free exercise clause. '9 8 The court
found that Rainbow Bridge has held a position of central importance in the
Navajo religion for at least a hundred years and that plaintiffs believe that if
humans alter the earth in the area of the bridge the gods will not hear their
prayers. The court expressly stated, however, that it did not reach the ques-
tion of whether the government action infringes the free exercise of reli-
gion,' 99 because it held that the government's interest outweighs any
189. Id. at 686.
190. 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980).
191. Id. at 175.
192. Id. at 176.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. See Abington School District v. Schernpp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963).
198. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
199. 638 F.2d at 177 n.4.
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religious interest the plaintiffs might have. 20° The court noted that in order
to drop the water level sufficiently to meet the plaintiffs' demands the stor-
age capacity of the lake would have to be cut in half. Such action would
reduce significantly the water available to the Upper Basin states of Colo-
rado, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming.
20 1
With respect to the claim that the presence of tourists burdens the prac-
tice of the plaintiffs' religion, the court pointed out that the Navajos may
enter the monument on the same basis as anyone else. Moreover, the court
held that the plaintiffs' goal would violate the establishment clause because
the plaintiffs demanded government action to exclude and control the be-
havior of others. 20 2 The court also stated that "we do not believe plaintiffs
have a constitutional right to have tourists visiting the Bridge act 'in a re-
spectful and appreciative manner.' "203
V. PRISONERS' RIGHTS
The major prisoners' rights case before the Tenth Circuit during the
year was Ramos v. Lamm.204 The State of Colorado appealed an order of the
United States District Court 20 5 directing that the state close the maximum
security unit of the Colorado State Penitentiary at Canon City (Old Max)
because conditions at the prison violated the eighth amendment prohibition
of cruel and unusual punishment. Implementation of the closing order was
deferred on the condition that the state present proper plans for eradicating
constitutional violations.
20 6
The primary constitutional issue presented was whether the district
court had applied the correct constitutional standard in finding that the to-
tality of conditions at Old Max violated plaintiffs' eighth amendment rights.
The state argued that there was insufficient evidence of a violation if the
correct constitutional standard were applied.
20 7
With respect to the constitutional standard, the court of appeals quoted
its opinion in Battle v. Anderson:208 "[Tihe United States Supreme Court has
not wavered in its holding that the Eighth Amendment . . . is, inter a/ia,
intended to protect and safeguard a prison inmate from an environment
where degeneration is probable and self-improvement unlikely because of
the conditions existing which inflict needless suffering, whether physical or
mental. ' ' 2° 9 The court emphasized that an inmate does not have a constitu-
tional right to rehabilitation, although he is entitled to be confined in an
environment which does not result in his "degeneration.
'2 °1 0
200. Id. at 177.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 179.
203. Id.
204. 639 F.2d 559 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denitd, 101 S. Ct. 1759 (1981).
205. 485 F. Supp. 122 (D. Colo. 1979).
206. 639 F.2d at 562.
207. Id. at 566.
208. 564 F.2d 388 (10th Cir. 1977).
209. Id. at 393.
210. 639 F.2d at 568.
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The state argued that it was error to apply the Battle "degeneration
standard." The state urged instead the adoption of the rule enunciated in
Newman v. Alabama :211 "If the State furnishes its prisoners with reasonably
adequate food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal
safety, so as to avoid the imposition of cruel and unusual punishment, that
ends its obligations under Amendment Eight."
2 12
The Tenth Circuit stated that there was no conflict between its decision
in Battle and the Fifth Circuit's decision in Newman, despite the fact that the
Newman court expressly rejected the degeneration test, referring to it as an
"uncharted bog."' 213 The appellate court concluded that in the core areas of
the eighth amendment claim-shelter, sanitation, food, personal safety, and
medical care-the district court's findings and conclusions of violations were
justified.
21 4
The district court had also made findings with respect to idleness, classi-
fication, and motility and had ordered that each inmate be involved in some
kind of productive activity-jobs, recreation, treatment, or education-at
least eight hours out of every twenty-four. The court further ordered that no
prisoner be housed in less than eighty square feet for twenty or more hours
per day, and that any systems of classification, placement, and assignment be
"clearly understandable, consistently applied, and conceptually
complete."
2 15
The court of appeals reversed the district court on these issues and
stated that the record did not justify exploring the concepts of penology re-
specting motility, classification, and idleness adopted by the district court
because "the shortcomings in these areas are not of constitutional dimen-
sion." 216 The court did state, however, that there may be a point where
abuse in these areas would constitute an actual violation of the eighth
amendment.
2 1 7
With respect to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings of
the district court in the core areas of shelter, sanitation, food, personal safety,
and medical care, the state argued that the undisputed evidence did not
support the court's ultimate findings and conclusions.
Deficiencies in shelter and sanitation found by the district court in-
cluded, inter alia, inadequate cell size, leaky roofs, inadequate heating sys-
tems, inadequate ventilation resulting in mold and fungus growth,
accumulation of sewage in the cells, and rodent infestation. The court of
appeals sustained the trial court's conclusion that these conditions were
211. 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977), crt dnid, 438 U.S. 915 (1978).
212. 559 F.2d at 291.
213. Id. In its petition for certiorari, the state argued that because the degeneration stan-
dard contains virtually no constraints on the ability of federal courts to impose their concepts of
penology on the states, the standard must be replaced by a more objective one. Under the
degeneration standard, argued the state, "when a judge sees prison programs which differ from
those he favors, and when he sees degeneration (as he always will), he is free to declare the
conditions at the prison unconstitutional." Petition for Certiorari at 12.
214. 639 F.2d at 566.
215. 485 F. Supp. at 170.
216. 639 F.2d at 566-67.
217. Id. at 567.
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"grossly inadequate and constitutionally impermissible. ' '21 8
The district court had found that conditions in the food service areas
failed to meet any known health standards. The court of appeals held that
part of the "healthy habilitative environment" that the state must provide
an inmate is "nutritionally adequate food that is prepared and served under
conditions which do not present an immediate danger to the health and well
being of the inmates who consume it."21 9 The court further held that al-
though the state health code does not establish constitutional minima it is
relevant in making a finding regarding the constitutionality of existing con-
ditions.220 Deficiencies included rotting food on the floors, standing water in
the kitchen, mold on the walls of the walk-in coolers where food was stored,
and food left uncovered allowing rodents and roaches to contaminate it.
The appellate court found that the record amply supported the district
court's conclusion that the conditions in the food service areas had a substan-
tial detrimental impact upon the health of the inmate population. 22'
The district court also found that the inmates and staff lived in constant
fear in the prison and that the design and staffing of the prison contributed
to violence among inmates. It concluded that this lack of safety deprived
prisoners of their constitutional right to be free from constant threats of vio-
lence and sexual assault from other inmates. 222 The court of appeals upheld
the court's conclusion that failure to provide for the physical safety of the
inmates also violated the eighth amendment.
223
The district court found the inadequate health care to be "perhaps the
most appalling" problem at Old Max.2 24 The court of appeals held that
under Estelle v. Gamble2 2 5 accidental or inadvertent failure to provide ade-
quate medical care is not a violation of the eighth amendment; only "delib-
erate indifference" to the serious medical needs of the inmates or intentional
failure to provide for them are unconstitutional. 226 The court of appeals
upheld the findings of the district court that health care was inadequate in
primary care physician on-site coverage, on-site dental care, staff and vehi-
cles for transporting inmates to health care facilities, and mental health
care.
227
The trial court also held that restrictions on visitation improperly in-
fringed upon the inmates' rights of association, privacy, and liberty under
the first, ninth, and fourteenth amendments. 228 The challenged regulations
permitted each inmate a total of five full days or ten half-days of visiting
privileges per month. Visitors were required to be on an approved list. Lim-
ited contact was allowed-kisses at the beginning and end of each visit,
218. Id. at 570 (citing 485 F. Supp. at 155).
219. 639 F.2d at 570-71.
220. Id. at 571.
221. Id. at 571-72.
222. 485 F. Supp. at 155-56.
223. 639 F.2d at 574.
224. Id. (citing 485 F. Supp. at 158).
225. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
226. 639 F.2d at 575.
227. Id. at 578.
228. Id.
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hand-holding, and holding small children on laps. Any other type of bodily
contact was prohibited. The district court had found the regulations to be
"overbroad, unrelated to any legitimate penological purpose, and an exag-
gerated and excessive response to concerns for prison security." 229 The court
of appeals disagreed, noting that there is no constitutional right to contact
visitation 230 and that contact visits provide a unique opportunity for passing
contraband into the prison. The court found that the record shows that the
challenged regulations had been successful in discouraging the transfer of
contraband between inmates and their visitors. The court stated further
that "[tihe existence of less restrictive alternatives is not dispositive of the
matter . . .for we are convinced that the discretion of prison officials in
these matters should stand unless patently unreasonable."
'23'
The court of appeals upheld the district court declaration of invalidity
of a number of policies relating to prisoners' mail. 232 The policy of refusing
to deliver mail in a language other than English was held to infringe the
rights of inmates without any reasonable justification, particularly in light of
the fact that one-third of the population of Old Max was Hispanic. 233 The
policy of refusing to deliver mail when the correspondence would allegedly
cause severe psychiatric or emotional disturbance to an inmate was held not
unreasonable on its face, but unreasonable as applied because there was no
qualified psychiatrist or psychologist at the prison to make the determina-
tion. The regulations were also deficient because they did not make clear
that in those exceptional circumstances when outgoing privileged mail may
be opened it must be opened only in the presence of the inmate.
234
Finally, the regulation defining "legal mail" stated that it was "any
mail directed between an inmate and any public official or agency or any
lawyer with respect to either his criminal conviction or a complaint he might
have concerning the administration of the prison under exceptional circum-
stances." 235 The court of appeals held that the protection afforded legal cor-
respondence applies equally to criminal and civil matters and cannot be thus
confined. 236 The court concluded that the prisoner mail standards were in-
valid under the first and fourteenth amendments and were unjustified by the
standards laid down by the United States Supreme Court in Procunure' v.
Marlinez .237
With respect to access to the courts, the court of appeals upheld a dis-
trict court determination that the law libraries at Old Max were inade-
quate.238  Under Bounds v. Smith,239 prison authorities must provide
adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the
229. Id. at 580.
230. Id. n.26.
231. Id. at 580.
232. Id. at 581.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 582.
235. Canon Correction Facility Reg. 302-18(6).
236. 639 F.2d at 582.
237. 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
238. 639 F.2d at 584.
239. 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
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law.24 ° The court of appeals held that the state provided neither, thus deny-
ing the prisoners meaningful access to the courts.
24 1
The court remanded the case to the district court to reconsider the
proper remedy in light of present conditions. The district court was in-
structed to consider, i'nler alia, the present state of the new facility, the spe-
cific plans regarding transfer and housing of inmates in the new facility, the
specific commitments for enlarged staff personnel to remedy the deficiencies
found, and the actual progress in these areas.
24 2
There were a number of less significant prisoners' rights cases during the
past year. One such case was Brown v. Bigger,2 4 3 in which the court held that
prison guards' forcibly putting the plaintiff into bed while he was at a hospi-
tal for treatment of stab wounds did not constitute cruel and unusual
punishment.
In Major v. Benton,2 4 4 the court of appeals held that an allegation of
simple negligence was not sufficient to support a section 1983 claim. Plain-
tiffs' decedent was an Oklahoma state prisoner who died in a sewer ditch
cave-in. The court rejected the plaintiffs' claim that the deceased was de-
prived of life without due process of law simply because the state had not
formulated the proper safety measures.
2 45
In Li'tlefld v. Deland,246 the court of appeals affirmed a lower court
holding that the plaintiff had been unconstitutionally punished. Plaintiff
had been arrested and charged with disorderly conduct based on "certain
bizarre but nonviolent activities" in a service station. The court held that
holding the plaintiff in a strip cell without notice or opportunity to be heard
constituted punishment without due process of law.
2 4 7
In Barton v. Malley, 2 48 the Tenth Circuit court rejected an appeal from
the dismissal of a habeas corpus petition. Plaintiff claimed that his parole
was revoked because he had spoken critically about the New Mexico correc-
tions system to a prison reform group. The trial court found that the peti-
tioner had violated an earlier parole because he was outside the county
(where he was involved in an accident). His parole was revoked, but subse-
quently reinstated. The petitioner then left the state and was arrested in
Pennsylvania. Again, his parole was revoked.
249
Barton maintained that he was denied equal protection because New
Mexico selectively enforced its laws. Citing United States v. Torquato,250 the
court of appeals held that to support a claim of selective enforcement based
upon a discriminatory revocation of parole, the petitioner must establish two
240. id. at 828.
241. 639 F.2d at 585.
242. Id. at 586.
243. 622 F.2d 1025 (10th Cir. 1980) (per curiam).
244. 647 F.2d 110 (10th Cir. 1981).
245. Id. at 113.
246. 641 F.2d 729 (10th Cir. 1981).
247. Id. at 732.
248. 626 F.2d 151 (10th Cir. 1980).
249. Id. at 153.
250. 602 F.2d 564 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 941 (1979).
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facts. First, he must show that he has been singled out for prosecution when
others similarly situated have not. Second, he must show that selection of
petitioner for parole revocation was based on intentional, purposeful dis-
crimination stemming from impermissible considerations such as race, reli-
gion, or the desire to prevent the exercise of a constitutionally secured
right. 25' Because the court found that Barton had not met his burden of
proof, the dismissal of his habeas corpus petition was upheld.
25 2
VI. CASE DIGESTS
A. Drug Paraphernah
In Heji'ra Corp. v. MacFarlane,253 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals up-
held the constitutionality of the Colorado Drug Paraphernalia Act.2 54 The
trial court had held that the statutory definition of "drug paraphernalia"
was unconstitutionally vague. Although the lower court recognized the
power of the state to enact laws regulating drug paraphernalia, it held that
the statutory standard of "primarily adapted, designed, and intended" was
not adequate. 255 The trial court further held that the eleven factors enumer-
ated in the statute for determination of whether an article is an item of drug
paraphernalia were not adequate notice either to possible violators or to
police.
256
The court of appeals recognized that the standard "adapted, designed,
251. 626 F.2d at 155.
252. Id.
253. No. 80-2062 (10th Cir. May 5, 1981).
254. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 12-22-501 to -506 (Supp. 1980).
255. No. 80-2062, slip op. at 5. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 12-22-502(2) (Supp. 1980) provides:
"Drug Paraphernalia" means any machine, instrument, tool, equipment, or device
which is primarily adapted, designed, and intended for one or more of the following:
(a) To introduce into the human body any controlled substance under circum-
stances in violation of the laws of this state;
(b) To enhance the effect on the human body of any controlled substance under
circumstances in violation of the laws of this state;
(c) To conceal any quantity of any controlled substance under circumstances in
violation of the laws of this state;
(d) To test the strength, effectiveness, or purity of any controlled substance
under circumstances in violation of the laws of this state.
256. No. 80-2062, slip. op. at 5. COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-22-503(1) (Supp. 1980) provides:
In determining whether an object is drug paraphernalia, a court, in its discretion,
may consider, in addition to all other relevant factors, the following:
(a) Statements by an owner or by anyone in control of the object concerning its
use;
(b) The proximity of the object to controlled substances;
(c) The existence of any residue of controlled substances on the object;
(d) Direct or circumstantial evidence of the intent of an owner, or of anyone in
control of the object, to deliver it to persons who he knows intend to use the object to
facilitate a violation of this part 5;
(e) Instructions, oral or written, provided with the object concerning its use;
(0 Descriptive materials accompanying the object which explain or depict its
use;
(g) National or local advertising epncerning its use;
(h) The manner in which the object is displayed for sale;
(i) Whether the owner, or anyone in control of the object, is a supplier of like or
related items to the community for legal purposes, such as an authorized distributor or
dealer of tobacco products;
(j) The existence and scope of legal uses for the object in the community;
(k) Expert testimony concerning its use.
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and intended" was defective. The terms "adapted" and "designed" are con-
tradictory-"designed" means that something was devised for a specific pur-
pose; "adapted" means that something is changed so that it can be used for
purposes for which it was not designed. The court, however, finding that the
term "adapted" contributed virtually nothing to the standard, held that the
legislative intent was "fostered and promoted" by severance of the term.
25 7
Consequently, the court was left to determine whether the remaining stan-
dard, "primarily designed and intended," was vague and overbroad.
With respect to the argument that the law does not provide the notice
of proscribed conduct required by Lanzeta v. New Jersey, 258 the court held
that because the statute requires intent on the part of the violator it provides
adequate notice.259 With respect to the argument that the statute does not
provide adequate standards for law enforcement officers as required by
Papachritou v. City of Jacksonui/le,260 the court, quoting United States 0. Pa-
tr,1/o, 26 1 stated that the fact that different minds could reach different results
with respect to a given item of drug paraphernalia is not sufficient reason to
hold the language unconstitutionally vague.2 6 2 The court found that the
eleven factors listed in the statute provided adequate guidance.
The court also held that the statute was not overbroad. It held that the
word "primarily" preceding the word "designed" eliminates the concern
that any item that conceivably may be used with illegal drugs may be de-
clared illegal.
2 6 3
B. Access to the Ballot
In Skeen v. Hooper,26 4 the court of appeals upheld the constitutionality of
a New Mexico statute that provided that if a vacancy occurred after a pri-
mary election in the list of nominees of a politicial party for a general elec-
tion, the central committee of the state party could fill the vacancy. 26 5 The
action arose out of the primary election of June 3, 1980, in which the five-
term Democratic incumbent won a position on the general ballot for Con-
gress. The Republicans did not nominate a candidate. On August 5, 1980,
the Democratic nominee died. Both Democratic and Republican State Cen-
tral Committees then met to select candidates for the general election. The
Democratic nominee was certified by the secretary of state, but the Republi-
can nominee was rejected on the ground that his nomination was not per-
mitted under the statute because there was no vacancy to fill. The plaintiff
argued that the statute violated article I of the United States Constitution
and the first and fourteenth amendments. The court of appeals relied on
257. No. 80-2062, slip op. at 14.
258. 306 U.S. 451 (1939).
259. No. 80-2062, slip op. at 24.
260. 405 U.S. 150, 162 (1972).
261. 332 U.S. 1 (1947).
262. No. 80-2062, slip op. at 25.
263. Id. at 18.
264. 631 F.2d 707 (10th Cir. 1980).
265. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-8-8.A (Supp. 1979).
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Storer v. Brown26 for the proposition that not every substantial restriction on
the right to vote or associate is automatically invalid. The court then held
that the statute met the strict scrutiny test because it served the compelling
state interest of ensuring fair, honest, and orderly elections.267 The court
noted that Skeen still had the right to wage a write-in campaign.
268
Anderson v. Hooper269 arose out of the same election as Skeen. After her
husband's death, the widow of the deceased congressman decided to run as
an independent candidate. On September 3, 1980, she changed her party
affiliation from Democrat to Independent. Her declaration of candidacy
was rejected because it did not contain the statutorily required statement
that she had been unaffiliated since January 1st of the year of the general
election. 270 The court of appeals again relied on Storer v. Brown,2 7 1 which
upheld a California statute denying a position on the general election ballot
to an independent candidate who had a registered affiliation with a qualified
political party within one year prior to the immediately preceding primary
election. Because the New Mexico statute was actually less restrictive tem-
porally, the court found it to be constitutional.
2 72
C. Religious Freedom
In Espinosa v. Rusk,2 73 the Tenth Circuit was presented with the ques-
tion of whether an Albuquerque ordinance regulating solicitation violated
the first and fourteenth amendments as applied to the Seventh Day Advent-
ist annual solicitation drive known as the Ingathering. The money collected
by the Ingathering goes to medical, community, evangelical, and educa-
tional services, which the church maintained were all part of its religious
mission. The ordinance excepted solicitations by religious groups solely for
"evangelical, missionary, or religious but not secular purposes. ' 274 Compli-
ance with the ordinance for non-exempt activities required payment of a
twenty-five dollar fee plus the filing of an application which called for infor-
mation about the organization. The district court found the ordinance inva-
lid because it employed a religious test.
275
The court of appeals affirmed the holding of the district court, deeming
Cantwell v. Connecticut2 76 controlling.2 77 Cantwell had invalidated a statute
prohibiting non-religious solicitations. The court of appeals stated that "al-
though the ordinance does not express any anti-religious effort or object, it is
266. 415 U.S. 724 (1974).
267. 631 F.2d at 711.
268. The court noted that state election codes in 45 states and the District of Columbia
contained, at the time of the appeal, replacement provisions substantially the same as New
Mexico's election statute. Id. at 712.
269. 632 F.2d 116 (10th Cir. 1980).
270. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-8-48 (1978).
271. 415 U.S. 724 (1974).
272. 632 F.2d at 120. The California statute requires no party affiliation for more than one
year, the New Mexico statute requires no party affiliation for less than one year.
273. 634 F.2d 477 (10th Cir. 1980).
274. Id. at 479.
275. Id. at 480.
276. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
277. 634 F.2d at 480.
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objectionable because it involves municipal officials in the definition of what
is religious."
2 78
Judge Barrett, dissenting, argued that the question should be whether
the ordinance imposes an "undue, excessive restraint" upon the activities of
the church by requiring a prior application for a permit to solicit funds in-
tended for secular activities. 2 79 Judge Barrett would have answered the
question in the negative because he felt the burden on religious organiza-
tions to be de mintmis in relation to the city's compelling interest in prevent-
ing fraudulent solicitations.
28 0
D. The Supremacy Clause
In United States v. Colorado,28 ' the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that an attempt by Jefferson County, Colorado, to tax Rockwell Interna-
tional for the use of land at the Rocky Flats nuclear weapons plant was
unconstitutional as violative of the supremacy clause. 28 2 The land and
buildings at Rocky Flats are owned by the United States, and Rockwell is
presently operating and managing the plant under contract. In 1975, the
Colorado General Assembly enacted a statute providing that "[w]hen any
property .. .exempt from taxation is . ..used by a . . .corporation in
connection with a business conducted for profit, the. . . user thereof shall be
subject to taxation . . . to the same extent as though the . . . user were the
owner of such property. '2 8 3 Pursuant to the statute, the county assessor for
Jefferson County assessed Rockwell over $4.5 million in taxes for the year
1976. The United States brought an action against the state and county
seeking a declaratory judgment that the tax sought to be imposed was a tax
on property owned by the United States and therefore, under McCulloch v.
Mayland,284 barred by the supremacy clause. The trial court entered judg-
ment in favor of the United States.
285
The court of appeals affirmed, emphasizing that Rockwell did not have
a lease, permit, or license to the property, but merely used the property in
performance of its contract. Therefore, the court held, the efforts of the state
to impose a tax on Rockwell was in reality an effort to impose a tax on the
property itself.286 The court distinguished a number of cases relied upon by
the state. For example, in United States v. Boyd, 28 7 the Supreme Court upheld
the imposition of a "contractor's use tax" on two corporations that had con-
tracts with the Atomic Energy Commission relating to services to be per-
formed at the nuclear plant at Oak Ridge, Tennessee. The companies
procured materials which were used by them in performance of their con-
278. Id. at 481.
279. Id. at 483 (Barrett, J., dissenting).
280. Id.
281. 627 F.2d 217 (10th Cir. 1980).
282. Id. at 221.
283. Coto. REv. STAT. § 39-3-112 (Supp. 1980).
284. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
285. 627 F.2d at 219.
286. Id.
287. 378 U.S. 39 (1964).
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tractual obligations. The tax was measured by the purchase price of the
property used by the contractors and was imposed on contractors who
purchased personal property from third parties and thereafter used the prop-
erty in the course of their performance under the contracts. The court of
appeals distinguished Boyd on the basis that Colorado was not seeking to
impose a tax on goods acquired and then used by Rockwell, but rather seek-
ing to impose a tax on Rockwell measured by the value of the plant, which is
wholly government owned.
288
The court of appeals also discussed United States v. Detroit,289 in which
the city of Detroit was permitted to tax an industrial plant owned by the
United States but leased to Borg-Warner Corporation and used in a private
manufacturing business. The court distinguished Detroit, stating that
Rockwell is merely going onto government-owned property where it per-
forms management services. 2 90 The court also distinguished United States v.
Township of Muskegon, 29 ' in which the state was permitted to tax a govern-
ment-owned manufacturing plant used by Continental Motors Corporation
under a "permit," in the performance of government contracts to make
goods which were then sold to the government.
The court of appeals found that United States v. County of Allegheny
292
approximated the instant case, although the reasoning of Allegheny has been
questioned. 293 In Allegheny, a company entered into a contract to manufac-
ture ordnance for the United States. Equipment was installed in the com-
pany's plant at government cost and was to remain the property of the
United States. The Supreme Court rejected an attempt by Pennsylvania to
increase the plant's assessed value for ad valorem taxes, holding that the
"substance of this procedure is to lay an ad valorem general property tax on
property owned by the United States." 294 The court of appeals in the in-
stant case held that the substance of Jefferson County's attempted taxation
also was an attempt to impose a general property tax on United States
property.
295
Kingsley R. Browne
288. 627 F.2d at 220.
289. 355 U.S. 466 (1958).
290. 627 F.2d at 220.
291. 355 U.S. 484 (1958).
292. 322 U.S. 174 (1944).
293. Set United States v. County of Fresno, 429 U.S. 452, 462 n.10 (1977); American Invs-
Co Countryside, Inc. v. Riverdale Bank, 596 F.2d 211, 217 n.I I (7th Cir. 1979); United States v.
Town of Windsor, 496 F. Supp. 581, 590 (D. Conn. 1980).
294. 322 U.S. at 185.
295. 627 F.2d at 221.
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CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
OVERVIEW
During the period covered by this survey, the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals has again decided a large number of cases concerning criminal law
and procedure. This survey will discuss only the more significant cases, and
will briefly review the recent developments in criminal law and procedure in
the Tenth Circuit.
I. FOURTH AMENDMENT
A. Probable Cause
In Untied States v. Sporleder,I probable cause for a warrant to search a
building was established in the supporting affidavit largely through the hear-
say statements of two informants. One informant tipped Drug Enforcement
Agency (DEA) agents that he had delivered substantial quantities of phenyl-
2-proponone, an ingredient commonly used in the manufacture of
methamphetamine and amphetamine, to the subject location. The other in-
formant claimed that the defendant said he was manufacturing
methamphetamine in a fake radio shop at the location, and had previously
used a similar lab at a location where officers had seized paraphernalia fre-
quently used in methamphetamine labs.2 On appeal, the defendant chal-
lenged the validity of the search warrants.
The Tenth Circuit recognized that under Aguilar v. Texas, 3 an affidavit
supporting a search warrant must inform the magistrate "of some of the
underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded that the nar-
cotics were where he claimed they were, and some of the underlying circum-
stances from which the officer concluded that the informant .. . was
'credible' or his information 'reliable.' '4 In Sporleder, the affidavit clearly set
out underlying circumstances which verified the informant's conclusions
concerning the existence of narcotics on the premises. 5 The affidavit did not,
however, reveal the identity of the informants or whether they had previ-
ously proven reliable.
The appellate court held that a previous track record of reliability is not
necessary to satisfy Aguilar; an informant's trustworthiness may also be
proven through independent police investigation which corroborates the
1. 635 F.2d 809 (10th Cir. 1980).
2. Id at 811.
3. 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
4. 635 F.2d at 811-12. In two cases decided during this survey period, United States v.
Pennington, 635 F.2d 1387 (10th Cir. 1980) and United States v. Gagnon, 635 F.2d 766 (1981),
the Tenth Circuit implied that Agwiai' is of limited applicability in challenges of affidavit state-
ments supplied by nonprofessional informants who have little motivation for supplying false
information to police officers.
5. 635 F.2d at 812. The statements were based on conversations with the defendant and
personal observation of the premises.
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tip.6 In this case, the police placed a "beeper" in an order of methylamine,
the immediate precursor chemical used in the manufacture of
methamphetamine, and traced the delivery order to the subject location.
The court found this to be sufficient independent corroboration to satisfy the
second prong of the Agutlar test.
7
In United States v. Johnson,8 the defendant challenged the sufficiency of
an affidavit in support of an application for electronic surveillance on the
ground that the affidavit did not meet the necessary requirement of 18
U.S.C. § 2518(l)(c). This section of the statute provides that an application
for an order authorizing the interception of a wire communication shall in-
clude "a full and complete statement as to whether or not other investigative
procedures have been tried and failed or why they reasonably appear to be
unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous."9 In this instance, the
affidavit outlined the investigative procedures that had been used, and
stated that the wiretap on the phone of the principal actor of a drug conspir-
acy was necessary to identify the other conspirators.
The Tenth Circuit, in noting that wiretap affidavits are to be read in a
practical rather than a hypertechnical manner, refused to interpret the sec-
tion to mean that the government must exhaust all other conceivable investi-
gative procedures before resorting to wiretapping. Rather, the affidavit need
only show that traditional procedures would be inadequate. Since appre-
hension of the "satellites" of an extensive drug conspiracy is a proper pur-
pose of electronic surveillance, the court held the affidavit to be sufficient in
this instance.' 0
In United States v. Schauble, t the Tenth Circuit considered the necessity
of a Franks hearing 12 in light of a challenge to the veracity of the factual
statements made in an affidavit in support of a search warrant. The affida-
vit stated that the informant, while at the subject residence, had seen a
quantity of green leafy vegetation believed to be marijuana. The defendant
requested a Franks hearing on the basis of his own affidavit stating that only
one person had visited the house during the stated time period. According
to the affidavit, this person had come no further than the front porch, from
where it is physically impossible to see inside the front door. The defendant
also offered in evidence another affidavit filled out by the same affiant, iden-
tical to the one in issue except for the language that the informant was "in-
side" the residence instead of "at" the residence.' 3
The court of appeals noted that Franks v. Delaware4 provides a chal-
lenge to a warrant's veracity only when the defendant makes a preliminary
6. 635 F.2d at 811-12. See Mapp v. Warden, N.Y. State Corr. Inst., 531 F.2d I167 (2d
Cir.), cert. deried, 429 U.S. 982 (1976),
7. 635 F.2d at 812.
8. 645 F.2d 865 (10th Cir. 1981).
9. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c) (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
10. 645 F.2d at 867.
11. 647 F.2d 113 (10th Cir. 1981).
12. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), allows the defendant an evidentiary hearing
to challenge the factual allegations in a warrant affidavit in certain instances.
13. 647 F.2d at 117.
14. 438 U.S. 154 (1978).
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showing that the affiant knowingly or recklessly disregarded the truth in in-
cluding a false statement in the warrant affidavit. 15 In Schauble, the court
held that the defendant failed to make this preliminary showing, since the
defendant only produced facts showing that the informer's statement may
have been false, and not that the affiant knew or should have known it to be
false. That the affidavit stated that the informant was "at" the residence
was held not to sustain an inference that the affiant knew of the informant's
inability to see what the informant claimed to see. 16 The court concluded
that the Franks hearing was properly denied.
B. Investigatory Stop
In United States v. Merryman,' 7 the Tenth Circuit considered when an
officer on roving patrol may stop a car suspected of carrying illegal aliens
and what minimal intrusion upon the car's occupants may be justified by
this suspicion. In Menyman, the officer watched a truck pull over to the side
of the road just before it reached a United States border patrol checkpoint,
wait until a string of cars passed, and then make a U-turn across the median
and go back in the opposite direction. The officer followed the truck and
observed that it was a type frequently used to transport illegal aliens, and
that beneath the tarp covering the bed of the truck were lumpy objects.' 8
The officer approached the truck when it stopped at a gas station and ques-
tioned the driver about his citizenship and the contents in the bed of the
truck. The officer then stuck his head in the back of the truck "in prepara-
tion for reaching down and telling them to come out from under there.' 9
The officer smelled what he believed to be marijuana, and saw something
similar to hay sticking from under the tarp; the truck contained 242 pounds
of marijuana.
The Tenth Circuit relied upon United States v. Brignoni-Ponce2 ° in refus-
ing to suppress the marijuana as evidence discovered through an illegal
search. Brignoni-Ponce held that probable cause is not needed for an investi-
gatory stop of a car suspected of carrying illegal aliens; such a stop may be
justified by specific articulable facts together with rational inferences from
the facts which warrant suspicion that the car contained illegal aliens. 2 I By
looking at the total circumstances, the appellate court was satisfied that the
stop in Merryman met the Br'gnoni-Ponce test. The court distinguished United
States v. Oglvie ,22 which held that avoiding a checkpoint by exiting the high-
15. Id
16. Id
17. 630 F.2d 780 (10th Cir. 1980).
18. Id at 781.
19. Id
20. 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
21. Id
22. 527 F.2d 330 (9th Cir. 1975). In United States v. Lebya, 627 F.2d 1059 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 987 (1980), also decided during this survey period, the Tenth Circuit found that
sufficient "articulable facts" were present to justify a Bngnoni-Pnce stop since the car in that
case was travelling at night on a road near a border often used to transport illegal aliens, was
heavily loaded, and contained back seat passengers who appeared to be "slouching down" to
avoid detection when the car was illuminated. Id at 1063.
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way just prior to reaching it does not supply the requisite suspicion for a
stop.
The appellate court in Meyman also relied upon Brignoni-Ponce in hold-
ing that bending over the bed of the truck to pat the "lumpy objects" was
within the constitutional parameters of the investigatory stop.2 3 Under
Br'gnoni-Ponce, an officer may stop a car and investigate the circumstances
that provoked suspicion.2 4 According to the Tenth Circuit, the lumpy ob-
jects under the tarp constituted a suspicious circumstance, the investigation
of which was a constitutional minimal intrusion upon the truck's
occupants.
25
The court's opinion represents a significant extension of Brignoni-Ponce
principles. Bngnoni-Ponce does not expressly authorize, in the absence of
probable cause, the investigation challenged here; it only permits an officer
to question the driver and passengers about their citizenship and immigra-
tion status, and ask them to explain any suspicious circumstances. Any fur-
ther detention or search should be based on consent or probable cause. 26 By
condoning investigatory conduct beyond mere questioning as permissible
"minimum intrusion," the Tenth Circuit obscures the distinction between a
"search" requiring probable cause and an "investigatory stop" which does
not.
27
C. Warrantless Searches
1. Searches Incident to an Arrest
In United States v. Gay,28 the right to search incident to arrest was at issue
before the Tenth Circuit. In this case, FBI agents had a warrant for appel-
lant Gay's arrest as a federal escapee. En route to the intended arrest of Gay
at a Denver garage, the agents heard on their car radio of a bank robbery by
someone matching Gay's description. When the FBI agents arrested Gay at
the garage, they searched him and seized considerable currency which they
discovered in Gay's possession. This currency was used to convict Gay of the
bank robbery.
2 9
The Tenth Circuit relied on two cases to uphold the constitutionality of
both the full search of Gay and the seizure of the currency. The court cited
Chj'nel v. Cafonmt'a30 for the proposition that the arresting officer may seize
any evidence found on the defendant at the time of the arrest. The court
also relied on United States v. Simpson,31 an earlier Tenth Circuit case, to the
23. 630 F.2d at 784.
24. 422 U.S. at 881.
25. 630 F.2d at 784.
26. Id at 881-82.
27. In Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973), the Supreme Court held
that a border patrol officer may not search the car of a suspected illegal alien without probable
cause to believe that a crime has been committed. See W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE
§ 10.5(0 (1978 & Supp. 1981).
28. 623 F.2d 673 (10th Cir.), cert. dened, 101 S. Ct. 366 (1980).
29. I at 675.
30. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
31. 453 F.2d 1028 (10th Cir.), cert. dntid, 408 U.S. 925 (1972).
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effect that the arresting officer may, pursuant to a search incident to an ar-
rest, seize a totally unrelated object which provides grounds for prosecution
of a crime different than that for which the accused was arrested. The court
concluded that anything found on a defendant's person during a search inci-
dent to an arrest may be used as evidence in the prosecution of an offense
unrelated to the one leading to the arrest.
3 2
The Tenth Circuit apparently did not consider it significant that the
FBI agents had reason to suspect Gay of robbing the bank at the time they
arrested him as a federal escapee. Thus, the court did not address the ques-
tion of whether an arrest warrant for one crime may justify an intentional
search for evidence of another.3 3 By seizing the currency pursuant to a
search following Gay's arrest as a detainee, the FBI agents avoided judicial
process for establishing probable cause to arrest Gay on suspicion of bank
robbery. The court's opinion also ignores the issue of whether the agents had
probable cause to seize the currency at the time of Gay's arrest.
34
2. Searches of Persons Pursuant to a Premises Search Warrant
In United States v. Sporleder,35 police officers, in executing a premises
search warrant, also searched the defendant, thereby discovering and seizing
some methamphetamine in the defendant's possession. Upon challenge, the
Government attempted to justify the search as a constitutionally permissible
patdown for weapons. In ruling that the methamphetamine should have
been suppressed, the appellate court noted that the facts in Sporleder were
similar to those presented in Ybarra v. Ilhnois.
3 6
Under Ybarra, probable cause to search a location does not support a
search of a person who happens to be there during execution of the warrant.
That the person searched in Sporleder was an object of the Government's sus-
picion that led to the search of the premises was of no consequence.3 7 The
Sporleder court concluded that the search, unconstitutional under Ybarra, also
could not be justified under Terry v. Ohio38 as a patdown for weapons. Ac-
cording to Terry, the officers must have a reasonable belief the suspect is
armed and presently dangerous in order to conduct a limited search for
32. 623 F.2d at 675.
33. In Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960), the Supreme Court upheld the seizure of
evidence concerning a defendant's suspected espionage activities pursuant to a search incident
to arrest for immigration violations. An argument can be made, however, that an intended
search based upon probable cause of a separate crime should be supported by a separate war-
rant because warrantless searches are per se unreasonable under the fourth amendment. Set
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 481 (1971), where such an argument is implied. The
weakness of this argument lies in its emphasis of technical over practical considerations.
34. Seizure of items pursuant to a lawful search must be based upon probable cause that
the items seized are evidence of some crime. State v. Elkins, 245 Or. 279, 422 P.2d 250 (1966).
See aLto Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967), W. LAFAVE, szipra note 23, at § 5.20).
35. 635 F.2d 809 (10th Cir. 1980).
36. 444 U.S. 85 (1979). In Ybarra, police officers in execution of a search warrant for a
tavern also searched a patron of the tavern, thereby violating his fourth amendment rights. The
Supreme Court in Ybarra recognized that the right to privacy under the fourth amendment
protects persons, not places, so that each patron's rights are distinct from those of the tavern's
proprietor. Id at 91-92.
37. 635 F.2d at 814.
38. 392 U.S. 1 (1967).
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weapons. Since the Government presented no evidence in Sporleder leading
to such a belief, the search was unconstitutional under Terry. The Govern-
ment's final point in Sporleder, that the searching officer felt a metal object in
the defendant's pocket, did not support a reasonable belief before the search
that the defendant was armed.
39
3. Searches of a Dwelling
In two cases decided during this survey period, the Tenth Circuit held
that the Government had failed to meet its heavy burden of justifying a
warrantless search of a dwelling. In United States v. Ochoa-A/manza,40 an of-
ficer conducting an investigation of illegal aliens had reason to believe the
aliens had entered a particular house. Pursuant to his investigation, the of-
ficer requested permission to enter the house from a six-year old child. Upon
entering the house, the officer saw the suspected aliens.
4 '
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the trial court decision that the Govern-
ment had failed to meet its burden of proving that the six-year old freely,
intelligently and knowingly gave consent to a search of the house. 42 The
appellate court thus did not directly address the issue of whether a six-year
old child has the capacity to waive another's fourth amendment rights.
Judge Barrett, in dissent, distinguished consent to enter a house from
consent to search the house. Judge Barrett reasoned that assuming consent
to enter the house was valid, the suspected aliens were discovered by the in-
vestigating officer in plain view without the officer searching the house.
43
Whether the officer intended to search upon entering was according to
Judge Barrett, speculation irrelevant to proper fourth amendment analysis.
He concluded that confusion between lawful entry and lawful search will
result in discouragement of customary and proper police investigatory
procedures.
44
Despite Judge Barrett's admonition in Ochoa-Almanza, the Tenth Circuit
in another case decided during this survey period presumed that police of-
ficers who entered a dwelling did so with intent to search. In United States v.
Anthon, 45 the defendant, Anthon, was arrested outside his motel room. The
arresting officers took Anthon back into his room to collect -his personal be-
longings, where they discovered and seized various items used against
Anthon at trial.
46
The appellate court first noted that no exigent circumstances justified a
warrantless search of the motel room incident to an arrest in the lobby.4 7 In
39. 635 F.2d at 814.
40. 623 F.2d 676 (10th Cir. 1980).
41. Id at 677.
42. Id The court applied the three-part test set out in United States v. Abbott, 546 F.2d
883, 885 (10th Cir. 1977), in determining whether consent to search the house was given
knowingly.
43. 623 F.2d at 678 (Barrett, J., dissenting).
44. Id at 680.
45. 648 F.2d 669 (10th Cir. 1981).
46. Id at 672.
47. Id at 675. This point of law was decided upon similar facts in Vale v. Louisiana, 399
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holding that the evidence should have been suppressed, the court ruled that
the officers' entry into and presence in the hotel room, absent Anthon's re-
quest or consent, violated Anthon's fourth amendment rights, even though
the agents found the seized items once they were inside the motel room in a
manner inoffensive to the Constitution.48  Evidently, where the intent to
search a dwelling is shown by the police officers' conduct, the officers' unin-
vited entry into a dwelling violates the occupant's rights regardless of
whether the officers subsequently search the dwelling or find evidence in
plain view.
D. Fruit of the Poisonous Tree
In United States v. Weller, 49 the defendant, Weller, was arrested for sus-
pected participation in a bank robbery. Weller made statements, later sup-
pressed, to the police that he and the known principal to the robbery
travelled from Oregon to Pueblo, Colorado, in a particular Monte Carlo
automobile. A Monte Carlo with Oregon license plates was found later
parked near the bank by a Colorado Bureau of Investigation agent. The car
was towed into the basement of the police building. When the police asked
Weller if he wanted to retrieve his personal effects from the car, Weller said
he did and proceeded to take a small box out of the trunk. The box con-
tained $1390 in cash; the money was inventoried and later used as evidence
against Weller. 50
The Tenth Circuit refused to suppress this evidence as resulting from an
illegal search of the Monte Carlo. Rather, the court concluded that no
search occurred in that the money was discovered pursuant to Weller's own
request to retrieve certain belongings from the trunk.5 '
The appellate court did not consider the fruit of the poisonous tree doc-
trine applicable, despite Weller's claim that the Monte Carlo incident was
"fruit" stemming from Weller's statements to the Pueblo police. Again, the
court focused on the voluntary nature of Weller's retrieval of the money as
dispositive of the issue.52 Such analysis avoided the question of whether the
Monte Carlo itself would have been discovered but for the police's illegal
questioning of Weller. If the car would not have been impounded but for
Weller's suppressed statements, the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine is at
least relevant to Weller's constitutional challenge. 5 3 If the appellate court
U.S. 30 (1970), in which a search of a house incident to an arrest on the house's front steps was
found to be unconstitutional.
48. 648 F.2d at 675-76.
49. 652 F.2d 964 (10th Cir. 1981).
50. Id at 968.
51. Id, at 969.
52. The court during this survey period also dismissed a "fruit of the poisonous tree" claim
in United States v. Leonard, 630 F.2d 789 (10th Cir. 1980). In Leonard, the court held that a
gun discovered in a glove compartment through illegal questioning need not be suppressed,
since the gun would have been found anyway through the customary inventory of the im-
pounded van. Id. at 791.
53. Under Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963), evidence which is an indirect
product of illegal police conduct must be suppressed, unless the evidence largely resulted from
an independent and legal source, such as the defendant's voluntary confession.
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considered Weller's voluntary request to retrieve his personal belongings as
sufficient attenuation to "dissipate the taint" of the illegality, such reasoning
was not expressed in the opinion.
II. FIFTH AMENDMENT
A. Double Jeopardy
In United States v. Central Liquor Co. 4 the Government indicted two
small partnerships and the most active partner of each for Sherman Act
55
violations. The defendants appealed prior to trial, the trial court's denial of
their motion to dismiss the indictment. As grounds for the appeal, appel-
lants urged that indictment of both the small partnerships and the individ-
ual partner of each for the same activity is precluded by the double jeopardy
clause. As support for their interlocutory appeal, the appellants principally
relied on Abnq v. United States56 in which the Supreme Court decided that a
denial of a double jeopardy claim may be appealed when denial of the claim
would place the defendants in the position of undergoing a second trial for
the same offense.
57
In a well-reasoned opinion, the Tenth Circuit recognized that the
double jeopardy clause protects both the right not to be tried more than
once for the same offense and the right not to receive multiple convictions for
the same offense. 58 In denying the defendant's interlocutory appeal, the ap-
pellate court noted that immediate review of the trial court's rejection of a
double jeopardy claim protects only the right against multiple prosecutions;
the defendant may appeal prior to trial only when he has already undergone
one trial for the offense. That the multiple counts in this case led to in-
creased attorney expenses and complexity of the issues does not constitute
multiple prosecution according to the court. The court therefore held that
the Abnqy doctrine did not apply to these defendants. 59
The appellate court concluded that protection against multiple convic-
tions could best be reviewed upon final order by the trial court. If the trial
results in conviction of only the partners or the partnerships, then no double
jeopardy claim would be presented; the clause does not protect against the
increased probability of a single conviction arising out of multiple charges.
If both partners and partnerships are convicted, post-conviction appeal sup-
ported by a trial record would provide an appropriate remedy.
6°
54. 628 F.2d 1264 (10th Cir. 1980).
55. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
56. 431 U.S. 651 (1977).
57. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976), only "final decisions" are appealable; AbnOy held that
at least some dismissals of double jeopardy claims may be considered as final decisions under the
statute. In United States v. Eggert, 624 F.2d 973 (10th Cir. 1980), decided in this survey period,
the Tenth Circuit held that an interlocutory appeal of a motion to dismiss an indictment on the
grounds that the indictment violated terms of a plea agreement does not involve double jeop-
ardy, and falls outside the Abney exception.
58. 628 F.2d at 1266. See Comment, Statutoy Implementation of Double Jeopard Clauses: New
Life for a Moribund Constitutional Guarantee, 65 YALE L.J. 339 (1956).
59. 628 F.2d at 1266-67.
60. Id
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The Supreme Court decided in United States o. DinitZ6 1 that retrial is not
available to the prosecution when, through its own misconduct, the prosecu-
tion provokes the defense to request a mistrial in order to further the prose-
cution's chances of conviction upon retrial. In United States v. Rios, 62 the
Tenth Circuit held that double jeopardy considerations are equally applica-
ble when prosecutorial misconduct requires reversal of conviction on appeal,
as when the misconduct leads to granting of the mistrial motion in the first
instance. That the mistrial grounds are accepted as valid only on appeal is
irrelevant to double jeopardy concerns.
6 3
The appellate court further decided in Rios that while prosecutorial
misconduct denied the defendants a fair trial, retrial was still available be-
cause the prosecutor did not intend, as in Dinitz, to cause a mistrial request
in order to further the chances of conviction upon retrial.64 The court relied
on its earlier United States v. Leonard65 decision for the proposition that the
prosecutor's bad faith in the abstract, absent intent to provoke a mistrial
request, will not bar retrial of the case. The court held that the record did
not indicate such intent on the part of the prosecution, because a strong case
had been made against the defendant, Government witnesses might not
have been available again, and the prosecutor had stated that he did not
want to retry the case.
6 6
Judge McKay, dissenting, disagreed with the reasoning of the majority
that the double jeopardy clause is not violated unless the prosecutor's pur-
pose is to obtain a mistrial. Judge McKay indicated that prosecutorial bad
faith, present in this case, is sufficient to bar retrial under Dinitz. He quoted
language from Lee v. United States,67 characterizing the Dinitz rule, that re-
trial is barred when the prosecutorial error was intended to provoke the mis-
trial motion or "was otherwise 'motivated by bad faith or undertaken to
harrass or prejudice' the petitioner."
' 8
In United States v. Combs, 69 the court was faced with the issue of whether
acceptance of a guilty plea on one count of an indictment precludes prosecu-
tion of a second count which charges the same offense. The defendant,
Combs, pled guilty to count I of bank larceny, and was later convicted of
bank robbery under count II. The trial judge merged the verdicts based on
the plea and the jury conviction, and handed down one sentence of twenty
years. 70 Combs appealed on double jeopardy grounds.
The Tenth Circuit concluded that bank larceny and bank robbery are
indeed lesser and greater forms of the same offense, and may not be the basis
61. 424 U.S. 600 (1976).
62. 637 F.2d 728 (10th Cir. 1980).
63. Id at 729; See Comment, 7he DoubeJeopardy Clause and MiVr&&ia Granted on Defendant's
Motiona Wha Kind of Poseauoriat Misconduct Preclues Reprosecution? 18 DUQUESNE L. REv. 103
(1979).
64. 637 F.2d at 729-30.
65. 593 F.2d 951 (10th Cir. 1979).
66. 637 F.2d at 730.
67. 432 U.S. 23 (1977).
68. Id (McKay, J., dissenting) (quoting Lee v. United States, 432 U.S. 23, 33-34 (1977)).
69. 634 F.2d 1295 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, No. 80-1071 (Feb. 23, 1981).
70. Id at 1296.
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of multiple punishment or prosecution. The court held, however, that
Combs was prosecuted and sentenced only once, reasoning that jeopardy did
not attach until Combs was sentenced on the guilty plea. 71 Since Combs
was not sentenced on his plea until conclusion of the trial on the count of
bank robbery, he was faced with only one prosecution for the offense. In
support of this conclusion the court noted that had the offenses been merged
in a single count, no double jeopardy claims could have been presented. The
court then suggested that double jeopardy considerations should not depend
upon how offenses are pled in a single indictment.
72
Again in dissent, Judge McKay criticized the majority decision for ex-
alting form over substance in focusing on imposition of the sentence as the
point when jeopardy attaches. To Judge McKay, this reasoning worked "se-
rious damage to the fabric of double jeopardy protection."7 3 He noted that
"[jjeopardy means exposure to the risk of a determination of guilt or inno-
cence," and suggested that jeopardy attaches not when sentence is imposed,
but when the guilty plea is accepted. 74 Judge McKay cited several cases to
the effect that a judge's acceptance of the plea is analogous to a jury verdict,
and concluded that jeopardy attaches when guilt or innocence is decided,
whether by plea or trial verdict.
Judge McKay's partial dissent would seem the better supported and
better reasoned opinion. The majority relied upon two Third Circuit deci-
sions for the proposition that jeopardy does not attach until sentencing on
the plea, yet Judge McKay correctly pointed out that the issue in the Third
Circuit is unclear; another case held that jeopardy attached upon acceptance
of the plea. 75 In the absence of clear case law to the contrary, the practical
effect of acceptance of the plea in terminating the issue of guilt would seem
to warrant attachment of jeopardy. The majority decision is, however, sup-
ported by the recognition in other circumstances that "the double jeopardy
implications reverberating from a guilty plea and a jury verdict are not
identical."
7 6
B. Se/f-Incrmnnatzon
In United States v. Jones,7 7 the Tenth Circuit considered the issue of
whether a defendant's right against self-incrimination is violated by use of a
psychiatric report at a sentencing hearing. In Jones, the trial court ordered
the defendant to undergo psychiatric evaluation prior to sentencing on a
guilty plea to possession of counterfeit obligations. During this evaluation,
Jones told the psychiatrist that he had committed several other crimes, in-
71. Id at 1298.
72. Id
73. Id at 1300 (McKay, J., dissenting in part).
74. Id
75. The majority relied upon United States v. Goldman, 352 F.2d 263 (3d Cir. 1965) and
United States v. Scarlata, 214 F.2d 807 (3d Cir. 1954). Judge McKay cited United States v.
Jerry, 487 F.2d 600 (3d Cir. 1973), to support his contrary view.
76. Ward v. Page, 424 F.2d 491, 493 (10th Cir. 1970) (holding that a guilty plea to a lesser
offense does not operate as an acquittal on all greater offenses, even though a jury conviction on
a lesser offense does have that effect).
77. 640 F.2d 284 (10th Cir. 1981).
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cluding the murder of a friend. The trial court considered these admissions
only insofar as they showed that Jones believed he had committed the al-
leged crimes.
78
The Tenth Circuit began its analysis with the observation that regard-
less of fifth amendment concerns, the trial court must base its sentencing on
true and accurate information. 79 Since it was not verified that Jones actu-
ally committed the crimes mentioned in the psychiatric report, the trial
court could not have used the statements in the report as substantive evi-
dence that Jones committed them.80 Furthermore, the sentencing process is
within the scope of fifth amendment protection. Any involuntary statements
by Jones included in the psychiatric report could not be used against him on
the issue of guilt.8 '
Under the facts of this case, however, the Tenth Circuit held that no
error was committed by the trial court. Neither the mandate that sentencing
be based on accurate information nor the privilege against self-incrimination
prohibits the court from considering the statements as pertinent to Jones'
mental status at the time of sentencing.8 2 The appellate court concluded
that the record reflected that the trial court considered the statements only
for that purpose. The court of appeals did recognize that in Smith v. Estelle8 3
the Fifth Circuit had held that a defendant could not be forced to undergo
psychiatric observations to determine the defendant's dangerousness at time
of trial. The Tenth Circuit distinguished Estelle on the facts, including the
fact that the defendant in Estelle had been charged with a capital offense.
84
C. Due Process
1. Right to Know Identity and Existence of Informer
In United States v. Perez-Gomez,8 5 the defendant challenged the Govern-
ment's refusals to advise the defendant of whether an informer was involved
in the case, and to disclose the informer's identity. The Government, in re-
sponding to a question on the omnibus hearing report, indicated that there
was no informer. Upon the defendant's motion to compel existence of the
suspected informer, the trial court ordered that the existence be disclosed.
The informer's existence was then revealed, and the trial court determined
after an in camera proceeding that the informer's identity need not be dis-
closed to defense counsel.
8 6
The Tenth Circuit recognized that the Government's failure to answer
the question on the omnibus report did not constitute reversible error absent
78. Id at 287.
79. Id The Tenth Circuit cited United States v. Lee, 540 F.2d 1205, 1211 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 894 (1976), in support of this proposition.
80. 640 F.2d at 286.
81. The Supreme Court has recognized that the privilege against self-incrimination can be
daimed in any judicial proceeding. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 47-48 (1967).
82. 640 F.2d at 288.
83. 602 F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1979), afd, 101 S. Ct. 1866 (131).
84. 640 F.2d at 288.
85. 638 F.2d 215 (10th Cir. 1981).
86. Id at 217.
1982]
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
a showing of prejudice. 87 Since the defendant learned of the informer's
existence prior to trial, the appellate court held that the defendant was not
prejudiced by the Government's admittedly improper actions.
The court then noted that in determining whether the informer's iden-
tity must be disclosed to the defense "a balance must be struck between the
public interest in protecting the flow of information and the individual's
right to prepare his defense." 8 In Perez-Gomez, there was a strong public
interest in protecting the identity of an informer who was currently involved
in ongoing investigations. The court held that the defendant's interest was
less strong, in that the informer could not have supplied information useful
in defense of the charges. The defendant was arrested for driving a car full
of illegal aliens. The defendant did not raise the issue of probable cause at
trial, so any information the informer may have had in this regard was irrel-
evant. The informer did not participate in transportation of the aliens, so
disclosure was not necessary to prepare an entrapment defense. The court
concluded that disclosure of the informer's identity was properly denied.8 9
Finally, the appellate court held that conducting the in camera proceeding
without the presence of defense counsel was not an abuse of the trial court's
discretion.9 0
2. Right to Fair Trial
In Soap o. Carler,9' a habeas corpus petition charged, in part, that the
prosecutor's racial remarks during his closing argument were so unfair as to
deprive the defendant of due process of law. The defendant, a Cherokee
Indian, stood trial for the murder of another Indian. Those present in the
home where the murder occurred were also Cherokees and had been drink-
ing. In his closing argument, the prosecutor suggested that "it is sad to see,
but when you see an Indian that drinks liquor, you see a man that can't
handle it."' 9 2 Later, the prosecutor said: "[y]ou try to impress upon people
that they can change . .. but some people just don't live that way ...
You have a class of people and a situation that exists that you and I can't
change irrespective of what we do. . . -93 The prosecution then suggested
that the alleged murder was "typical of the community in which this acci-
dent occurred." 94 No objection was made to these statements at trial.
The Tenth Circuit dismissed this due process claim as based on "a mi-
nor incident at trial to which no objection was made." 95 Judge Seymour,
dissenting, opined that such an appeal to personal bias, in which the prose-
cutor attempted to place himself and the jury in a class apart from the Indi-
ans and the defendant, impermissibly threatened the defendant's right to a
87. Id. The Tenth Circuit relied on United States v. Phillips, 585 F.2d 745, 747 (5th Cir.
1978), for this proposition.
88. 638 F.2d at 218.
89. Id
90. Id
91. 632 F.2d 872 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denzed, 101 S. Ct. 2021 (1981).
92. Id at 878.
93. Id
94. Id
95. Id at 876.
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fair trial. 96 Judge Seymour cited Haynes v. McKendrck97 for the applicable
standard that in absence of overwhelming evidence of guilt, the probability
of prejudice is sufficient to overturn a conviction. Since the defendant was
convicted by circumstantial evidence and the statements made were not in-
significant, Judge Seymour concluded that there was sufficient probability of
prejudice, in the absence of mitigating circumstances, to deprive the defend-
ant of his constitutional rights. 98
III. SIXTH AMENDMENT
A. Efective Assistance of Counsel
In Dyer v. Crisp,9 9 a case decided during the last survey period, the
Tenth Circuit adopted the stricter "reasonably competent" test over the pre-
vious "sham, farce and mockery" test as the standard for determining
whether a defendant has received effective assistance of counsel as guaran-
teed by the sixth amendment. 0 0 Several cases decided by the Tenth Circuit
during this survey period have established some guidelines for what the
court will consider as "reasonably competent" counsel.
The cases decided subsequent to Dyer have emphasized that defense
counsel's reasonable but possibly unfortunate choice of strategy, which in
hindsight may have been handled differently, is not a valid basis for a claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel. In United States v. Payne,' 0 1 the Tenth
Circuit held that defense counsel's decision not to call any defense witnesses,
because he believed the Government failed to meet its burden of proving the
defendant's guilt, was a reasonable strategy choice. In United States v.
Miller,10 2 the appellate court decided that failure to call a specific witness
whose testimony is only cumulative in nature is also a reasonably competent
decision.
The court of appeals also rejected a sixth amendment claim in United
States v. Johns.'0 3 In this case, defense counsel did not contest a charge of
parole violation in a probation revocation hearing. The appellate court held
that defense counsel's failure to contest the charge was not per se incompe-
tent, in that counsel may have desired to avoid having the matter more fully
explored by a judge who would eventually impose sentence.' 0 4 Thus, in ap-
peals on grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel, the Tenth Circuit ap-
parently will infer a reasonable strategy choice by defense counsel where one
is available. In such circumstances, the appellant may need to reach beyond
96. Id at 879 (Seymour, J., dissenting).
97. 481 F.2d 152, 159 (2d Cir. 1973).
98. 632 F.2d at 879-80 (Seymour, J., dissenting). There were no eyewitnesses to the mur-
der. Id at 880.
99. 613 F.2d 275 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 945 (1980).
100. The Tenth Circuit followed the precedent of all the other circuits except the Second
Circuit in adopting the stricter test. See Criminal Law and Procedure, Seventh Anmual Tenth Ciraut
Suny, 58 DEN. L.J. 319, 335 (1980).
101. 641 F.2d 866 (10th Cir. 1981).
102. 643 F.2d 713 (10th Cir. 1981).
103. 638 F.2d 222 (10th Cir. 1981).
104. Id at 224.
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what was done and reveal an improper purpose behind the challenged act in
order to present a successful claim of ineffective counsel.
In Marlinez v. Romero,10 5 the Tenth Circuit rejected a claim of ineffective
counsel in a habeas corpus action. This claim was based on defense counsel's
advice to the defendant to accept a plea bargain condition that the defend-
ant not contest identity at the subsequent habitual offender proceeding.
Through application of New Mexico's habitual offender statute, the defend-
ant was sentenced to a ten- to thirty-year prison term. In compliance with
the plea agreement, defense counsel did not bring to the sentencing court's
attention that a previous conviction was secured after the defendant signed a
form, possibly involuntarily, waiving his right to counsel.10 6 In holding that
the defense counsel's advice to the plea bargain was reasonable, the Tenth
Circuit focused on both the likelihood of conviction on the merits and a
much harsher sentence in a trial on the original charge.1
0 7
In United States v. Golub,"' the Tenth Circuit did find a defendant's
claim of ineffective counsel valid. In Golub, when the defendant's original
counsel withdrew from the case, the trial court refused to grant a continu-
ance of the trial scheduled to begin in two weeks. A relative of the defendant
agreed to represent him, and received the case file six days before trial. The
relative lacked recent experience in criminal law, and due to time and logis-
tical constraints was unable to interview witnesses. 0 9
The appellate court relied on Wo/fs v. Brtton, I0 an Eighth Circuit deci-
sion, for the applicable standards in determining whether a defendant has
received effective assistance of counsel under such circumstances. These
standards include "(1) the time afforded for investigation and preparation;
(2) the experience of counsel; (3) the gravity of the charge; (4) the complex-
ity of possible defenses; and (5) the accessibility of witnesses to counsel."'
I I
The appellate court concluded that the defendant's representation by his
relative failed to conform to any of these accepted standards. Defense coun-
sel's representation under the circumstances, including the seriousness of the
charge and complexity of the legal issues and defenses, was per se
ineffective. 112
In reaching its conclusion that the defendant's sixth amendment rights
were violated in Golub, the Tenth Circuit refused to consider whether defense
counsel's conduct in trial prejudiced the defendant. Rather, the court held
that regardless of counsel's conduct in trial the surrounding circumstances
105. 626 F.2d 807 (10th Cir.), cert. dented, 101 S. Ct. 585 (1980).
106. Id at 809.
107. Id If the defendant had been convicted of the original charge, he would have faced,
depending on the outcome of challenges to prior convictions, a possible sentence of 50 to 150
years. Id
108. 638 F.2d 185 (10th Cir. 1980).
109. Id at 187.
110. 509 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1975).
111. Id at 309; 638 F.2d at 189. For discussion of what investigation of a case is considered
necessary to criminal defense, see ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION, § 4-4.1 (2d ed. 1980)
(tentative draft).
112. 638 F.2d at 189. The defendant was charged with mail fraud, and upon conviction
received a five-year sentence.
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evidenced prejudice.'" 3 This same reasoning was used in United Slates v.
Payne,' 14 where the court of appeals noted that the Government has the
burden of establishing lack of prejudice when "incompetence of counsel is
pervasive . . . or other unusual circumstances exist."' "1 5 The court recog-
nized in Payne that this shift of the burden of proof in certain instances may
be questionable in light of United States v. Morrison, 1 6 in which the Supreme
Court held that a violation of sixth amendment rights does not merit rever-
sal of a conviction absent a showing of prejudice to the defendant.'17
In United States v. Weninger, 1 8 the Tenth Circuit considered whether ap-
pellant Weninger's refusal to hire an attorney within a reasonable time con-
stituted a waiver of his right to effective assistance of counsel. Weninger
appeared pro se to defend a charge of failure to file federal tax returns. He
contended at trial that he deliberately did not file the returns as a protest
against the conditions in our country and that he considered the income tax
laws to be invalid. The trial court recognized that Weninger's protest de-
fense was without legal merit and strongly urged him to retain counsel. The
trial court provided a recess to allow Weninger an opportunity to retain
counsel, but Weninger requested additional time to find a lawyer with Wen-
inger's unique political and legal views. The trial court refused to grant such
a continuance, and the trial proceeded. 119
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the trial court's decision that Weninger's
failure to hire an attorney, when given the opportunity, constituted a know-
ing and intelligent waiver of the right to assistance of counsel. ' 2 0 In so doing
the appellate court recognized that "the right to assistance of counsel does
not imply the absolute right to counsel of one's choice."' 2 1 The court con-
cluded that Weninger was given as much opportunity to retain counsel as
the effective administration of criminal justice allowed. In light of this
waiver of the right to counsel, the court noted that Weninger could not com-
plain that his own representation was ineffective.
122
B. Right to Trial by juy
In United States v. McAlister,' 23 the Tenth Circuit addressed the issue of
113. Id at 190.
114. 641 F.2d 866 (10th Cir. 1981).
115. Id. at 867-68.
116. 449 U.S. 361 (1981).
117. Id at 668-69.
118. 624 F.2d 163 (10th Cir. 1980).
119. Id at 164-66.
120. Id at 167; see Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (defendant has the right to
appear in his own defense); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (waiver of right to assistance
of counsel must be knowing and intelligent).
121. 624 F.2d at 166; see United States v. Dolan, 570 F.2d 1177 (3d Cir. 1978) (defendant is
not entitled to the services of a particular lawyer, when such services would lead to a conflict of
interest on the part of counsel); Kates v. Nelson, 435 F.2d 1085 (9th Cir. 1970) (defendant is not
entitled to appointment of different counsel upon expressed dissatisfaction with original ap-
pointed counsel); United States v. Rundle, 409 F.2d 1210 (3d Cir. 1969) (defendant is not enti-
tled to a continuance of longer than one weekend in order to retain counsel upon assertion of
dissatisfaction with appointed counsel).
122. 624 F.2d at 167.
123. 630 F.2d 772 (10th Cir. 1980).
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whether a defendant charged with trespass on a nuclear plant site, a crime
with a maximum penalty of $1000, had a constitutional right to trial by jury.
The trial court had refused the defendant's jury request on the grounds that
the charged offense was petty and therefore outside the scope of the sixth
amendment's jury trial guarantee. 1
24
The appellate court recognized that several circuits, including the
Tenth Circuit, had traditionallly used 18 U.S.C. § 1(3) as a guideline for
what constitutes petty offenses.' 25 Under this statute, any crime, the penalty
for which does not exceed either six months imprisonment or a fine of $500,
is a petty offense. 126 The court admitted that in Murnz v. Hojan,12 7 the
Supreme Court had held that sixth amendment concerns are not to be deter-
mined solely under the provisions of the statute, and that a $500 fine need
not be considered "serious" in all circumstances. In Muniz, the Supreme
Court upheld a $10,000 contempt fine levied on a 13,000-member labor
union in the absence of a jury.
128
The Tenth Circuit refused to apply Munz in considering whether an
individual is entitled to a jury. Instead, the court followed the Ninth Circuit
in acknowledging that constitutional rights should not vary depending on
the wealth of individual defendants. '2 9 In the absence of any other objective
criteria by which to judge a crime's seriousness, the appellate court con-
cluded that 18 U.S.C. § 1(3) should remain the benchmark for determina-
tion of an individual's right to jury trial. 130 Since the defendant had been
charged with committing a crime with a maximum penalty of over $1500, he
should have been afforded a jury trial.
C. Suafic'enO , of Miranda Wamnigs
In UnitedStates v. Anihon ,13 1 the Tenth Circuit considered whether state-
ments elicited before the defendant had been fully advised of his fifth and
sixth amendment rights should be suppressed. Anthon, arrested under suspi-
cion of possessing a pound of cocaine, was initially advised that he had a
right to remain silent, that anything he said could and would be used against
him in court, and that he had a right to counsel. He was not told that he
had a right to appointed counsel if he could not afford one, that he had a
right to have counsel present during questioning, and that he had a right to
stop questioning at any time. ' 32 After this partial advisement of his rights,
Anthon admitted that a small vial of cocaine and a marijuana cigarette
found in his motel room were his. When Anthon reached the DEA office, an
124. Id. at 773.
125. Id
126. 18 U.S.C. § 1(3) (1976).
127. 422 U.S. 454 (1975).
128. Id. at 476-77.
129. 630 F.2d at 774;see United States v. Hamdan, 552 F.2d 276 (9th Cir. 1977) (upholding
18 U.S.C. § 1(3) (1976) as the monetary measure of the "seriousness" of a fine).
130. 630 F.2d at 774. The court cited Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), and Frank
v. United States, 395 U.S. 147 (1969), as requiring objective criteria by which to measure a
crime's seriousness.
131. 648 F.2d 669 (10th Cir. 1981).
132. Id. at 672.
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agent, in the words of his own testimony, "again advised him of his
rights.' 1 3 3 At this time, Anthon, in an attempt to plea bargain with the
Government agents, acknowledged participation in the drug transaction
under investigation.' 34 Anthon was convicted of possession with intent to
distribute a quantity of cocaine.
The Tenth Circuit decided without discussion that Anthon's admission
to possessing the vial of cocaine and marijuana cigarette should have been
suppressed. The appellate court simply held that the statements "were im-
properly admitted inasmuch as Anthon was not fully advised of his Miranda
rights at the time he was originally arrested."' 3 5 The court ruled, however,
that Anthon's admission to participating in the transaction involving the
pound of cocaine was properly admitted, since the Government agent had
again advised him of his rights prior to this interrogation. The court con-
cluded that nothing in the record indicated that this final advisement was
inadequate. The court supported this conclusion with the recognition that
these statements were given voluntarily in an attempt to plea bargain with
the agents, and Miranda v. Arizona 136 does not bar admission of such volun-
tary statements. 1
37
Judge Seymour dissented, pointing out that the Government had failed
to meet its heavy burden under Miranda of proving that adequate warnings
were given and knowingly waived. She believed the majority was unjustified
in presuming that the final warnings were adequate, particularly in light of
the inadequacy of previous warnings. 138 If the warnings were not adequate,
then Anthon's fifth and sixth amendment rights could not have been know-
ingly waived. Nor did Judge Seymour believe that the statements could be
admitted as purely voluntary; the Miranda Court had recognized that custo-
dial interrogation contains inherently compelling pressures in response to
which no statement may be considered voluntary in the absence of sufficient
Miranda warnings. 1
39
Anthon raises the interesting question of whether a defendant's state-
ments made during attempted cooperation with Government agents for leni-
ency or immunity purposes, while the defendant is under arrest, may be
considered voluntary. 14 Since such statements are not in response to spe-
cific questions and are made for the defendant's own purposes, they are ar-
guably free of compulsion. However, such reasoning would appear to offend
the spirit if not the law of Miranda and Rhode Island v. Innis,14 ' which taken
133. Id at 672-73.
134. Id
135. Id
136. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
137. 648 F.2d at 674.
138. Id at 679 (Seymour, J., dissenting).
139. Id at 680. Judge Seymour quoted from Miranda examples of voluntary statements as
"a person who enters a police station and states that he wishes to confess a crime, or a person
who calls the police to offer a confession or any other statement he desires to make." 384 U.S. at
478.
140. While the Tenth Circuit majority considered Anthon's statements to be voluntary, this
conclusion was not necessary to the holding and was, therefore, dicta. 648 F.2d at 676.
141. 446 U.S. 291 (1980).
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together suggest suppression of an expected response to custodial
interrogation.
4 2
IV. PRISONERS' RIGHTS
In Parkhurst . Wyoming," 4 3 the defendant appealed the dismissal of an
action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.'44 The defendant had sought both
monetary relief and release from prison for his unconstitutional arrest, con-
viction and imprisonment, for murder and assault. The trial court had con-
strued all the claims as lying in habeas corpus, and denied relief for failure to
exhaust state remedies. 145 Appeal of the defendant's conviction was cur-
rently pending in the Wyoming Supreme Court when this action was
brought in federal court.
The Tenth Circuit held that while the defendant's request for release
from prison was cognizable .only through habeas corpus, the request for
money damages was a permissible claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.146 The
appellate court cited Woo9v. McDone// 4 7 for the procedural rule that a sec-
tion 1983 action may proceed while exhaustion of remedies runs its course in
state proceedings. Nevertheless, the court concluded that where the case for
damages arose from a claim of unconstitutional conviction, it was appropri-
ate to stay the action pending resolution of the defendant's state appeal.148
To handle the section 1983 action would be to decide the issues currently on
appeal to the Wyoming Supreme Court which, the court of appeals resolved,
would work undesirable interference with state criminal proceedings.
Philhps v. Carey"19 addressed the issue of what procedures must be fol-
lowed in order to dismiss prisoner complaints informapaupers as being with-
out merit. In Phi/lips, the trial court, after review of the defendant's prior
litigation history, concluded that the defendant had abused court process by
filing a series of frivolous complaints. The trial court set aside previousforma
pauper's authorization for a pending action, and placed certain limitations
on future actions brought by the appellant. 150
The Tenth Circuit recognized that the trial court's actions were not per
se improper; frivolous actions which cannot present a rational argument may
142. The Supreme Court in Int& succinctly held that "[a] practice that the police should
know is reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating response from a suspect thus amounts to
interrogation." 446 U.S. at 301.
143. 641 F.2d 775 (10th Cir. 1981).
144. This civil rights law provides that "[e]very person who, under color of any statute...
subjects or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress." 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
145. 641 F.2d at 776. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1976), any claim of unconstitutional con-
finement, pursuant to judgment of a state court, lies in habeas corpus and may not be heard in
federal court unless the petitioner "has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the
State."
146. 641 F.2d at 776.
147. 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
148. 641 F.2d at 777.
149. 638 F.2d 207 (10th Cir. 1981).
150. Id at 208.
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be dismissed, and the imposition of restrictions on future actions is permissi-
ble in "well documented and extreme cases." 15 1 The appellate court
stressed, however, that restrictions on an indigent person's access to the
courtroom are limited, and must be based on a record justifying such use of
the trial court's discretion. In the absence of the requisite procedures at the
trial level, the Tenth Circuit reversed the trial court's summary dismissal of
the action informa pauperis and remanded for further proceedings. 152 The
appellate court's reversal was thus based on the paucity of the record and
not on a particular violation of the defendant prisoner's rights. The appel-
late court did not say what specific procedures must be followed before a
forma pauperis petition may be dismissed.
V. CRIMINAL LAW AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
A. Conspiragy
In United States v. McMurray,153 the Tenth Circuit was faced with the
difficult task of deciding when apparently unrelated incidents should be
treated as parts of a single conspiracy. The alleged conspiracy involved a
sham investment plan to support an Application for Guarantee to the Small
Business Administration (SBA). Under SBA regulations, small businesses
could apply to the SBA for issuance of government guaranteed debentures.
The amount of debentures available through the SBA depended upon the
applicant's paid-in capital.
The alleged illegal acts in McMurray consisted of the "hub" defendants,
officers of the applicant investment company, borrowing money from
"spoke" defendants to swell the company's paid-in capital. 154 After submis-
sion of the applications, the invested money was returned to contributing
defendants by way of sham loans. A grand jury handed down several indict-
ments of conspiracy to defraud the government based on these transactions,
treating the separate investments as distinct conspiracies. After conviction
upon one indictment, the appellants sought to dismiss further indictments of
conspiracy on double jeopardy grounds, claiming that the involved actions
constituted a single conspiracy for which they could be tried only once.
The Tenth Circuit cited Blumenthal v. United States' 55 and Kotteakos v.
United States 5 6 as the applicable law on whether defendants who participate
in only a portion of a criminal activity may be considered as members of the
same conspiracy with other peripheral defendants of whose identity and ac-
tivities they are unaware. In Kotteakos, the principal defendant acted as a
broker for placement of illegal loans on behalf of unrelated clients. The
Supreme Court held that since each illegal loan transaction was complete in
itself, individual client defendants who had no knowledge of or concern for
151. Id. at 209.
152. Id
153. No. 78-1928, 1929 (10th Cir. Feb. 10, 1981).
154. Id slip op. at 3.
155. 332 U.S. 539 (1947).
156. 328 U.S. 750 (1946).
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the others could not be treated as members of a single conspiracy.' 57 In
Blumenthal, however, the Supreme Court held that the purchasers, middle-
men, and sellers of an illegal whiskey distribution scheme were members of a
single conspiracy, although ignorant even of the existence of the other mem-
bers in the distribution chain, since they all had knowledge of and a stake in
the overall plan.' 58
In upholding the appellants' double jeopardy claim in McMurray, the
Tenth Circuit likened the defendants' common objective to that found in
Blumenthal. The appellate court found that each of the investing defendants
must have known of the existence of other investors to the capital pool, and
that all shared the single goal of submitting the fraudulent Guarantee Appli-
cation to the SBA. As the court said, "[t]he objective here was to defraud the
SBA by the Application of Guarantee based on fictitious bank deposits. All
the convicted defendants knew the objective-the purpose of the accumula-
tion of funds, and all participated in attaining the objective."'1 59 Judge
Doyle, dissenting, focused on the separation between the independent loan
transactions in claiming that there was no basis for imputing knowledge to
the spoke defendants of similar transactions involving the same hub defend-
ants. t6° Judge Doyle thus saw the facts as similar to those in Kotteakos,
presenting multiple conspiracies.
There is apparent similarity between the arrangement presented here,
where core defendants instigate multiple transactions with isolated defend-
ants, and that in Kotteakos, where each might have been considered as a "hub
and spoke" arrangement different than the "chain" distribution in Blumen-
thai. '6' However, the majority correctly distinguished Kotleakos in empha-
sizing the common objective of the SBA investors; no one defendant was to
be successful unless the single application was accepted. The majority and
dissent differed less regarding the law than in their perceptions of the facts
and the nature of the understanding between the defendants.
In United States v. Johnson, 62 the Tenth Circuit affirmed appellant Arm-
strong's conviction for conspiracy to distribute both marijuana and cocaine,
even though Armstrong was not directly involved in the distribution of co-
caine. Armstrong, an assistant district attorney in Oklahoma, aided his co-
conspirators in the theft of confiscated marijuana by informing them of its
157. Id at 755.
158. 332 U.S. at 557. Justice Rutledge, writing for the Court, stated "the law rightly gives
room for allowing the conviction of those discovered upon showing sufficiently the essential
nature of the plan and their connections with it, without requiring evidence of knowledge of all
its details or of the participation of others." Id
159. No. 78-1928, 1929, slip op. at 9.
160. Id slip op. at 13 (Doyle, J., dissenting).
161. In Kotteakos, the Supreme Court agreed with the Government that "the pattern was
that of separate spokes meeting in a common center .. " 328 U.S. at 755. The operation of
a criminal enterprise involving the distribution of a commodity, as in Blumenthal, has been lik-
ened to a chain, with each participant a necessary link. Set Note, Resolution of the Multiple Con-
spiraces Issue Via a "Nature of the Enterpise" Analysis: The Resurrection of Agreement, 42 BROOKLYN
L. REv. 243, 257 (1975). For discussion of the multiple conspiracy problem, see id; Note, The
Conspiraty Dilmnuv Proseaution of Group Crnme or Protection of Individual Defendants, 62 HARV. L.
REv. 276 (1948).
162. 645 F.2d 865 (10th Cir. 1981).
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location and allowing them to steal it. After this transaction, the conspira-
tors' operation was expanded to include the acquisition and sale of cocaine.
Armstrong discussed the cocaine transactions with the other participants,
obtained cocaine for personal use from them, and advised them of the status
of proceedings before a grand jury. '
6 3
The appellate court's conclusion that Armstrong conspired to distribute
cocaine was based on both Armstrong's failure to withdraw from the original
conspiracy and his continued participation with the co-conspirators after
they began distribution of the cocaine. For the court, this constituted suffi-
cient connection with and knowledge of the illegal scheme to warrant con-
viction under Blumenthal.164
While the appellate court pointed out Armstrong's connection with the
co-conspirators, the court did not discuss the intent element. A remaining
question is whether Armstrong actually agreed to participate in the distribu-
tion of cocaine. That he had previously conspired in the theft of marijuana,
an unrelated transaction, is insufficient to prove such agreement, as is Arm-
strong's knowledge of the cocaine distribution and even his purchase of co-
caine for personal use.' 65 That Armstrong warned the other defendants that
they were under suspicion and advised them of the status of grand jury pro-
ceedings, however, does evidence Armstrong's implicit agreement to partici-
pate in the distribution.
B. Interstate Transportation of Securities
In United States v. Sparrow, 166 the defendant was charged with several
counts of interstate transportation of false securities under 18 U.S.C.
§ 2314.167 Both counts involved alleged tampering with a Cadillac's certifi-
cate of title issued in Oregon. The first count charged the defendant with
bringing the car into Idaho with a certificate of title which had been altered
by substituting the defendant's name for the actual lienholder's name.
Count II charged the interstate transportation of a new certificate of title
issued in Oregon and sent to a Utah bank which the defendant indicated
would be the new lienholder. Some of the representations which the defend-
ant made to the Oregon authorities in order to indice them to issue the new
certificate of title allegedly were false.168
This appeal had previously been before a Tenth Circuit panel, which
163. Id at 868.
164. 332 U.S. 539 (1947).
165. Knowledge of a conspiracy is insufficient to prove participation in the conspiracy. See
United States v. Falcone, 311 U.S. 205 (1940) (knowledge by seller that yeast was bought to
make illegal liquor was insufficient to prove the seller's participation in the conspiracy); Weni-
ger v. United States, 47 F.2d 692 (9th Cir. 1931) (county sheriff's failure to enforce National
Prohibition Act does not make the sheriff a conspirator to violate the Act).
166. 635 F.2d 794 (10th Cir. 1980).
167. The relevant section of 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1976) provides that "Whoever, with unlawful
or fraudulent intent, transports in interstate or foreign commerce any falsely made, forged, al-
tered, or counterfeited securities ... shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not
more than ten years, or both." The defendant was also convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1014
(1976) for making a materially false statement to a federally insured bank.
168. 635 F.2d at 795.
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affirmed the conviction on both counts. 169 In hearing the appeal en banc,
the Tenth Circuit reversed the conviction on both counts.
The issue most recently facing the appellate court under Count I was
whether the Government must prove that the security was in a forged or
altered condition at the time of its interstate passage. There was no evidence
that the Oregon certificate of title presented in Utah was actually falsified
before the defendant entered Utah. In upholding the defendant's challenge,
the appellate court agreed that the security must be forged prior to its inter-
state travel in order to warrant conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 2314.170 In
reaching this conclusion the court followed precedent set by the Fifth and
Eighth Circuits and strictly construed the criminal statute.17 1 Judge Bar-
rett, who wrote the original panel opinion, dissented, noting that the inter-
state element was included in the statute solely to afford federal jurisdiction,
and that in this case interstate movement of the false certificate of title was
necessary to complete the fraudulent design. 1
72
The appellate court also overturned the conviction for the interstate
transportation of the new certificate of title issued in Oregon. The court
distinguished documents "falsely made" or "false in their execution" from
those "false in fact." The court held that under a Tenth Circuit opinion,
Mareney v. United States, 173 a security that is only false in fact is not "falsely
made, forged, altered, or counterfeited" under the statute. Since the new
certificate of title was what it purported to be, and was false only in content,
the certificate could not be the basis for conviction of transportation of a
falsely made security.' 74 Again in dissent, Judge Barrett stressed that the
State of Oregon was without legal authority to issue the new certificate, so
that it was falsely made as well as false in fact. 1
75
C. Theft and Interstate Commerce
United States v. Luman 176 called into question the sufficiency of evidence
for conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 2315. This statute prohibits the disposition
of goods moving to interstate commerce, with knowledge that the goods have
been stolen. 177 In Luman, certain oil field drill bits were stolen in Wyoming
and were sold by the defendants to undercover agents in Oklahoma twenty-
eight days later. The defendants claimed that the evidence was insufficient
to show that the defendants knew the property was stolen, or that the drill
169. 614 F.2d 229 (10th Cir. 1980).
170. 635 F.2d at 796.
171. United States v. Hilyer, 543 F.2d 41, 43 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Owens, 460
F.2d 467, 469 (5th Cir. 1972).
172. 635 F.2d at 797 (Barrett, J., dissenting).
173. 216 F.2d 760 (10th Cir. 1954).
174. 635 F.2d at 797.
175. Id (Barrett, J., dissenting).
176. 624 F.2d 152 (10th Cir. 1980).
177. 18 U.S.C. § 2315 (1976) states that "Whoever receives, conceals, stores, barters, sells or
disposes of any goods. . . moving as, or which are a part of, or which constitute interstate or
foreign commerce, knowing the same to have been stolen . . . shall be fined not more than
$10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both."
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bits were still moving in interstate commerce. 178
The Tenth Circuit rejected the argument that the Government must
present direct evidence that the property was known to be stolen, or that it
had recently crossed state lines. Rather, both elements could be proven
through inference arising from established facts.179 The appellate court first
held that unexplained possession of recently stolen property may support a
finding that the possessor knew he was dealing with stolen property. Under
this standard, the jury's guilty verdict was more than justified by the facts
that the defendants were not in the business of selling drill bits, the bits were
sold for less than one tenth of their worth, the bits were new and in their
original boxes, and the transaction took place in a motel parking lot and
involved no receipt or bill of sale.' 80 Regarding the interstate element, the
court further held that unexplained possession in Oklahoma of drill bits sto-
len in Wyoming was sufficient to support the finding that the challenged
transaction was one step in a total scheme of interstate transportation of the
stolen goods.' 8 '
D. False Statements to a Federal Agency
The defendant in United States v. Irwin 182 was convicted for, among
other charges, willingly making false statements in a grant application to a
federal agency, and for knowingly concealing material facts in a matter
within the jurisdiction of the federal agency, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1 0 0 1 .i83 The misrepresentations were made in an application to the Eco-
nomic Development Administration (EDA) for a federal grant. The defend-
ant Irwin was hired by the City of Delta, Colorado to help obtain federal
and state funds to finance a proposed industrial park. Prior to submitting
the grant application, Irwin orally agreed with the industrial park project
engineer to be paid for work in preparing the application.' 184 Under EDA
rules, Irwin's services in preparing the application were ineligible for pay-
ment with EDA funds. Irwin indicated in response to a question on the
grant application that he was not to receive compensation for such services.
Irwin was later appointed Delta's city manager; in this capacity Irwin sub-
mitted bills to EDA for work done on the industrial park. These bills did not
specify that EDA funds would be used to pay Irwin for his services in apply-
178. 624 F.2d at 154.
179. Id at 155. United States v. White, 649 F.2d 779 (10th Cir. 1981), also decided during
this survey period, held that a jury instruction permitting such an inference did not give rise to a
presumption of guilt and an unconstitutional shift of the burden of proof. For discussion of the
difference between a permissible inference and a presumption, see Sandstrom v. Montana, 442
U.S. 510, 527 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
180. 624 F.2d at 154.
181. Id at 155.
182. 654 F.2d 671 (10th Cir. 1981).
183. The pertinent portion of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1976) provides:
Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the
United States knowingly and willfully falsifies, conceals or covers up by any trick,
scheme, or device a material fact, or makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent state-
ments or representations. . . shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not
more than five years, or both.
184. 654 F.2d at 674.
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ing for the grant. ' 8 5 Irwin was eventually paid for the services with the EDA
funds by the project engineer.'
8 6
The Tenth Circuit decided that under these facts Irwin was properly
convicted of making a false statement of material facts in the grant applica-
tion. The failure to specify, in response to a question on the application, that
Irwin was to receive compensation constituted a false statement.' 8 7 This
statement was material, in that it had a capacity to influence EDA's decision
to offer Delta financial assistance with the industrial park project. 18  The
court concluded that the issue of materiality was one of fact properly before
the jury under an instruction that the statement must have the capacity to
influence "action" by the EDA, instead of "payment" by the EDA, as re-
quested by the defendant.' 8 9
The appellate court did, however, reverse Irwin's conviction for con-
cealing a material fact within the jurisdiction of a federal agency (EDA).
This charge arose out of Irwin's failure to mention on the bills submitted to
EDA that part of the funds would be paid to himself. The court recognized
that it is not illegal for Irwin to omit this information from the bills in the
absence of any legal duty to disclose the information.19° Since the project
engineer was not required under law to indicate the names of every em-
pioyee who was to receive grant funds, it was not unlawful to fail to mention
that Irwin was one of the employees.' 9 '
Unted States v. Woff19 2 also involved interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001,
which prohibits the making of a false statement "in any matter within the
jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States." Appellant
Wolf was vice-president of Pioneer Energy Corporation which had con-
tracted to furnish Apco Oil Corporation with crude oil. The challenged false
statement was the certification on invoices from Pioneer to Apco of the ship-
ments of "stripper crude oil," while Pioneer actually delivered inferior fuel
oil. This certification was included on monthly reports sent by Apco to the
United States Department of Energy (DOE) as part of an entitlement pro-
gram based on the pricing of different types of crude oil. The certification
allowed Pioneer to receive the higher price for stripper crude allowed under
federal regulations.19 3 Evidence indicated that Wolf was aware of the enti-
tlement program and the significance of the certificate. 194
Wolf contended that the certification on the invoice was not a matter
within the jurisdiction of the DOE or any other federal agency. In finding
that the federal jurisdiction element had been met in this case, the Tenth
185. Id at 675.
186. Id
187. Id at 676.
188. Id at 678.
189. Id at 677.
190. Id 678-79. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227-28 (1980) (petitioner, a
financial printer with "inside" knowledge about a corporation, had no duty to disclose informa-
tion to other individuals with whom the printer was trading stock of the corporation).
191. 654 F.2d at 679.
192. 645 F.2d 23 (10th Cir. 1981).
193. Id at 24.
194. Id
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Circuit recognized that the false statement need not be made directly to a
federal agency to sustain a section 1001 conviction, as long as federal funds
are involved.1 95 Since the false certification of the type of oil would eventu-
ally affect disbursement of DOE funds to Apco under the entitlement pro-
gram, the false statement was a matter within the jurisdiction of DOE.196
Under these circumstances, it was immaterial that the statements were made
to wrongfully induce a private entity to make payments to which Pioneer
was not entitled, rather than to induce the wrongful disbursement of federal
funds.
E. Aiding and Abetting
In United States v. Cotton, 97 the defendant contended that he was ille-
gally convicted of aiding and abetting under 18 U.S.C. § 2 in the distribu-
tion of cocaine, a controlled substance.' 98 The defendant argued that since
the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970
(Act) 199 was designed to include all drug control offenses in one comprehen-
sive act, he could not be convicted of aiding and abetting, an offense not
included in the Act.
2 ° °
The appellate court refused to find that aiding and abetting could not
be combined with a substantive offense in an indictment, no matter how
comprehensive the pertinent statutory scheme. Rather, the court, citing
United States v. Alvil/ar20 ' to the effect that the "language [of 18 U.S.C. § 2]
neither defines nor denounces as criminal any act or omission which, without
it, would have been unlawful," 20 2 held that 18 U.S.C. § 2 need not be specif-
ically incorporated in any particular substantive offense in order to be prop-
erly joined with it in an indictment. The court concluded that aiding and
abetting constitutes an alternative theory of criminal responsibility rather
than a prohibition of specific conduct, and may be appropriately joined with
any substantive charge203
In United States v. Cueto,204 the Tenth Circuit focused on aiding and
abetting as an alternative theory of responsibility in holding that aiding and
abetting need not be specifically charged in the indictment to warrant con-
viction for aiding and abetting at trial. In Cueto the defendant was charged
195. Id. at 25. The appellate court cited cases from five circuits as authority for this rule of
law. The court quoted United States v. Baker, 626 F.2d 512, 514 n.5 (5th Cir. 1980) to the effect
that, "the necessary link between deception of the non-federal agency and effect on the federal
agency is provided by the federal agency's retention of 'the ultimate authority to see that the
federal funds are properly spent.' " Baker held that submission of false time sheets claiming pay
for hours not actually worked to a federally-funded housing authority violates the statute.
196. 645 F.2d at 25.
197. 646 F.2d 430 (10th Cir. 1981).
198. 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1976). Under this general statute concerning criminal responsibility,
anyone who "aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures" the commission of a crime
"is punishable as a principal."
199. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1976).
200. 646 F.2d at 432.
201. 575 F.2d 1316 (10th Cir. 1978).
202. Id at 1319-1320.
203. 646 F.2d at 432.
204. 628 F.2d 1273 (10th Cir. 1980).
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with robbing a bank.20 5 While the Government initially proceeded on the
theory that the defendant was the principal of the robbery, the Tenth Cir-
cuit concluded that, based on the evidence presented at trial, an aiding and
abetting instruction was properly submitted to the jury by the trial court.
206
The appellate court noted that the defense counsel was not misled as to the
nature of the charge. While the defense tried to create confusion as to the
identity of the actual robber, this confusion did not preclude the jury from
finding the defendant guilty as an aider and abettor based on other evidence
before the court.
20 7
F. Wire Fraud
United States v. B/htsteh 208 involved the conviction of an attorney for wire
fraud on the basis of the attorney's discussion with a client concerning fees
and the status of the client's case. 20 9 When the client, DeYoung, an actor
working in Colorado, consented to a baggage check for weapons at Denver
Stapleton Airport, the security officer discovered and confiscated a small vial
containing a substance later identified as less than one gram of cocaine.
Upon his arrival in California, DeYoung contacted the defendant attorney,
Blitstein, concerning the possible legal consequences of the incident. Blit-
stein requested a retainer fee based upon the information that the confis-
cated substance had tested positive as cocaine, even though he had not yet
asked the police about the test results. 2 10 When DeYoung was subsequently
indecisive about paying Blitstein's large fee for the case, Blitstein notified
DeYoung that there was a warrant out for his arrest, and that upon his re-
turn to Colorado the police would drag him off in chains. 21 ' Blitstein fur-
ther stated in conversation with DeYoung that he must act quickly, in that
Blitstein would not be able to "control" the evidence once it was shipped to
Miami.2 '1 2 During this time, however, no warrant had been issued for De-
Young's arrest.
In holding that these facts supported a conviction for wire fraud, the
Tenth Circuit focused less on the technical elements of the statute than on
the generally unethical aspects of Blitstein's conduct. The appellate court
held that the high standards of moral conduct imposed on members of the
legal profession were violated by Blitstein's intimidation of his client for pre-
payment of the fee before any criminal charges had even been filed in the
case.
2 13
205. 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), (d) (1976).
206. 628 F.2d at 1275.
207. d at 1276.
208. 626 F.2d 774 (10th Cir. 1980), cerl. denied, 449 U.S. 1102 (1981).
209. 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1976) prohibits the transmission of sounds by means of wire for the
purpose of making false representations. Blitstein was also convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1952
(1976) for interstate travel with the intent to promote an illegal activity (extortion). 626 F.2d at
776.
210. 626 F.2d at 777.
211. Id. at 778.
212. Id
213. Id at 781.
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VI. TRIAL MATTERS
UntedSlates v. Winner2 14 involved the issue of whether the deputy attor-
ney general and the assistant attorney general of the United States could be
compelled to attend a post-conviction hearing, and if necessary, personally
invoke Governmental privileges concerning certain matters in that hearing.
This issue arose when the real party in interest (Feeney) filed a post-trial
motion for production seeking documentary information concerning certain
conversations he participated in during the course of his informant activi-
ties.215 Noting that Feeney had a constitutional right to exculpatory evi-
dence in mitigation of punishment, the trial judge granted access to tapes of
conversations with Government agents in which Feeney had participated
during the course of his informant activities.
2 16
After Feeney claimed that the produced documents were incomplete,
assistant attorney general Heymann was subpoenaed to appear at an eviden-
tiary hearing and to bring relevant documents concerning the taped conver-
sations. Heymann did not appear at the hearing; instead, two other
Department of Justice employees appeared, with instructions from deputy
attorney general Renfrew not to answer any questions pertaining to ongoing
investigations of the matter in which Feeney was used as an informer.
2 17
The trial judge ordered Renfrew to appear before the court and to invoke
the Government privilege in person, but indicated that Renfrew's testimony
could be given through an in camera hearing. The Government petitioned
for a writ of mandamus to vacate the order requiring the attendance of Ren-
frew and Heymann at the post-conviction hearing.
21 8
The Tenth Circuit, in considering the mandamus petition, recognized
that the deputy attorney general had not followed the recognized procedure
for invoking the law enforcement evidentiary privilege, which requires per-
sonal consideration of and objection to production of the requested informa-
tion. 21 9 Even so, the appellate court accepted a Government compromise,
with modifications, which did not require Renfrew's attendance at the hear-
ing. Under this compromise, Government representatives were to testify as
to the privileged information i'n camera. Any continued claims for privilege
were to be made by Renfrew after his personal review of the challenged
questions, and had to be supported in writing by his reasons for the contin-
ued claim of privilege.220 Concerning assistant attorney general Heymann's
attendance at the hearing, the appellate court held that attendance could be
214. 641 F.2d 825 (10th Cir. 1981).
215. Feeney was convicted of submitting materially false statements to federally insured
financial institutions for the purpose of influencing credit decisions in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1014, 2 (1976), wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343, 2 (1976) and interstate transpor-
tation of fraudulent securities in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314, 12 (1976).
216. 641 F.2d at 828.
217. Id at 829.
218. Id at 830. In United States v. Feeney, 641 F.2d 821 (10th Cir. 1981), the Tenth Circuit
held that a third party who had intervened in United States v. Winner must risk contempt and
appeal from such citation in order to contest a subpoena duces tecum.
219. See Association for Women in Science v. Califano, 566 F.2d 339 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Black
v. Sheraton Corp., 564 F.2d 531 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
220. 641 F.2d at 833.
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required only after the trial court determines that Government representa-
tives' testimony shows a sufficient likelihood that Heymann's testimony is of
sufficient relevancy to require production.
22'
The Tenth Circuit's opinion in Winner presents a reasonable resolution
of the conflict between Feeney's due process right to disclosure of exculpa-
tory material and the Government's law enforcement privilege for the pro-
tection of ongoing investigations. The opinion provides, however, a curious
review of a petition for writ of mandamus. 222 The appellate court held that
the district court did not abuse its discretion so as to justify issuance of a writ
of mandamus, yet it did overrule the district court's order mandating Hey-
mann's and Renfrew's attendance at the post-conviction hearing. The prac-
tical effect of the Tenth Circuit's decision was a reconsideration of the trial
court's exercise of discretion which the appellate court said was improper in
this instance.
United States v. Tager223 concerned disclosure of matters occurring before
a grand jury. In Tager, Mr. House, employed by the Insurance Crime Pre-
vention Institute (ICPI), developed sufficient evidence to refer the case to the
United States Postal Inspection Service. A grand jury was convened, and
Mr. House continued to assist the Government in the investigation. The
Government moved for, and was granted, an order for disclosure to Mr.
House of certain grand jury materials to enable him to further assist in the
investigation. On the grounds that this disclosure was illegal, the defendant
moved to dismiss the indictment presented against him.
224
The appellate court established that the legality of the disclosure must
be decided under rule 6(e)(2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
This rule generally prohibits the disclosure of matters occurring before the
grand jury. Exception is made for disclosures to a Government attorney, by
court order in connection with a judicial proceeding, and to a criminal de-
fendant under certain conditions.
225
The Government sought to bring the disclosure to the admittedly non-
government investigator under the "judicial proceeding" exception. The
Government cited cases holding that the grand jury proceeding itself is a
judicial proceeding under the exception.226 The appellate court distin-
guished these cases as upholding disclosure either to Government personnel
or to a discharged grand jury. In holding that the disclosure in this instance
was improper, the court reasoned that to interpret a "judicial proceeding" as
221. As did the district court, the Tenth Circuit cited Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83
(1963), for the proposition that all exculpatory material must be disclosed to both the accused
and his counsel. This rule is also incorporated in rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
222. A writ of mandamus is authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1976), and brought under rule
21 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, FED. R. App. P. 21. Under Supreme Court
Rule 30, the issuance of such a writ "is not a matter of right but of sound discretion sparingly
exercised."
223. 638 F.2d 167 (10th Cir. 1980).
224. Id at 168.
225. These exceptions are listed in FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(A) 3(C).
226. United States v. Stanford, 589 F.2d 285 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 983 (1979);
In re Braniff Airways, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 344 (W.D. Tex. 1975); In re Minkoff, 349 F. Supp. 154
(D.R.I. 1972); In re Grand Jury Witness Subpoenas, 370 F. Supp. 1282 (S.D. Fla. 1974).
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including an ongoing grand jury before which the challenged material was
being considered would effectively emasculate the intent of rule 6(e)(2).
Rather, disclosure in connection with a judicial proceeding must be for a
purpose other than assistance of the present grand jury proceedings.
227
Co/in Campbell
227. 638 F.2d at 170.
1982]

FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
OVERVIEW
In the past term, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed a vari-
ety of issues in the area of federal practice and procedure. The court inter-
preted rules of civil and appellate procedure, defined the jurisdiction of
district and appeals courts, and reviewed district court discretion. The court
broke new ground when it interpreted the amended rules of appellate proce-
dure for the first time. Several well-publicized cases were decided on proce-
dural issues, thus not reaching the substantive and constitutional matters for
which they received their publicity. This survey will examine the decisions
in which the Tenth Circuit changed or clarified current practices in the past
year in the area of federal practice and procedure.
I. DISTRICT COURT JURISDICTION
A. Removal Jurisdiction
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals was required in Madsen v. Prudential
Federal Savings & Loan Association I to define the district court's removal juris-
diction in what was perhaps the most complex practice and procedure case
before the court this term. The Madsens sued in state court claiming breach
of contract and unjust enrichment. They sought to recover interest which
Prudential had realized on escrow accounts. 2 Prudential subsequently filed
an action for declaratory relief in federal court, removed the state court ac-
tion to federal court, and had the two cases consolidated. Summary judg-
ment was granted in favor of Prudential. The Madsens appealed claiming
that the removal was improper.
3
Prudential contended removal was proper under section 1441(b) of the
Judiciary and Judicial Procedure Act which permits the removal of "[a]ny
civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction founded on
a claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United
States .... -4 District courts have original jurisdiction under the Judiciary
and Judicial Procedure Act of "any civil action. arising under any Act of
Congress regulating commerce. . ,5 and of "all civil actions wherein the
matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000 . . . and arises
under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States."'6 The key
question became whether the Madsens' claims were claims that "arise
1. 635 F.2d 797 (10th Cir. 1980).
2. Id. at 799. Under a trust deed agreement, the Madsens were making monthly pay-
ments to Prudential for their taxes and insurance; the money was placed in escrow by Pruden-
tial until it made one yearly payment from the escrowed funds. Id.
3. Id. at 799-80.
4. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1976).
5. Id. § 1337.
6. Id. § 1331(a). Section 1331 has since been amended, but the modifications do not af-
fect the interpretation of the statute made in Madsen. 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (Supp. II 1979).
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under" federal law. 7
Prudential argued that regulation of federal savings and loan associa-
tions is so extensive that Congress has preempted the area, and the Madsens'
claims necessarily arose under federal law or involved a substantial federal
question. The court disagreed. The Tenth Circuit had previously estab-
lished a standard for determining whether a complaint asserts a claim aris-
ing under federal law.8 The action must be expressly authorized by federal
law, must require the construction of a federal statute and/or regulation,
and must be required by some distinctive policy of a federal statute to be
determined by application of federal legal principles. 9 Although there is ex-
tensive regulation in the savings and loan associations area, the Madsens'
claims sounded only in contract and did not rely on authorization by federal
law. Every federal issue raised in the case was raised by Prudential. Even if
federal preemption had been established, it would not have conferred juris-
diction when raised by the defendant to defeat a common law contract claim
brought in the state court.' 0 Further, the Madsens' claims did not require
construction of a federal statute or regulation, even if raised in Prudential's
defense. I I
As a final measure, Prudential argued that the last prong of the test had
been met-a distinctive policy of a federal statute or regulation required the
application of federal legal principles.' 2 Thus, extensive regulation in the
area demanded application of federal common law to the definition of "con-
tract." The court acknowledged this to be true in some instances where
there is "a significant conflict between some federal policy or interest and the
use of state law,"' 3 but that situation did not exist in this case. 
1
4
The court concluded that since all the bases for federal jurisdiction had
been raised in Prudential's defense, the case had been removed improperly.
Therefore, the case was remanded to the state court.'
5
7. The court noted that the "same standards apply to whether the issue 'arises under'
federal law in section 1331 and section 1337." 635 F.2d at 800 n.6.
Prudential did not and could not argue that federal jurisdiction can be established by any
defense or counterclaim. Federal jurisdiction must be established on the face of the complaint.
Id. at 800-01. Seealso Pan Am. Petrol. Corp. v. Superior Court, 366 U.S. 656 (1961); Skelly Oil
Co. v. Phillips Petrol. Co., 339 U.S. 667 (1950); Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109 (1936).
8. Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Johnson, 586 F.2d 1375, 1381 (10th Cir. 1978).
9. Id.
10. 635 F.2d at 801.
11. As the Madsen complaint was framed, the case could have been decided on common
law principles of contract if the defendants did not raise the federal regulation as a defense.
12. 635 F.2d at 802.
13. Id. (quoting Wallis v. Pan Am. Petrol. Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966)).
14. The regulation Prudential principally relied upon, 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-11 (c) (1980), con-
templated variances between states on whether interest would be required to be paid on escrow
accounts. 635 F.2d at 802.
15. 635 F.2d at 803. The federal declaratory judgment action begun by Prudential was
also dismissed. The court determined that the claims of the federal action were actually embod-
ied in the defenses in the state action. In such a case, the federal court will not seize litigations
from the state court. Id. at 803-04. See also Public Serv. Comm'n v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237,
248 (1952).
On the related issue of appellate review of remand orders in removed cases, the court in
four unpublished opinions found it had no jurisdiction to review the orders. Estrada v. Cuaron,
No. 80-1793 (10th Cir. Nov. 14, 1980); Strickland v. Roosevelt County Rural Elec. Coop., No.
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B. Abstention
The validity of an abstention order was reviewed in Arrow v. Dow. 16
Appellants were members of the State Bar of New Mexico. They claimed
that a lobbyist hired by the New Mexico Board of Bar Commissioners acted
outside the scope of the functions of the State Bar, and these actions effec-
tively denied appellants their rights guaranteed by the first, fifth, and four-
teenth amendments.' 7 The district court abstained and dismissed the
complaint, finding that proceeding in the federal court would conflict with
an overriding state policy. 18 The Tenth Circuit ruled that the abstention
was proper but that the complaint should be held in abeyance, not
dismissed. '9
The court found the principle first enunciated in Rairoad Commission of
Texas v. Pullman Co. 20 controlling. The Pu//man doctrine holds that a district
court, even when it has jurisdiction, should "stay the action in the federal
forum if the construction of pertinent but unclear state law by the state
courts may obviate the necessity for a decision of the federal constitutional
question or substantially modify the constitutional issue." 2 1 The rule under
which the lobbyist was appointed and from which his authority was purport-
edly derived had never been construed in the state courts, so the case in-
volved an unsettled question of state law.
22
The district court's reliance on Burford o. Sun Oil Co. 23 was misplaced
because Bur ford did not involve new or unsettled areas of state law.
2 4
Rather, the state in Burford had such an elaborate review system in that par-
ticular subject area that the lower court abstained rather than impose an
impermissibly disruptive effect on state policy. 25 Therefore, the abstention
in Arrow occurred because state law in the area is unsettled, not because the
state has an overriding policy. Nevertheless, the federal constitutional ques-
tion undoubtedly would be presented in a different light after the state con-
strued the rule and the lobbyist's activities.26 For these reasons, abstention
was proper to obtain state guidance on pertinent but unsettled state law.
27
80-1701 (10th Cir. Nov. 14, 1980); Holguin v. Dawson, Nos. 80-1584, 1585 (10th Cir. Nov. 14,
1980); Palmer v. Pace, No. 80-1064 (10th Cir. Aug. 26, 1980).
16. 636 F.2d 287 (10th Cir. 1980).
17. Appellants were required by state law to be members of the state bar and to pay an-
nual fees. Specifically, they claimed that the use of a portion of these fees to pay a lobbyist
whose actions were not approved by appellants deprived them of constitutional rights under
color of state law in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). 636 F.2d at 288-89.
18. 636 F.2d at 287.
19. Id. at 291.
20. 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
21. IA MOORE's FEDERAL PRAc'rICE 0-.20311] (2d ed. 1981).
22. 636 F.2d at 290.
23. 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
24. 636 F.2d at 290.
25. Id.
26. As the court noted, this aspect of the abstention doctrine is clearly laid out in Colorado
River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976): "[a]bstention is appro-
priate 'in cases presenting a federal constitutional issue which might be mooted or presented in
a different posture by a state court determination of pertinent state law.' " Id. at 814 (quoting
County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 189 (1959)).
27. 636 F.2d at 290.
19821
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
Abstention is not a doctrine by which federal courts can avoid cases
completely, however. Once federal jurisdiction is properly invoked, the case
should not be dismissed simply because part of it involves unsettled state
law.28 The state court may never address the federal issues, so if the federal
court had abstained and dismissed the case, this would have amounted to
abdication of its judicial responsibility. The Supreme Court has recognized
that a party should have the right to litigate federal issues after the pertinent
state matter is concluded.29 In Arrow it was especially important to retain
jurisdiction because the state procedures to review the rule were uncertain.
3 0
To insure plaintiffs' rights are protected, the federal court should retain juris-
diction until the state has had adequate time to act. If satisfactory progress
were not made, the Tenth Circuit implied the federal district court could
proceed on its own.
3 1
C. Preemption
The jurisdiction of federal district courts extends only to those areas
which Congress has designated.32 Congress can deny federal courts author-
ity over certain cases otherwise in their jurisdiction by vesting that authority
exclusively in another body.33 This doctrine of preemption operates in the
field of labor law where Congress has vested jurisdiction over certain na-
tional labor policies solely in the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB).
34
District court jurisdiction was challenged in Silkwoodv. Kerr-McGee Corp. 35 on
the ground that Congress had given exclusive jurisdiction of the contested
matter to the NLRB.
The estate of Karen Silkwood brought suit against the Kerr-McGee
Corporation, the FBI, and various individuals for allegedly violating
Silkwood's constitutional rights when she and other Kerr-McGee employees
began organizing a union. 36 Defendants claimed that preemption had
placed jurisdiction of the action with the NLRB because "[w]hen an activity
is arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of the [National Labor Relations] Act [29
U.S.C. §§ 157, 158], the States as well as the federal courts must defer to the
exclusive competence of the National Labor Relations Board . . .37
However, courts often have been reluctant to find their jurisdiction pre-
empted by the NLRB.
3 8
The Tenth Circuit found that a more elaborate standard than the Gar-
28. See Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813-14
(1976).
29. England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Exam'rs, 375 U.S. 411 (1964).
30. 636 F.2d at 289-90.
31. d. at 291.
32. See generally 13 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRO-
CEDURE: JURISDICTION § 3522 (1975).
33. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
34. Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1976).
35. 637 F.2d 743 (10th Cir. 1980).
36. d. at 745.
37. Id. at 746 (quoting San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 245
(1959)).
38. See, e.g., San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. at 244 n.2.
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mon standard advocated by the defendants has evolved through United
States Supreme Court decisions, 39 and that the guiding principle to be used
when a jurisdictional conflict arises revolves around the nature of the inter-
ests being asserted.40 Three factors developed in Farmer v. United Brotherhood
of Carpenters4 ' were found to be controlling when applying the standard:
First, whether there exists a potential for a direct conflict of sub-
stantive law between the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)
and the state or federal cause of action; second, whether there is a
state interest "deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility";
and third, whether adjudication of the cause of action interferes
with the effective administration of national labor policy by decid-
ing issues identical to those underlying the labor dispute.
42
No problems surfaced when the first two criteria were applied, 43 but the
court was concerned that the third criterion presented a serious obstacle to
judicial jurisdiction.44 The plaintiffs had described the alleged violations as
being directed against those involved in unionizing activities. Judicial treat-
ment of this issue would be identical to that performed by the NLRB.
45
Thus, recent court decisions would indicate the court is preempted from act-
ing.46 However, the Tenth Circuit found that such consideration was not
controlling. It reasoned that the three factors evolved from and are con-
trolled by Congress' intent based upon a "balanced inquiry into such factors
as the nature of the federal and state interests in regulation and the potential
for interference with federal regulation.
4 7
A "balanced inquiry," according to the court, demonstrated that inter-
ference with labor policy was of secondary importance to the case. Primary
constitutional issues outweighed issues arguably under the National Labor
Relations Act. Assumption of jurisdiction by the federal courts would not
substantively "interfere with effective administration of national labor pol-
39. The standard demands that "the decision to preempt federal and state court jurisdic-
tion over a given class of cases must depend upon the nature of the particular interests being
asserted and the effect upon the administration of national labor policies of concurrent judicial
and administrative remedies." Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 180 (1967).
40. 637 F.2d at 746.
41. 430 U.S. 290 (1977).
42. 637 F.2d at 746 (citing Farmer v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, 430 U.S. at 298).
43. The allegations of the plaintiff indicated little possibility of a conflict of substantive
law. Ms. Silkwood was allegedly deprived "of civil rights through a conspiracy and course of
conduct involving wiretapping, surveillance, discriminatory firing and transfers, breaking and
entering, and life-endangering harassment on public highways." 637 F.2d at 746. The lawsuit
created sensational headlines in the national news media, even to the point of intimating that
some of the defendants were responsible for her death. Consideration of these issues posed no
substantive conflict with the NLRB's jurisdiction over labor and union policies. Id. at 747.
Outrageous activities such as those alleged did not come within the scope of protection or au-
thority of the NLRB. See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S.
180 (1978); Farmer v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, 430 U.S. 290 (1977); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S.
171 (1967); San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
44. 637 F.2d at 746.
45. Id. at 747.
46. Id. See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180 (1980);
Bova v. Pipefitters Local 60, 554 F.2d 226 (5th Cir. 1977); and Iowa Beef Processors, Inc. v.
Gorman, 476 F. Supp. 1382 (N.D. Iowa 1979).
47. 637 F.2d at 747 (quoting Farmer v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, 430 U.S. at 300).
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icy" as Congress had intended the policy to be governed. 48 "[Tihe Labor
Management Relations Act 'leaves much to the states [and to the federal
courts], though Congress has refrained from telling us how much . .. .'
This penumbral area can be rendered progressively clear only by the course
of litigation."'49 The court noted that grave constitutional problems would
arise if constitutional issues were entrusted to the NLRB which lacks experi-
ence and necessary ancillary powers to conduct such cases effectively.
50
II. APPELLATE JURISDICTION
A. Timeiwness of Appeal
The Tenth Circuit addressed in several cases this past year the issue of
timeliness of appeal. As in the past, the court interpreted its jurisdiction
narrowly.
5 1
Three of the cases involved construction of revised rule 4 of the Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure. The most significant of the three is Mayfld v.
United States Parole Commission.52 Mayfield, apro se appellant, filed his notice
of appeal three days after the expiration of the sixty-day period allowed
under Rule 4(a)(l) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.
53
Several cases have held that compliance with the time limitations of
rule 4 are '"mandatory and jurisdictional."5 4 However, a majority of the
circuits, including the Tenth Circuit, had ruled that if a notice of appeal was
not filed within the time prescribed by rule 4(a), but was submitted within
the rule's thirty-day grace period,5 5 the case would be remanded for a deter-
mination of whether appellant's tardiness was the result of excusable ne-
glect. 56 If the district court decided that appellant's late notice of appeal
48. 637 F.2d at 747.
49. Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468, 480-81 (1955).
50. 637 F.2d at 747.
51. See Federal Practice and Procedure, Seventh Annual Tenth Circuit Suvey, 58 DEN. L.J. 371
(1980).
52. 647 F.2d 1053 (10th Cir. 1981) (per curiam).
53. The normal appeal period in a civil case is 30 days, but when the United States or any
of its agencies or officers is a party, any party may take an appeal within 60 days of the entry of
judgment. FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(1).
54. E.g., Browder v. Dept. of Corrections, 434 U.S. 257 (1978); United States v. Robinson,
361 U.S. 220 (1960) (decided under old rules 37 & 45); Silvia v. Laurie, 594 F.2d 892 (1st Cir.
1979); Moorer v. Griffin, 575 F.2d 87 (6th Cir. 1978).
The use of the wordjurcidictional in conjunction with rules of procedure may be deceptive.
Strictly speaking, the rules are not jurisdictional as that term is used in denoting subject matter
jurisdiction. The Supreme Court has recognized this distinction and in recent years has in-
cluded quotation marks around the phrase 'mandatory and jurisdictional'. Browder v. Dep't of
Corrections, 434 U.S. at 264. A lengthy analysis of the conceptual problems caused by misuse of
the term is beyond the scope of this article. For a good, brief discussion of the jurisdictional
nature of rule 4, see 9 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 204.02[2] (2d ed. 1980).
55. Before the 1979 amendments, rule 4(a) provided that "[ulpon a showing of excusable
neglect, the district court may extend the time for filing the notice of appeal by any party for a
period not to exceed 30 days from the expiration of the time otherwise prescribed by this subdi-
vision." The 30-day grace period is important because its limits have become jurisdictional cut-
offs for appeals.
56. See, e.g., United States v. Lucas, 597 F.2d 243 (10th Cir. 1979); Moorer v. Griffin, 575
F.2d 87 (6th Cir. 1978); United States v. Shillingford, 586 F.2d 1106 (5th Cir. 1978); United
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was the result of excusable neglect, the court of appeals would have author-
ity to proceed.
57
In 1979 the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure were amended. The
Tenth Circuit decided in Mayfteld how the 1979 amendments affected exten-
sions for excusable neglect under rule 4. The issue before the court was
"whether we can remand for a hearing to determine whether excusable ne-
glect warrants an extension of time to file the notice of appeal."58S
In United States v. Lucas ,59 decided under old rule 4, the Tenth Circuit
held that the "only generally accepted prerequisite establishing appellate ju-
risdiction is the filing of a notice ofappeal. . . within the maximum period for
which the district court can grant an extension of time based on a showing of
excusable neglect under Fed. R. App. P. 4."60 According to Lucas, since the
notice of appeal was the only jurisdictional prerequisite and the notice had
been filed, the motion for an extension of time was a mere technicality.
6 1
The untimely notice of appeal, which did not rise to the stature of an irrepa-
rable jurisdictional defect, could be overcome by a district court ruling nunc
pro tune that the late filing was the result of excusable neglect.
62
The court in Mayftld found that the ruling in Lucas, as it pertains to
civil appeals, became obsolete when revised rule 4 was promulgated. 63 The
court noted that the 1979 amendments had made the filing of a motion for
extension a jurisdictional prerequisite.64 Although the old rule required only
that the motion be made with such notice as the court deemed appropri-
ate,6 5 the current rule restricts the district court's power to "extend the time
States v. Umfress, 562 F.2d 359 (5th Cir. 1977). The language in several of these cases indicates
that pro se appellants might be treated more leniently than appellants who are respresented by
counsel when they do not meet the rule 4 requirements, but the holding in Mayfrid will likely
make this distinction moot.
One Third Circuit case held that the appellate court had no authority to remand when it
had no jurisdiction; it could only announce it was without jurisdiction and dismiss the appeal.
United States v. McKnight, 593 F.2d 230 (3d Cir. 1979). In a dissenting opinion, however,
Judge Adams concluded that a remand was appropriate since it was for the "limited purpose of
ascertaining facts upon which the question of jurisdiction turns [and] is not a novel exercise of
authority by a federal appellate tribunal." Id. at 234 (Adams, J., dissenting).
57. 647 F.2d at 1059.
58. Id.
59. 597 F.2d 243 (10th Cir. 1979).
60. Id. at 245 (emphasis added).
61. The court in Lucas stated:
It is the opportunity to establish excusable neglect which courts should extend to ap-
pellants such as Lucas who have tried, but technically failed, to comply with the re-
quirements for filing a notice of appeal.
Accordingly, we hold that a defendant who filed his notice of appeal beyond the
time specified in Fed. R. App. P. 4, but within the thirty-day permissible extension
period, should have the opportunity to seek relief by showing excusable neglect. Id.
(citations omitted).
62. Id.
63. The court noted that the 1979 amendments did not change rule 4(b) which governs
criminal appeals. 647 F.2d at 1055 n.4. Thus, Lucas presumably still applies to criminal appeals
under rule 4(b).
64. 647 F.2d at 1055. The Advisory Committee Notes to rule 4(a)(5) explicitly state that
the amendment "make[s] it clear that a motion to extend the time must be filed no later than 30
days after the expiration of the original appeal time, and that if the motion is timely filed the
district court may act .... 
65. Since no time limit was placed on this nonjurisdictional prerequisite courts often per-
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for filing a notice of appeal upon motion fled not later than 30 days after the expira-
tion ofthe tune prescribed by this Rule 1(a). "66 Because Mayfield had not filed a
motion for extension of time within the prescribed time or within the grace
period and the district court had never entered an order extending the time,
jurisdiction over the case never vested in the court of appeals. Since the time
for filing under rule 4(a)(5) had passed without such a filing, the appellant
had extinguished his right to appeal.
6 7
The court further rejected the appellant's argument that the district
court's filing and acceptance of the notice of appeal should be construed as a
grant of an extension of time. 68 The court noted that although the Lucas
ruling on extensions of time was superceded by the revisions to rule 4, the
rest of the Lucas opinion remains in effect. In Lucas, the court had held that
while rule 4 demanded a judicial determination that excusable neglect ex-
isted, the acceptance of a notice of appeal for filing was a mere clerical func-
tion.69  Thus, the court concluded that acceptance of the appellant's
argument would put rule 4(a)(5) practice in the same posture it had been
before rule 4 was rewritten, which is precisely the practice that the Advisory
Committee had said was to be avoided.70
The court expanded its interpretation of amended rule 4 in Oda v. Trans-
con Lines Corp. 71 Appellant Oda had filed several motions after the pre-
scribed appeal period had run, but within the thirty-day grace period. The
motions included a motion to extend time for filing notice of appeal, and a
notice of appeal. The appellant did not give notice of the motions to the
appellee at that time and he did not set the motions for hearing. Neverthe-
less, the district court granted the motion to extend time ex parte, after
which the appellant gave notice to the appellee.
72
In the circuit court, the appellee argued the appeal should be dismissed
for lack of jurisdiction because the appellant had not given proper notice of
the motion to extend time under rule 4(a)(5). The court agreed, although it
ruled that Oda's right to appeal had not been "extinguished beyond revival"
as was the petitioner's in Mayfeld.
73
As previously discussed, rule 4(a) had been amended to make the mo-
tion for extension of time a formal, jurisdictional step to be taken before the
appellate court has authority to act, 74 and the current rule 4 forbids ex parte
action on motions filed after the prescribed appeal period. 75 The old rule
mitted "a showing of excusable neglect long after the fact when the appellant has neglected to
make his Rule 4(a)(5) motion on time." 9 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 204.13121 at 4-103
(2d ed. 1980).
66. FED. R. App. P. 4(a)(5) (emphasis added).
67. 647 F.2d at 1055.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. FED. R. App. P. 4(a)(5) (Advisory Comm. Notes). See note 64 supra.
71. 650 F.2d 231 (10th Cir. 1981).
72. Id. at 232.
73. Id.
74. See notes 50-70 supra, and accompanying text.
75. The current rule states: "Any such motion [to extend] which is filed before expiration
of the prescribed time may be ex parte unless the court otherwise requires." FED. R. App. P.
4(a)(5). By implication, a motion filed after expiration of the prescribed time may not be ex
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had permitted motions for extension to be filed "with such notice as the
court shall deem appropriate, '76 and courts in several cases did not require a
written motion until it was found that the notice of appeal was filed late and
that the court of appeals would not proceed without a finding of excusable
neglect. 77 After the 1979 amendments, however, the motion to extend is a
formal requirement as noted in Mayf1ld, as is proper notice to other parties.
Rule 4(a)(5) states: "Notice of any such motion which is filed after expira-
tion of the prescribed time shall be given to the other parties in accordance
with local rules." The Tenth Circuit ruled that notice of the motion was
required to be given to the appellee within the thirty-day grace period before
jurisdiction to act on the motion vested in the district court.
78
Since the district court was without jurisdiction to act ex parte on Oda's
motions, its order was void ab initio.79 When Oda subsequently picked up
the copies and mailed them to appellee within the thirty-day grace period,
jurisdiction vested in the district court.8 0 Appellant had finally taken both
steps required by the rule. He had made the motion to extend and had given
notice to the other party within the thirty-day grace period.
8 1
The court stated that "[t]he [district] court's . . . order, being a nullity,
did not divest the court of jurisdiction or in any other way alter the status
quo.")8 2 It still had jurisdiction to determine whether excusable neglect war-
ranted an extension of time, a finding which was necessary before appellate
jurisdiction could attach. Therefore, the court of appeals dismissed the case
for lack of jurisdiction, subject to district court action which could later vest
jurisdiction in the court of appeals.
83
An unpublished opinion, Beehive International, Inc. v. Soroc Technology,
Inc.,84 further indicated the court's intention to interpret compliance with
the provisions of rule 4 as "mandatory and jurisdictional." On its own mo-
tion, the court dismissed a cross-appeal for lack of jurisdiction because it was
untimely.8 5
parte. This interpretation accords with the "mandatory" nature of rule 4, and the Advisory
Committee's comment that "[a]fter the expiration of the initial time a motion for the extension
of the time must be made in compliance with the F.R.C.P. and local rules of the district court."
FED. R. App. P. 4(a)(5) (Advisory Comm. Notes).
76. FED. R. App. P. 4 (1976).
77. Numerouspro se appellants, when advised that the court of appeals could not act with-
out a district court finding of excusable neglect, were permitted to petition the district court
even after their hearing in the circuit court. See 9 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACrICE 204.12121 (2d
ed. 1980) and cases cited therein.
78. 650 F.2d at 232. This is consistent with the Advisory Committee's intent and with rule
5 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See note 75 supra. Rule 5 states that "every written
motion other than one which may be heard ex parte. . . . shall be served upon each of the
parties." FED. R. Civ. P. 5(a). Since the late motion to extend could not be ex parte, it had to
be served on opposing parties before jurisdiction attached. The Tenth Circuit had previously
ruled that "timely filing and service are both prerequisite to an effective motion for new trial."
Sutherland v. Fitzgerald, 291 F.2d 846 (10th Cir. 1961).
79. 650 F.2d at 232.
80. Id. at 232.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 233.
84. Nos. 80-1661, 1743 (10th Cir. Nov. 18, 1980) (not for routine publication).
85. Id.
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Under rule 4(a)(3) a party may file a cross-appeal within a prescribed
time period or within fourteen days after another party has filed an appeal.
Although Beehive admittedly filed its notice of cross-appeal late, it argued
that the untimely cross-appeal was not an irreparable jurisdictional defect
when "the same issue is raised in the cross-appeal as was timely raised in the
initial appeal."'86 It further argued that compliance with rule 4 on cross-
appeals is a matter of practice rather than a jurisdictional prerequisite when
the same issue is raised by both.8 7
The circuit court found that the same issues were not raised in the cross-
appeal and the initial appeal. Beehive's request for relief was distinguishable
from Soroc's request.88 While Soroc contended that the damages awarded
were excessive, Beehive argued that the damages were insufficient. The
court stated that "a non-appealing party can [not] expand the scope of an
appeal beyond the issues raised by an appellant." 8 9
Thus, the court did not address the question of whether rule 4(a)(3)
should be considered a rule of practice rather than a jurisdictional prerequi-
site when the issue raised by both parties is the same. It appears, however,
that barring exceptional circumstances the Tenth Circuit will probably re-
quire strict adherence to the provisions of rule 4.
The final case which dealt with timeliness of appeal was Se/co Supply Co.
v. EPA .o At issue was whether a petition for reconsideration of an EPA
order tolled the running of time for appeal. 9 1 The court held that since the
statute providing for judicial review92 made no provision for petitions to re-
consider, such motions could not toll or alter the time for appeal. 93 Selco's
appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because it was filed after the
sixty-day period permitted by statute. Alternatively, the court ruled that
even if tolling were permitted, Selco's appeal would be dismissed as prema-
ture because it was filed before final action on the petition for
reconsideration .94
Selco arose under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide
Act (FIFRA).95 Judicial review of administrative orders under FIFRA is
governed by section 136n 9 6 Although section 136n does not mention mo-
tions to reconsider or motions to reopen, the EPA regulations that supple-
ment section 136n do provide for petitions to reconsider and reopen if filed
within ten days of the order. 97 Judge Breitenstein reasoned that the EPA
regulations could not provide for tolling when there was no such provision in
86. No. 80-1743, slip op. at 3.
87. Se, e.g., Scott v. University of Del., 601 F.2d 76 (3d Cir.), cert. dented, 444 U.S. 931
(1979); In re Continental Mortgage Investors, 578 F.2d 872 (1st Cir. 1978); Grunin v. Int'l House
of Pancakes, 513 F.2d 114 (8th Cir.), cert. dentied, 423 U.S. 864 (1975).
88. No. 80-1743, slip op. at 4.
89. Id. at 3-4.
90. 632 F.2d 863 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. dented, 101 S. Ct. 1740 (1981).
91. Id. at 864.
92. 7 U.S.C. § 163n (1976).
93. 632 F.2d at 865.
94. Id.
95. 7 U.S.C. § 136 (1976).
96. Id. § 136n.
97. 40 C.F.R. § 168.70 (1977) (repealed and consolidated into 40 C.F.R. § 22 (1981)).
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the statute. 98 The court added that "[d]ecisions under other federal statutes
permitting tolling of the limitation period are not pertinent." 99
Judge Seymour wrote a compelling concurring opinion in which she
agreed that the appeal should be dismissed as premature, but concluded that
a motion for reconsideration should toll the time to appeal.10° She argued
that decisions in other cases permitting tolling were pertinent.' 0 ' Judge Sey-
mour cited a number of cases for the proposition that "where a statute or a
regulation provides for agency reconsideration, courts have held that a mo-
tion for reconsideration delays the time for seeking judicial review until the
agency has acted upon the motion." 10 2 This line of authority plus strong
policy considerations favoring such delay convinced Judge Seymour that a
similar rule should be adopted in this EPA case.'
0 3
B. Final Orders
Federal courts of appeals have jurisdiction only to the extent that Con-
gress has granted it to them. Generally, exercise of their appellate jurisdic-
tion over district court cases is limited to final decisions. 1° 4 Exceptions to
this rule have been created for certain interlocutory orders 10 5 as well as situ-
ations in which a district judge makes a non-final order but certifies it for
immediate appeal.' 0 6 The Tenth Circuit became concerned this past term
that these jurisdictional requirements for an appeal were misunderstood;
10 7
98. 632 F.2d at 865. The court cited Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969), and
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), for the proposition that "[tederal courts may exercise only
that judicial power provided by the Constitution and conferred by Congress." 632 F.2d at 865.
99. 632 F.2d at 865.
100. Id. at 866 (Seymour, J., concurring).
101. Id.; see Outland v. CAB, 284 F.2d 224 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
102. 632 F.2d at 866 (Seymour, J., concurring).
103. Id.
104. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976). "The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction ofappeals from
all final decisions of the district courts . . . except where a direct review may be had in the
Supreme Court." Id.
The Supreme Court has recognized that "[tihe finality requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1291
embodies a strong congressional policy against piecemeal reviews, and against obstructing or
impeding an ongoing judicial proceeding by interlocutory appeals." United States v. Nixon,
418 U.S. 683, 690 (1974). In certain circumstances the Court has been called upon to determine
what Congress intendedftial to mean, and when injustices might result, the Court has deter-
mined thatfinal does not necessarily mean absolutelyfial. E.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S.
683 (1974); United States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530 (1971); Perlman v. United States, 247 U.S. 7
(1918).
105. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) (1976). Two cases this past term involved section 1292(a).
Milonas v. Williams, 648 F.2d 688 (10th Cir. 1981) (failure to cite section 1292 in notice of
appeal is not jurisdictionally fatal); Lexco v. United States, No. 79-2217 (10th Cir. Oct. 30,
1980) (standard used on appeal of injunction order under section 1292(a)(1) is a clear showing
of abuse of discretion).
106. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1976); FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b). Section 1292(b) permits a district
judge to certify an order for immediate appeal when he is "of the opinion that such order
involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of
opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate
termination of the litigation." 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). Upon application the circuit court has
discretion to grant an appeal. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). Rule 54(b) allows a district judge to certify
for appeal as a final order any order which determines the status of fewer than all claims or
parties "only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an
express direction for the entry of judgment." FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b).
107. A.O. Smith Corp. v. Sims Consol. Ltd., 647 F.2d 118, 119 (10th Cir. 1981).
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a number of cases had been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because the
appealed ruling was not a final order and no rule 54(b) certification had
been obtained. ' 0 8 The court, in A. 0. Smith Corp. v. Sims Consolidated Ltd, 09
explained its authority to act in this area.
The district court, on several motions for summary judgment, dismissed
Smith's complaint and determined all issues before it except a malicious
prosecution counterclaim."10 Smith filed a notice of appeal, and when he
was advised that the court of appeals was considering dismissing the appeal
for lack ofjurisdiction, Smith subsequently obtained from the district court a
rule 54(b) certification of its original order.' The question before the cir-
cuit court was whether the rule 54(b) certification acted nuncpro lunc to cure
Smith's defective appeal.' 12
The court declined to follow a recent decision by the Seventh Circuit
which held that certification secured after filing a notice of appeal does act
nuncpro tune. 1"3 The Tenth Circuit analogized rule 4(a) of the Federal Rules
of Appellate Procedure to rule 54(b).' 14 A proper 54(b) certification makes
an order appealable as a matter of right under section 1291 of the Judiciary
and Judicial Procedure Act;'" the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure
would therefore apply. The court found that the intent behind rule 4, as
amended, was persuasive authority to establish a rule contrary to that in the
Seventh Circuit."16 The court noted that the reviser's notes to rule 4 indi-
108. Peterson v. Koch Indus., Inc., No. 81-1282 (10th Cir. June 3, 1981); Quistberg v.
Natomas Energy Co., No. 80-2192 (10th Cir. June 3, 1981); Smith v. Hill, No. 81-1075 (10th
Cir. June 3, 1981); Radiology Management Trust v. United States, No. 80-2281 (1Oth Cir. May
14, 1981); Brazell v. Bergland, No. 80-2185 (10th Cir. May 12, 1981); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Ander-
son, No. 80-1924 (10th Cir. March 30, 1981); Viersen & Cochrane Drilling Co. v. Grynberg, No.
80-2325 (10th Cir. Feb. 27, 1981); Farrar v. Northrop Worldwide Aircraft Serv., Inc., No. 80-
1456 (10th Cir. Jan. 28, 1981); Price Dev. Co. v. Casper Properties, No. 80-1454 (10th Cir. Dec.
11, 1980); Short v. Graves, No. 80-1105 (10th Cir. Aug. 22, 1980); Harris v. Tri-State Ins. Co.,
No. 80-1007 (10th Cir. July 18, 1980).
In each of these cases the court cited as authority olden Villa Spa, Inc. o. Health Indus., Inc.,
549 F.2d 1363 (10th Cir. 1977), which states that "the jurisdiction of a court of appeals is lim-
ited by statute to review of 'final decisions' of the district courts." Id. at 1364 (citing 28 U.S.C.
1291 (1976)). Where there are multiple claims or multiple parties, no order is appealable which
determines the status of fewer than all of the claims or all the parties unless a rule 54(b) certifi-
cation is obtained. 1d.
109. 647 F.2d 118 (10th Cir. 1981).
110. d. at 119. The defendant who raised the malicious prosecution issue filed a notice of
intent to proceed on the issue after summary judgment was denied. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Meat Cutters Local P-171 v. Thompson Farms Co., 642 F.2d 1065, 1073-75 (7th Cir.
1981). The appellant in Thompson obtained a § 1292(b) certification from the district court
judge after filing the notice of appeal, but it was treated as a 54(b) certification. 642 F.2d at
1068-73.
The Thompson court made an exception to the general rule that a notice of appeal divests a
district court of jurisdiction to proceed any further in the matter. Id. at 1073. In support, it
found that the general rule had "always been shot through with exceptions," and it found
guidance in several Supreme Court decisions in which purely formal deficiencies were over-
looked when strict adherence to the rule might result in an injustice. Id. The leaps in logic and
willingness to make exceptions to the rule may have impaired its precedential value for the
Tenth Circuit.
114. 647 F.2d at 120.
115. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976).
116. 647 F.2d at 120.
[Vol. 59:2
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
cate that a notice of appeal filed before district court action on motions enu-
merated in rule 4(a)(4) should be determined premature and incapable of
bestowing jurisdiction on the court of appeals because "it would be undesir-
able to proceed with the appeal while the district court has before it a mo-
tion the granting of which would vacate or alter the judgment appealed
from."' 17 By analogy, the same rule should apply when a notice of appeal is
filed before the district court enters an order on a 54(b) certification. This is
another instance where the district court has a motion before it which must
be decided before jurisdiction vests in the circuit court." 18
The court further stated that no prejudice results for an appellant in
this scheme, even though this particular appeal was dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction. The appellant has an appeal period which runs from the entry
of the 54(b) certification, or he can appeal when the final judgment is
entered. 19
III. PARTIES AND PLEADING
Failure to prove standing to sue precluded the court's determination of
alleged first amendment violations in Citizens Concerned for Separation of Church
and Slate o. City and County of Denver. 120 The plaintiffs (Citizens) claimed in
the district court that the City and County of Denver's Christmas display'21
created excessive government entanglement with religion and violated the
first amendment. 122 They set a hearing for preliminary injunction before
the defendant was required to respond and the hearing was consolidated
with the trial on the merits under rule 65(a)(2).' 23 The trial judge ruled that
117. Id. (quoting 1979 Notes of the Advisory Comm. on Appellate Rules, 28 U.S.C. (1980)).
118. Before the 1979 amendments, in an appellate rule 4 proceeding, courts often remanded
for a district court finding of excusable neglect to cure the defective appeal. See 9 MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE 204.1212] (2d ed. 1980). A similar process would occur if circuit courts
were to remand cases for a 54(b) certification.
However, the court is making the district court certification under 54(b) a jurisdictional
prerequisite to thefding of a notice of appeal. The Tenth Circuit had ruled previously that
"[tihe finality requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 must have been satisfied as of the date a notice
of appeal is filed." Century Laminating, Ltd. v. Montgomery, 595 F.2d 563, 567 (10th Cir.),
cert. granted, 444 U.S. 897, cert. dismtssed, 444 U.S. 987 (1979) (decided under old rule 4). Sims
Consohdated has been cited for the proposition that all jurisdictional prerequisites such as the rule
54(b) certifation must be satisfied as of the date the notice of appeal is filed. Rosa v. Cantrell,
No. 81-1275 (10th Cir. April 24, 1981). See also Gooch v. Skelly Oil Co., 493 F.2d 366 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 997 (1974).
119. 647 F.2d at 120-21. This is similar to the situation in Oda. If the district court has not
yet ruled on the motion to extend or on the certification issue, it still has jurisdiction to make
such a ruling and appellant's dismissal in the circuit court does not affect his right to appeal
once the order is finally made.
120. 628 F.2d 1289 (10th Cir. 1980).
121. The trial judge described the display as:
a spectacle of light(s), stars, candles, Christmas cards, an elves' toy shop, Santa Claus,
reindeer, flood lights, various tinsel, a cross, and the challenged creche or Nativity
Scene; . . . the creche consists of life-size figurines of Mary, Joseph, the infant Jesus,
shepherds, wise men, and domesticated animals, depicting the birth of Christ as de-
scribed in the writings of St. Matthew, St. John, and St. Luke.
Id. at 1292.
122. Id. at 1291.
123. FED. R. Ctv. P. 65(a)(2) states in pertinent part: "[b]efore or after the commencement
of the hearing of an application for a preliminary injunction, the court may order the trial of
the action on the merits to be advanced and consolidated with the hearing of the application."
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excessive entanglement was apparent and the creche was ordered removed
from the display.
124
On appeal the defendant argued that the district court was without ju-
risdiction to enter its order because standing had not been proven. Citizens
had alleged standing in its complaint, but no evidence was offered on the
issue at the hearing. At issue before the Tenth Circuit was whether the de-
fendants had admitted the jurisdictional standing allegation in the com-
plaint or if Citizens was required to present proof of standing at the hearing.
The court ruled that the defendant was not required to have entered a re-
sponse before the hearing date, so it was not required to admit or deny the
allegations of the complaint.125 Therefore, since Citizens failed to prove the
required basis for standing, the case was dismissed on appeal for lack of
jurisdiction. 126
Citizens made adequate standing allegations in its complaint, stating
that it was an unincorporated association whose members were taxpaying
residents of the City and County of Denver and whose taxes had been used
in erecting and maintaining the display. The court acknowledged that this
was a sufficient pleading statement of standing.'2 7 The court noted that "a
party must clearly demonstrate by facts alleged that 'he himself is adversely
affected' or those he represents have been 'injured in fact.' ,128
Citizens asserted that since it alleged standing properly in its complaint,
and the defendants had not denied the allegation, the issue must be deemed
admitted as stated pursuant to rule 8(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure.129 The court agreed that rule 8(d) considerations were controlling, but
held that the rule placed the burden of proving standing on Citizens, not on
the defendant;13 0 denial or admission by the defendant of Citizens' standing
depended on whether a responsive pleading was required.
Citizens further contended that by stipulating to a rule 65(a)(2)13 1 con-
solidation, the defendant had waived its right to file a responsive pleading
and thus admitted any issue it did not contest in the hearing. Again, the
court rejected Citizens' argument, noting that this was not a usual or routine
litigative procedure under which the City could be deemed to have made
such admissions by any waiver of an answer. '3 2 The answer of the City was
not due when the hearing on the injunctive relief was held; thus, there was
124. Citizens Concerned for Separation of Church and State v. City and County of Denver,
481 F. Supp. 522, 532 (D. Colo. 1979).
125. 628 F.2d at 1298-99.
126. Id. at 1299.
127. Id. at 1298 (citing Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S.
83 (1968); Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923)).
128. 628 F.2d at 1296 (citing Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972); Data Processing
Serv. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970)).
129. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(d). Rule 8(d) provides in pertinent part: "[a]verments in a pleading
to which a responsive pleading is required. . . are admitted when not denied in the responsive
pleading. Averments in a pleading to which no responsive pleading is required or permitted
shall be taken as denied or avoided."
130. 628 F.2d at 1298.
131. FED. R. Civ. P. 65(a)(2).
132. 628 F.2d at 1298.
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no failure on the part of City to plead.' 33 The result of the court's decision is
that at a hearing consolidated under rule 65(a)(2), which is held before any
responsive pleading is either required or submitted, a petitioner must prove
every element of the complaint unless, in the testimony adduced at the hear-
ing, the defendant specifically admits or confesses the elements.
The Citizens case returned to the Tenth Circuit within three months. In
its original order, the circuit court had held that the "appeal is dismissed and
the cause is remanded to the District Court with instruction to vacate the
judgment .. .for want of jurisdiction."' 34 The district court, aware of the
public interest in the case, noted that the appellate mandate was that the
judgment be vacated, and it thus determined that after vacating the judgment
it still had jurisdiction to reform the record so that a new judgment could be
entered.' 3 5 The City then applied to the Tenth Circuit for a writ of prohibi-
tion in City and County of Denver v. Matsch, 136 to halt further proceedings by
the district judge. A divided court held that the writ should issue. 137 The
court reasoned that when the case was first before the court, Citizens had
failed to prove its standing allegations. In the cases relied upon by Citizens
and the district court, the parties had been permitted to return to the district
court and correct technical pleading defects. 138  However, there was no
pleadin deficiency in this case, but instead a failure to prove for which there
is no right to return and correct the error.1 39 Conceptually, Citizens had its
day in court, but failed to prove its case. To allow Citizens to return and
correct its record could possibly lead to innumerable re-starts in cases where
a party has failed to carry its burden of proof.
IV. SPECIAL MASTERS
In Polin v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. ,t40 a rehearing en banc was granted
after a panel of judges on its own motion had exercised its supervisory pow-
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1301.
135. City and County of Denver v. Matsch, 635 F.2d 804, 806 (10th Cir. 1980).
136. 635 F.2d 804 (10th Cir. 1980). The City actually requested a writ of mandamus to
compel compliance with the previous circuit court order. The Tenth Circuit found no harm in
the mislabeling of the petition. Id. at 809 n. 1.
137. Id. at 809.
138. Id. at 808.
139. Id. In his dissenting opinion, Judge Doyle claimed "[iit is fundamental that where
there is a lack of jurisdiction it does not have any effect on the cause of action. No adjudication
affecting the cause has been rendered. It follows, of course, that the complaint is open to
amendment and such should have been carried out." Id. at 809 (Doyle, J., dissenting).
The court may have been swayed by the fact that plaintff moved for consolidation. Advi-
sory Committee notes to rule 65 indicate that a consideration of major importance is that a
plaintiff be given a full opportunity to prove its case. FED. R. Civ. P. 65 (Advisory Comm.
Notes). Here, the plaintiff was given that opportunity; any prejudice was caused by its own act.
140. 634 F.2d 1319 (10th Cir. 1980). The original appellate ruling on this issue was dis-
cussed briefly in Federal Practice and Procedure, Seventh Annual Tenth Circuit Survey, 58 DEN. L.J. 371,
377 (1981).
This was the second time this case had been before the court of appeals. In the first case,
the trial court granted summary judgment for the defendant because the statute of limitations
had run. The court of appeals reversed. Polin v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 511 F.2d 875 (10th
Cir. 1975).
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ers to reverse and remand the case. 14 ' The panel determined that a refer-
ence to a special master by the district court violated rule 53(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 14 2 and amounted to an abdication of the
judicial function. 1
43
On rehearing, a divided court 144 ruled that it would not exercise super-
visory powers to invalidate a 53(b) reference, but it would remand the case
because the district court failed to review the master's report as required by
rule 53(e)(4). 145 The majority decision by Judge Seymour summarily ruled
that the panel's use of the supervisory power was inappropriate. 1
46
The majority found a more serious problem which required a remand of
the case. The trial court had entered judgment as recommended by the
master, and did not indicate that it had reviewed the master's report and
recommendation.1 47 Apparently, the majority felt that it could not address
the appealed issue of the propriety of summary judgment until the trial
court had actually reviewed the master's recommendation. "Failure of the
district court to review and consider questions of law arising upon the special
master's report violates Rule 53(e)(4). District court scrutiny of the master's
report is essential ... .
On the rule 53(b) issue, the Poin majority's statement that "a reference
does not raise an issue of jurisdiction"' 49 is important because it is the issue
attacked by the dissent. Judge Doyle strenuously argued that an improper
order of reference does raise a jurisdictional issue and the court is authorized
to raise the issue sua sponte and remand. 150 Citing La Buy v. Howes Leather
Co. ,15' he reasoned that rule 53 was written "in aid of Article III of the
Constitution,"' 152 which is a jurisdictional matter. Further, Judge Doyle
141. 634 F.2d at 1320.
142. Rule 53(b) provides:
A reference to a master shall be the exception and not the rule. In actions to be tried
by a jury, a reference shall be made only when the issues are complicated; in actions to
be tried without a jury, save in matters of account, and of difficult computation of
damages a reference shall be made only upon a showing that some exceptional condi-
tion requires it.
FED. R. Civ. P. 53(b).
143. 634 F.2d at 1320.
144. Judge Doyle dissented and was joined by Judge Holloway and Judge McWilliams.
145. 634 F.2d at 1321. Rule 53(e)(4) provides:
The effect of a master's report is the same whether or not the parties have consented to
the reference; but, when the parties stipulate that a master's findings of fact shall be
final, only questions of law arising upon the report shall thereafter be considered.
FED. R. Civ. P. 53(e)(4).
146. 634 F.2d at 1321.
147. Id. at 1320.
148. Id. at 1321. Two subsequent cases were remanded by the Tenth Circuit in light of its
Polin decision. Warne v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., No. 78-1601 (10th Cir. March 2, 1981); Catts
Co. v. Gulf Ins. Co., No. 78-1452 (10th Cir. Dec. 15, 1980). In both, Pohn was cited for the rule
that the district court must consider questions of law arising upon the special master's report, as
required by FED. R. Civ. P. 53(e)(4). It is interesting to note that each of these cases involving
special masters originated in the same district court.
149. 634 F.2d at 1321 (citing Cruz v. Hauck, 515 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424
U.S. 917 (1976); Diamond Door Co. v. Lane-Stanton Lumber Co., 505 F.2d 1199 (9th Cir.
1974)).
150. 634 F.2d at 1324 (Doyle, J., dissenting).
151. 352 U.S. 249 (1957).
152. 634 F.2d at 1324 (Doyle, J., dissenting).
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found a commitment to strict enforcement of rule 53(b)153 evidenced in
prior Tenth Circuit decisions in Wilver v. Fiher154 and Bartlett-Collins Co. v.
Surinam Navigation Co. 155
Judge Doyle's opinion argued that although there were four dissents in
La Buy, the La Buy minority did not dissent on the issue of violation of rule
53(b).156 Judge Doyle's argument suggests that the minority in La Buy at
least tacitly approved the proposition that violation of rule 53(b) is a juris-
dictional or article III matter which the court may consider on its own mo-
tion, waiting only until a final order is entered.1 5 7 The minority in La Buy,
however, contended that rule 53(b) does not involve jurisdiction or article
III;158 the majority never directly addressed the issue.' 59
The majority in Pohn directed its attention to this distinction and found
that "such a reference does not raise an issue of jurisdiction."'60 Therefore,
the court of appeals could not sua sponte attack the order of reference. Be-
cause the parties stipulated to the interlocutory order,' 6 t they raised no
timely objection to the discretionary order and thus waived their right to
appeal.
Two cases were cited by the majority in support of its interpretation. In
the earliest case, Diamond Door Co. v. Lane-Stanton Lumber Co. ,162 the court of
appeals had refused to hear the appeal of a reference to a master when it had
been raised as an issue for the first time on appeal. The court had ruled that
objections to the reference could be waived because rule 53(b) is not
jurisdictional.1
63
153. Id.
154. 387 F.2d 66 (10th Cir. 1967).
155. 381 F.2d 546 (10th Cir. 1967).
156. 634 F.2d at 1323 (Doyle, J., dissenting).
157. Id.
158. The minority opinion of Justice Brennan states:
The case before the Court of Appeals was 'not a case where a court has exceeded or
refused to exercise it jurisdiction rule . . . .' Rule 53(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure vested Judge La Buy with discretionary power to make a reference ....
Here also 'the most that could be claimed is that the district court . . . erred in ruling
on matters within their jurisdiction." 352 U.S. at 260-261 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(quoting Parr v. United States, 351 U.S. 513, 520 (1956)).
159. The majority only mentioned jurisdiction once in its opinion, stating that appellate
courts had power "to issue writs of mandamus in aid of jurisdiction," which was apparently the
case in La Buy. 352 U.S. at 255 (emphasis added). That presupposes, however, that jurisdiction
was not an issue. In fact, the majority concluded "that supervisory control of the District Courts
by the Court of Appeals is necessary to proper judicial administration in the federal system."
352 U.S. at 259-60. "Proper judicial administration" is not the same issue as jurisdiction of the
court.
Judge Doyle may be arguing that the "All Writs Act confers an independent appellate
power in the Courts of Appeals to review interlocutory orders." 352 U.S. at 263 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). However, the majority in Polin implicitly ruled that was not a consequence of the
La Buy ruling.
160. 634 F.2d at 1321.
161. The Polin majority noted that the parties in La Buy had objected to the reference, and
the parties in Poltn had not. Id. Since the issue was not one of jurisdiction, but of abuse of
discretion, the Tenth Circuit felt that it was not authorized to act on its own motion with
supervisory powers. Id.
162. 505 F.2d 1199 (9th Cir. 1974).
163. Id. at 1206. Se also discussion in 5A MOORE's FEDERAL PRAcIrCE 53.05[3] (2d ed.
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In the second of these cases, Cruz v. Hauck,' 64 the pertinent facts were
identical to the facts in Polin: neither party objected to the reference in the
trial court, but the issue was raised on appeal. The Cruz court addressed
initially the problem of raising the issue for the first time on appeal:
Since the judge's reference was within his power [under Rule
53(a)], a challenge to that order is unlike a challenge to a court's
subject matter jurisdiction. The latter attacks the essence of the
court's powers. An order without power is void; a challenge, there-
fore, to subject matter jurisdiction may be raised for the first time
on appeal. 
165
It then addressed the applicability of article III and waiver of objections to a
reference:
The ineluctable conclusion is that the 'exceptional condition' limi-
tation results from the deficiencies of the master system rather than
from constitutional limitations upon non-Article III judges.
We are of the opinion, therefore, that the policy underlying
Rule 53 is the alleviation of unnecessary burdens to litigants and
the cornerstone of the rule is the avoidance of delay, costs, and a
fact finder other than a judge. We see no reason why the parties to
the lawsuit, for whose benefit the restrictions are imposed, may not
waive their objections to a reference.
166
This authority is the cornerstone of the majority's ruling on the issue dis-
puted by the dissent. As the dissent pointed out, the result is that the exces-
sive grant of authority may be corrected only by remanding the case to the
district court to review the referee's recommendations. 16 7 The problem of
the excessive order of reference remains; the only solution is that the judge
on review will negate the effects of the grant.
Franklin Delanor Patterson
1980); 13 C. WRIGHT, A MILLER, & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: JURIS-
DICTION § 2606 (1971).
164. 515 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1975).
165. Id. at 327.
166. Id. at 330.
167. 634 F.2d at 1324 (Doyle, J., dissenting).
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OVERVIEW
The decisions made by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in the area
of labor law followed precedent and were basically unsurprising. This arti-
cle presents a digest of the decisions in the field during the past year for the
use of Tenth Circuit practitioners.
I. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS AcT-LABOR MANAGEMENT
RELATIONS ACT'
A. Jursd'ction
In a case involving joint employers, Board of Trustees of Memorial Hospital
v. NLRB, 2 one employer, a five-member Board of Trustees (Trustees) was
appointed pursuant to statute3 by the Fremont County Commissioners.
4
Under a lease agreement, the Trustees agreed to lease the grounds, building
and equipment of the Memorial Hospital of Fremont County in return for a
nominal consideration and the management services of the Lutheran Hospi-
tals and Homes Society of America (Society), the second employer involved
in the case.
5
The American Nurses' Association (Association) was certified by the
National Labor Relations Board (the Board or the NLRB) as the bargaining
representative of the registered nurses at the hospital. The certification fol-
lowed a finding by the Board that the Society, not the Board of Trustees,
was the employer of the nurses. 6 After the election, however, the Trustees
adopted a resolution directing the Society to refrain from entering into a
collective bargaining posture with the Association. 7 The Association re-
sponded by filing an unfair labor practice charge alleging failure to bargain
in good faith under section 8(a)(5)8 of the National Labor Relations Act (the
NLRA or the Act). The Administrative Law Judge found that the Society
"controlled" the operation of the hospital9 and was the sole employer of the
hospital's registered nurses within the meaning of section 2(2) 10 of the Act.
The Board adopted his findings.
In reversing, the Tenth Circuit Court found that although the Society
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-144, 151-169, 171-188 (1976).
2. 624 F.2d 177 (10th Cir. 1980).
3. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 18-8-102 (Michie 1977).
4. 624 F.2d at 179.
5. Id
6. Id at 180.
7. Id at 181.
8. Id 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976) provides that it shall be an unfair labor practice to
refuse to bargain collectively with the employees' representative.
9. 624 F.2d at 183.
10. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1976) defines an "employer" for purposes of the Act as a person
other than a governmental agency, person subject to the Railway Labor Act, or any labor organi-
zation not acting as an employer.
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was a private employer, it did not retain sufficient control over the employ-
ment relationship to enter into fruitful collective bargaining because the
Trustees retained the right to approve or disapprove staffing, wage rates and
fringe benefits, employment of particular individuals, and changes in room
rates.II The Society would be unable to bargain effectively in these circum-
stances, and it could not be considered the sole employer of the nurses in the
bargaining unit. 12 The real employer, the Trustees, as a political subdivision
of the state, was not required to bargain. Therefore, the Board's order was
set aside for lack of jurisdiction.'
3
B. Election Bar
In American Safety Equipment Corp. v. NLRB, 14 the propriety of the
Board's setting aside an election was at issue. The International Association
of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (Workers) sought to organize produc-
tion and maintenance employees at one of the company's facilities.'
5 An
NLRB election was held in which the Workers lost. The election was set
aside by the Regional Director 16 because of two rules in the employee hand-
book that prohibited distribution of literature during working hours and al-
lowed only company-approved solicitations during working hours. '
7 After a
second election was held in which the Workers won, the company objected
to the election based on the "election bar" rule of section 9(c)(3)18 of the Act
and refused to respond to communication from the union. This, according
to the Board, was an unfair labor practice in violation of sections 8(a)(l)
19
and 8(a)(5)20 of the Act.
The Tenth Circuit Court found no evidence showing that the handbook
rules were not applied properly and held that the Board had erroneously set
11. 624 F.2d at 185-86.
12. Id at 186-88.
13. Id at 188.
14. 643 F.2d 693 (10th Cir. 1981).
15. d at 694.
16. Id
17. One rule banned "distribution of unauthorized leaflets, papers, or other materials dur-
ing working hours on Company property." The second stated that "only the recognized solici-
tations for charitable organizations and similar activities specifically approved by the Company
will be permitted during working hours." Id
A disparate application of no-solicitation rules to various groups may violate the employees
right to self-organization. See, e.g., Oak Apparel, Inc., 218 N.L.R.B. 701 (1975).
18. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3) (1976) provides that no representation election shall be held if a
valid election has been held within the preceding twelve-month period.
19. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976) provides that it shall be an unfair labor practice for an
employer to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of their § 7 rights. Sec-
tion 7, the heart of the Act, provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organ-
izations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to
engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all such
activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requir-
ing membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in
section 8(a)(3).
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976). Section 8(a)(3) is described in note 33 nfra.
20. See note 8 supra. 643 F.2d at 696.
[Vol. 59:2
LABOR LAW
aside the first election. 2' The employees had been free to engage in union
activities during nonwork time at the plant and had distributed union
materials as well.
22
In a lengthy dissent, Judge Doyle commented that the rules said "work-
ing hours" not "working time" and were therefore presumptively invalid.
2 3
In addition, he deemed the evidence given by four employees, three supervi-
sors and a personal secretary, not persuasive enough to set aside the Board's
findings.
24
C. Discharge
In NLRB v. First National Bank of Pueblo,25 the Board sought enforcement
of an order issued against the Bank after holding that the Bank had violated
the Act by interfering with the union's solicitation of employees and by dis-
charging an employee involved in union activity. 26 The sole issue on appeal
was whether the Board's conclusion was supported by substantial
evidence.
27
The court held that the Board could not use an isolated incident in
which the union was precluded from distributing leaflets to form an impor-
tant backdrop to the discharge of an employee.28 It was uncontested that
the Bank terminated the employee for an unexcused absence. The evidence
also showed that her termination occurred two and one-half months after
her union activity and that she had received a good evaluation and a merit
raise during that period of time.29 The finding that the Bank harbored the
union animus necessary to make the discharge unlawful was not supported
by the evidence, and enforcement of the Board's order was denied.
30
In NLRB v. Schlegel Oklahoma, Inc. ,3 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
unanimously agreed that the Board's findings of section 8(a)(l) 32 and
8(a)(3)33 violations were supported by substantial evidence. In an effort to
organize Schlegel employees, two Schlegel workers were passing out notices
of an organizational meeting on public property near the plant. The com-
pany president advised the employees to leave the "company property" and
threatened to call the police.34 There was substantial evidence that the
21. A representation election should be conducted under "laboratory conditions." General
Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 127 (1948). If an employer can show that the no-solicitation or
no-access rules did not interfere with the employees' right to organize, the election can be up-
held. Essex Int'l, Inc., 211 N.L.R.B. 749 (1974).
22. 643 F.2d at 696.
23. Id at 697.
24. Id at 699.
25. 623 F.2d 686 (10th Cir. 1980).
26. Id at 687.
27. Id at 691.
28. Id at 692.
29. Id at 689-90.
30. Id at 691, 694.
31. 644 F.2d 842 (10th Cir. 1981).
32. See note 19 supra.
33. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976) provides that it shall be an unfair labor practice for an
employer to discriminate in regard to hiring, tenure, or any other condition of employment, in
order to encourage or discourage membership in a labor organization.
34. 644 F.2d at 843.
19821
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
handbilling took place on a pub/ic thoroughfare and that the president had
indeed threatened to call the police.35 "Threatening to summon law en-
forcement authorities for the purpose of inhibiting lawful union activities has
long been held violative of section 8(a)(l) of the Act."'36 Thus, the order was
enforced.
3 7
In NLRB v. Dillon Stores,38 the anti-union activities of an employee
found not to be a supervisor for purposes of voting in Board-conducted elec-
tions were imputed to the company when, during unfair labor practice pro-
ceedings, the employee was found to be a supervisor after all.39 Stating that
"[t]he purpose of determining whether an individual is a supervisor is differ-
ent in a representation proceeding than it is in an unfair labor practice pro-
ceeding involving interference with organizational rights . . . "40 the court
held that the discharge of the employee was unlawfully motivated and a
violation of sections 8(a)(l) 4 1 and 8(a)(3)42 of the Act.
In Hasten v. Phillips Petroleum Co ., a truckdriver, subject to the provi-
sions of a collective bargaining agreement between his employer and the
Teamsters' Union, brought a libel suit following grievance proceedings for
statements made in a letter of discharge. 44 Article nine of the collective bar-
gaining agreement stated that an employee's discharge "must be by proper
written notice to the employee and the union."
'45
Using the "absolute privilege" theory of General Motors Corp. v.
Mendici,46 the district court granted the defendants' summary judgment
motion.4 7 The Mendicki doctrine bars libel suits based on termination or
suspension notices specifically contemplated by a collective bargaining
agreement. 48 The circuit court upheld the summary judgment ruling de-
spite the plaintiffs argument that the allegedly libelous statements were
made in a discharge letter and not during a grievance proceeding as in
Mendicki. Agreeing with the district court that the "federal policy encourag-
ing collective bargaining and frankness in labor disputes applies to termina-
35. Id
36. Id (citing NLRB v. Revlon Prod. Corp., 144 F.2d 88, 89 (2d Cir. 1944)).
37. Id at 844. The Board's findings were supported by substantial evidence, the necessary
standard for enforcement of the Board's order by an appeals court. Universal Camera Corp. v.
NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 496-97 (1951).
38. 643 F.2d 687 (10th Cir. 1981).
39. Id at 689-90. The Board has inconsistently applied the term "supervisor," making it
difficult to find a pattern in its decisions. See NLRB v. North Ark. Elec. Coop., 412 F.2d 324,
328 (8th Cir. 1969). Seegeneralty Note, The NLRB andSupersoqy Satw: An Explanation of Inconsis-
tent Rendts, 94 HARv. L. REv. 1713 (1981).
40. 643 F.2d at 690.
41. See note 19 supra.
42. See note 33 supra.
43. 640 F.2d 274 (10th Cir. 1981).
44. Hasten brought suit against his employer, American Stevedoring Corp., and against
the company for which he was assigned to drive, Phillips Petroleum Co. The discharge letter
stated that Hasten was being discharged for dishonesty because he had said he could not drive
for American, had filed a Workmen's Compensation claim, and had been driving for another
company at the same time. Id. at 274-76.
45. Id. at 275 n.2.
46. 367 F.2d 66 (10th Cir. 1966).
47. 640 F.2d at 275.
48. 367 F.2d at 71-72.
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tion notices as well as to bargaining sessions," 49 the court also addressed the
plaintiff's argument that state law should apply in this action.
50
Because a state tort action in libel would necessarily resolve the merits
of this labor dispute,5 1 such an action would impermissibly interfere with the
collective bargaining process according to the court. Noting the Supreme
Court guidelines52 for allowing preemption of state laws in favor of a uni-
form federal labor policy, the Tenth Circuit determined that frank state-
ments made in the course of and demanded by the collective bargaining
process should be able to be made without fear of retribution. Therefore, the
statements were within the ambit of the "unqualified privilege" doctrine of
Mendicki.53
D. Duty to Bargain
NLRB v. Barle-Collins Co. 54 dealt with the question of mandatory col-
lective bargaining. The American Flint Glass Workers of North America
(Glass Workers) had been certified in 1974 as the collective bargaining agent
for the Bartlett-Collins Company (Bartlett-Collins) employees. Unfair labor
practices filed against the company for refusal to bargain in good faith had
been upheld by an Administrative Law Judge. Against this background, the
parties met to negotiate in 1976.
5 5
Because of the prior unfair labor practice proceeding "in which there
was some question about the accuracy of testimony concerning what had
transpired" at previous bargaining meetings, Bartlett-Collins employed a
court reporter to provide an accurate transcript of the new meetings. 56 The
Glass Workers objected, saying the court reporter was "unnecessary and
costly and that his presence would create a courtroom atmosphere, induce
unnecessary speech making, and frustrate negotiations. '5 7 As an alternative,
the Glass Workers proposed that the sessions be tape-recorded and tran-
scribed.58 Bartlett-Collins refused to negotiate without a reporter present.
The Board agreed with the Glass Workers and found that Bartlett-Collins
had violated sections 8(a)(1) 59 and 8(a)(5) 60 of the Act.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, applying the Borg-Warner stan-
dard,6 1 enforced the Board's order, accepting the Board's conclusion that the
49. 640 F.2d at 276.
50. The court identified and considered the following three factors: the potential for direct
conflict between federal labor policy and the state cause of action, the state interest in the
matter, and the similarity of issues to be decided in the federal labor case and the state action.
Id. at 277-79.
51. Id. at 279.
52. Id. at 277. See, e.g., San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
53. 640 F.2d at 279.
54. 639 F.2d 652 (10th Cir.), cert. dentd, 101 S. Ct. 3109 (1981).
55. Id at 653.
56. Id
57. Id
58. Id
59. See note 19 supra.
60. See note 8 supra.
61. 639 F.2d at 654-55. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976) defines collective bargaining as the duty
of both parties to meet and confer at reasonable times and in good faith about wages, hours,
1982]
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presence of a court reporter during collective bargaining sessions does not
fall within the "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employ-
ment" category necessary for finding a subject mandatory for collective bar-
gaining purposes. 62 Therefore, Bartlett-Collins could not legally bargain to
impasse on the topic.
In Lone Star Steel Co. v. NLRB, 63 Lone Star Steel Company (Lone Star)
appealed an unfair labor practice ruling involving two disputed clauses64 in
a union's national agreement. Lone Star had acquired the Starlight mine
and initially operated it under a collective bargaining agreement governed
by the Bituminous Coal Operator's Association (BCOA).65 Prior to the time
the national agreement expired, the union asked Lone Star and others to
execute a memorandum agreement expressing their intent to be bound by
the terms of any successor national agreement negotiated by the union and
BCOA. Lone Star declined but offered to meet and negotiate a new con-
tract separately. 66
Lone Star, although not a member of BCOA, agreed to abide by the
provisions of the contract, only insofar as they applied to the Starlight mine
as a mine run by an independent coal operator. 67 Lone Star employees
joined in a nationwide strike when a new agreement between BCOA and the
union was not reached.6a Several weeks later, a new national agreement was
executed containing the two disputed provisions.
69
and other terms and conditions of employment. NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp.,
356 U.S. 342, 349 (1958), established that the duty to bargain is limited to mandatory subjects,
such as wages and hours, and that the parties are free not to negotiate about nonmandatory
subjects.
Examples of mandatory subjects are pay scales, incentive pay, severance pay, insurance,
and pension plans. Examples of permissive or nonmandatory subjects are performance bonds,
internal union affairs, and interests of retired employees. J. ATLESON, R. RABIN, G. SCHATZKI,
H. SHERMAN, E. SILVERSTEIN, LABOR RELATIONS AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS: COLLECTIVE BAR-
GAINING IN PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT 429 (1978).
62. "The Board candidly admits that in prior cases it has, in effect, treated the issue of the
presence of a court reporter as a mandatory subject of bargaining." 639 F.2d at 657. The
NLRB has traditionally relied on adjudication, rather than rulemaking, to develop its policy.
In this instance, if the Board had had a written rule about court reporters, Bartlett-Collins
Company would have understood more clearly what the agency's policies were and would have
experienced greater procedural fairness. Se generally Note, NLRB Rulemaking: Pol/tttal Reality
Versur Procedural Fairness, 89 YALE L.J. 982 (1980).
63. 639 F.2d 545 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 911 (1981).
64. The "successorship clause" stated:
In consideration of the Union's execution of this Agreement, each Employer promises
that.its operations covered by this Agreement shall not be sold, conveyed, or otherwise
transferred or assigned to any successor without first securing the agreement of the
successor to assume the Employer's obligations under this Agreement.
The "application of contract" clause stated:
As part of the consideration for this Agreement, the Employers agree that this Agree-
ment covers the operation of all the coal lands, coal producing and coal preparation
facilities owned or held under lease by them, or any of them, or by any subsidiary or
affiliate at the date of this Agreement, or acquired during its term which may hereaf-
ter (during the term of this Agreement) be put into production or use.
Id at 548.
65. Id at 547.
66. Id. at 547-48.
67. Id at 547 n.l.
68. Id at 548.
69. Id See note 64 supra.
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Lone Star refused to accept the conditions of the new national agree-
ment, and its Starlight mine employees continued to strike. 70 After negotia-
tions, a cooling-off period, and a resumption of the strike, Lone Star filed
unfair labor practice charges against the union alleging a violation of the
"hot cargo" provision of the Act, section 8(e), 7 1 and a failure to bargain
under sections 8(b)(4)(A)
72 and 8(b)(3). 73
The Board found that the successorship clause was not proscribed by
section 8(e) and that it would "effectively assure the survival of the Starlight
mine employees' previously negotiated wages and working conditions" and
"vitally affected the miners' terms and conditions of employment."'74 The
clause was therefore a mandatory subject of bargaining, and striking was a
legal weapon.
The contract clause as applied, however, was found to be overly broad
75
and nonmandatory. Mindful of the need for deference to the Board's judg-
ment as to what constitutes a mandatory subject of bargaining, the court
nonetheless found the subject permissive because it could only affect unit
jobs if the company opened another mine; it was not a direct attack on a
problem threatening the maintenance of the basic wage structure established
by the collective bargaining agreement. 76 By striking to achieve agreement
on a nonmandatory subject, the union refused to bargain within the mean-
ing of section 8(b)(3) of the Act. 7 7 Judge Barrett, in a partial dissent, dis-
agreed with the majority that the successorship clause was a mandatory
subject of bargaining.
78
E. Unilateral Change in Working Conditions; No Deferral to Arbitration
In NLRB v. Northeast Oklahoma City Manufacturing Co. ,79 the Tenth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals granted enforcement of the Board's order after con-
cluding that the company's unilateral delays in paying bonuses amounted to
a serious unfair labor practice.8 0 The company had argued that the Board's
refusal to direct deferral of the contract interpretation dispute to arbitration
constituted an abuse of discretion in view of the Board's own precedent.
8 1
70. Id
71. 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1976) provides that it shall be an unfair labor practice for a union
and an employer to agree that the employer will stop doing business with any other employer.
"[Tihe purpose of the section 8(e) proviso was to alleviate the frictions that may arise when
union men work continuously alongside nonunion men on the same construction site." Drivers
Local 695 v. NLRB, 361 F.2d 547, 553 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
72. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(A) (1976) provides that it shall be an unfair labor practice to
attempt to force an employer to enter into any agreement prohibited by § 8(e) with a labor
organization. See note 71 supra.
73. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (b)(3) (1976) provides that it shall be an unfair labor practice for a
labor organization to refuse to bargain collectively with an employer.
74. 639 F.2d at 549.
75. Id at 558.
76. Id at 559.
77. Id
78. 639 F.2d at 559 (Barrett, J., dissenting).
79. 631 F.2d 669 (10th Cir. 1980).
80. Id at 677.
81. Id at 673.
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Citing NLRB v. Strong8 2 and Care, v. Westinghouse Corp.,8 3 the court stated
that where the jurisdiction of the Board is invoked to adjudicate unfair labor
practice allegations arising from a violation of the collective bargaining
agreement, "the Board's jurisdiction to proceed is unaffected by the exist-
ence of an arbitration clause in the parties' contract.
'8 4
F. Protected Concerted Activity
In Coors Container Co. v. NLRB, 85 the court resolved the question of
whether Coors Container Company (Coors Container) interfered with the
section 7 rights8 6 of its employees by prohibiting display of a boycott sign, by
interrogating two employees about their reasons for displaying the sign, and
by disciplining the two employees.8 7 Although Coors Container employees
were not unionized and were not on strike, they had to cross the picket line
of Coors Brewery strikers in order to report to work. 88 A security guard,
acting pursuant to instructions, stopped two Coors Container employees for
displaying in their pickup truck a sign which read "Boycott Coors--Scab
Beer." 89 After refusing to remove the sign, the two employees were asked
about their union sympathies, and a heated conversation ensued. The two
employees were again quizzed by company officials the next day; one was
discharged and the other was given a verbal warning.
The court pointed out that its "function is limited to determining
whether the findings of violations are supported by substantial evidence on
the record as a whole."0 Although section 7 of the Act protects concerted
activity,9' Coors Container contended that special circumstances at the
plant allowed the company to prohibit distribution of union literature such
as the sign in the pickup.92 The boycott sign, however, neither disparaged
the quality of Coors beer nor ,was its display connected with a labor contro-
versy between these two employees and their employer, Coors Container.
93
The display was therefore not "indefensible" and punishable under the stan-
dard set by NLRB v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers."
By disciplining an employee for engaging in such protected activity,
Coors Container violated section 8(a)(3)95 of the Act. Recognizing that an
employer has the right to discharge or discipline an employee for "a good
reason, a bad reason or no reason at all,"' ' the court emphasized that such a
82. 393 U.S. 357, 360-61 (1969).
83. 375 U.S. 261, 271 (1964).
84. 631 F.2d at 673.
85. 628 F.2d 1283 (10th Cir. 1980).
86. See note 19 supra.
87. 628 F.2d at 1285.
88. Id
89. Id at 1285-86.
90. Id at 1286 (citing Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 491 (1951)).
91. See note 19 supra.
92. Coors Container maintained that the rule was necessary for security. 628 F.2d at 1286.
93. Id
94. 346 U.S. 464 (1953).
95. 628 F.2d at 1287. See note 33 supra.
96. 628 F.2d at 1288.
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right is restricted when union animus is present.9 7
In NLRB v. Gould, Inc. ,98 the Board's disputed findings were that Gould,
Inc. (Gould) had violated sections 799 and 8(a)(l)'oo of the Act by discharg-
ing two union officials for participating in a sympathy walkout.' 0 ' At the
time of the walkout, Gould and the union were bound by a collective bar-
gaining agreement that included a grievance procedure leading to arbitra-
tion. The contract also contained a general "no-strike" clause.1
02
An informational picket set up by the union on behalf of its construc-
tion division triggered the walkout. It was directed against a nonunion con-
tractor performing remodeling work on Gould's premises.' 0 3 Employees
represented by the manufacturing division of the union inquired as to
whether to cross the picket line. Union officials told them to make their own
decisions, and most of the morning shift employees walked out.'04 The next
day, all employees returned to work, but two were suspended pending an
investigation into their roles in what the company termed an "illegal wildcat
strike."1 05
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed that the refusal to cross the
picket line was protected concerted activity under section 7106 of the Act,
and it thus enforced the Board's order. 10 7 No-strike clauses are the "quid
pro quo" for arbitration clauses,' 0 8 and if the underlying dispute is arbitra-
ble, the no-strike clause is triggered.i09 Because the sympathy strike had
nothing to do with the collective bargaining agreement in effect between
97. Id See Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981). In
Pugh, the plaintiff was fired without explanation after 32 years of employment. The appeals
court held that See's motion for nonsuit was erroneously granted by the trial court because the
plaintiff "has demonstrated a prima facie case of wrongful termination in violation of his con-
tract of employment." Id at 329, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 927. For an argument in favor of passage of
state statutes articulating the right of employees not to be disciplined or discharged except for
just cause, see Summers, lndi'dual Protecton Agarnrt Unjicri Disrmsal Time for a Statute, 62 VA. L.
REV. 481, 521-22, 523 (1976).
98. 638 F.2d 159 (10th Cir. 1981).
99. Set note 19 supra.
100. See note 19 supra.
101. 638 F.2d at 161.
102. Id
103. Id at 161-62.
104. Id
105. Id at 162.
106. See note 19 supra.
107. 638 F.2d at 163.
108. Even in the absence of an express no-strike clause, a collective bargaining agreement
containing an arbitration clause will be read to prohibit strikes. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail
Clerks, 398 U.S. 235 (1970). In Teamsters Local v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962), Justice
Stewart, writing for the majority, stated:
It is argued that there could be no violation [of the collective bargaining agreement by
striking] in the absence of a no-strike clause in the contract explicitly covering the
subject of the dispute over which the strike was called. We disagree.
The collective bargaining contract expressly imposed upon both parties the duty
of submitting the dispute in question to final and binding arbitration. In a consistent
course of decisions the Courts of Appeals of at least five Federal Circuits have held
that a strike to settle a dispute which a collective bargaining agreement provides shall
be settled exclusively and finally by compulsory arbitration constitutes a violation of
the agreement.
ld at 104-05 (footnote omitted).
109. 638 F.2d at 164.
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Gould and the manufacturing division of the union, the no-strike clause was
not in effect.
The issue in Gould, as differentiated from that in BuJalo Forge v. Unted
Steelworkers," 10 was whether "an employee has the right to honor the lawful
picket line of his own union which is set up at his employer's place of busi-
ness but is directed at a stranger employer doing work on the premises." I I
To deny this right, in the court's opinion, would be to hold that "although
Congress protected the fundamental right of labor organizations to engage
in primary picketing, it withheld this protection from the normal employee
response which makes this right effective."' 
12
G. Successor Employer; Alter Ego
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the Board's orders in NLRB
v. Tricor Products, Inc. 13 and Sturdevant Sheet Metal & Roofing Co. A NLRB. 114
The two businesses, found to be alter egos of predecessor employers, were
ordered by the Board to adhere to and work under the collective bargaining
agreements of their predecessor employers. In both cases, the same individu-
als were involved in the management of new companies in which the work
force was substantially identical." '5 Even if the old and the new companies
are separate legal entities and such a change is economically motivated, if
the new business is the alter ego of the old, the former collective bargaining
commitments must be upheld."
16
H. Union's Duty of Fair Representation
At issue in Denver Stereotypers & Electrotypers Local 13 v. NLRB" 7 was
whether the Board was entitled to infer bad faith from the union's interpre-
tation of its constitution and bylaws. In 1973, the Denver Stereotypers and
Electrotypers Union (Stereotypers Union) had negotiated a multiemployer
agreement governing stereotypers of the Denver Post, Inc. (Post) and the
Rocky Mountain News (News)." t8 The grievant, Paul Simonette, was as-
signed a position in the street circulation department of the News after its
stereotyping department was discontinued. The Denver Newspaper Guild
(Guild) represented the street circulation department employees, and
Simonette applied for union membership. After a discharge due to physical
injuries, Simonette contacted the Guild, but since he had not become a per-
110. 428 U.S. 397 (1976).
111. 638 F.2d at 163.
112. Id (quoting West Coast Casket Co., 97 N.L.R.B. 820, 823 (1951), enforced, 205 F.2d 902
(4th Cir. 1953)). The Tenth Circuit also upheld the Board's decision not to defer to the arbitra-
tor's award. The arbitrator had not addressed the legality of the walkout, and "where an arbi-
trator's award clearly ignores a long line of Board and court precedent, the Board's refusal to
defer under Spitberg [Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080, 1082 (1955)] is proper." 638 F.2d
at 166-67.
113. 636 F.2d 266 (10th Cir. 1980).
114. 636 F.2d 271 (10th Cir. 1980).
115. Id at 274; 636 F.2d at 269.
116. 636 F.2d at 269-70; 636 F.2d at 273-74.
117. 623 F.2d 134 (10th Cir. 1980).
118. Id at 134.
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manent employee in the bargaining unit, that union could not aid him in his
employment problem." 19 He contacted the Stereotypers Union and re-
quested that his name be put on a list as a substitute stereotyper for the
Post. 120
Since Simonette had first worked within Stereotypers Union jurisdiction
in 1971, his name could have been placed in the second highest position on
the substitute list.' 2' His name was placed at the bottom of the priority list,
however, and he filed a charge with the NLRB against the Stereotypers
Union. 122
The Administrative Law Judge concluded that the Stereotypers Union
had violated section 8(b)(1)(A)123 of the Act because its decision was tainted
with "dual unionism."' 24 The Board overturned this ruling because the is-
sue of "dual unionism" had never been raised. 125 Nevertheless, the Board
concluded that the Stereotypers Union had violated its duty of fair represen-
tation 26 because Simonette's placement on the list was directly contrary to
his contractual rights under the collective bargaining agreement. 12 7
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that holding union officials to
a "standard of skill in interpreting legal documents akin to that possessed by
the Board" was error.1 28 The officers believed the local constitution and
bylaws did not apply to the situation at hand;' 29 the court did not find evi-
dence that the union's interpretation of its rules was influenced by animus
toward Simonette, and it denied enforcement of the Board's order.'130 Judge
McKay dissented, expressing his dissatisfaction with the process of having so
many tribunals review administrative disputes. He stated that the proper
procedure would be to return the case to the factfinders to determine if the
post-interpretation conduct of the Stereotypers Union officers was sufficient
to support the inference that the officers acted in bad faith toward
Simonette. 131
In an unpublished opinion, Vzck v. United Transportation Union,132 the
Tenth Circuit considered a union's breach of its duty of fair representation.
Characterizing the action as a tort, the court found that the New Mexico
119. Id
120. Id at 135.
121. Id at 134-36.
122. Id. at 136.
123. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1l)(A) (1976) provides that it shall be an unfair labor practice for a
labor organization to restrain or coerce employees in their exercise of § 7 rights. See note 19
Sapra.
124. 623 F.2d at 136.
125. Id
126. Section 7 says nothing about an employee's right to be represented fairly. See note 19
supra. By judicial fiat, however, a duty has been imposed on a union to represent the employees
in its bargaining unit in a fair, non-arbitrary, and non-discriminatory fashion. See Hines v.
Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 570 (1976); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967).
127. 623 F.2d at 136.
128. Id at 137.
129. Id at 138.
130. Id
131. Id at 138 (McKay, J., dissenting).
132. No. 79-2234 (10th Cir. Aug. 22, 1980) (not for routine publication).
19821
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
three-year statute of limitations for torts barred the suit.' 33 The plaintiff-
appellant, Jennings Vick, had been employed by the Santa Fe Railroad as a
brakeman. The collective bargaining agreement in effect at the time set a
deadline for contesting grievances regarding seniority. 134 Since Vick did not
bring his claim before the Railroad Adjustment Board, as he was entitled to
do, the doctrine of laches also applied.'
35
II, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT
In an action arising under the Railway Labor Act,' 36 Eason v. Frontier Air
Lines, Inc. ,137 the plaintiff, after suffering a back injury, filed for compensa-
tion under the Colorado Workmen's Compensation Act.' 38 Subsequently,
the plaintiff brought suit against his union because his grievance was not
processed and against his employer because he had not been assigned to do
"light duty" after an earlier back injury.' 39 The Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals sustained the defendant's motion to dismiss based on the exclusivity
of remedy provided by the Workmen's Compensation Act.14° The union's
processing of the grievance would have been useless because recovery against
the employer was barred by the statute.'
4'
Another workmen's compensation case, Davidson v. Hobart Corp. ,142
presented the issue of whether individual members of a corporation's board
of directors are "employees" under the Workmen's Compensation Act'
43
and therefore immune from liability. In determining the issue, the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals stated that "[i]t would be an anomalous contraven-
tion of the workmen's compensation scheme to remove personal liability
from executive officers, supervisors, and all other workers, while leaving the
directors personally liable for damages arising from an employee's in-
jury."' 44 The court found language in the statute treating the employer and
those performing work for the employer as a "single economic unit,"' 45 and
held that the exclusive remedy provision of the Kansas Workmen's Compen-
sation Act barred a common-law negligence suit against members of the em-
ployer corporation's board of directors.146
133. Id at 5.
134. Id
135. Id at 4.
136. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1976).
137. 636 F.2d 293 (10th Cir. 1981).
138. Id at 294. CoLO. REV. STAT. §§ 8-40-101 to -54-127 (1973 & Supp. 1980).
139. 636 F.2d at 294.
140. Id
141. Id at 294-95.
142. 643 F.2d 1386 (10th Cir. 1981).
143. In this case, the Kansas Workmen's Compensation Act was at issue. KAN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 44-501 to -573 (1973). Section 44-501 provides that "no employer, or other employee of such
employee, shall be liable for any injury for which compensation is recoverable under this act
144. 643 F.2d at 1388.
145. Id
146. Id
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III. SOCIAL SECURITY ACT 14 7
Walter Kelbach, an inmate of the Utah State Penitentiary, filed an ap-
plication for social security disability benefits under sections 416(i) (1) (A) and
423(d)(1)(A) of the Social Security Act. 14 ' He claimed that he had become
disabled and unable to work as a result of a "mental disorder" and that he
had "earned" less than $100 in 1976 and less than $100 in 1977.'
4 9
In affirming the trial court's denial of the claim, the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals stated that even if Kelbach could prove the requisite disa-
bility that would qualify him for benefits, he was not entitled to the benefits
of the Social Security Act because he was not "in need."' 50 The eighth
amendment to the United States Constitution protects against cruel and un-
usual punishment and has been interpreted to obligate the states to furnish
their prisoners with reasonably adequate food, clothing, shelter, sanitation,
medical care, and personal safety.' 5 ' Nothing in the record indicated
Kelbach lacked any of these provisions.' 52 Thus, the denial was proper.
IV. FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT
15 3
In Schoenhals v. Cockrum, 154 the court of appeals reversed a finding by the
lower court that the defendant, Cockrum, was a retail or service establish-
ment and therefore exempt from the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938
(FLSA).' 55 The court noted that Cockrum's business of providing an inven-
tory service to other commercial wholesale and retail businesses was "by its
very nature one which the consuming public would never use in the course
of its daily living. . ." and therefore could not qualify for the retail business
exemption of the FLSA.'
56
In Harding v. Kurco, Inc. ,57 ten former employees of Kurco, Inc.'s
(Kurco) dance studio sought backpay under the FLSA based on Kurco's
failure to pay the minimum wage and overtime. Kurco claimed its business
was not in interstate commerce, a requirement for FLSA jurisdiction. How-
ever, Kurco, as a franchisee of Fred Astaire Dance Studios, encouraged par-
ticipation in national dance competitions and pleasure trips by the
instructors and students. This participation, according to the court, pro-
vided the necessary interstate commerce activities.' 5 8 Thus, the requirement
for FLSA jurisdiction was met.
147. 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-306, 401-433, 501-504, 601-676, 701-716, 901-909, 1101-1108, 1201-
1206, 1301-1324, 1351-1355, 1381-1383, 1391-1397 (1976 & Supp. III 1980).
148. Kelbach v. Harris, 634 F.2d 1304, 1306 (10th Cir. 1980).
149. Id at 1306-07.
150. Id at 1311.
151. Id
152. Id
153. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1976).
154. 647 F.2d 1080 (10th Cir. 1981).
155. 29 U.S.C. § 216 (1976) exempts retail or service establishments from the requirements
of FLSA.
156. 647 F.2d at 1081.
157. 650 F.2d 228 (10th Cir. 1981).
158. Kurco contended it did not have the interstate contacts required for application of the
FLSA. The FLSA, as amended, applies to any business which has employees engaged in inter-
state commerce. Id at 229.
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V. OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT 15 9
Two cases were brought before the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals dur-
ing the past year seeking review of orders of the Occupational Safety and
Health Review Commission (OSHRC), Austin Building Co. v. OSHRC' 6° and
Kent Nowhn Construction Co. v. OSHRC.' 6 1 Both were decided based on the
Un'versal Camera Corp. v. NLRB 162 standard of whether the Commission's
findings of fact were supported by substantial evidence in the record when
considered as a whole. After a careful examination of the contentions of the
companies which the Commission had found to be in violation of Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Act regulations, the court held in both cases that
the Commission's finding of facts were conclusive. The trial courts' decisions
were upheld. '
63
VI. EMPLOYMENT RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT (ERISA)164
The eligibility of employers, who contributed on their own behalf to a
pension fund covered by ERISA, to receive pension benefits from that fund
was the issue addressed in Peckham v. Board of Trustees of the International Brother-
hood of Painters.165 Two employers were denied their claims for pension ben-
efits by their pension fund administrator because they were not
"employees."' 66 The claimants brought suit in federal district court and
were awarded pension benefits and attorneys' fees following a jury verdict in
their favor. 167
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, relying on Paris v. Profit Sharing
Plan 168 and Aitken v. IP & GCU-Employee Retirement Fund,169 stated that the
fund administrator's denial of claims must be upheld unless "(1) arbitrary or
capricious, (2) not supported by substantial evidence, or (3) erroneous on a
question of law." 1 70 The administrator's decision was upheld.
Both claimants, Peckham and Woolum, were signatories to a collective
bargaining agreement, and the pension fund in question was set up to bene-
fit employees represented by the collective bargaining representative.
Peckham and Woolum, as self-employed sole proprietors, were excluded spe-
cifically by terms of the pension fund.
1 7'
The appeals court disagreed that the appellees were "dual status em-
159. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976).
160. 647 F.2d 1063 (10th Cir. 1981).
161. 648 F.2d 1278 (10th Cir. 1981).
162. 340 U.S. 474, 491 (1951).
163. 648 F.2d at 1282; 647 F.2d at 1069.
164. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1086, 1101-1144, 1201-1242, 1301-1381 (1976).
165. 653 F.2d 424 (10th Cir. 1981).
166. Id. at 425-26.
167. Id. at 426.
168. 637 F.2d 357 (5th Cir. 1981).
169. 604 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1979).
170. 653 F.2d at 426.
171. Id. at 426-27. Self-employed individuals were specifically excluded. Id. at 427.
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ployer-employees." Based on specific language in ERISA 172 and its legisla-
tive history, 1 73 and on rules and regulations of the Secretary of Labor, 174 the
court held that the claimants were ineligible to receive pension benefits. 175
The case was remanded with directions to the district court to decide
whether the claimants should be repaid their fund contributions and
whether an award of attorneys' fees would be proper.1
76
Christine K. Truitt
172. Set 29 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(1) (1976).
173. See H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., rtpnhnedih [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 4639, 4698; S. REP. No. 127, 93d Cong., 2d Ses., repnhted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 4838, 4851.
174. 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3 to .3(c)(1) (1980).
175. Id. at 427-28.
176. Id. at 428.
19821

LANDS AND NATURAL RESOURCES
OVERVIEW
The decisions of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals belie the increased
legal activity generated by the energy boom in the western states. The deci-
sions this year include many of the areas addressed in previous years: envi-
ronment, property, public land, and federal regulation. Indian law
continues to be a significant area in the Tenth Circuit.
I. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
In Stauffer Chemical Co. v. Environmental Protection Agenc,' the Tenth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals interpreted section 114(a)(2) of the Clean Air Act.
2
This section requires the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to con-
duct annual oversight inspections of major polluters in every state in order to
evaluate the effectiveness of the individual state's inspection and regulatory
procedures, as well as to assess the individual polluter's compliance with the
Act's provisions. 3 Section 114(a)(2) specifically provides that "the Adminis-
trator or his authorized representative upon presentation of his credentials-
(A) shall have a right of ent0i to, upon, or through any premises .... 4
A controversy arose when Stauffer's Leefe Plant in Wyoming5 was se-
lected as one of the sources to be inspected in 1980.6 When the team of EPA
inspectors arrived unannounced at the plant, two of its members were re-
fused admittance unless they signed a nondisclosure and hold harmless
agreement. This condition was imposed because the two inspectors were em-
ployees of GCA Corporation, a North Carolina corporation under contract
to the EPA who aided in carrying out the oversight inspections. 7 The team
left the plant after refusing to sign the agreements. Negotiations between
Stauffer and EPA on the matter failed, and EPA subsequently applied for
and obtained an administrative search warrant from the United States Mag-
I. 647 F.2d 1075 (10th Cir. 1981).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (Supp. 11 1978 & Supp. III 1979). Section 114(a)(2) appears as
42 U.S.C. § 7414(a)(2) (Supp. 11 1978 & Supp. III 1979).
3. Wyoming lies within the jurisdiction of Region VIII of the EPA. At the time the suit
was brought there were about 1000 major stationary sources of air pollution in the Region, 230
of them in Wyoming. The Clean Air Act mandates that the inspections cover ten percent of
these sources. 647 F.2d at 1076.
4. 42 U.S.C. § 7414(a)(2) (Supp. 11 1978 & Supp. III 1979) (emphasis added).
5. The facility is a phosphate ore processing plant located in Lincoln County near Sage,
Wyoming. 647 F.2d at 1075-76.
6. The selection of sources to be inspected is based upon a neutral administrative scheme
which focuses on classes of industry, geographic location, and frequency of past inspection. Id.
at 1076.
7. Stauffer claimed it was simply trying to protect its trade secrets from competitors. Id.
It further insisted that Stauffer be permitted to advise the contractors of the areas and processes
it deemed to be confidential and proprietary, and that Stauffer reserved the right to exclude any
areas other than emission sources from the inspection, and to refuse to disclose any information
which Stauffer deemed inappropriate. Id. n.2.
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istrate.8 The search warrant proved to be ineffective in gaining entry,9 and
Stauffer then filed a motion in district court to enjoin the EPA from execut-
ing the search warrant and to quash the warrant. The district court issued
the temporary restraining order and later permanently enjoined EPA from
using GCA or similar employees in any inspection of Stauffer's Wyoming
plant. '0
The narrow issue presented to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals was
whether an employee of a private company under contract with EPA was an
"authorized representative" of the Administrator for the purpose of inspec-
tion under section 114(a)(2). Since the term "authorized representative" is
not defined in the Clean Air Act, the court ascertained its meaning by refer-
ring to congressional intent.
Judge McWilliams, writing for the court, rejected a literal interpreta-
tion of the term "authorized representative."'' Although the legislative his-
tory provided no definitive guidance, the court relied on the language of one
proposed Senate amendment to the House version of the Clean Air Act
which specifically limited entry to "DHEW personnel.' 2 A later conference
report on the final compromise version of the Act substantially included the
provisions of this Senate amendment. 13 The court concluded that this provi-
sion of the Senate bill later substantially became section 114(a)(2) of the
Clean Air Act, evidencing that Congress intended the term "DHEW person-
nel" to be synonomous with "authorized representative." Today, the EPA
has replaced the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (DHEW) as
the agency administering the Clean Air Act; therefore "authorized represen-
tative" must now be construed to mean "EPA personnel". Because Congress
granted a particular agency the authority to inspect, delegation of that au-
thority to other agencies is precluded.'
4
Further support for this interpretation was found in the Tenth Circuit's
analogy between section 114(a) (2) and the inspection provisions of the Clean
Water Act.'5 In 1972, the Clean Water Act was amended,' 6 making its in-
spection provisions virtually identical to section 114(a)(2). One Senate re-
port on the amendment had commented, "as under the Clean Air Act, [the
authority to enter] is reserved to the Administrator and his authorized represent-
atives which such representatives must befull-time employees of the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency. The authority is not extended to contractors with the EPA in
1 8. The search warrant authorized "any duly designated enforcement officers and employ-
ees of EPA and authorized employees of EPA's contractor, GCA Corporation, who have been
duly authorized to conduct inspections as EPA representatives" to enter the plant. Id. at 1077.
9. Stauffer again refused admittance unless the contractors signed the nondisclosure and
hold harmless agreement. Id.
10. In re Stauffer Chem. Co., 14 Envir. Rep. 1737 (D. Wyo. 1980).
11. 647 F.2d at 1078.
12. Id. S. 4358, 91st Cong. 2d Sess. § 116 (1970).
13. H.R. REP. No. 1783, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., repninedin [19701 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWs 5356, 5379-81.
14. 647 F.2d at 1078.
15. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976, Supp. 1 1977 &
Supp. 11 1978).
16. Section 308 was added, 33 U.S.C. § 1318(a)(B) (1976).
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pursuit of research and development." 1 7 The court stated that it must pro-
hibit employees of EPA contractors from inspecting under the Clean Air Act
in order to maintain consistency of interpretation; an employee of a com-
pany under contract with EPA could not be an "authorized representative"
for purposes of one Act and not the other.' 8
The Tenth Circuit acknowledged that some ambiguity existed within
the language of the statute itself and that its decision conflicted with two
district court decisions. 19 However, the court concluded that the legislative
history of the two Acts mandated affirmance of the trial court's decision.
20
II. CONDEMNATION
In United States v. 77,819.10 Acres of Land,2 ' the United States appealed
the amount of a condemnation award made to compensate landowners for
the imposition of an evacuation estate22 on their land. At issue were the
methods used by the court-appointed commission to determine the amounts
awarded.
23
The Tenth Circuit found no error in the award to the private party
plaintiffs, 24 whose award was based on the testimony of an expert witness.
The court concluded that in determining diminution in property value, ex-
pert opinion can be used if the opinion is based upon a rational founda-
tion.25 In the award to the state, however, the court found that the
commission had erroneously relied upon an exhibit, introduced solely for the
purpose of showing the entire project area and the ranch in juxtaposition to
each other, as the basis for its conclusion that the state land's remaining
highest and best use was for granting easements. 26 The court concluded that
17. S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.,reprtedin [1972], U.S. CODE CONG. &AD. NEWS
3668, 3729 (emphasis added). In considering the weight to be given to the Clean Water Act for
interpreting section 114(a)(2), the Tenth Circuit was cognizant of the fact that it was looking to
post-enactment legislative history, generally held to have less weight than contemporaneous
legislative history. United States v. Wise, 370 U.S. 405, 411 (1962). The court, however, found
the short interval between enactments and the similar subject matter of the two Acts to be
offsetting factors. 647 F.2d at 1079.
18. 647 F.2d at 1079.
19. Id. n.9. Bunker Hill Co. v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, No. 80-
2087 (D. Idaho, Oct. 15, 1980), appeal docketed, No. 80-3446 (9th Cir. 1980); In Re Aluminum
Co., No. M-80-13 (M.D. N.C. July 9, 1980), appeal docketed, No. 80-1599 (4th Cir. 1980).
20. 647 F.2d at 1079-80.
21. 647 F.2d 104 (10th Cir. 1981).
22. An evacuation estate is an interest in land enabling the condemnor to require occu-
pants to periodically vacate the land. Id. at 106 n. 1. The United States had taken two succes-
sive evacuation estates of over 77,819.10 acres of plaintiffs' ranchland. The duration of the
taking totaled thirteen months. Id. at 106.
23. The commission had awarded the Taylors, who owned approximately 58,131 acres and
leased another 19,949.99 acres from the State of New Mexico, $33,735. The state, which re-
served all other interests in the land leased to the Taylors, was awarded $4,237 as compensation
for the takings. Id.
24. The Taylors' award was based on "a fair rental value per animal approach" for 13,494
animal unit months. Id. at 107.
25. The expert witness was not titled as an expert appraiser, but based his expertise on his
experience as a cattle ranch manager in the area, as well as upon his participation in ranch sales
in the area. He had concluded that the fair rental value of the ranchland would be diminished
by 50% after the taking. This determination was held to be rationally founded. Id. at 108.
26. Id. at 109-10. The fair market value of condemned property is determined by reference
19821
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
the commission's reliance on the exhibit for this purpose was clearly
erroneous.
27
The district court also erred in calculating the actual acreage of the
state land which may have been used for easements. After reviewing the
exhibits, the Tenth Circuit could find no competent evidence to support the
commission's determination of acreage.
2 8
The commission's conclusion that a highest and best use as an easement
existed was also not supported by the evidence. The court, applying the
standard of whether there is a "reasonable probability that the land is physi-
cally adaptable for such use and whether there is a need or demand for such
use in the reasonably near future,"'29 again found no basis to support the
state's award. The state presented no evidence establishing past requests to
use the land as an easement, nor any potential for such use.30 Therefore, the
award rendered on behalf of the state was reversed.
3 t
In another condemnation case, United States v. 179.26 Acres of Land,32 the
Tenth Circuit addressed the narrow issue of whether the presence of lime-
stone in condemned property is to be considered in determining fair market
value of the land. The court determined that the commission had correctly
included the value of limestone in assessing the fair market value of the
property.
At the time of the taking, the land was being used for livestock and
grain production, and as a rock quarry.33 The land contained some 2.4 mil-
lion tons of Plattsmouth limestone reserves. The commission found the land
was being put to its highest and best use, and included the expected income
from the rock quarry in valuing the condemned property. 34 The landowners
were awarded $243,930 as compensation for the taking.
35
The Government contended that the limestone deposits should not have
been considered in determining the fair market value, and that if the depos-
its were properly included in the valuation, the commission's method of val-
uation was erroneous. 36 In reviewing the district court's determinations in
to the highest and best use for which the land is available. United States v. 91.90 Acres of Land,
586 F.2d 79 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 944 (1979). Though the highest and best use is
usually the best use to which the property is subjected, the courts have recognized that certain
circumstances may require a finding that another highest and best use exists. United States v.
Buhler, 305 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1962).
27. 647 F.2d at 109-10.
28. Id. at 110. The parties had stipulated that 16,945.99 acres of state land had been
taken, but the Tenth Circuit concluded that only about 1,600 acres could have been considered
as having clear potential for highest and best use as easements.
29. The landowner has the burden of establishing the amount of compensation due. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. 644 F.2d 367 (10th Cir. 1981).
33. The condemned lands constituted 179.26 acres of a 282.39 acre tract. The lands were
condemned for the construction and operation of a lake as part of a comprehensive plan of flood
control in the Missouri River Basin. Id. at 368.
34. The value of the property included a capitalized net annual return from the quarry.
Id. See note 36 infra.
35. Id. at 368.
36. The commission had determined that the land would have produced 100,000 tons of
limestone per annum for 20 years (the life of the quarry); the net annual return would have
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the condemnation proceedings, the Tenth Circuit refused to scrutinize the
commission's findings except to determine whether they were clearly errone-
ous.3 7 Using a substantial evidence test, the court concluded that it had not
been clearly erroneous for the commission to consider the presence of lime-
stone under the land when awarding condemnation damages.
38
The commission had used an income capitalization method to deter-
mine the fair market value of the property. The Government contended
that this method was highly speculative and unreliable, and it should not
have been used. The Government argued that prevailing royalty rates for
limestone leasing in the area, 39 which were significantly lower than the net
annual return rate, should be used as establishing the market value of lime-
stone.4° Capitalizing the royalty rate would substantially reduce the
amount of the award. The court determined that since there had been no
comparable land sales which the commission could use as evidence of market
value other factors must be considered. 4 ' On a number of occasions the
Tenth Circuit had already articulated what those factors might be.4 2 In
these holdings, the Tenth Circuit had concluded that no particular formula
for determining the fair market value exists. 43 That being the case, some
element of speculation and uncertainty might be allowed to creep into ex-
pert testimony, particularly relative to "in place" mineral reserves. 44 The
income capitalization method had been approved by the Tenth Circuit as
well as several other circuits in condemnation proceedings. 45 It was the
court's view that the competency of the expert witnesses had been properly
established. The record reflected sufficient evidence to allow the commission
been 26 cents per ton ($26,000 each year); a proper capitalization rate was 18% per annum; the
income and capitalization computation basis was the proper method to employ since there were
no comparable sales for the limestone reserves; applying the Inwood Table, the proper factor to
be used to determine the present contributory value of limestone reserves in place was 5.352747;
and the present contributory value of the limestone reserves in place was $139,170. 644 F.2d at
368.
37. Id. at 369.
38. Id. at 373-74.
39. At trial, it was established that the royalty rates had varied from three cents to eight
cents per ton and that the current royalty rates in the area were between eight and ten cents per
ton. Id.
40. The Government also presented evidence that the quarry could not sell 100,000 tons
per year and that a more accurate capitalization rate in a mining operation was 25%. However,
all the valuation evidence was controverted. Id. at 369-71.
41. Id. at 371-72.
42. United States v. 25.02 Acres of Land, 495 F.2d 1398 (10th Cir. 1974); United States v.
Corbin, 423 F.2d 821 (10th Cir. 1970); United States v. Sowards, 370 F.2d 87 (10th Cir. 1966).
43. The best evidence of market value is the purchase price of comparable land within a
reasonable time before the taking. If this is unavailable, other major factors to be considered
include: 1) a view of the premises and the surroundings; 2) the physical characteristics of the
property and its relation to points of importance in the neighborhood; 3) the purchase price of
the land; 4) the price of neighboring land at the time of the taking; 5) expert opinion; 6) the uses
for which the land is available; 7) the cost of improvements; and 8) the net income derived from
the land. 644 F.2d at 371-72 (citing United States v. 25.02 Acres of Land, 478 F.2d 484 (10th Cir.
1973)).
44. 644 F.2d at 372-73.
45. United States v. Corbin, 423 F.2d 821 (10th Cir. 1970); United States v. Whitehurst,
377 F.2d 765 (4th Cir. 1964); United States v. 158.76 Acres of Land, 298 F.2d 559 (2d Cir.
1962); United States v. 1629.6 Acres, 360 F. Supp. 147 (D. Del. 1973), afdinpart and rev'd in part
on other grounds, 503 F.2d 764 (3d Cir. 1974).
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to make an informed estimate of value. Its findings, adopted by the district
court, were not clearly erroneous and the landowner had sustained his bur-
den of establishing the right to substantial compensation. 46
III. PUBLIC UTILITIES RATEMAKING
In Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. United States 4 7 the Tenth Circuit consid-
ered three petitions seeking review of rates set by the Interstate Commerce
Commission (ICC) which Union Pacific Railroad and Utah Railway Com-
pany could charge the Nevada Power Company for transporting coal from
Utah to Nevada.48 The ICC had allowed the railroads to charge Nevada
Power a rate of $9.21 per ton while it investigated the "fall back" rate sched-
ule that the railroads proposed. The ICC then cancelled the $9.21 per ton
rate and declared that a rate of $7.91 was justified. The railroads were or-
dered to refund to Nevada Power the unjustified portion of the increase with
interest.
49
The first issue on appeal was whether the ICC had acted properly under
49 U.S.C. § 10306(a). 50 This section requires a majority of the ICC to be
present in order to transact business. The ICC consists of eleven members; 5 1
however, at the time the ICC's decision was filed, only six persons were serv-
ing on the ICC due to vacancies. Furthermore, only four members partici-
pated in the decision. The railroads argued that because a quorum of six
was necessary to transact business, the ICC's order was a nullity since it had
acted in an improper fashion. 52 The Tenth Circuit disagreed, finding that
section 10301(e)53 provides that vacancies in the ICC's membership do not
impair the rights of the remaining members to act. 54 Because a majority of
the six existing members participated in the decision, the order was proce-
durally valid.
The railroads further contended that the decision was not supported by
a majority of the four members who did participate. One member dissented,
and the three who voted in favor of the decision did not agree in their "nota-
tion votes" on the exact rate to be allowed. However, the Tenth Circuit held
that the fact that no objections were filed to the revised proposal which was
circulated on an "absent objection" basis constituted action by the
majority.55
In addressing the merits of the controversy, the court concluded that the
ICC had acted without justification in limiting Union Pacific's rate to a
46. 644 F.2d at 373.
47. 637 F.2d 764 (10th Cir. 1981).
48. Nevada Power had a coal-burning station at Moapa, Nevada and purchased coal at
two mines in Utah. Utah Railway transported the coal from the mines to Provo, Utah and
Union Pacific completed the transportation to the power station. Id. at 765.
49. Id. at 766.
50. 49 U.S.C. § 10306(a) (Supp. III 1979).
51. Id. § 10306(b).
52. 637 F.2d at 766.
53. 49 U.S.C. § 10306(e) (Supp. III 1979).
54. The court noted that it was in accord with the Seventh Circuit on this issue, 637 F.2d
at 766. See Assure Competitive Transp., Inc. v. United States, 629 F.2d 467 (7th Cir. 1980).
55. 637 F.2d at 767.
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fixed standard seven percent additive5 6 over fully allocated costs without
giving Union Pacific the opportunity to present evidence of the need for a
greater additive. The court stated that while deference will be given an
agency decision generally, the decision must be rationally based.57 The rec-
ord reflected no facts supporting the decision; instead, the ICC's cost deter-
minations appeared to have simply imposed the fixed seven percent additive.
The decision was set aside and the case remanded for further proceedings. 58
IV. THE FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION
In Public Service Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission,59 the Tenth
Circuit consolidated three cases involving orders issued by the Federal En-
ergy Regulatory Commission.
The first petition appealed an order by the Commission requiring the
Public Service Company of New Mexico (PNM) to file its contract for
purchase of coal from Western Coal Company with the Commission. The
Commission based its order on 18 C.F.R. § 35.14(a)(7) 60 which requires
filing if the purchase is made from a controlled source and is not subject to
regulatory authority. PNM protested the order because the Commission
would treat any subsequent changes in the contract as rate schedule
changes.6 1 The issues were whether PNM "controlled" Western Coal and
whether the contract was subject to the jurisdiction of a regulatory body.
The court set the Commission's order aside on two grounds: first, the
Commission could not find "control" based solely on the fact that PNM
owned fifty percent of the stock of Western Coal; 62 and second, the contract
between PNM and Western Coal was subject to the "regulatory authority"
of the New Mexico Public Service Commission. The Tenth Circuit inter-
preted the "regulatory authority" requirement of section 35.14(a)(7) as ap-
plying to the contract, rather than to the sources of the fuel. Since a recent
amendment of state law clarified the New Mexico Public Service Commis-
sion's authority to determine whether a utility's fuel contract was reason-
56. The seven percent formula was first introduced as an interim standard by the ICC in
Annual Volume Rates on Coal-Wyoming to Flint Creek, Arkansas, 361 I.C.C. 533, 550 (1979).
57. 637 F.2d at 768-69.
58. The Tenth Circuit's disposition of this case placed it in accord with the Circuit Court
for the District of Columbia in San Antonio, Tex. v. United States, 631 F.2d 831 (D.C. Cir.
1980).
59. 628 F.2d 1267 (10th Cir. 1980).
60. 18 C.F.R. § 35.14(a)(7) (1980). The regulation reads in part:
Where the utility purchases fuel from a company-owned or controlled source, the price
of which is subject to the jurisdiction of a regulatory body, such cost shall be deemed
to be reasonable and includable in the adjustment clause . . . . With respect to the
price of fuel purchases from company-owned or controlled sources pursuant to con-
tracts which are not subject to regulatory authority, the utility company shall file such
contracts and amendments thereto with the Commission for its acceptance. . . . Any
subsequent amendment to such contracts shall likewise be filed with the Commission
as a rate schedule change and may be subject to suspension under section 205 of the
Federal Power Act.
Id.
61. 628 F.2d at 1268.
62. The court had previously held that control is a question of fact. SEC v. Int'l Chem.
Dev. Corp., 469 F.2d 20 (10th Cir. 1972). The record showed only that PNM owned 50% of the
coal company stock and Tucson Gas and Electric owned the other 50%. 628 F.2d at 1269.
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able,63 the court found the requisite "regulatory authority" to exempt PNM
from the filing requirement. 6
The other two petitions involved the Commission's approval of certain
rates charged to the City of Gallup by PNM. The issue was whether the
Commission should have used a fixed-rate standard rather than a nonfixed-
rate standard in approving the rates. 65 The Commission had determined
that the PNM-Gallup contract was not a fixed-rate contract, and thereby
applied a "just and reasonable" standard in the hearings required by section
206 of the Federal Power Acts.66 The Tenth Circuit agreed that the Com-
mission had applied the correct standard.
The court based its holding upon specific contract provisions which
gave PNM the right to increase the rates and gave Gallup the option to
terminate the contract within 90 days. 67 The court had previously deter-
mined that the same contract did not permit unilateral rate increases by rate
filings, and that changes could only be made upon order of the Commission,
that is, the "regulatory body" contemplated in Article XII of the contract.
68
As a final issue, the court determined that the City of Gallup failed to
prove that the new higher rate schedule effected a "price squeeze" 69 on the
city as a purchaser for resale. The city failed to show either that it competed
with PNM at the retail level or that the rate schedules for Gallup were
higher than PNM retail rates.
70
The issue in Cities Services Gas Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatoy Commiszon 7'
was whether the Commission had acted arbitrarily in affirming an adminis-
trative law judge's refusal to permit Cities Services Gas Company (Cities) to
earn a return on its unrecovered purchased gas costs 7 2 by including that
63. The amendment reads:
The sale, furnishing or delivery of coal, uranium or other fuels by any affiliated inter-
est to a utility for the generation of electricity for the public shall be subject to regula-
tion by the commission but only to the extent necessary to enable the commission to
determine that the cost to the utility . . . at the point of sale is reasonable ....
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 62-6-4(C)(1978 & Supp. 1980).
64. 628 F.2d at 1269.
65. The significance of applying a particular standard lies in the scrutiny subsequently
given the rate proposals by the Commission. The nonfixed-rate standard requires a finding that
the rates are "just and reasonable." 16 U.S.C. § 824e(a)(1976 & Supp. l1 1979). The standard
for fixed-rate contracts, set forth in F.P.C. v. Sierra Pac. Power Co., 350 U.S. 348 (1956), is
whether the contract rates are so low "as to adversely affect the public interest."
66. 16 U.S.C. § 824e (1976 & Supp. 11 1979).
67. 628 F.2d at 1270.
68. Public Service Co. v. FPC, 557 F.2d 227 (10th Cir. 1977). Accord, Louisiana Power &
Light v. FERO, 587 F.2d 671 (5th Cir. 1979); Southern Cal. Edison Co. v. FPC, 535 F.2d 1325
(D.C. Cir. 1976).
69. The Supreme Court, in FPC v. Conway Corp., 426 U.S. 271 (1976), held that the
"price squeeze" issue was a proper one in the Commission's consideration of new rate schedules.
70. 628 F.2d at 1270.
71. 627 F.2d 1027 (10th Cir. 1980).
72. Because the cost of purchased gas constitutes the largest single component of a pipeline
company's cost of service, the Commission allows the pipeline company to include purchased
gas cost adjustment provisions (PGA clauses) within their tariffs. The company is allowed to
increase its rates every six months, based on changes in the PGA. Cost increases the company
has experienced in the interim period are recorded in an unrecovered purchased gas account,
which, with carrying charges, are recovered through a surcharge filed with the next PGA ad-
justment. Id. at 1028-29.
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amount as working capital in its rate base.
Between January 23, 1974 and April 22, 1975, Cities, a natural gas
pipeline company, experienced a dramatic price increase in the cost of gas
purchased from its suppliers. The price increases were approved by the
Commission. The increases, in turn, raised Cities' unrecovered purchase gas
account balance to an annual average of $10,915,352, reflecting annual car-
rying costs of approximately $2,000,000. Cities had sought to include the
actual average balance of unrecovered purchased gas costs as working capi-
tal in its rate base, thereby earning a return on costs "prudently and neces-
sarily incurred in serving its customers." '73 The administrative law judge
ruled that decreases in working capital which would have resulted without
the inclusion of unrecovered costs in the working capital account were suffi-
cient its providing funds for the unrecovered purchased gas costs. 74 Though
the Commission affirmed, it did so on the grounds that carrying charges on
these costs were prohibited by regulations prior to 1979, and that Cities
failed to establish that the average costs were representative of true costs
actually incurred, and failed to justify its proposed return through its rates.
75
Cities appealed, alleging that it was unlawfully prohibited from earning a
return on its investment (unrecovered purchase gas costs), and that the Com-
mission's "reasons" for denying cost recovery were arbitrary and
capricious. 76
The scope of the court's inquiry in this case was narrow. It essentially
determined whether the Commission abused or exceeded its authority,
whether the Commission's order was supported by substantial evidence, and
whether the order's economic consequences were reasonable vis-a-vis the rel-
evant public interest. The test used was whether the Commission had
"given reasoned consideration to each of the pertinent factors."' 77
The court determined that the Commission had acted arbitrarily, based
upon the Commission's refusal to consider the adverse economic conse-
quences Cities would suffer.78 The costs Cities incurred stemmed directly
from the Commission's actions in approving producer price increases. In
addition, the court noted that the Commission had amended its PGA regula-
tions on June 1, 1979 to allow recovery of the carrying costs the Commission
had argued were prohibited by earlier regulations. 79 By pursuing this denial
of relief to Cities, the Commission was erroneously relying on traditional
ratemaking principles in derogation of "present day conditions" mandated
by the Supreme Court in United Railways v. West. 8°
McCombs v. Federal Energ Regulatog Commission8 ' involved review of a
73. Id. at 1029-30.
74. Id. at 1029.
75. Id. at 1029-30.
76. Id. at 1030.
77. Id. (citing Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 791-92 (1968)).
78. Cities' only burden was to establish that its proposed rate was "just and reasonable".
627 F.2d at 1030.
79. Id. at 1031.
80. 280 U.S. 234 (1930).
81. No. 75-1829 (10th Cir. Nov. 7, 1980), reheaning granted en banc, No. 75-1829 (Mar. 10,
1981). The court had set aside the Commission's order in its first opinion, McCombs v. FPC,
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Commission order requiring the petitioners to deliver natural gas produced
from certain leases in Texas to United Gas Pipe Line Company. McCombs'
predecessor, Quin, acquired an oil and gas lease and entered into a contract
with United Gas whereby United Gas could purchase gas produced from the
"Butler B" tract and any "unitized" 8 2 lands which included the Butler B
tract. The gas was to be resold in interstate commerce; therefore, Quin ap-
plied to the Commission for certificates of public convenience and necessity
needed to provide interstate service under the Natural Gas Act.8 3 The But-
ler B lease was assigned on various occasions. United Gas had stopped re-
ceiving natural gas under the contract in 1966 when production on the
Butler B tract ceased, even though the contract itself remained effective until
1981. McCombs acquired his interest in 1971 and unitized the Butler B
tract with a neighboring tract, "Butler A." He drilled deep produced wells
on both tracts and then contracted to sell the natural gas produced from the
tracts to duPont in intrastate commerce.8 4 The Commission found that this
sale violated the Natural Gas Act,8 5 and therefore ordered McCombs to de-
liver or "pay back" to United Gas volumes of gas produced from wells on
Butler A equal to those previously delivered to duPont.
8 6
The court held that the issue of whether the Commission had authority
to order interstate deliveries from the wells on the neighboring Butler A tract
was not ripe for review until the Commission determined whether Butler A
was dedicated to interstate commerce.8 7 The court also determined that the
Commission had no authority to order gas paybacks as a remedy for viola-
tions of the Natural Gas Act, The proper course of action under the Act was
for the Commission to have brought an action in district court.88 Allowing
the paybacks under section 16 of the Natural Gas Act,8 9 as was urged by the
Commission, would unduly expand the Commission's powers. Section 16
sets forth the general administrative powers of the Commission, but does not
give it the tribunal powers prerequisite to imposing remedies for past viola-
tions, nor does it enlarge the Commission's substantive authority specifically
granted in other sections of the Act. 9°
The Tenth Circuit's narrow view of section 16 authority in McCombs
542 F.2d 1144 (10th Cir. 1976). This decision was vacated, and the order was again set aside
after rehearing. McCombs v. FPC, 570 F.2d 1376 (10th Cir. 1978). The United States Supreme
Court unanimously reversed, United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. McCombs, 442 U.S. 529 (1979), and
the present case was remanded for consideration of the remaining matters.
82. Two or more tracts overlying a common field of oil or gas are "pooled" or "unitized" if
they are operated as a single producing unit. No. 75-1829, slip. op. at 3 n. 1.
83. 15 U.S.C. § 717 (1976).
84. McCombs v. FPC, 542 F.2d at 1145-46.
85. 15 U.S.C. § 717 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
86. No. 75-1829, slip. op. at 4-5.
87. The court determined that while postponing this decision would require McCombs to
continue delivering gas from Butler A to United Gas, it would not constitute irreparable hard-
ship. If error in the Commission's order was found later, it could be remedied by reducing the
amount of gas McCombs must deliver from the Butler B tract in the future.
88. Section 20, 15 U.S.C. § 717s (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
89. Section 16, 15 U.S.C. § 717o (1976 & Supp. IV 1980) "The Commission shall have
power. . . to. . . issue. . . such orders, rules and regulation as it may find necessaOy or appropri-
ate .... " (emphasis added).
90. No. 75-1829, slip op. at 15.
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places it in disagreement with other circuits. In Cox v. Federal Energy Regula-
tog Commission,9 1 the Fifth Circuit upheld the Commission's orders requiring
companies to pay back diverted gas to the interstate market. In GulfOil Corp.
v. FPC,9 2 the Third Circuit agreed with the Fifth Circuit's expansive view of
section 16, 03 and upheld the Commission's refund order. The Tenth Cir-
cuit's holding in McCombs is, however, in accord with the Circuit Court for
the District of Columbia's narrower reading of section 16 authority ex-
pressed in Mobil Oil Corporation v. FPC04 and New England Power Co v. FPC.9 '
The Tenth Circuit also found that the order should be set aside because the
Commission had failed to establish a rational explanation for the payback
order.
96
Judge Holloway dissented from the majority's narrow reading of the
Commission's lack of authority to order paybacks under section 16. 9 7 The
dissent found the Commission's remedy of ordering paybacks for unlawfully
diverted gas logical and within the broad authority granted by section 16.
Even so, the Commission's order requiring paybacks from the date of the
duPont-McCombs contract was unjustified. Almost a year had elapsed be-
tween the contract and the date United Gas asserted its claim for the di-
verted gas. The dissent argued that the equities of the circumstances did not
justify an order to restore gas prior to the date United Gas asserted its claim.
The dissent concluded that the payback order should be affirmed, but modi-
fied to reflect the tardy assertion of United's claim. 98
The Tenth Circuit also addressed duPont's status in these proceedings.
The Commission had decided not to address duPont's motion that it be dis-
missed as it was not subject to the Commission's jurisdiction.99 DuPont was
not under Commission orders at the time of this case; however, it feared the
Commission might issue orders against it in the future. The court deter-
mined that the Commission's denial of duPont's motion was "an order issued
by the Commission," thereby subject to court review under section 19(b) of
the Natural Gas Act. t°0 Because duPont was aggrieved by the order, it was
91. 581 F.2d 449 (5th Cir. 1978).
92. 563 F.2d 588 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. dentied, 434 U.S. 1062, cert. dtimtssed, 435 U.S. 911, reh.
dened, 435 U.S. 981 (1978).
93. The Third Circuit relied upon the Fifth Circuit's interpretation of section 16 in Mesa
Petroleum Co. v. FPC, 441 F.2d 182 (5th Cir. 1971).
94. 483 F.2d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
95. 467 F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir. 1972), afd, 415 U.S. 345 (1974). Whether such a narrow
reading of section 16 authority is still followed by the D.C. Circuit is questionable. In a 1976
curtailment plan case, United States Steel Corp. v. FPC, 533 F.2d 1217(D.C. Cir. 1976), the
court stated, "We find payback not only permissible but mandatory in cases such as this to
protect the interest of other pipeline customers who must absorb the additional curtailment
which results." Id. at 1223. While the Tenth Circuit distinguished the remedy of a reduction in
allocations from a "payback," No. 75-1829, slip op. at 16 n.5, US. Steel apparently upholds an
assumption of tribunal power by the Commission in remedying a past violation.
96. The only explanation given by the Commission was that United Gas would be made
whole by the payback order. No. 75-1829, slip op. at 17-18 n.6.
97. No. 75-1829, slip op. at 6, (Holloway, J., dissenting).
98. Id., slip op. at 6-9.
99. No. 75-1829, slip op. at 20.
100. 15 U.S.C. § 717r(b) (1976). "Any party to a proceeding aggrieved by an order issued
by the Commission in such proceeding may obtain a review of such order in the circuit court of
appeals of the United States .... "
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allowed petition for review under the Act. In determining the merits of du-
Pont's contention that it was not subject to Commission jurisdiction, the
Tenth Circuit found that duPont did not purchase, 10 ' transport or sell gas in
interstate commerce. Therefore, duPont was not a "natural gas company"
within the meaning of the Act,10 2 and the Commission had no basis for juris-
diction. The Tenth Circuit thus directed the Commission to dismiss duPont
from the proceedings.
0 3
V. PUBLIC LANDS
In Beaver v. Andrus,104 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals interpreted 43
C.F.R. § 2802.1-2, 105 which grants an applicant seeking a right-of-way per-
mit over federal land an exemption from reimbursing the United States for
administrative costs incurred in the processing of his application. The plain-
tiffs were twenty-nine cities and towns in Utah and California, which formed
Intermountain Power Project (IPP), a non-profit corporation. IPP's pur-
poses were to build and operate a coal-fueled steam electric generating plant
on federal lands in southern Utah and to provide power to cities and towns
in Utah and California. The plaintiffs claimed an exemption based upon
their status as "[s]tate or local governments or agencies or instrumentalities
thereof where the lands shall be used for governmental purposes and such
lands and resources shall continue to serve the general public. . . ."I The
issue was whether the land and resources would continue to "serve the gen-
eral public."
The Secretary of the Interior argued that publicly owned utilities or
power sources do not "serve the general public" because the land involved is
not fully and completely open to the public. 10 7 The plaintiffs contended
that generation and transmission of power by a non-profit corporation for
the people within its geographical service area is a public purpose and serv-
ices the general public as a class. The benefit to the general public rather
than the public's access to the land should be controlling in determining
whether the exemption is applicable. The narrow issue presented was
whether the exemption applies only if the proposed use serves all of the pub-
lic within a particular geographic area.108
Turning to legislative history and the language of three acts' 0 9 dealing
with reimbursement by beneficiaries of government services, the court found
101. The Tenth Circuit distinguished California v. Southland Royalty Co., 436 U.S. 519
(1978), on the basis that duPont purchased the gas for its own use, not for resale.
102. Natural Gas Act § l(b), 15 U.S.C. § 717a(6) (1976).
103. No. 75-1829, slip op. at 24.
104. 637 F.2d 749 (10th Cir. 1980).
105. 43 C.F.R. § 2802.1-2 (1979) (superseded by 43 C.F.R. § 2803.1-1 (1980)).
106. 43 C.F.R. § 2802.1-2(a)(2)(i) (1979).
107. 637 F.2d at 752.
108. Id. at 753-54.
109. The plaintiffs argued that they were exempt from cost reimbursement due to provi-
sions within the Independent Offices Appropriation Act of 1953 (IOAA), 31 U.S.C. 483a (1976),
and the Public Land Administration Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1371, 74 Stat. 506 (repealed 1976). The
Secretary contended that the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA), 43
U.S.C. § 1701 (1976), was the authorizing statute. 637 F.2d at 752-53.
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a common thread. Services the federal government provides to special inter-
est groups at the taxpayers' expense were distinguished from services the gov-
ernment provides for the benefit of the public at large. The court concluded
that the thrust of the regulations is to make the beneficiaries, whose special
interests are served by government services, pay for the costs of those serv-
ices. The plaintiffs in this case simply did not fall into that self-interest
classification. "10
The Tenth Circuit clarified its holding in Alumet v. Andn es" which im-
plied that the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA)
alone was the standard for interpreting the regulation in question. Al/umet
addressed only the issue of whether the reimbursement could include the
cost of an environmental impact statement. The issue of whether the regula-
tions were valid under other acts did not arise, thus the Alumet holding was
in accord with this case.
11 2
The appellants in Topaz Beryllhum Co. v. United States" t3 challenged regu-
lations promulgated under FLPMA 4 because they set forth requirements
for the filing of unpatented claims which exceed the requirements under the
Act itself.' -15 The appellants contended that the regulations are "in excess of
statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right,"
and therefore unlawful. 1
6
The court recognized that the filing and recordation provisions of the
regulations were more demanding than section 1744 of the Act. 11 7 However,
three of the filing requirements, 43 C.F.R. § 3833.1-2(a),(b) and § 3833.2-1,
were no more stringent than those under section 1744 of the Act. Further-
more, the effect of not complying with the additional requirements of other
subparts of Section 3833 would only make the filings defective; such failure
would not render a claim abandoned and void." 8 Any defects in filing
could be cured later."19
The court reasoned that the purpose of the supplemental filings, to give
notice of the claim and to provide data to be used in land use planning,1
20
was fulfilled by the broad grant of authority to the Secretary of the Interior
under FLPMA. The gathering of the information required by section 3833
assisted in the efficient administration of section 1744 and coordinated its
operation with the rest of the Act.
12 1
110. 637 F.2d at 753-57.
111. 607 F.2d 911 (10th Cir. 1979).
112. 637 F.2d at 756.
113. 649 F.2d 775 (10th Cir. 1981).
114. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1782 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
115. The specific recordation requirements under FLPMA are found at 43 U.S.C. § 6, 1744
(1976). The regulations contain additional filing requirements and supplement filings. 43
C.F.R. § 3833 (1980).
116. 649 F.2d at 776.
117. 43 C.F.R. §§ 3833.0-5(e),.1-2(c)(2), .2-2(a)(2), -2(b)(2), -3(a)(l)(ii), -3(b)(2), .0-5(i),. 1-
2(c)(5), -2(c)(6), .2-3 (1980) supplement 43 U.S.C. § 1744 (1976). 649 F.2d at 778 n.2.
118. Only failure to comply with 43 C.F.R. §§ 3833.1-2(a),-2(b), .2-1(1980) renders a claim
abandoned and void. 649 F.2d at 778.
119. 649 F.2d at 778.
120. Id.
121. Id.
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The appellants further contended that the notice requirement of 43
C.F.R. § 3833.5(d) was invalid.' 22 This section provides that notice of ac-
tions or contests affecting unpatented mining claims need be given only to
those owners who have recorded their claims or sites pursuant to section
3833.1-2, or have filed a notice of transfer of interest pursuant to section
3833.3. Appellants alleged that this provision would allow parties other
than the Government to initiate contests and win default judgments. In ad-
dition, even if such actions were brought by the Government, the section
could result in the loss of valuable mining claims; a result not authorized
under FLPMA. 1
23
The court held that section 3833.5(d) was unavailable to third parties; it
applies only to Government-initiated contests. Third parties cannot rely
simply upon claims recorded with the government, but must also search lo-
cal records when determining to whom notices should be sent.' 24 Further-
more, the regulation does not, in itself, operate as an automatic forfeiture;
section 1744 of the Act is the operative forfeiture provision.' 25 The notice
provision found in 43 C.F.R. § 3833.5(d) merely provides a facilitated proce-
dure by which the Secretary can efficiently satisfy his due process obligation
to give notice to affected parties when a contest is initiated. ' 26 Moreover, a
transferee who failed to file a notice of transfer will be unprotected only until
he files his first annual filing, required by 43 U.S.C. § 1744, as the govern-
ment is required to search all records filed with it pursuant to the regula-
tions.' 27 This minimizes any risks involved and provides adequate due
process protection to affected parties, yet comports with the practical necessi-
ties of managing public lands.'
28
Rosebud Coal Sales Co. v. Andrus 129 involved an appeal from the trial
court's denial of Rocky Mountain Energy Company's (RME) motion to in-
tervene in Rosebud Coal's challenge of the Department of the Interior's stat-
utory right to increase the royalty rate on certain federally leased coal taken
pursuant to Rosebud's federal coal lease. 130 Although not a party to the
lease, RME contended that it was entitled to intervene by virtue of its in-
dependent coal leasing contract with Rosebud covering non-federal coal de-
122. Id.
123. Id. at 778-79.
124. Id. at 779.
125. 43 U.S.C. § 1744(c) (1976) provides, in pertinent part: "The failure to file such instru-
ments as are required by subsections (a) and (b) of this section shall be deemed conclusively to
constitute an abandonment of the mining claim . . . by the owner."
126. The Tenth Circuit quoted the following language of the district court: "It is easier and
more efficient to require millions of claim holders to say to the government early on, 'tell me' if
you intend to challenge my interest, than to require the government to ferret out millions of
interested persons from local records scattered in thousands of locations." 649 F.2d at 779.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. 644 F.2d 849 (10th Cir. 1981).
130. The district court opinion is reported as Rosebud Coal Sales Co. v. Andrus, No. C79-
160B (D. Wyo., June 10, 1980). The district court held that the attempted adjustment was
arbitrary, capricious, and beyond the Department of the Interior's statutory authority. The
Department has appealed this decision. St Rosebud Coal Sales Co. v. Andrus, No. 80-1842
(10th Cir., filed Aug. 11, 1980).
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posits.' 3 1 Because the royalty rate under this contract was determined by
reference to the royalty rate Rosebud Coal paid under the federal coal
lease,' 32 RME claimed that the contract constituted "an interest relating to
the property or transaction which is the subject of the action," a basis for
intervention under rule 24(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
However, RME did not seek to intervene until the district court held that
the Department exceeded its statutory authority in attempting to increase
the royalty rate.' 33 The district court denied RME's motion to intervene on
the ground that it was untimely. The Tenth Circuit agreed with the denial,
but based its decision on public policy grounds.
The Tenth Circuit held that the vague language of rule 24(a)(2)134 ne-
cessitated applying the policies underlying the rule's "interest" requirement
to the facts of the case.' 35 The policies under rule 24 are often conflicting:
avoiding a multiplicity of lawsuits and protecting interested parties, yet
maintaining efficiency and due process protections of litigants.1 36 The "in-
terest" requirement directs the intervenor to show he has a "direct, substan-
tial, legally protectable interest in the proceedings,"' 3 7 that is, "standing"
under Rule 17(a).
138
The court found that RME's claim was based solely on the fact that
RME voluntarily tied its contract lease rate to the Department-Rosebud
rate schedule. No privity of contract existed between RME and the Depart-
ment. The court concluded that the Rosebud-RME contract's relation to
the federal rate schedule did not establish the requisite "interest" for a right
of intervention. RME was in the same position as total strangers who incor-
porate the Department-Rosebud rate schedule into their own coal leasing
contracts. 139 The court as a practical matter found that allowing such a
universal rate of intervention would open the floodgates to intervenors in
every adjustment of a federal standard. 14
131. 644 F.2d at 850.
132. RME leased coal land to Rosebud in return for royalty payments on the coal removed
from the property. If the Department of the Interior could increase Rosebud's royalty rate,
RME could profit from the increase in its own royalty payments. Id.
133. RME had filed an amicus brief at the trial. Id.
134. Rule 24(a) reads, in pertinent part:
(a) Intervention of Right. Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to
intervene in an action: . . .(2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the
property or transaction which is the subject of the action and he is so situated that the
disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to
protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by ex-
isting parties.
FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a). The fact dependence of rule 24(a)(2)'s interest requirement has prece-
dence in the Tenth Circuit. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States, 578 F.2d
1341 (10th Cir. 1978).
135. The lease agreement provided that the Department of the Interior could raise the roy-
alty rates every twenty years. The issue was whether the increase must occur on the twentieth
anniversary or whether it can occur anytime after twenty years.
136. 644 F.2d at 850 n.3.
137. Id. (quoting Piambino v. Bailey, 610 F.2d 1306, 1321 (5th Cir. 1980)).
138. 644 F.2d at 850 n.3.
139. "It would be absurd to allow the unilateral conduct of private parties to divest the
Government of control over its own litigation." Id. at 851 n.4.
140. Id. Bul see Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States, 578 F.2d 1341
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VI. MINERAL RESERVATION
In Lazy D Grazing Associ'aton v. Terry Land & Livestock Co. ,j4M the Tenth
Circuit interpreted a mineral reservation found in six deeds conveying land
to grazing associations, to be used for grazing purposes. The deeds reserved
all gas, casinghead gas, oil, and other minerals valuable as sources of petro-
leum. The issue on appeal focused on whether coal was included in this
reservation. ' 42 The Tenth Circuit found the reservation clause ambiguous
and stated that rules of construction of ambiguous contracts should be used
to determine its terms.' 43 Lazy D asserted that the reservation could not
have included coal because its extraction could be accomplished only by
strip mining, which would destroy the value of the surface for the grazing
and agricultural uses for which the land was purchased. Intent to destroy
surface use was not contemplated; therefore the reservation should not be
construed to include coal. The Tenth Circuit noted that some courts have
held, as a matter of law, that a broad reservation of mineral interests does
not include a mineral which is not specified in the reservation when the only
means of extraction would destroy the surface. ' 44 Noting also that other
jurisdictions have rejected this argument,145 the court chose not to address
the issue since Lazy D failed to present evidence that strip mining was the
only available method of extraction. 146 There was no factual support for
appellants' allegation that the intent to preserve surface uses would be vio-
lated by interpreting the reservation as including coal.
Lazy D further contended that the parties intended the terms "other
minerals valuable as a source of petroleum" to include only minerals pres-
ently valuable as petroleum sources, rather than minerals with prospective
value. Expert witnesses for both parties testified that coal was not a valuable
source of petroleum in the United States in 1965 (the date of the deed) nor at
the present time. They did state, however, that given the current oil
shortage, coal will become a valuable petroleum source in the future. The
trial court had concluded that the parties intended to reserve minerals with
prospective value as a source of petroleum. 1
4 7
(10th Cir. 1978) (Stare decisis effect of enjoining the issuance of license creates an "interest" in
the litigation; potential licensees allowed to intervene).
141. 641 F.2d 844 (10th Cir. 1981).
142. Lazy D asked the trial court to declare the respective owners of all minerals underlying
the land. However, on appeal it only sought a determination of ownership of the coal reserves.
Id. at 846 n.2.
143. Id. at 847.
144. E.g. Cumberland Mineral Co. v. United States, 513 F.2d 1399 (Ct. Cl. 1975); Carson v.
Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 212 Ark. 963, 209 S.W.2d 97 (1948); Farrell v. Sayre, 129 Colo. 368, 270
P.2d 190 (1954); Wulf v. Schultz, 211 Kan. 724, 508 P.2d 896 (1973); Acker v. Guinn, 464
S.W.2d 348 (Tex. 1971).
Other courts view the destruction of the surface estate as a means of determining the par-
ties' intent. Strip mining is only one factor in finding an intent to include a particular mineral
in a reservation. See, e.g., Southern Title Co. v. Oiler, 286 Ark. 300, 595 S.W.2d 681 (1980).
145. 641 F.2d at 846. A Ninth Circuit decision appears to have rejected the "destruction of
the surface" argument without discussion. Chugach Natives v. Doyton, 588 F.2d 723 (9th Cir:
1978).
146. In fact, evidence was presented that underground mining might be feasible, and that
there were outcroppings of coal on the land. 641 F.2d at 847.
147. Id.
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The Tenth Circuit was reluctant to impose the "present marketabil-
ity"1 48 rule of "valuable" under the Federal Mineral Land Statute' 49 to a
reservation in a private deed. No evidence was presented to show that the
parties in this case were influenced by the definition of rights under federal
mining law when they drafted the reservation. The record did not reveal
any particular intent as to the meaning given by the parties. The court
thought it was significant that two witnesses, representing other grazing as-
sociations that purchased land in the same transaction and under deeds
identical to Lazy D's, testified that the parties intended the reservation of all
minerals except sand and gravel.150 Finding no clear error by the trial court,
the Tenth Circuit affirmed that the reservation included minerals with pro-
spective value as a source of petroleum.
Addressing the issue in Terry Land's cross-appeal, whether "source of
petroleum" could include minerals which serve as depositories for petroleum
in the ground as well as minerals which could be converted into petroleum,
the Tenth Circuit considered the context in which this term was used.' 5 1
Looking to the language of the entire reservation, the court applied the doc-
trine ofyqusdem genenr' and concluded that the enumeration of petroleum-like
minerals indicated that the parties were interested in reserving only minerals
similar in character to petroleum. Therefore, the phrase "and other minerals
valuable as a source of petroleum" reserved only those minerals that could
be converted to petroleum, and not those which serve as depositories.'
52
VII. INDIAN LANDS
In Logan v. Andrus,'153 seven members of the Osage tribe who owned
shares in the Osage mineral estate appealed an interpretation of the perime-
ters of tribal council powers pursuant to the Osage Allotment Act,1 54 partic-
ularly the extent of those powers when administering the tribe's mineral
estate. The appellants contended that the council's authority was limited to
administering the mineral estate and did not extend to participating in or
representing the Osage tribe in various federal programs.
The Tenth Circuit held that the provisions of the 1906 version of the
Act, as well as the 1929 reenactment, 155 vested the tribal council with the
power to administer the mineral estate as well as the general powers of tribal
government. Even though the 1906 Act was enacted primarily to establish
148. Two rules determine whether a mineral deposit is valuable. The "prudent man" rule
requires a claimant to show that "a person of ordinary prudence would be justified in the fur-
ther expenditure of his labor and means, with a reasonable prospect of success in developing a
valuable mine." Castle v. Womble, 19 L.D. 455 (1894). The "present marketability" rule re-
quires that at the time of discovery, the mineral could be marketed at a profit." United States
v. Coleman, 390 U.S. 599, 602 (1968). The present marketability rule complements the prudent
man rule at times. 641 F.2d at 848.
149. 30 U.S.C. § 21 (1976).
150. 641 F.2d at 849.
151. Id. at 848-49.
152, Id. at 849-50.
153. 640 F.2d 269 (10th Cir. 1981).
154. Ch. 3572, 34 Stat. 539 (1906) (amended 1929 and 1978).
155. Act of March 2, 1929, ch. 493, 45 Stat. 1478.
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individual mineral allotments, the rules for election of the Osage tribal of-
ficers described the offices in terms of typical tribal government positions,
such as "Principal Chief" and "Osage Tribal Council."' 156 The statute did
not limit the positions to any specific function; in fact, the tribal government
exercised general authority. The 1929 reenactment described the officers
and council as the "tribal government,"' 157 further resolving the question of
the council's general authority. The general authority, the court concluded,
encompassed the right to include the tribe as a participant in various federal
programs. 158
The Tenth Circuit also affirmed the trial court's denial of the plaintiff's
motion to vacate the judgment based on the unconstitutionality of the 1906
Act. The plaintiffs contended that the Act limited the right to vote for coun-
cil candidates to only those who owned shares in the mineral estate. The
trial court had denied the motion because the plaintiffs had failed to address
the issue in their pleadings and because the plaintiffs, as owners of shares,
had no standing to assert the rights of those not owning shares. 159
The Tenth Circuit reversed the trial court's determination that the 1881
Osage Constitution was valid. The Tenth Circuit found that no tribal coun-
cil rights or authority were derived from the 1881 Constitution; therefore it
was not in a position to address the possible implications of such a ruling.
The issue of the constitution's validity was not adjudicated in this case.16°
In Misouri-Kansas- Texas Railroad Co. v. Earl, 161 the Tenth Circuit Court
of Appeals was asked to decide the nature of the railroad's property interest
in its roadbed running over Indian lands. The trial court had held that the
railroad had a vested fee simple absolute title in the land.
The Tenth Circuit began its resolution of the case with an examination
of the history of how the railroad initially acquired the land upon which the
roadbed was built. In 1833, the United States granted the Creek Nation
certain lands in fee; letters of patent were issued in 1852.162 In 1866, Con-
gress had ratified a treaty between the Creek Nation and the United
States 163 which granted a right-of-way for railroads through the Indian
lands.' 64 In addition, the Creek Nation agreed to sell to the United States
certain strips of lands lying along the railroad. 165 The court then examined
two acts of Congress which vested title to these strips of land. The Act of
July 25, 1866,166 provided an incentive for each of the three railroads build-
ing lines in Kansas to quickly finish their work. The first railroad to com-
plete its work was given the right to build a track from southern Kansas
through Indian territory and to link up with a line near Preston, Texas. The
156. Ch. 3572, § 9, 34 Stat. 539 (1906) (amended 1929 and 1978).
157. 640 F.2d at 270.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 271.
160. Id.
161. 641 F.2d 856 (10th Cir. 1981).
162. Id. at 857.
163. 14 Stat. 785 (1866).
164. Id. at 787.
165. Id.
166. Ch. 241, 14 Stat. 236 (1866).
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winner, Missouri-Kansas-Texas (MKT) Railroad's predecessor, was granted
a right-of-way of 100 feet on each side of the roadbed. The Act of July 26,
1866167 provided for a similar grant to MKT's predecessor to expedite con-
struction of a railroad line from Kansas to Fort Smith, Arkansas. Both acts
covered the strip of land at issue.
The appellants argued that the Creek Nation acquired the lands in
question by patent in 1852. The subsequent grant of the right-of-way was in
the nature of an easement which was never purchased. The appellants
urged that the easement had been abandoned, thereby extinguishing the
railroad's interest in the property and vesting it in the owners of the adjacent
land. The Tenth Circuit disagreed.
The court noted that prior to 1875, it was common for Congress to
grant to the railroads fee interests, using the term "right-of-way."'' 6 Fur-
thermore, the Supreme Court had construed the Act of July 26, 1866, as
granting the railroad a fee interest.1 69 While the court acknowledged that
some ambiguity may have existed in the language of the Act of July 25,
1866, it was clarified by the Act of July 26, 1866 which clearly granted to the
railway a fee interest.' 70 Therefore, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the trial
court in holding that the railroad had acquired a fee simple interest in the
property.
In Mescalero Apache Tribe v. New Mexico,' 7 1 the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals addressed the issue of whether state or tribal law prevailed in regu-
lating wildlife within the Mescalero Apache reservation. The tribe had
adopted various hunting and fishing ordinances as part of an extensive tour-
ism and revenue raising program. Some of the tribal ordinances were clearly
inconsistent with New Mexico's hunting and fishing laws.' 72 The tribe
sought and obtained a declaratory judgment that held state hunting and
fishing laws inapplicable within the boundaries of the reservation. 173 The
state had conceded that it had no jurisdiction over tribal members on the
reservation. However, the state appealed the district court's holding as ap-
plied to non-members of the tribe.
The court initially addressed several procedural questions. The state
questioned the tribe's right to bring an action, alleging that the tribe had no
standing to sue 174 and that the suit was not justiciable. The court found
that standing existed based on the imminent, adverse economic effects of
167. Ch. 270, 14 Stat. 289 (1866).
168. Id. at 859.
169. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. v. Oklahoma, 271 U.S. 303 (1926); Missouri, K. & T. Ry. v.
Roberts, 152 U.S. 114 (1894).
170. 641 F.2d at 860.
171. 630 F.2d 724 (10th Cir. 1980), vacated, 101 S. Ct. 1752 (1981).
172. The tribe did not require hunters on the reservation to purchase a state license, and
contrary to state law, the tribe permitted elk and antelope hunters to purchase permits in con-
secutive years. Tribal hunting seasons and bag limits also differed from those of the state. 630
F.2d at 726.
173. Id.
174. The state claimed that the tribe was seeking to enjoin enforcement of statutes which
did not apply to its members. In the state's view, the challenge could only be prosecuted by
aggrieved non-member sportsmen. Id. at 727 n.6.
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compliance with state law upon the tribe, 175 as well as on an injured sover-
eign basis.' 76 Since the state has indicated that it would prosecute non-tri-
bal violators of the state game laws and the impact of such prosecution upon
the tribe was "sufficiently direct and immediate,"' 1 77 the court determined
that the issue was ripe for review. The court also affirmed the district court's
holding that the United States need not be joined as a necessary party.'17
The merits of the case, however, involved the question of federal pre-
emption. The court began its discussion with the recognition of the premise
that states cannot exercise regulatory powers within the confines of a feder-
ally recognized, "semi-independent" Indian reservation if the subject matter
has been preempted by federal law or if the state regulation infringes on the
tribe's right of self-government.' 79 The court then applied a two-part analy-
sis to determine whether federal preemption existed. First, under the tradi-
tional liberal standard of construction of Indian treaties and statutes,' 8 0 the
court found six sources of preemption in this case: 181 1) the Treaty;'8 2 2) the
Enabling Act of New Mexico;' 8 3 3) the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934;
(IRA);' a4 4) the Tribal Constitution '8 5 and ordinances enacted pursuant to
the IRA; 5) extensive federal developmental assistance; and 6) the negative
inferences from Public Law 280.186
The court found explicit expression of federal dominance on the reser-
vation in the language of the Mescalero Apache Reservation Treaty l' 7 and
the Enabling Act of New Mexico,'8 with an express grant of tribal control
175. The tribe's wildlife management ordinances were part of a larger tourism program
"designed to bring income and employment to the Reservation." Id. at 726. The effect of
requiring the individual sportsmen to meet state and tribal regulations, could limit the tribe's
ability to raise the costs of its licenses and deter sportsmen from entering the reservation. Id. at
727.
176. Other circuits have found standing whenever Indian tribes have brought actions to
prevent states from unlawfully interfering with tribal regulation of hunting and fishing. See,
e.g., Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation v. Washington, 591 F.2d 89 (9th
Cir. 1979); Eastern Bank of Cherokee Indians v. North Carolina Wildlife Resources Comm'n,
588 F.2d 75 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. dimissed, 446 U.S. 960 (1980).
177. 630 F.2d at 728.
178. Id.
179. Id.; White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 142 (1980).
180. 630 F.2d at 728; The liberal standard dates back to the Marshall Court's decision in
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832) and has been consistently followed since then.
Se, e.g., Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976); McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax
Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973); Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1 (1956); Carpenter v. Shaw, 280
U.S. 363 (1930).
181. 630 F.2d at 731.
182. Treaty with the Apaches, 10 Stat. 979 (1852).
183. Ch. 310, 36 Stat. 557 (1910) (amended 1942).
184. 25 U.S.C. § 476 (1976).
185. MESCALERO APACHE TRIBE REVISED CONST. art. 11, § 1(c).
186. Ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588 (1953) (codified in scattered sections of 18, 28 U.S.C.).
187. In article I of the treaty the tribe submits itself "exclusively [to] the laws, jurisdiction,
and government of the United States of America." 10 Stat. 979. The treaty, in article 9, also
provides that the United States shall "designate, settle, and adjust [the tribe's] territorial bound-
aries, and pass and execute. . . such laws as may be deemed conducive to the prosperity and
happiness of [the Mescalero Apaches]." 10 Stat. 979, 980.
188. Under the Act New Mexico Indian lands were placed "under the absolute jurisdiction
and control of the Congress of the United States." Ch. 310, 36 Stat. 557, 559 (1910) (amended
1942). Relying upon McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973), the
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over hunting and fishing. The Tribal Constitution also specifically gives the
tribe power over wildlife on the reservation.' 8 9 Even prior to enacting its
constitution, the tribe had enacted ordinances to implement its traditionally
held and congressionally approved powers, which the court stated may serve
to preempt the state. 19° The court, relying on a Fourth Circuit decision,
Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians v. North Carolina Wildlife Resources Commis-
sion,191 found a significant indication of federal preemption in the federal
government's extensive participation in the tribe's development of its
reservation fishing program, which was accomplished without state assist-
ance. t92 Finally, the state failed to exercise its option under Public Law
280193 of unilaterally asserting civil and criminal jurisdiction over the tribe.
Even if the state had assumed jurisdiction, that law in its present form specif-
ically protects the tribe from deprivation of its rights "with respect to hunt-
ing, trapping, or fishing or the control, licensing, or regulating thereof."'
94
The court concluded that the treaty and statutory scheme, rather than over-
coming the presumption of federal preemption, "reasserts the exclusivity of
federal and tribal regulation of hunting and fishing."' 195 The state, there-
fore, had no power to apply game laws to persons hunting and fishing on the
reservation.
In the second part of the test, 196 determining the propriety of state regu-
lation of Indian reservations, the court analyzed the impact of the state regu-
lation upon tribal self-government. The Tenth Circuit used the test of
interference set forth by the Supreme Court in Williams v. Lee: 19 7 "absent
governing Acts of Congress, the question has always been whether the state
action infringed on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws
and be ruled by them."' 9 8 In applying that test, the Tenth Circuit found
that under Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation, 99 a court
must "[seek] an accommodation between the interests of the Tribes and the
Federal Government on the one hand, and those of the State, on the
other. ' ' 200 The court identified one overriding federal interest: "the obliga-
tion of the United States to respond to the strong expression of the Indian
people for self-determination."'2 0 1 In pure-taxation schemes, the state's in-
terest in raising revenue from on-reservation activity was outweighed by the
tribe's interest, because the tribe's revenues were derived from value gener-
Tenth Circuit concluded that in the area of resource management, the treaty language suggests
that "absolute" jurisdiction was synonymous with "exclusive" jurisdiction. 630 F.2d at 731.
189. MESCALERO APACHE REVISED CONST. art II, § I(c).
190. 630 F.2d at 731.
191. 588 F.2d 75 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. dimrissed, 446 U.S. 960 (1980).
192. "Where the state plays no role in stocking reservation waters, it 'has no perceivable
interest in reservation fishing,'" 630 F.2d at 732 (quoting Easten Band, 588 F.2d at 78).
193. Ch. 505, § 2, 67 Stat. 588 (1953) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1976)).
194. 25 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(1976).
195. 630 F.2d at 732.
196. The court noted that the analyses of the two tests overlap and that they may eventually
become one test. d. at 733, n. 18.
197. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
198. Id. at 220.
199. 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
200. 630 F.2d at 733 (citing 447 U.S. at 156).
201. 630 F.2d at 733 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 450a(a) (1976)).
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ated on the reservation by activities involving the tribe, with the taxpayer
receiving tribal rather than state services. 20 2 Colville was distinguishable be-
cause of the clear state interference with a traditional tribal regulatory
power in the present case. Here, the tribe had a significant interest in wild-
life management, and the effect of state regulation was not limited to depri-
vation of tribal revenues. The principle underlying the Co/oil/e test was the
desire to promote Indian opportunities for developing their own
institutions.
203
The court also made an analogy to United States v. Sanford,20 4 where the
Ninth Circuit held Montana's elk hunting laws applicable to non-Indians
hunting on the reservation because the laws did not interfere with tribal self-
government. 20 5 In this case, however, the tribe did show that the state's laws
interfered with tribal self-governance.
20 6
The state raised environmental concerns, asserting itself as primary pro-
tector of the environment. The Tenth Circuit held that preservation of wild-
life was the duty of all sovereigns. 20 7 The court concluded that simultaneous
regulation was not in order here as it had been in the Montana case because
of the tribe's record in wildlife management.
20 8
The final issue concerned what the state called a "vacuum in the area of
enforcement" which would be created if neither the state nor the tribe could
exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-tribal members. The Tenth Circuit
pointed out that while the tribe may not have criminal enforcement powers,
it retained civil authority over non-tribal members. The United States
would have criminal jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1165. Section 1165
reads, in part: "Whoever, without lawful authority or permission, willfully
and knowingly goes upon any land that belongs to any Indian or Indian
Tribe. . . for the purpose of hunting, trapping, or fishing thereon, or for the
removal of games, peltries, or fish therefrom, shall be fined not more than
$200 or imprisoned not more than ninety (90) days, or both . . . ." The
United States' jurisdiction is based on conditional entry on tribal land, the
condition being that the entrant obey tribal game laws while on the reserva-
tion. A knowing violation of these laws renders the entry impermissive and,
therefore, a trespass subject to section 1165.209
As a final point, the court declared that the state could not regulate
possession of game off the reservation. The state must treat game legally
obtained from the reservation as it would game legally obtained from any
other source outside the state's jurisdiction. Furthermore, once the game has
been lawfully reduced to possession, the state's interest in protection of wild-
202. 630 F.2d at 733. The Supreme Court articulated this balancing process in Colville, 447
U.S. at 163-64.
203. 630 F.2d at 734.
204. 547 F.2d 1085 (9th Cir. 1976).
205. Id. at 1089.
206. 630 F.2d at 733.
207. Id. at 734.
208. The state agreed that tribal management of reservation wildlife had been exemplary
and in conformance with accepted wildlife management procedures. Id. at 726.
209. Id. at 736.
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life ends.2 10
On April 6, 1981, the United States Supreme Court granted a petition
for writ of certiorari in the Mescalero case. 21 1 The judgment by the Tenth
Circuit was vacated and remanded for further consideration in light of the
Supreme Court's decision in Montana v. United States.
2 12
The Montana case reversed and remanded a Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals decision 2 13 dealing with the power of the Crow Tribe to prohibit or
regulate hunting and fishing within reservation boundaries. The Supreme
Court's holding in Montana was a narrow one, focusing on the distinction
between tribal-owned lands and lands owned in fee by non-members of the
tribe. 2 14 The Tenth Circuit failed to make such a distinction in Mescalero
and, therefore, may on remand have to amend its holding in the case.
The Ninth Circuit had held in Montana that the tribe could prohibit
non-members from hunting and fishing on lands belonging to the tribe or
held by the United States in trust for the tribe. 21 5 The Ninth Circuit had
further held that if the tribe did permit non-members to hunt or fish on such
lands, it could condition their entry on payment of a fee and could establish
bag and creel limits. 2 16 The Supreme Court concurred with the Ninth Cir-
cuit on both of these issues. 2 17 However, the Supreme Court held that these
tribal regulatory powers did not extend to non-members hunting and fishing
on reservation land owned in fee by non-members of the tribe.218
According to Montana, the Tenth Circuit's finding in Mescalero that the
tribe, not the state, has the power to regulate hunting and fishing on the
reservation would be affirmed. However, under Montana, that power is lim-
ited to those lands held by the tribe or in trust by the United States for the
tribe. 2 19 Those lands within the reservation held in fee by non-members
would be subject to state, rather than tribal regulation.220 In this respect,
the Tenth Circuit will have to determine if any such fee lands are regulated
by the Mescaleros. Since it is not the reservation boundaries which deter-
mine tribal jurisdiction for purposes of regulating hunting and fishing, but
rather tribal ownership of the land, the Mescaleros' laws may not apply to
the entire reservation.
Another aspect of the Mescalero case which might be given reconsidera-
tion in light of Montana is the Tenth Circuit's assertion that for purposes of
210. Id. at 736-37,
211. 450 U.S. 1036 (1981).
212. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
213. United States v. Montana, 604 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1979).
214. 450 U.S. at 557.
215. 604 F.2d at 1165-66.
216. Id.
217. 450 U.S. at 557.
218. Id. The General Allotment Act of 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388, and the Crow Allotment
Act of 1920, ch. 224, 41 Stat. 451, authorized the issuance of patents in fee to individual Indian
allottees within the reservation. Under these Acts, an allottee could alienate his land to a non-
Indian after holding it for 25 years. Today approximately 28% of the Crow reservation is held
in fee by non-Indians. 450 U.S. at 548.
219. 450 U.S. at 557.
220. Id.
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enforcement of the laws, the tribe has civil jurisdiction over non-members. 22 1
The Supreme Court again distinguished non-member lands from Indian
lands within the reservation. While the tribe does retain some inherent
power to exercise civil authority over non-members on fee lands within the
reservation, that power is limited to conduct which "threatens, or has some
direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or
welfare of the tribe."'222 The Supreme Court specifically held that non-
member fishing and hunting posed no such threat.223 It may be assumed
that the activities of the non-member hunters and fishermen in the Mescalero
case were similarly nonthreatening. Therefore, the Tenth Circuit may find
the tribe's civil jurisdiction to be, likewise, limited.
Ma ,E Walta
221. 630 F.2d at 735.
222. 450 U.S. at 566.
223. Id.
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SYNERGISM: ONE YEAR LATER'
INTRODUCTION
The federal courts of appeals still disagree on the standard to be applied
in determining the nonobviousness2 of combination patents. "Combination
patents" is the term assigned to patented inventions that are combinations of
previously known components. Non-combination patents are patented in-
ventions that are entirely innovative. The question dividing the courts is
whether the sum of the components in a combination patent must achieve a
result which is variously described as "surprising," 3 "unusual," 4 or "greater
than the sum of the several effects taken separately." 5 This definition-defy-
ing result has come to be called "synergism.
' 6
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has vacillated on the synergism
issue. For example, it required synergism in March 1979, 7 and again in May
1978,8 but expressly rejected the synergism requirement in August 1979 in
Plastic Container Corp. v. Continental Plastics of Oklahoma, Inc. 9 Although it ap-
peared that Plastic Container was the final word in the Tenth Circuit,' 0 the
case merely prefaced the July 1980 opinion in Norfm, Inc. v. IBM,II which
acknowledged the conflict among the three earlier cases but opted to "leave
its resolution for a later day.'
12
The synergism conflict should be resolved soon and conclusively. Syn-
ergism should not be required in a combination patent for three reasons.
1. In last year's Tenth Circuit Survey, the synergism question was analyzed and the law
of the several circuits surveyed in Note, Synergism and Nonobviousness.. The Tenth Circuit Enters the
Fray, 58 DEN. L.J. 465 (1981). This note is intended to update that note by surveying the
synergism cases decided in the past year and adding the author's own reflections to the earlier
exhaustive analysis.
2. The Patent Act of 1952 states:
A patent may not be obtained . . . if the differences between the subject matter
sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole
would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having
ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.
35 U.S.C. § 103 (1976).
3. Gettlemen Mfg., Inc. v. Lawn 'N' Sport Power Mower Sales & Serv., 517 F.2d 1194,
1199 (7th Cir. 1975).
4. Huron Machine Prods., Inc. v. A. & E. Warbern, Inc., 615 F.2d 222 (5th Cir. 1980).
5. St. Regis Paper Co. v. Bemis Co., 549 F.2d 833, 838 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 833
(1977) (quoting Anderson's-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 57, 61 (1969)).
6. The word "synergism" was coined in Anderson's-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage
Co., 396 U.S. 57 (1969). There it was defined as a combination of elements resulting in an effect
"greater than the sum of the several effects taken separately." Id. at 61.
7. Deere & Co. v. Hesston Corp., 593 F.2d 956 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 838
(1980).
8. True Temper Corp. v. CF&I Steel Corp., 601 F.2d 495 (10th Cir. 1979).
9. 607 F.2d 885 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1018 (1980).
10. See Note, Synergzwm and Nonobviousness." The Tenth Circuit Enters the Fray, 58 DEN. L.J. 465,
466 (1981).
11. 625 F.2d 357 (10th Cir. 1980).
12. Id. at 365.
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First, synergism has no basis in the statutory language. Second, its applica-
tion is completely subjective. Third, it is illogical to apply it to patents for
mechanical inventions, which are by their nature combinations of previously
known components, each performing its expected function. The genius of
invention lies in the combination itself, not in persuading individual compo-
nents to perform unusual stunts. This article will briefly discuss the nonobvi-
ousness standard and its relation to the synergism concept, and it will survey
the synergism developments of the past year in all circuits.
I. THE NONOBVIOUSNESS STANDARD
After decades of increasing judicial hostility to patents13 and increasing
inconsistency in the standard employed in measuring patentability, Congress
enacted section 103 of the Patent Act of 1952,14 the nonobviousness test. An
invention fails the nonobviousness test of patentability "if the differences be-
tween the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such
that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the
invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art .... ,, 5
The Supreme Court, in the leading case of Graham v. John Deere Co. ,16
interpreted section 103 to require three specific determinations: 1) the scope
and content of the prior art; 2) the differences between the prior art and the
claims at issue; and 3) the ability of those skilled in the art.17 These three
factors determine whether the invention would have been obvious to one
skilled in the art under section 103.
Prior to the enactment of section 103, courts required "invention" 18 -a
rather nebulous concept-in addition to the then existing statutory require-
ments of novelty and usefulness. Judicial hostility to patents prior to Graham
found expression in the ever-constricting concept of invention. Although
Graham provided a systematic approach to the nonobviousness question,
courts quickly split as to whether the Graham approach replaced, or merely
supplemented, the invention standard.' 9 For non-combination patents, the
Graham approach became the sole test of nonobviousness. 20 For combina-
tion patents, however, in addition to the Graham test, some courts embodied
the old standard of "invention" in the new term "synergism."''2
Those courts requiring synergism rely upon the Supreme Court opin-
13. See Cuno Eng'r Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84, 91 (1941) (requiring a
"flash of genius" for patentability). Later came Great Ad. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket
Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147 (1950) (requiring that "the whole in some way exceeds the sum of its
parts").
14. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1976).
15. Id.
16. 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
17. Id. at 17.
18. See Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248, 266 (1850).
19. See generally Note, After Black Rock: New Tests of Patentabilty--The Old Tests of Invention,
39 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 123 (1970).
20. See, e.g., Norwood v. Ehrenreich Photo-Optical Indus., Inc., 529 F.2d 3 (9th Cir. 1975);
Popiel Bros. v. Schick Elec., Inc., 494 F.2d 162 (7th Cir. 1974).
21. See, e.g., ITT v. Raychem Corp., 538 F.2d 453 (ist Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 886
(1976); Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Tell-Design, Inc., 460 F.2d 625 (9th Cir. 1972).
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ions of Anderson's-Black Rock Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co. 22 and Sakraida v. Ag
Pro, Inc. 23 Both cases suggested that combination patents should be scruti-
nized more carefully than non-combination patents. 24 Neither, however,
held that synergism is required of combination patents.
II. REVIEW OF THE CIRCUITS: MORE CONFUSION
A. The Tenth Circuit
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals decided only four patent cases be-
tween June 1980 and May 1981.25 In two of those cases, the court in dictum
discussed the standard for combination patents. In Escoa Fintube Corp. v.
Tranter, Inc. ,26 Judge Doyle, citing Plastic Container Corp. v. Continental Plastics
of Oklahoma, Inc. ,27 stated that "[t]he issue is whether the subject matter as a
whole, the particular use or result of the assembly of old elements, would
have been obvious to one with ordinary skill in the art at the time the discov-
ery was made." 28 The court rejected synergism and looked instead to the
obviousness of the combination.
Judge Barrett, in the court's opinion in Norfm, Inc. v. IBM,29 written two
months before Escoa, regarded the synergism question as still unsettled in the
Tenth Circuit despite the Plastic Container decision. He acknowledged a con-
flict between Plastic Container and the earlier cases requiring synergism but
decided to "leave its resolution for a later day."'30 The court held that the
patent was valid under either standard.
B. Other Circuits
Two recent cases, ITT v. Raychem Corp. 31 and Rosen v. Lawson-Hemphill,
Inc. ,32 are inconclusive as to whether the First Circuit requires synergism.
IT, citing Sakraida and Black Rock for the position that a combination must
result "in an effect greater than the sum of several effects taken sepa-
rately," 3 3 uses synergism terminology. But Rosen, decided only six months
later, applied a strict Graham analysis without even mentioning Black Rock.
34
The First Circuit has not faced the synergism question since Rosen.
The Second Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Miller, sitting by designa-
tion from the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, rejected synergism in
22. 396 U.S. 57 (1969).
23. 425 U.S. 273 (1976).
24. Id. at 281; 396 U.S. at 61-62.
25. Central Soya Co., Inc. v. Geo. A. Hormel & Co., 645 F.2d 847 (10th Cir. 1981);
Ausherman v. Stump, 643 F.2d 715 (10th Cir. 1981); Escoa Fintube Corp. v. Tranter, Inc., 631
F.2d 682 (10th Cir. 1980); Norfin, Inc. v. IBM, 625 F.2d 357 (10th Cir. 1980).
26. 631 F.2d 682 (10th Cir. 1980).
27. 607 F.2d 885 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1018 (1980).
28. 631 F.2d at 696.
29. 625 F.2d 357 (10th Cir. 1980).
30. Id. at 365.
31. 538 F.2d 453 (1st Cir. 1976).
32. 549 F.2d 205 (1st Cir. 1976).
33. 538 F.2d at 457.
34. 549 F.2d at 209.
19821
DENVER LAWJOURNAL
Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Gyromat Corp. 3 The district courts of the Second
Circuit have not followed the Champion case. For example, in Brennan v. Mr.
Hanger, Inc. ,36 the district court confronted the synergism question and con-
cluded that, though synergism may lack "either [a] statutory or logical ba-
sis," 37 the court was bound by prior cases to apply the synergism test. The
court upheld the patent, which was for a wardrobe hanger, saying that the
invention "seems as close to 'synergism' as anyone will ever get with a
mechanical device."
'38
The district court in Leinoffv. Valerie Furs Lid.39 permitted the synergism
test to wholly pre-empt the Graham nonobviousness test. The court stated
that "[w]ith respect to combination patents, the Graham criteria are further
augmented by the requirement that the result of the combination must be
synergistic. . .-40 The court noted, however, that the synergism test is not
to "override" the guidelines of section 103 of the Patent Act of 1952 and
Graham.4 ' The court envisioned a two-step test for determining the nonobvi-
ousness of combination patents: 1) do the elements of the combination sat-
isfy the section 103 and Graham guidelines? 2) if not, is the result of the
combination synergistic?4 2 Therefore, even if the elements fail the Graham
test, the invention is patentable if synergistic, which in fact was the holding
of the case.
Under the Leinoffjapproach, however, the first step of the two-step test is
superfluous for two reasons, thereby making synergism the sole test. First,
the case held that the invention was patentable if the second step--the syner-
gism test-were satisfied, even if the first step-the Graham test-were not.
One may infer that even if the Graham test were satisfied, the synergism test
must also be satisfied.43 The test in Lehoff therefore, is not a two-step test
that is met if either step is satisfied; nor is it a two-step test that is met only if
both steps are satisifed. It is a test that is met only if the second step is
satisfied, regardless of the outcome of the first step.
The second reason that the application of the Graham test is superfluous
under the Leinof approach is that the Leihoff court erred in applying section
103 and Graham to the individual elements of the invention, rather than to
the invention as a whole. Courts that draw a distinction between combina-
tion and non-combination inventions define a combination patent as one
comprising old, or obvious, elements. Since old elements are by definition
obvious under Graham, the patent will always fail the first step of the two-
step test. Such an approach makes the first step in the analysis totally
unnecessary.
35. 603 F.2d 361 (2d Cir. 1979).
36. 479 F. Supp. 1215 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
37. Id. at 1225.
38. Id.
39. 501 F. Supp. 720 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
40. Id. at 724.
41. Id. at 725.
42. Id.
43. The Court declared that for combination patents "the Graham criteria are further aug-
mented" by the synergism requirement. No court that has adopted the synergism approach has
held that synergism is not required if the Graham test is met.
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Ironically, had the court correctly applied the Graham guidelines to the
entire invention rather than to its individual elements, the synergism ques-
tion-that is, whether the result was unanticipated-would have been incor-
porated into the first step. As a result, the second step--synergism-would
have been properly superflous.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals, in Sims v. Mack Truck Corp. ,44 re-
fused to decide whether synergism was required. The patent was declared
invalid when the court found the design was "no more striking an improve-
ment than those [designs] found to be inadequate for a combination patent
in Sakraida or in Black Rock." ' '45
Later, in American Slerilizer Co. v. Sybron Corp. ,46 the court employed a
strict Graham analysis, making no mention of Sakraida or Black Rock. Still
later, a Third Circuit district court, in Toro Co. v. Textron, Inc. ,47 cited SUns
and Sakratda to support its declaration of patent invalidity.48 The Toro court
reasoned that the patented design was a mere combination that must there-
fore be closely scrutinized for obviousness. 49 The Toro court, like the Ameri-
can Sterlhzer and Sms courts before it, did not decide whether synergism was
required. Like Sims, however, Toro closely scrutinized a combination patent.
The Fourth Circuit has not addressed the synergism question since the
Supreme Court's Sakraida decision.
The Fifth Circuit has not discussed synergism sinceJohn Znk Co. v. Na-
tional Airoil Burner Co. ,o where it expressly required "a synergistic result." 5 1
The Sixth Circuit in Smith . Acme General Corp. 52 concluded that "defini-
tional deficiencies, theoretical flaws and judicial application of synergism
have contributed to muddy the patent waters." 53 But the court was unwill-
ing to abandon completely the synergism approach. Instead, it concluded
that synergism is symbolic of a more stringent standard of patentability for
combinations.54 Because a combination design is more likely to be obvious
than a non-combination design, the combination must be more carefully ex-
amined under the Graham guidelines.
The conclusion of the Smith court with respect to synergism and combi-
nation patents is similar to the position of this note. A so-called combination
patent is a patent for a less sophisticated invention; it is therefore more likely
to be invalid for obviousness. The test for "synergism," under the Sixth Cir-
cuit's approach, is simply a shorthand expression for carefully ensuring that
the relatively unsophisticated "combination" patent was nonobvious under
the Graham guidelines. The Sixth Circuit's analysis will nonetheless remain
44. 608 F.2d 87 (3d Cir. 1979).
45. Id. at 93.
46. 614 F.2d 890 (3d Cir. 1980).
47. 499 F. Supp. 241 (D. Del. 1980).
48. Id. at 245.
49. Id.
50. 613 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1980).
51. Id. at 551.
52. 614 F.2d 1086 (6th Cir. 1980).
53. Id. at 1095.
54. Id.
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confusing until the court drops the synergism and combination patent
terminology.
Judge Swygert's piercing analysis in his 1979 opinion in Repubhc Indus-
tries, Inc. o. Schlage Lock Co. 55 rejected the synergism approach in the Seventh
Circuit and shook the approach's credibility in other circuits. 56 The Seventh
Circuit has not since addressed the synergism question but it is unlikely to
stray from the Republic precedent.
The Eighth Circuit apparently requires synergism. In Reinke Manufactur-
ing Co. v. Sidney Manufacturing Corp. 5 and Sing v. Culture Products, Inc. ,58 the
courts, without specifically using the word synergism, spoke in language as-
sociated with the synergism test.
59
In Palmer v. Orthokinetics, Inc. ,60 the Ninth Circuit, citing Republc, held
that nonobviousness was to be determined exclusively by section 103 and the
Graham guidelines. In so doing, it reversed its position in several earlier
cases. 6 1 The Palmer court was nonetheless unwilling to reject outright the
synergism approach. In a curious footnote to its argument that all structural
inventions involve combinations of old elements, the court said that "[wle
recognize that in assessing the patentability of combination patents, a 'more
severe' test is applied to determine whether the whole in some way exceeds
the sum of its parts to produce unusual or surprising circumstances."'62 The
footnote seems to require synergism while the text rejects it. The Ninth Cir-
cuit has not grappled with synergism in the past year, but Palmer leaves the
impression that it is moving away from the synergism requirement.
The District of Columbia Circuit has implied in dictum that synergism
is required.6 3 The disputed patent was held invalid, however, on the basis of
the Graham test alone.64
55. 592 F.2d 963 (7th Cir. 1979).
56. The Tenth Circuit cited Repubti when it rejected synergism in Plastic Container Corp.
v. Continental Plastics of Olda., Inc., 607 F.2d 885, 905 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
1018 (1980). The Second Circuit, though its position on synergism is uncertain, has seen logic in
the Repubtic reasoning. Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Gyromat Corp., 603 F.2d 361, 371 (2d Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 916 (1980). See Brennan v. Mr. Hanger, Inc., 479 F. Supp. 1215,
1225 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
57. 594 F.2d 644 (8th Cir. 1979).
58. 469 F. Supp. 1249 (E.D. Mo. 1979).
59. The Rethke court said that "we will not only consider whether it was obvous that by
putting together the various elements used the result would be the effect achieved . . . . [W]e
will also consider whether the effect is a new effect, or simply each of the items performing its
expected function." 594 F.2d at 648 (emphasis in original). The &ng court cited Reinke and
held the patent valid because "[pllaintiff combined known elements in such a manner as to
achieve a result which was clearly 'greater than the sum of the several effects taken separately'."
469 F. Supp. at 1256.
60. 611 F.2d 316 (9th Cir. 1980).
61. See, e.g., Satco, Inc. v. Transequip, Inc., 594 F.2d 1318 (9th Cir.), ceri. denied, 444 U.S.
865 (1979); Deere & Co. v. Sperry Rand Corp., 513 F.2d 1131 (9th Cir.), cer. dented, 423 U.S.
914 (1975).
62. 611 F.2d at 323 n.15.
63. Robintech, Inc. v. Chemidus Wavin, Ltd., 628 F.2d 142, 144-45 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
64. Id. at 144.
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CONCLUSION
The analytical defect of the synergism requirement is that it initially
demands distinguishing between combination and non-combination patents.
All inventions are ultimately combinations of previously known elements;
the difference among inventions is only in how far the combination must be
unravelled before it is reduced to such elements. To term one invention a
combination and another a non-combination implies that the two are differ-
ent in kind. The only difference, however, is in degree. Along a scale mea-
suring sophistication of inventions, at some point a level is reached where the
interaction of the invention's components exceeds the understanding of a
non-technically trained judge. At that point, the judge announces that the
invention is not just a combination, it is an innovation.
There is nonetheless a similarity between the nonobviousness standard
of section 103 and Graham, on the one hand, and the synergism standard on
the other. Both depend on the sophistication of the invention. A sophisti-
cated combination will likely be dubbed a non-combination patent and be
found to be nonobvious as well. Conversely, an unsophisticated combina-
tion will be dubbed a combination patent-which is usually a way of saying
that the patent holder loses-and will be found to be obvious. In this sense
the synergism test is redundant to the nonobviousness test.
It should be emphasized that sophistication is a relative term. The fault
of the synergism test is that it measures an invention's sophistication relative
to the judge's technical training rather than relative to the state of the art
and the ability of those skilled in the art. Whether an invention is found to
be a combination or a non-combination depends to a large extent on the
technical expertise of the judge. If the judge possesses sufficient proficiency
in technical matters to understand the workings of the components, the in-
vention is proclaimed a combination. Whether the invention is nonobvious,
however, depends on the answer to specific factual determinations, namely,
the state of the prior art, the advance that the invention represents over the
prior art, and the ability of those skilled in the art. Satisfaction of the syner-
gism requirement, therefore, is determined not by whether the invention was
obvious to one skilled in the art, but whether the invention, obvious or not,
can be understood by a lay judge. By shifting the focus from the industry to
the judge, the requirement of synergism introduces a new and unjustified
subjective standard.
Courts should recognize that all inventions are combinations of previ-
ously known elements. The next step is to recognize that differentiating be-
tween the patented combination and prior combinations is simply another
way of measuring obviousness. The pitfall to be avoided is the measuring of
sophistication, or obviousness, or inventiveness, by the judges' own standards
rather than by the standards of the industry. The synergism approach is just
such a pitfall.
Glenn Kirwan Beaton
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OVERVIEW
Four recent decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit' have clarified the court's position on issues central to securi-
ties litigation. This survey will examine the decisions and the questions with
which each dealt in the following order: first, the problem of when the fed-
eral equitable tolling doctrine applies to statutes of limitations in securities
fraud cases;2 second, whether purchases of lots in a real estate development,
combined with the sellers' promises to develop the property, constitute a "se-
curity";3 third, what the required standards and burdens of proof are in es-
tablishing a conflict of interest in violation of the Investment Company Act
of 1940;4 fourth, what degree of wrongful intent is required for aiding and
abetting a violation of that Act;5 and fifth, whether a private right of action
under rule lOb-5 6 extends to a plaintiff seeking injunctive relief to prevent
the defendant from issuing securities for the purpose of financing litigation
against the plaintiff, where the securities consisted of agreements to share
money recovered in the lawsuit.7
I. TOLLING THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IN FEDERAL
SECURITIES CASES
In Aldnch v. McCulloch Properties, Inc. ,8 the plaintiffs, who purchased sub-
divided lots in the defendants' real estate development, sought to recover
their investment under several federal securities provisions, as well as under
the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act (ILSFDA),9 and under various
common law theories. 10 However, the plaintiffs did not file their lawsuit
1. Ohio v. Peterson, 651 F.2d 687 (10th Cir. 1981); Decker v. SEC, 631 F.2d 1380 (10th
Cir. 1980); Aldrich v. McCulloch Properties, Inc., 627 F.2d 1036 (10th Cir. 1980); Westinghouse
Credit Corp. v. Bader & Dufty, 627 F.2d 221 (10th Cir. 1980).
2. Ohio v. Peterson, 651 F.2d 687 (10th Cir. 1981); Aldrich v. McCulloch Properties, Inc.,
627 F.2d 1036 (10th Cir. 1980).
3. Aldrich v. McCulloch Properties, Inc., 627 F.2d 1036 (10th Cir. 1980).
4. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-I (1976); Decker v. SEC, 631 F.2d 1380 (10th Cir. 1980).
5. Decker v. SEC, 631 F.2d 1380 (10th Cir. 1980).
6. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1981), which states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any na-
tional securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security.
7. Westinghouse Credit Corp. v. Bader & Dufty, 627 F.2d 221 (10th Cir. 1980).
8. 627 F.2d 1036 (10th Cir. 1980).
9. 15 U.S.C. § 1701 (1976).
10. 627 F.2d at 1038.
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until more than eight years after they had purchased the lots in question.I
The United States District Court for the District of Colorado ruled that the
applicable statutes of limitations barred all the plaintiffs' claims.1
2
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit partly af-
firmed and partly reversed the district court's decision, and held that while
the claims under the ILSFDA were indeed barred, the claims under the se-
curities laws were not. 13 According to the court of appeals, the federal equi-
table tolling doctrine protected the plaintiffs' securities violations claims
from summary disposal, even though the limitations period had expired, be-
cause the plaintiffs had asserted facts supporting the allegation that the de-
fendants concealed the fraud until the limitations period had run.
1 4
Since the federal securities provisions under which the plaintiffs sued do
not contain a limitations period, the court adopted the policy delineated by
the United States Supreme Court in Ernst &Ernst v. Hochfelder: '5 whenever a
remedy is judicially implied (as in, for example, a rule lOb-5 action),' 16 and
no statute of limitations is provided, the forum state's limitations period is
adopted.' 7 Colorado law provides a three-year limitations period for fraud
actions.' 8 Under normal legal principles, this alone would not have helped
the plaintiffs, who sued more than eight years after signing the contract com-
plained of.'9 However, as stated above, the court utilized federal equitable
tolling principles to delay the operation of the Colorado statute of
limitations.
The equitable tolling doctrine is based on the premise that a plaintiff in
a fraud case should not be penalized when the defendant conceals the fraud
so efficiently that even if the plaintiff is diligent, the fraud remains hidden
until it is too late to bring suit. The United States Supreme Court recog-
11. Id.
12. Id. See 15 U.S.C. § 1711 (1976) (amended 1979); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 13-80-108,-109
(1973).
13. 627 F.2d at 1041-42.
14. Id. at 1042.
15. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
16. Id. at 210 n.29.
17. 627 F.2d at 1041 (citing Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 210 n.29). The court
also cited Nickels v. Koehler Mgmt. Corp., 541 F.2d 611, 613 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1074 (1977) (where no federal statute of limitations exists, federal courts must implement
the state statute of limitations which best effectuates the policy objectives of the federal remedy
provided). See Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 395 (1946), where the Supreme Court
stated:
If Congress explicitly puts a limit upon the time for enforcing a right which it created
there is an end of the matter. The Congressional statute of limitation is definitive
.... The rub comes when Congress is silent. . . . [Tihe silence of Congress has
been interpreted to mean that it is federal policy to adopt the local law of limitation
.... The implied absorption of State statutes of limitation within the interstices of
the federal enactments is a phase of fashioning remedial details where Congress has
not spoken but left matters for judicial determination within the general framework of
familiar legal principles.
See also I A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, SECURITIES FRAUD & COMMODITIES FRAUD
§ 2.5(1) at 41-42 (1981).
18. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 13-80-108, -109 (1973). Section 13-80-109 states that "[blills for
relief on the ground of fraud shall be filed within three years after the discovery by the ag-
grieved party of the facts constituting such fraud, and not afterwards."
19. 627 F.2d at 1038.
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nized this problem in Bailey v. Glover,2 ° a bankruptcy case, and summarized
the doctrine: "[w]here the ignorance of the fraud has been produced by af-
firmative acts of the guilty party in concealing the facts from the other, the
statute will not bar relief provided suit is brought within proper time after
the discovery of the fraud."'2 1 The Court also held that the equitable tolling
doctrine applies to actions at law as well as in equity.
22
The Bailey holding was reaffirmed in Exploration Co. v. United States,23 a
Colorado land patent fraud case in which the Court allowed the United
States government to benefit from the equitable tolling doctrine. 24 The doc-
trine was further clarified in Holmberg v. Armbrecht,2 5 where the Court held
that in federal actions, equitable tolling principles apply to federal as well as
to state statutes of limitations regardless of whether an action is grounded in
fraud: "[tjhis equitable doctrine is read into every federal statute of limita-
tion. . . . It would be too incongruous to confine a federal right within the
bare terms of a State statute of limitation unrelieved by the settled federal
equitable doctrine."
26
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in Aldrich followed Supreme Court
decisions and reaffirmed its own precedents in applying federal tolling rules
to state statutes of limitation. Nine years before Aldrich, the court held that
"it is a matter of federal law as to the circumstances that will toll a state
statute applied to private actions under the securities laws."
2 7
The federal equitable tolling doctrine has no effect on the ILSFDA stat-
ute of limitations.28 The court emphasized that equitable principles are
read into state and federal statutes of limitations only if no contrary intent
appears. 29 Unlike the federal securities statutes discussed in Aldrich,3° the
20. 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 342 (1874).
21. Id. at 347-48.
22. Id. at 349. See text accompanying notes 58-61 infra.
23. 247 U.S. 435 (1918).
24. Id. at 446, 449-50.
25. 327 U.S. 392 (1946).
26. Id. at 397. See Comment, Fraudulent Concealment as Tolling the Antitrust S atute of Limita-
tions, 36 FORDHAM L. REV. 328, 329-30 (1967). See also Glus v. Brooklyn E. Dist. Terminal, 359
U.S. 231 (1959), where the statute of limitations was tolled because the defendants fraudulently
represented it to be longer than it actually was.
27. DeHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d 1223, 1226 (10th Cir. 1970) (citing Esplin
v. Hirschi. 402 F.2d 94, 103 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. dented, 394 U.S. 928 (1969)). The limitations
period begins to run from the date the plaintiff has actual or constructive notice of the fraud.
Jones v. Ford Motor Co., 599 F.2d 394 (10th Cir. 1979); Dzenits v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fen-
ner & Smith, Inc., 494 F.2d 268 (10th Cir. 1974). See also Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 784
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965); Public Serv. Co. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 315 F.2d 306 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 809 (1963); 1 A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, supra note 17, at 42.
28. 627 F.2d at 1042; 15 U.S.C. § 1711 (1976) (amended 1979). A plaintiff alleging a
fraudulent land sale may sue both under the ILSFDA and under the securities laws; neither
cause of action precludes the other. 627 F.2d at 1039 n.2; Jenne v. Amrep Corp., [1978] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,343, at 93,166 (D.N.J. Feb. 14, 1978).
29. 627 F.2d at 1042 (citing Glus v. Brooklyn E. Dist. Terminal, 359 U.S. at 234 (equitable
estoppel applies to toll the Federal Employers' Liability Act statute of limitations where the
language of the Act does not preclude such an application); Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S.
at 395.
30. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976); 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.10b-5 (1981); Securities Act of 1933 § 17, 15 U.S.C. § 77(q) (1976).
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ILSFDA contains a three-year statute of limitations.3 1 The court found that
Congress intended this limitation period to be absolute and not susceptible
to extension under the federal equitable tolling doctrine, "notwithstanding
allegations of fraudulent concealment.
'32
Thus, according to the Aldrich court, congressional intent overrides the
general rule, embraced by the United States Supreme Court, that the equi-
table tolling doctrine is "read into every federal statute of limitation. ' '33 The
language of the ILSFDA statute of limitations indicates such a contrary con-
gressional intent, that is, an intent to render the limitations period absolute
notwithstanding extenuating circumstances. 34 At the time the lawsuit was
brought, the ILSFDA statute of limitations concluded with the statement
that "[i]n no event shall any such action be brought by a purchaser more
than three years after the sale or 'lease to such purchaser."'35 The court, fol-
lowing Illinois federal district court precedent, 36 ruled that this language
created "an absolute bar to untimely suits under the ILSFDA. ' '37 The
ILSFDA statute of limitations begins to run from the time the initial con-
tract is signed, not, as the plaintiffs suggested, from the time all installments
on the contract are paid.
3 8
The 4drich court inserted a note of caution: While the language of the
ILSFDA statute of limitations definitely precludes its extension through the
federal equitable tolling doctrine, other equitable doctrines are not fore-
closed. The ILSFDA statute of limitations may be tolled by the principle of
equitable estoppel when the wrongdoer persuades his victim not to sue until
it is too late.
39
31. 15 U.S.C. § 1711 (1976) (amended 1979). This statute was amended to provide a
three-year limitation period for all ILSFDA violations, instead of varying limitations with an
"in no event" provision attached. See text accompanying note 35 in7fa. See also H.R. REP. No.
154, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 38, repniedin [19791 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2317, 2354. In
light of this change, it is uncertain whether the Aldrich ruling still applies to post-1979 actions
under the ILSFDA.
32. 627 F.2d at 1043.
33. Id. at 1042 (citing Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. at 397).
34. 627 F.2d at 1042-43. The court pointed out that the interpretation of the ILSFDA
statute of limitations as absolute accords with an identical interpretation generally given to the
statute of limitations under § 13 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77 (1976), upon
which the ILSFDA is based. 627 F.2d at 1043. See, e.g., Brick v. Dominion Mtg. & Realty
Trust, 442 F. Supp. 283, 291 (W.D. N.Y. 1977). However, there are federal decisions sanction-
ing the tolling or extension of the ILSFDA statute of limitations. See, e.g., Lukenas v. Bryce's
Mountain Resort, Inc., 538 F.2d 594, 597 (4th Cir. 1976); Fuls v. Shastina Properties, Inc., 448
F. Supp. 983, 987-88 (N.D. Cal. 1978); Fogel v. Sellamerica, Ltd., 445 F. Supp. 1269, 1274 (S.D.
N.Y. 1978) (monthly payments on fraudulent land contract constitute fresh violations of the
ILSFDA, hence the two-year statute of limitations has not run, even though the purchase agree-
ment was signed two years before the plaintiffs sued on it); Happy Inv. Group v. Lakeworld
Properties, Inc., 396 F. Supp. 175, 188 (N.D. Cal. 1975). In Timmreck v. Munn, 433 F. Supp.
396, 408-09 (N.D. Il1. 1977), upon which the A/dnrh court relied, the court tolled the two-year
ILSFDA statute of limitations, even while it refused to toll the three-year "in no event" limita-
tions period. Se text accompanying note 35 infra.
35. 15 U.S.C. § 1711 (1976) (amended 1979).
36. 627 F.2d at 1043; Timmreck v. Munn, 433 F. Supp. at 408-09.
37. 627 F.2d at 1043.
38. Id. at 1043-44. But see Fogel v. Sellamerica, Ltd., 445 F. Supp. at 1274.
39. 627 F.2d at 1043 n.7. See Glus v. Brooklyn E. Dist. Terminal, 359 U.S. at 233-34;
Bomba v. W.L. Belvidere, Inc., 579 F.2d 1067 (7th Cir. 1978).
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In regard to the equitable tolling of limitations periods, the Aldrich opin-
ion left two questions unanswered. The first is whether a recent Supreme
Court case, Board of Regents v. Tomanzo,40 prohibits the application of the fed-
eral equitable tolling doctrine to state statutes of limitations in federal securi-
ties cases. In Tomanio, the Supreme Court held that in a civil rights action
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, federal courts must apply both state statutes of limi-
tations and state equitable tolling principles. 4 1 The.41dnch court declined to
decide this issue, since "the state and federal tolling rules here coincide."
'42
It also skirted the question of how to dispose of the issue of the plaintiff's
diligence. It is indisputable that equitable tolling principles do not rescue a
lax plaintiff who would have discovered the fraud in the exercise of reason-
able diligence.4 3 However, the Aldrich holding did not specify whether the
issue of due diligence could be disposed of in a motion for summary judg-
ment, or if it is an issue for determination by the finder of fact. 4 4 A subse-
quent Tenth Circuit case, Ohio v. Peterson,45 answered both questions.
On October 7, 1976, the State of Ohio (Ohio) brought a securities fraud
action against a lawyer, Lowry, and the law firm which had represented a
bankrupt enterprise, King Resources Company (KRC). The lawsuit was ini-
tiated six years after Ohio had purchased promissory notes from KRC. The
Federal District Court for the District of Colorado summarily dismissed the
action because the limitations period had expired.46 Ohio appealed from
the summary judgment, arguing that the limitations period should have
been stayed until January 5, 1976, when Lowry's involvement in the fraud
allegedly was discovered.
4 7
The court of appeals first addressed the question of whether Tomanio
undermines the Tenth Circuit rule "that in fraud cases only the limitations
period is borrowed from state law, whereas the tolling rule is supplied by
40. 446 U.S. 478 (1980).
41. Id. at 484-85.
42. 627 F.2d at 1041. In reaching this conclusion, the court compared the federal cases of
Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. at 397, Bailey v. Glover, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) at 347, and
deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d at 1225-26, with the Colorado cases of Wright of
Nelson, 125 Colo. 217, 226-27, 242 P.2d 243, 247-48 (1952), and Pipe v. Smith, 5 Colo. 146, 158
(1879) ("IT]he statute commenced to run upon the discovery of the facts constituting the
fraud.") The court also pointed to a Colorado statute of limitations, CoLO. REV. STAT. § 13-
80-109 (1973), which states, "[bills for relief on the ground of fraud shall be filed within' three
years after the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting such fraud, and not
afterwards."
43. See, e.g., Dzenits v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, & Smith, Inc., 494 F.2d at 171;
deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d at 1226; Greco v. Pullara, 166 Colo. 465, 467, 444
P.2d 383, 383 (1968); Pipe v. Smith, 5 Colo. at 159.
44. 627 F.2d at 1042. The court did state that "[tihe question of whether a plaintiff should
have discovered the basis of his suit under the doctrine of equitable tolling does not lend itself to
determination as a matter of law." Id. Yet, the court held the trial court's dismissal of the
securities claims on the pleadings "improper," id., only because facts were pled that complicated
the due diligence issue. Id. at 1041-42.
45. 651 F.2d 687 (10th Cir. 1981).
46. Id. at 689.
47. Id. at 690. Lowry had made certain revelations in a deposition. Ohio claimed that
despite its exercise of due diligence, it had no way of knowing about Lowry's complicity until
the deposition, since the court had imposed a stay of discovery during earlier litigation in the
same case. Id. at 690-91.
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federal jurisprudence."'48 This doctrine had been derived originally from the
United States Supreme Court case ofHolmberg v. Armbrecht.4 9 The Ohio court
decided that Tomamo applies only to actions under federal civil rights provi-
sions. 50 The court reasoned that allowing the Tomano holding to expand
beyond the borders of civil rights and invade the securities regulation terri-
tory would effectively overrule Holmberg, "a decision whose continuing vital-
ity is attested by the many cases relying upon it in § 10(b) private actions.
5 1
Having decided that federal equitable tolling rules do apply to toll Col-
orado's limitations period whenever justice so requires, the court next turned
to the problem of whether the question of the plaintiffs diligence may be
decided in a motion for summary judgment (as permitted by federal law),
52
or whether it must be submitted to the finder of fact (as Colorado law re-
quires). 53 The plaintiff argued that diligence in discovering the fraud is a
jury question, and that the trial court's summary judgment was therefore
invalid.54 The court disagreed, and ruled that in this matter, federal prece-
dent was preferable because the law of diligence should relate to securities
fraud alone, rather than to vigilant discovery of any given cause of action.
55
Federal judges within the Tenth Circuit therefore are empowered to
decide summarily whether a plaintiff who failed to discover the fraud within
the limitations period was sufficiently diligent so as to merit suspension of
the limitations period until the date the plaintiff actually discovered the
cause of action. 56 The Ohio court explained that the rationale of allowing
federal judges such discretion is steeped in English and Early American pre-
cedent: "[i]n equity the issue of diligence was decided by the chancellor
often on written petitions as opposed to live testimony-a procedure much
like our summary judgment . . .57
Even though the tolling doctrine is of equitable origin, many legisla-
tures, English and American, have codified it in order to apply it to statutes
of limitations in legal actions as well as to the laches principle in equity. 58
The equitable rule continues to exist, and has been applied in cases at law
where a statutory tolling rule does not exist. 59 Because of the equitable ori-
gins of the tolling doctrine, the court decided that "there remains some room
48. Id. at 691 (emphasis in original).
49. 327 U.S. 392 (1946). See text accompanying notes 25-26 supra.
50. 651 F.2d at 691.
51. Id.
52. For a discussion of the applicable federal law, see id. at 692-94.
53. Id. at 692. See Owens v. Brochner, 172 Colo. 525, 474 P.2d 603 (1970); Norton v.
Leadville Corp., 610 P.2d 1348 (Colo. App.), cert. dented, 449 U.S. 993 (1980).
54. 651 F.2d at 692.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 693-94. The court may have resolved a conflict within the Tenth Circuit on this
issue. Aldrich v. McCulloch Properties, Inc., 627 F.2d at 1042, and Dzenits v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner, & Smith, Inc., 494 F.2d at 172, could be cited in favor of jury resolution of the
diligence issue, while Jones v. Ford Motor Co., 599 F.2d 394, 399-400 (10th Cir. 1979) affirmed
the trial court's summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiff had had sufficient notice of
the fraud before the limitations period had run out.
57. 651 F.2d at 693. See FED. R. Civ. P. 56.
58. 651 F.2d at 693.
59. Id. Actions under the federal securities laws are a prime example of such an applica-
tion. The Ohio court quoted Bailey v. Glover, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) at 349: "[wle see no reason
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for discretion by the court on the issue of plaintiff's discovery and diligence
in cases under § 10(b) when the pleadings show that the action would be
time-barred but for the equitable doctrine. '60 Thus, the Ohio court held
that the question of whether to toll the statute of limitations in a securities
fraud action may be decided by the trial court pursuant to a motion for
summary judgment.
6 1
In dicta the court noted that summary disposition of the statute of limi-
tations question is desirable from a policy standpoint. The policy behind
statutes of limitations is one of repose,62 of preventing vexatious and pro-
tracted litigation, crowded dockets, delays resulting in ineffective evidence,
contingent liabilities, and absent witnesses. 63 Making the statute of limita-
tions defense a jury question "defeats the statute's purpose of preventing tri-
als of stale claims." 64 In actions under section 10(b), where multiple lawsuits
may result from the same transaction, the interest in avoiding outdated law-
suits is especially strong.
65
The court next turned to the level of proof needed to support summary
judgment based on a statute of limitations, and decided that summary dispo-
sition is appropriate where the defendant shows that the plaintiff would have
discovered the fraud before the statute of limitations expired if reasonable
diligence had been exercised. 66 This diligence is required regardless of
whether the defendant actively attempted to cover up his wrongdoing. The
court rejected the defendant's view that attempts to prevent discovery of the
fraud tolls the statute of limitations "until actual discovery regardless of dili-
gence." 6 7 If the evidence before the court is insufficient to demonstrate the
plaintiff's lack of diligence, the statute of limitations issue becomes a jury
question to be decided by a preponderance of the evidence.68
The court cautioned that it would uphold the trial court's exercise of
discretion only in cases involving material misstatements about publicly
traded securities. 69 Trial courts may have less discretion in summarily rul-
ing on statute of limitations questions in private fraud actions under section
10(b).
70
The trial court's summary judgment was sustained on several grounds.
why the principle [of equitable tolling] should not be as applicable to suits tried on the com-
mon-law side of the court's calendar as to those on the equity side."
60. 651 F.2d at 693.
61. Id. at 693-94. The court, citing Aldrich v. McCulloch Properties, Inc., 627 F.2d at
1042, acknowledged that "the question of whether a plaintiff should have discovered the basis of
his suit under the doctrine of equitable tolling does not lend itself to determination as a matter
of law." 651 F.2d at 693 n.13. Nevertheless, the court added that this issue is properly subjected
to the discretion of the trial judge, because of the equitable origins of tolling. Id.
62. 651 F.2d at 694.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. Thus, the court ruled that in the Tenth Circuit, "there is but one federal doctrine
of equitable tolling, as set forth in Holmberg v. Armbrecht." Id. at 694-95.
67. Id. at 694.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 694 n. 15.
70. Id. Adriih and Dzerits were private fraud actions under § 10(b), and in both cases the
Tenth Circuit was pessimistic about a trial judge's ability to determine adequately the question
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Pleadings in previous lawsuits on the same facts and involving the same de-
fendant had revealed information about Lowry's role in the fraud. The
plaintiff, if diligent, would have obtained the pleadings and the information
contained in them long before the statute of limitations precluded the law-
suit. 7' Mere allegations are sufficient to set the limitations period running;
such allegations need not be "supported by hard evidence."' 72 Thus the
plaintiff had three years7 3 after actual or constructive discovery of the fraud
in which to obtain evidence sufficient to support a lawsuit. The plaintiff also
could have obtained more time for investigation by filing a timely lawsuit,
thereby taking advantage of extensions granted for pre-trial discovery.
74
Additionally, Ohio's knowledge that Lowry signed a fraudulent letter of cer-
tification, structured the allegedly unsavory transaction, and prepared the
relevant documents provided further justification for the trial court's en-
forcement of the limitations period.
75
II. ARE SUBDIVIDED REAL ESTATE LOTS SECURITIES?
In Aldrich v. McCullocA Properties, Inc. ,76 the plaintiffs' amended com-
plaint alleged that they had purchased real estate lots for investment pur-
poses, after having been enticed by the defendants' promises of appreciations
in property value stemming from construction activities on the lots. 77 The
lots, therefore, were securities for purposes of the federal securities laws, ac-
cording to the plaintiffs.78
The trial court dismissed the allegations because the necessary elements
of a security were not averred in the complaint. 79 The court of appeals re-
manded the case to the trial court without deciding whether the lots consti-
tuted securities, holding only that the plaintiffs' allegations were "sufficient
to preclude determination of this issue on a Rule 12(b) motion." a
The plaintiffs had asserted that the lots, together with the defendants'
promises to develop them, were "investment contracts" and therefore securi-
ties under section 2(1) of the Securities Act of 193381 and section 3(a)(10) of
of diligence. Aldrich v. McCulloch Properties, Inc., 627 F.2d at 1042; Dzenits v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner, & Smith, Inc., 494 F.2d at 172.
71. 651 F.2d at 695.
72. Id.
73. CoLO. REv. STAT. §§ 13-80-108, -109 (1973).
74. 651 F.2d at 695.
75. Id.
76. 627 F.2d 1036 (10th Cir. 1980). The plaintiffs sued under the federal securities laws, as
well as under the ILSFDA. A lawsuit under the ILSFDA does not preclude analogous claims
under the federal securities laws. Id. at 1039 n.2; Jenne v. Amrep Corp., [1978] FED. SEc. L.
REP. (CCH) $ 96,343 at 93,166 (D. N.J. Feb. 14, 1978). See Securities Act Release No. 5347,
[1972-73] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 1 79,163 at 82,536 (Jan. 4, 1973): "[t]he offer of real estate
as such, without any collateral arrangements with the seller or others, does not involve the offer
of a security. When the real estate is offered in conjunction with certain services, a security, in
the form of an investment contract, may be present."
77. 627 F.2d at 1039.
78. Id. at 1038.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. 15 U.S.C. § 77(b)(1) (1976).
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the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.82 The court stated that this was a fac-
tual question-from the plaintiffs' allegations one could infer either an in-
vestment in a common enterprise, which is a security, or merely an ordinary
real estate purchase.8 3 Thus, the court set out guidelines for the trial court's
use in determining whether the sale of a security actually had occurred.
8 4
The court first applied the test formulated in SEC v. W.J. Howey, Inc. ,85
to determine whether the transaction in Aldrich constituted an investment
contract. Howey defines an investment contract as a "contract, transaction,
or scheme whereby a person invests his money in a common enterprise and is
led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third
party." 86 The plaintiffs' allegations may have satisfied the Howey require-
ments: the plaintiffs claimed the defendants promised to develop the subdi-
vided lots, provide amenities, and establish a trust "to construct and operate
facilities for their common benefit."8 7 It did not matter that the plaintiffs
expected no profits until the property was resold. A transaction may involve
an investment contract, and therefore a security, as long as there is an intent
to invest and the profits arise from capital appreciation resulting from devel-
opment of the initial investment. 88 The court cautioned that while "capital
appreciation" resulting from planned development characterizes a security,
ordinary appreciation in property values resulting from random neighbor-
hood growth and improvements does not.8 9
Furthermore, the lots could have constituted a security even if they were
subdivided, that is, sold in individual parcels rather than in undivided shares
similar to shares of stock: "[a] common enterprise does not require the sale
of undivided interests or an entirely separable and express management con-
tract." 9 Since it was necessary to analyze the underlying transaction care-
fully to determine whether the characteristics of an investment contract were
present, the Aldrich court remanded the case to the trial court for this very
purpose: "[wihile. . . it could be inferred that what plaintiffs purchased was
not an investment in a common enterprise but merely individual parcels of
real estate, resolution of these conflicting inferences was inappropriate with-
out greater factual exploration." 91
The court next turned to the test expounded in SEC v. C M. Joiner Leas-
82. Id. § 78c(a)(l0).
83. 627 F.2d at 1039-40.
84. Id.
85. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
86. Id. at 298-99.
87. 627 F.2d at 1039.
88. Id. (citing United Housing Found'n, Inc., v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852 (1975)). See
also Timmreck v. Munn, 433 F. Supp. at 401.
89. 627 F.2d at 1039 n.I.
90. Id. at 1039. The court was referring to the holding of SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing
Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943), in which the United States Supreme Court held that the sale of oil
lease assignments, where the lessees were to drill for oil on individually owned parcels of prop-
erty, involved "a form of investment contract in which the purchaser was paying both for a
lease and for a development project." 320 U.S. at 349.
91. 627 F.2d at 1039. As of this writing, the action was pending in the federal district
court.
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tg Corp. ,92 which emphasizes the promotional aspect of the securities sale.
This test characterizes a transaction on the basis of what the seller promised:
"[t]he test. . . is what character the instrument is given in commerce by the
terms of the offer, the plan of distribution, and the economic inducements
held out to the prospect."'93 Again, this entailed a remand to the trial court
to determine exactly what representations the sellers made.
94
Other criteria set forth in Aldrich included the question of whether the
plaintiffs purchased the lots primarily for residential purposes or for personal
use and enjoyment, without expectation of profit. 95 If so, the lots were not
securities.9 The court also indicated that the trial court should examine
whether the developers were obligated to provide significant development
services, to the extent that the "burden of management and develooment
• . . rest[s] on the developers."'9 7 Thus, minimal managerial functions alone
do not turn a real estate deal into a security. Under Howey, as modified by
SECy. Glenn W. Turner Enlerprses, Inc. ,98 a transaction constitutes a security if
the profits are produced essentially through the efforts of someone other than
the investor.99
III. STANDARDS AND BURDENS OF PROOF IN INVESTMENT
COMPANY VIOLATIONS
In Decker v. SEC, 100 the court decided that the standard of proof needed
to establish violations of the Investment Company Act of 1940 (ICA) 10 '
should be the least restrictive one-preponderance of the evidence--even
though the petitioners argued in favor of a more stringent standard. The
court gave primary consideration to the overall statutory intent to protect
investors, concluding that a liberal standard of proof fulfills this statutory
intent.
The petitioner, Decker, appealed from a Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (Commission) order censuring him for aiding and abetting a viola-
tion of the conflict of interest provisions of the ICA. 02 The alleged conflict
of interest involved the relationships between an investment advisory firm,
the Forum Corporation (Forum) and its subsidiary Forum Investment Coun-
92. 320 U.S. 344 (1943).
93. Id. at 352-53.
94. 627 F.2d at 1040. See note 91 supra. The court distinguished Woodward v. Terracor,
574 F.2d 1023 (10th Cir. 1978), in which summary judgment was affirmed on the ground that,
considering the pleadings, the court "failled] to see any common venture or common enterprise
between the plaintiffs and Terracor." 574 F.2d at 1025. See McCown v. Heidler, 527 F.2d 204
(10th Cir. 1975), where the court allowed the plaintiffs to amend their pleadings, since they had
raised factual questions that precluded summary judgment, although they had not alleged fed-
eral securities violations.
95. 627 F.2d at 1040.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir.), cert. dented, 414 U.S. 821 (1973).
99. 627 F.2d at 1040 n.3. Seealso SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary Inc., 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir.
1974).
100. 631 F.2d 1380 (10th Cir. 1980).
101. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 (1976).
102. 631 F.2d at 1382. The provision allegedly violated was 15 U.S.C. §80a-17(e)(1)
(1976).
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selors, Inc. (FIC), and a brokerage firm, Jesup & Lamont, Inc. (J & L) and its
subsidiary Jesup & Lamont International Limited U & L International). J &
L International allegedly made illegal payments to FIC to induce Forum to
use J & L to handle the affairs of Forum's clients. Pursuant to a contract,
FIC was to provide investment and research services to J & L International
in exchange for $25,000 per year. The Commission sued, claiming the pay-
ments were actually intended to be, at least in part, compensation to Forum
for increasing its volume of business with J & L. 10 3 The Commission alleged
this was a violation of section 17(e)(1) of the ICA.
10 4
Section 17 of the ICA generally prohibits transactions creating conflicts
of interests in the relationships between investment companies and their in-
vestment advisors, principal underwriters, and other affiliates, without the
Commission's advance approval.' 0 5 Section 17(e)(1) in particular limits the
compensation, regardless of its source, that affiliated agents of registered in-
vestment companies may receive for purchasing or selling property to or on
behalf of the registered investment company.' 0 6 The Commission alleged
that Forum's brokerage business was illegally allocated to its affiliate, J & L,
as a consequence of the agreement between the two firms' subsidiaries.
The case was tried before an administrative law judge (ALJ). The ALJ
applied a "clear and convincing" standard of proof, and concluded that the
Commission's Enforcement Division failed to establish a nexus between the
compensation J & L International paid to FIC and the brokerage business
Forum allocated to J & L. The ALJ also decided the Enforcement Division
had not proven that the services performed by FIC for J & L International
were worth less than the $25,000 paid annually from J & L International to
FIC.10 7 The ALJ's decision was appealed to the Commission, which re-
versed and found that Decker willfully aided and abetted a section 17(e)(1)
violation.10 8 The Commission did not discuss the standard of proof it used
in its determinations. Pursuant to section 203(e)(5) of the Investment Advi-
sors Act,' 0 9 the Commission censured Decker for his role in the violation.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the Commission's decision on the ground
that the "preponderance of the evidence" standard of proof is the correct
standard to use in establishing ICA violations. Decker had argued that the
intermediate "clear and convincing" standard was proper because the Com-
103. 631 F.2d at 1382.
104. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(e)(I) (1976).
105. See Rosenblat & Lybecker, Some Thoughts on the Federal Securities Laws Regulating External
Investment Management Arrangements and the ALI Federal Securities Code Project, 124 U. PA. L. REV.
587, 598 (1976).
106. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(e)(1) (1976) provides:
(e) It shall be unlawful for any affiliated person of a registered investment company,
or any affiliated person of such person-
(1) acting as agent, to accept from any source any compensation (other than a
regular salary or wages from such registered company) for the purchase or sale of
any property to or for such registered company or any controlled company
thereof, except in the course of such person's business as an underwriter or
broker ...
107. 631 F.2d at 1383.
108. Id.
109. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(e)(5) (1976).
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mission alleged fraud, which carries potentially severe sanctions.' 10 The
United States Supreme Court had approved the clear and convincing stan-
dard for use in civil cases "involving allegations of fraud or some other quasi-
criminal wrongdoing by the defendant,"' where the interests at stake are
more than merely pecuniary ones and may be reputational, or may involve
individual liberties." 2 The Court established a balancing test to determine
which standard of proof to use in such cases: The individual's interests are
weighed against the interests of society in deciding how to allocate the risk of
error.1 13 In Decker, the court of appeals applied this balancing test and de-
cided in favor of the "preponderance of the evidence" standard. Since the
primary purpose of the ICA is to protect investors, such a purpose takes
priority over the possibility of unjust injury to the defendants involved in the
litigation." 4 Therefore the court found, in balancing individual interests
against those of the public, that "primary consideration must be given to the
statutory intent to protect investors,"' ' 5 and endorsed the use of the "pre-
ponderance of the evidence" standard in cases involving violations of section
17 (e)(1) of the ICA.
The Decker court next stated that because section 17(e)(1) prohibits the
receipt of compensation for the purchase or sale of property to or for an
investment company, a nexus must be established between the compensation
received and the property bought or sold, in order to prove a section 17(e)(1)
violation. The compensation must have been received for the transaction in
question, although intent to influence need not be shown.' 1 6 It is not suffi-
cient merely to show that a conflict of interest existed with respect to the
allocation of brokerage business." 7 The court agreed with Decker that to
interpret section 17(e)(l) to prohibit per se conflicts of interest without re-
quiring a showing of the actual purpose of the compensation received is "too
expansive."' 
1 8
Thus, the court continued, when a conflict of interest is demonstrated,
for example, when the Commission shows that compensation was received in
exchange for the purchase or sale of investment company property, a pre-
sumption of a section 17(e)(l) violation arises. The burden then shifts to the
defendant to show that the compensation creating the conflict of interest was
not in violation of section 17(e)(l). In Decker's case, the compensation re-
ceived in exchange for increased brokerage business presented a presumption
of a violation." 9 The court, in affirming the Commission's ruling and clari-
fying the law, carefully summarized the procedure for proving a section
110. 631 F.2d at 1383-84. Such sanctions include censure, placing of limitations on, or sus-
pension or revocation of, an investment advisor's registration. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(e)(5) (1976).
111. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 424 (1979).
112. E.g. ,,Addinglon applied the clear and convincing standard to a proceeding to commit an
individual to a state mental hospital indefinitely. Id at 419-20.
113. Id. at 425.
114. 631 F.2d at 1384.
115. Id. (quoting Associated Sec. Corp. v. SEC, 283 F.2d 773, 775 (10th Cir. 1960)).
116. 631 F.2d at 1384-85.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1384.
119. Id. at 1385. See Investors Research Corp. v. SEC, 628 F.2d 168, 175 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
dened, 449 U.S. 919 (1980).
[Vol. 59:2
SECURITIES
17(e)(l) violation. First, the Enforcement Division must prove each element
of the violation by a preponderance of the evidence. When the Enforcement
Division presents prima facie evidence of a conflict of interest (in the alloca-
tion of brokerage business, in this case), the burden shifts to the defendant to
show that no compensation was received illegally for the sale or purchase of
investment company property. If the defendant produces such evidence, the
presumption vanishes, and the Commission must "consider all relevant evi-
dence and determine whether the Enforcement Division established its case
by a preponderance of the evidence."'
20
In light of the command to consider all relevant evidence, the court
remanded the case to the Commission for reconsideration of evidence that
the Commission had disregarded. The testimony of Decker's expert wit-
nesses, who testified that the fair market value of the services performed by
FIC for J & L International equalled the sum actually paid, was disregarded
on the ground of subjectivity.' 2' Even though the court expressed doubt
that the transactions would be rendered valid if the services were actually
worth the compensation paid,' 22 it nevertheless remanded the case to the
trial court, stating that no rule of law was known that would permit a court
or agency to discount valuation evidence properly received in the record.'
23
IV. STATE OF MIND AND THE IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS
One who violates a provision of the ICA may have sanctions levied
against him only if the Commission finds that he acted willfully.' 24 To levy
sanctions against aiders and abettors such as the petitioner in Decker, how-
ever, requires a higher standard. Because aiding and abetting liability is a
still unpolished facet of the securities regulation scheme,125 the Commission
and court turned to a recent District of Columbia Circuit case, Investors Re-
search Corp. v. SEC,126 for guidance.
In Investors Research Corp., the court first concluded that a violation of
section 17(e)(1) does not require an awareness of wrongdoing. ' 2 7 The Decker
court agreed, on the basis that section 17(e)(1) contains no language requir-
120. 631 F.2d at 1385 n.7.
121. Id. at 1385-86. No objective evidence of market value existed since FIC did not sell the
services in question to anyone but J & L International. Thus, there were no other arm's length
transactions with which one could compare FIC's dealings with J & L International. Id.
122. Id. at 1385 n.8.
123. Id. at 1386.
124. Id. The Decker court quoted Tager v. SEC, 344 F. 2d 5, 8 (2d Cir. 1965): " 'willfully' in
this context means intentionally committing the act which constitutes the violation. There is no
requirement that the actor also be aware that he is violating one of the Rules or Acts."
125. 631 F.2d at 1387.
126. 628 F.2d 168 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 919 (1980).
127. As the Decker court pointed out, 631 F.2d at 1387 n.13, "awareness of wrongdoing" is
not the same as "scienter." "Scienter" is defined in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 193
n. 12, as a "mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud." The mental state
referred to in Investors Research Corp. and in Decker is merely a general awareness that one is
involved in an improper activity; intent to deceive is not necessary. Decker v. SEC, 631 F.2d at
1386-87; Investors Research Corp. v. SEC, 628 F.2d at 178. For a discussion of scienter in the
Tenth Circuit, see Securities, Seventh Annual Tenth Circuit Surve, 58 DEN. L.J. 489 (1981); Note,
Aaron v. SEC- The Seienter Requirement in SEC Injunctive Actions, Seventh Annual Tenth Circuit Survq,
58 DEN. LJ. 493 (1981).
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ing awareness of wrongdoing for primary liability. The United States
Supreme Court has maintained that statutory language principally deter-
mines whether a particular state of mind is a required element of a securities
violation. 128 Since no state of mind requirement is evident from the lan-
guage of section 17(e)(1), a primary violator may be punished even if he was
not aware he was committing a wrongful act.
Both the Investors Research Corp. court and the Decker court agreed, how-
ever, that aiders and abettors of section 17(e)(1) violations constitute a differ-
ent class. In order to punish aiders and abettors, the requisite state of mind,
which is "an awareness of wrongdoing," 129 must be proven, "to insure that
innocent, incidental participants in transactions later found to be illegal are
not subjected to harsh, [sic] civil, criminal, or administrative penalties.
1 30
The Decker court remanded the case to the Commission on this issue as
well, to determine whether Decker possessed an awareness of wrongdoing
sufficient to sustain the commission's censure1 3 1 for aiding and abetting an
ICA violation. 13
2
V. RULE 10B-5 AND LITIGATION-FINANCING SECURITIES
The United States Supreme Court in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores 133 adopted the Birnbaum 134 rule, which limits the class of plaintiffs in
private rule lOb-5 actions to actual purchasers or sellers of securities.
135
Nevertheless, a recent Tenth Circuit case, Westinghouse Credit Corp. v. Bader &
Duft>,136 raised the question of whether a defendant in a lawsuit may sue for
injunctive relief under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934'13 and rule lOb-5,13 8 to prevent the plaintiff and the plaintiff's legal
counsel from illegally issuing securities to finance the lawsuit against the de-
fendant. The securities allegedly consisted of agreements to share the fruits
of the litigation. 39
Westinghouse Credit Corporation, the original defendant, acknowl-
edged that the Blue Chip Stamps holding precluded those who did not
purchase or sell securities from suing under rule lOb-5. ' 40 Westinghouse also
acknowledged that it did not purchase or sell the securities offered by Wood-
moor Corporation, the original plaintiff.' 4 ' Westinghouse argued, however,
that it had standing to sue on the ground that the Blue Chip Stamps holding is
128. Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 695-96 (1980); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at
197.
129. See note 127 supra.
130. 631 F.2d at 1388 (quoting Investors Research Corp. v. SEC, 628 F.2d at 177).
131. Pursuant to § 203(e)(5) of the Investment Advisers Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(e)(5) (1976).
132. 631 F.2d at 1388-89.
133. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
134. Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. dented, 343 U.S. 956
(1952).
135. 421 U.S. at 736, 749.
136. 627 F.2d 221 (10th Cir. 1980).
137. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976).
138. 17 C.F.R. § 240.I0b-5 (1981).
139. 627 F.2d at 222.
140. Id at 223.
141. Id.
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inapplicable to actions where the only relief sought is injunctive. A previous
Tenth Circuit case, Vincent v. Moench, 142 was offered for the proposition that
whenever equitable relief under rule lOb-5 is sought, "any person showing a
'causal connection' between the fraudulent sale of a security and an injury to
himself may invoke federal jurisdiction."'
' 43
The Westinghouse court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of Westing-
house's suit. The issue of Westinghouse's standing to sue was resolved pursu-
ant to the Vincent rule rather than the more restrictive Blue Chip Stamps rule:
"[w]e do not feel compelled to here decide whether the rule of Blue Chip
Stamps applies to a private action under Rule lOb-5 which is purely injunc-
tive in nature, since in our view Westinghouse does not have standing even
under the rule of Vincent."'
144
The court pointed out that the "causal connection" rule of Vincent re-
quires a direct association between the fraudulent sale and the plaintiffs
injury.145 Mere allegations of "a scheme to defraud, a deceptive purchase of
a security, and an injury to the plaintiffs"' 46 are not sufficient to invoke
federal jurisdiction; the injury must ensue directly from the fraudulent sale
of a security. According to the court, the Vincent rule, applied to the facts of
Westinghouse, revealed at best an indirect connection between the sale of
profit-sharing agreements and the maintenance of litigation against West-
inghouse 147 (even though Westinghouse alleged that without the sale of the
profit-sharing agreements, Woodmoor would be unable to finance or to pur-
sue its lawsuit against Westinghouse).1 48 Furthermore, the court expressed
doubt that the securities statutes contemplated litigation as an injury worthy
of standing to sue. 1
49
Westinghouse also claimed standing on the ground that Woodmoor's
failure to register its securities and to report to the Commission, as required
by law, 150 deprived Westinghouse of information it could use to defend the
lawsuit.' 5  The court dismissed this assertion on the basis that the registra-
tion and reporting requirements of the securities laws were not designed to
facilitate discovery in securities litigation; rather, they were enacted to help
the investing public make informed investment decisions.' 5 2 Hence, West-
inghouse did not have standing to challenge Woodmoor's failure to register
and report to the Commission.
Westinghouse is a narrow holding and thus leaves many questions unan-
swered. First, and most obvious, is whether the Blue Chip Stamps holding
142. 473 F.2d 430 (10th Cir. 1973).
143. 627 F.2d at 223 (citing Vincent v. Moench, 473 F.2d at 435).
144. 627 F.2d at 223.
145. Id. (citing Vincent v. Moench, 473 F.2d at 435).
146. 627 F.2d at 223.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 222.
149. Id. at 224.
150. Securities Act of 1933 § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77(e) (1976); Securities Exchange Act of 1934
§ 13, 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1976).
151. 627 F.2d at 224.
152. Id. (citing SEC v. Continental Tobacco Co., 463 F.2d 137, 154 (5th Cir. 1972); Greater
Iowa Corp. v. McLendon, 378 F.2d 783, 790 (8th Cir. 1967)).
1982]
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denies standing to non-purchasers or non-sellers who seek only injunctive
relief under rule lOb-5. But a larger question looms: whether Westinghouse
has demonstrated the need for new remedies for third parties who indirectly
are affected by fraudulent securities transactions in which they have not
partaken.
Susan R. Hams
TAXATION
OVERVIEW
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals considered several cases in the area
of federal taxation during the period covered by this survey. This article will
review the significant changes and additions in the law of federal taxation
resulting from the court's published decisions.
I. CONSTRUCTIVE DIVIDENDS
In Williams v. Commt'siner,' the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals consid-
ered whether cash withdrawals from closely held corporations are taxable
dividends or bona fide loans. In the Williams case, the taxpayers appealed
from a tax court decision which upheld the Commissioner's determination of
deficiencies for the tax years 1964-69.2 The court of appeals relied upon an
earlier Tenth Circuit decision, Dolese v. United Stales,3 in upholding the tax
court.
The taxpayers owned most of the stock and were the controlling officers
in three Oklahoma Corporations. 4 Although they received salaries, they
withdrew additional funds from 1964 until 1969.5 The three corporations
had significant earned surplus for the years 1964-69, yet neither declared nor
paid any dividends during that period.6 Throughout that time the corpora-
tions' accountant advised the taxpayers to make notes to the companies for
the withdrawals. 7 In 1967, some notes were drawn by the taxpayers. The
notes, however, were not made for the full amount due, nor did any of the
notes contain a payment schedule or interest rate.8 Apparently no payments
were ever made on these notes.
In August 1969, after the taxpayers became aware that their tax returns
for 1964-68 were being audited, they executed notes for the entire amount of
the withdrawals.9 The notes bore interest and a payment schedule that cor-
responded with a note the taxpayers had received earlier.10
The taxpayers' three corporations were acquired in October 1969 by
Smith International, Inc. in a stock exchange in which the taxpayers re-
ceived 90,000 shares of Smith stock." The taxpayers then assigned a sepa-
l. 627 F.2d 1032 (10th Cir. 1980).
2. TAx Cr. MEM. DEc. (P-H) $ 78,306.
3. 605 F.2d 1146 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. dented, 445 U.S. 961 (1980). For a brief note on the
Doltse case, see Taxation, Seventh Annual Tenth Circuit Surve, 58 DEN. L.J. 523 (1981).
4. 627 F.2d at 1032-33.
5. Id. at 1033.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 1033-34.
10. Id. One of the taxpayers had sold some Canadian property on April 16, 1969, for
which he received cash and a note secured by a second mortgage and seven sales contracts. Id.
at 1033.
11. Id. at 1034.
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
rate note to the three corporations to fulfill their note obligation to the
corporations.1 2 Eighteen months later, the assigned note was returned to the
taxpayers in exchange for their Smith stock.13
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals stated that the question of whether
taxpayers' withdrawals are loans or constructive dividends is normally one of
fact. Since the evidence in this case was undisputed, however, such a deter-
mination was a question of law.1
4
The taxpayers argued that their intent to repay the notes indicated that
the payments were nontaxable loans and not taxable constructive divi-
dends.1 5 The court of appeals disagreed, stating that subjective intent is not
enough to prove that payments are loans. 16 The court found that four fac-
tors combined to outweigh the taxpayers' subjective intent to repay which
rendered the payments constructive dividends. First, no repayment on the
withdrawals was made until the taxpayers knew of the audit even though
they had the means to repay earlier. Additionally, the withdrawals were
made over a long period of time; the companies were controlled by the tax-
payers; and a large earned surplus had accumulated.7 In further support of
its decision, the court of appeals noted that it must give "primary weight" to
the trier of fact who had found that the taxpayers did not intend to repay. ' 8
The taxpayers also argued that equitable estoppel should apply because
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) had settled on a disputed 1970 tax re-
turn.t 9 The court noted that equitable estoppel does not apply to prior tax
returns and thus does not extend to subsequent returns or settlements.
20
II. SALE OF STOCK
2 1
The Tenth Circuit, in Sprague v. United States, 22 considered the proper
use of the "installment sales" method of reporting income fron the sale of
stock. The action was originally brought in the district court for a refund of
federal income taxes.23 The district court found that the taxpayer did not
12. Id. Payment was in full except for a later satisfied obligation. Id. The separate note
assigned to the three corporations was the note received by one of the taxpayers for Canadian
property he had sold. See note 10 supra.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. (citing Alterman Foods, Inc. v. United States, 505 F.2d 873, 877 (5th Cir. 1974); Fin
Hay Realty Co. v. United States, 398 F.2d 694, 697 (3d Cir. 1968)).
17. 627 F.2d at 1034-35.
18. Id. (citing Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 289 (1960)). See also Tollefson v.
Commissioner, 431 F.2d 511, 513 (2d Cir. 1970).
19. Id.
20. Id. (citing Automobile Club v. Commissioner, 353 U.S. 180, 183 (1957); Union Equity
Coop. Exch. v. Commissioner, 481 F.2d 812, 817 (10th Cir.), cert. dented, 414 U.S. 1028 (1973);
Wiles v. United States, 312 F.2d 574, 577 (10th Cir. 1962)).
21. Another case decided by the court in this area is Monarch Cement Co. v. United
States, 634 F.2d 484 (10th Cir. 1980). There the court affirmed the district court's valuation of
stock warrants. A full discussion of the case is not included in this survey because the Tenth
Circuit was not required to determine the value of the warrants, but merely considered whether
the district court had committed clear error. Id. at 486.
22. 627 F.2d 1044 (10th Cir. 1980).
23. Sprague v. United States, 78-2 T.C. 9650 (W.D. Okla. Aug. 2, 1972).
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qualify for the installment sales method of reporting a stock sale and thus
was not entitled to a refund. 24 The court of appeals reversed, holding that
the taxpayer was entitled to report under the installment sales method.
25
The stock in question was owned by a partnership to which the tax-
payer had belonged and was held primarily by banks as collateral for loans
to the partnership. The partnership arranged to sell the stock to Transairco,
Inc. on a deferred payment plan. The partnership received a down payment
of cash and debt assumption which amounted to 29.3% of the total sales
price. The balance due consisted of notes payable to the partnership.
26
To release the stock used as security for the partnership's loans, the part-
nership assigned the notes made by Transairco to the banks holding the
partnership's loans. The partnership was still primarily liable on the loans,
but in the event of default the banks were to look to Transairco to pay the
notes. If Transairco defaulted on its notes., the banks were to look to the
security on the notes.
2 7
Following the stock sale, the partnership became substantially dormant
and payments on the bank loans were usually made by drawing on the let-
ters of credit supplied as security by Transairco. On the basis of the above
transactions, the taxpayer reported the stock sale to Transairco under the
installment sales method, 28 and claimed a loss carryback to 1967 resulting in
a claimed refund of $905.53.29
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals designated the issues as whether
1) the partnership constructively received year-of-sale payments or 2) real-
ized year-of-sale debt relief, in either case receiving more than thirty percent
of the selling price in the year of sale. Either situation would disqualify the
taxpayer from reporting under the installment sales method.
30
24. 627 F.2d at 1046.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. Initially the security was certificates of deposit but after the stock sale letters of
credit were used.
28. Id. The installment sales provision in effect at the time of decision provided:
Installment Method.
(a) Dealers in personal property.
(1) In general.-Under regulations prescribed by the Secretary, a person who
regularly sells or otherwise disposes of personal property on the installment plan
may return as income therefrom in any taxable year that proportion of the instal-
ment payments actually received in that year which the gross profit, realized or
to be realized when payment is completed, bears to the total contract price.
(b) Sales of realty and casual sales of personalty.
(1) General rule.-Income from- ..
(B) a casual sale or other casual disposition of personal property .. for a
price exceeding 51,000, may (under regulations prescribed by the Secretary)
be returned on the basis and in the manner prescribed in subsection (a).
(2) Limitation.-Paragraph (1) shall apply only if in the taxable year of the
sale or other disposition-
(A) there are no payments, or
(B) the payments (exclusive of evidences of indebtedness of the purchaser)
do not exceed 30 percent of the selling price.
I.R.C. § 453 (subsequently amended by Act of Oct. 19, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-471, § 2a, 94 Stat.
2247).
29. 627 F.2d at 1047.
30. Id.
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A. Constructive Receipt
The Government relied on three different theories in contending that
the partnership had constructively received payment. First the Government
asserted that since the underlying security made the notes certain of collec-
tion the security was as good as cash, and the taxpayer should be treated as
having received cash. The court noted that secured and unsecured notes are
treated the same under the installment sales method. 3' Thus, "certainty of
collection" on a note or security has no bearing on the constructive receipt of
any cash value.
32
The Government next theorized that the partnership actually received
the value of the security in the year of sale because the security could be
readily converted into cash.33 The court found no merit in this argument
because the right to convert the security into cash would have arisen under
the security agreement only when Transairco defaulted on the notes, which
were not due until after the year of receipt.
34
Finally, the Government argued "substance over form"--that the notes
as security were in reality payments constructively received. 35 The critical
inquiry under this argument is whether the purchaser is effectively relieved
of his debt obligations. 36 The court stated that the partnership was not actu-
ally relieved of its debt; indeed, Transairco was unable to pay the full cash
price of the stock at the time of the sale. There had been no substitution of a
third party as an obligor,37 and therefore, the Government's "substance over
form" theory failed.
B. Debt Relief
The Government further alleged that in the year of sale the partnership
had received debt relief which, when included with the other payments
31. 627 F.2d at 1047-48 (citing R. L. Brown Coal & Coke Co. v. Commissioner, 14 B.T.A.
609 (1928)).
32. 627 F.2d at 1048. The court noted that the Government's "certainty of collection"
theory would penalize those who were most careful in guarding against default by requiring
good security on the debt owed them. Id.
33. The court said that this was closer to the actual concept of constructive receipt as
defined at Treas. Reg. § 1.451.2(a) T.D. 6723, 1964-1 (Part I) C.B. 73:
Constructive Receipt of Income.
(a) GeneralRuk. Income although not actually reduced to a taxpayer's possession is
constructively received by him in the taxable year during which it is credited to
his account, set apart for him, or otherwise made available so that he may draw
upon it at any time, or so that he could have drawn upon it during the taxable
year if notice of intention to withdraw had been given. However, income is not
constructively received if the taxpayer's control of its receipt is subject to substan-
tial limitations or restrictions.
627 F.2d at 1048.
34. 627 F.2d at 1048.
35. Id at 1049. See, e.g., Oden v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 569 (1971); Pozzi v. Commis-
sioner, 49 T.C. 119 (1967).
36. 627 F.2d at 1049.
37. Id. at 1050. Substitution of a third party as obligor would occur if the purchaser would
put the total sale price in an escrow account directed to be paid to the seller at certain intervals.
See, e.g., Trivett v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 675 (1977), afd, 611 F.2d 655 (6th Cir.
1979); Oden v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 569 (1971); Pozzi v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 119 (1967).
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made to the partnership, exceeded thirty percent of the selling price.38 The
Government contended that Transairco had assumed the partnership's debts
because the partnership had assigned the Transairco notes as substitute col-
lateral for its loans. The court of appeals found that the notes were "only
'further security' " and that the partnership was still primarily liable.
39
The Government also asserted that the substitution of collateral was
actually a "sham" arrangement to substitute Transairco as the debtor in
place of the partnership. 4° The fatal flaw in that argument, according to the
court, was that the substitution of collateral took place after the actual sale
transaction. Nothing at the time of sale suggested anything other than an
installment sale transaction. 4 1 Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals held that the taxpayer was entitled to report the sale on an installment
sale basis.
42
III. FEDERAL TAX LIENS
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals had an opportunity this past year
to review the law regarding attachment of federal tax liens and government
foreclosures on such liens. The issue whether a federal tax lien may attach to
a spouse's interest in the homestead of both spouses was decided in Ti//ey v.
Parks.43 The wife brought an action to quiet title on the family homestead.
The homestead was burdened by a federal tax lien that the IRS had filed
44
because the husband had defaulted on his obligation to pay withholding
taxes. The taxes were due from corporations of which the husband was the
responsible officer. 45 The district court granted relief by ordering the tax
lien discharged as to the homestead property.
46
The plaintiff argued that the Tenth Circuit had previously held that a
federal tax lien could not attach to homestead property.4 7 The court of ap-
peals distinguished its earlier decisions by noting that those decisions dealt
with foreclosures, and not solely with the attachment of liens. In this case no
forclosure action had been undertaken.
48
In upholding the federal tax lien on the husband's undivided one-half
interest in the homestead property, the court reiterated the distinction be-
tween the attachment of a lien and a foreclosure action. The attachment of
38. 627 F.2d at 1050. This would then disqualify the taxpayer from using the "installment
sales method." Riss v. Commissioner, 368 F.2d 965, 968 (10th Cir. 1966).
39. 627 F.2d at 1050.
40. Id. at 1051.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1052.
43. 630 F.2d 775 (10th Cir. 1980).
44. Section 6321 of the Internal Revenue Code grants the IRS the right to file tax liens.
That section states that liens shall be "in favor of the United States upon all property and rights
to property, whether real or personal, belonging to such person." The question of what prop-
erty or property right belongs to the taxpayer is determined by state law. Aquilino v. United
States, 363 U.S. 509, 513 (1960). See In re Carlson, 580 F.2d 1365, 1368-69 (10th Cir. 1978).
45. 630 F.2d at 776.
46. Id.
47. 630 F.2d at 777. Set United States v. Hershberger, 475 F.2d 677 (loth Cir. 1973); Jones
v. Kemp, 144 F.2d 478 (10th Cir. 1944).
48. 630 F.2d at 777.
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a lien is not discretionary, whereas the court has equitable discretion to order
foreclosure.
49
In United States v. Annis50 the court of appeals reviewed a district court
authorization of a federal tax lien foreclosure on a taxpayer's property. The
Government had filed the lien following a judgment in the tax court against
the taxpayer for taxes, penalties, and interest. 5' No appeal was taken from
the tax court judgment.5 2 After the lien on the taxpayer's real estate was
perfected, the taxpayer conveyed the tract of land to a trust. The Govern-
ment filed suit to set aside the transfer as a fraudulent conveyance and to
foreclose on the lien. The district court granted summary judgment in favor
of the Government, and the taxpayer appealed.
53
The court of appeals first held that the taxpayer could not relitigate the
tax deficiency issued since such relitigation was barred by the doctrine of res
judicata. 54 The court stated further that because the Government was seek-
ing to enforce the lien-an action in equity-the taxpayer did not have a
right to a jury trial. 55 The court also held that the Government's dropping
of one of its claims did not constitute a denial of due process. The defense of
the case had actually been simplified.
56
The taxpayer alleged that summary judgment was not proper because
the amount of the lien was significantly higher than the assessed tax defi-
ciency. The allegation was without merit because the penalties and interest
on an assessed tax deficiency run from the date ofjudgment until it is paid.
5 7
The lien reflected those costs, and thus the taxpayer's argument was insuffi-
cient to deny the validity of summary judgment. 58
The court of appeals did find merit in the claim that the trustee could
have been an indispensable party and should have been joined in the suit.5 9
The court noted, however, that it did not see any meritorious defenses that
could be raised by the trustee that had not been raised by the taxpayer.
Nevertheless, the court remanded the case to the district court to determine
whether the trustee has title to the property.6°
49. Id. The attachment of a lien is provided for under I.R.C. § 6321 which states that the
lien shall attach to the property of the taxpayer. See note 44 supra. Whereas I.R.C. § 7403
gives the Government authority to bring an action in district court to enforce a tax
lien of the United States against the property of the delinquent taxpayer. . . 'The
court. . . may decree a sale of such property, by the proper officer of the court, and a
distribution of the proceeds of such sale according to the findings of the court in re-
spect to the interest of the parties and of the United States.'
630 F.2d at 777 n.2 (quoting I.R.C. § 7403(c)).
50. 634 F.2d 1270 (10th Cir. 1980).
51. Id. at 1272.
52. d.
53. Id.
54. Id. (citing Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 598 (1948)).
55. 634 F.2d at 1272.
56. Id.
57. Id. 1272-73.
58. The court stated that the "[t]axpayer has the burden of showing error in the amount of
an assessment; none has been shown here." Id. at 1273 (citations omitted).
59. Id.
60. Id.
[Vol. 59:2
TAA TION
IV. POWER OF APPOINTMENT
In the Estate of Rosenblatt v. Commissioner,6' the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals considered the issue of whether a beneficiary's minority diminishes
her power of appointment and thus allows the value of a trust to be excluded
from the gross estate of the minor for estate tax purposes. The trustee had
petitioned the tax court to have the trust's value excluded from the value of
the gross estate of the beneficiary. The beneficiary of the trust had died at
age sixteen, too young to make an effective will.62 The tax court held that
the beneficiary had a vested remainder in the trust income, and the value of
the trust should, therefore, be included in the beneficiary's gross taxable
estate.
63
The original trust instrument provided that the beneficiary of the trust
had a general power of appointment as to the property and income of the
trust. 64 Federal estate tax law provides that the value of trust income and
property must be included in the gross estate of the beneficiary if the benefi-
ciary has the power of appointment, regardless of whether the power is exer-
cised. 65 The trustee argued that because of the beneficiary's minority, her
power of appointment was rendered useless. 66 Since the "power" was there-
fore not really a "power," the value of the trust should not have been in-
cluded in the gross estate of the beneficiary.
6 7
The court of appeals rejected the trustee's argument. "The federal es-
tate tax is a tax on the exercise of the privilege of directing the course of
property at one's death."6 The property of the trust or estate can be di-
rected without exercising the power of appointment. 69 The court stated fur-
ther that section 2041 of the Internal Revenue Code was drafted to make
61. 633 F.2d 176 (10th Cir. 1980).
62. UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-501 (repl. vol. 1978) ("Any person 18 or more years of age
who is of sound mind may make a will.").
63. Id. at 178. The tax court made its decision under I.R.C. § 2033 which states, "The
value of the gross estate shall include the value of all property ... to the extent of the interest
therein of the decedent at the time of his death." The court of appeals stated that application of
I.R.C. § 2041 would be more appropriate in this case. 633 F.2d at 178. Those provisions, in
relevant part, are:
(a) The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all property.
(2) To the extent of any property with respect to which the decedent has at the
time of his death a general power of appointment created after October 21, 1942.. .
such property would be includible in the decedent's gross estate .... For purposes of
this paragraph (2), the power of appointment shall be considered to exist on the date
of the decedent's death . . .whether or not on or before the date of the decedent's
death ... the power has been exercised.
(b)(l) The term "general power of appointment" means a power which is exercisable
in favor of the decedent, his estate, his creditors, or the creditors of his estate ...
64. 633 F.2d at 177 n.1.
65. I.R.C. § 2041(a)(2). See note 63 supra.
66. In Utah, a minor may also disaffirm a contract. UTAH CODE ANN. § 15-2-2, -3 (1953).
67. 633 F.2d at 178-79.
68. Id. at 179 (quoting Estate of Bagley v. United States, 443 F.2d 1266, 1270 (5th Cir.
1971) (Ainsworth, J., dissenting)).
69. 633 F.2d at 179. The court stated, "one who holds the general power of appointment
can effectively 'direct the course' of property subject to it byfailing to exercise it and thus decid-
ing in favor of the takers by default." (Citing S. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 232 (1942);
Alperstein v. Commissioner, 613 F.2d 1213, 1216 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 918 (1980);
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"capacity to exercise general powers irrelevant."'70 Therefore, the benefici-
ary's failure or incapacity to exercise her power of appointment does not
cause the value of the trust to be excluded from her gross estate. Since there
was a valid power of appointment in the trust instrument, the property and
income of the trust were required to be included in the beneficiary's gross
estate.
V. TAX EVASION
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals recently considered cases involving
willful failure to file a federal tax return and filing false returns. The convic-
tion of a tax protester for willful failure to file a federal tax return was up-
held by the court in United States v. Rzckman. 7 The taxpayer set forth five
arguments that were easily rejected by the court of appeals.
The taxpayer first argued that his prosecution was selective and dis-
criminatory. He alleged that his prosecution resulted from his speaking pub-
licly about his opposition to taxes. 72 The court of appeals found that the
taxpayer had established none of the elements required to sustain a claim of
unconstitutional selective enforcement. 73 The court also noted that vocal
opposition to taxes creates no immunity from prosecution.
74
The court of appeals found no merit in the taxpayer's claim that his
rights under the Privacy Act of 197475 were violated. The taxpayer claimed
that the Privacy Act requires disclosure, on the tax form, of the potential
criminal penaties for failing to file a tax return. The court stated that no
such notice was required, and furthermore, that the taxpayer's filing of re-
turns in previous years indicated that he knew of his duty to do SO.
76
The taxpayer next claimed that he had filed a tax return for 1975 and
therefore should not have been charged with failure to file a tax return for
that year. The taxpayer did indeed file, but with little information on the
form other than his name and address and "000.00" in certain places on the
form. 7 7 The court upheld the taxpayer's conviction on the 1975 count, not-
ing that the Tenth Circuit had previously sustained a conviction of a tax-
payer who had filed a return and furnished only his name, address, and
Estate of Bagley v. United States, 443 F.2d 1266, 1270 (5th Cir. 1971) (Ainsworth, J., dissent-
ing)). See note 63 supra.
70. 633 F.2d at 180. The court reiterated that a decedent's incapacity and inability to
exercise the power of appointment does not cause any property to be excluded from the dece-
dent's gross estate (citing Alperstein v. Commissioner, 613 F.2d 1213 (2d Cir. 1979), cerl. denied,
446 U.S. 918 (1980); Pennsylvania Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 597 F.2d 382 (3d Cir.),
cert deid, 444 U.S. 980 (1979); Fish v. United States, 432 F.2d 1278 (9th Cir. 1970)).
71. 638 F.2d 182 (10th Cir. 1980).
72. The taxpayer claimed his protests were reported by one of his students, the daughter of
an Internal Revenue Service agent. d. at 183.
73. Id. The elements of unconstitutional selective enforcement are set forth in Barton v.
Malley, 626 F.2d 151, 155 (10th Cir. 1980).
74. 638 F.2d at 183 (citing United States v. Stout, 601 F.2d 325, 328 (7th Cir. 1979)). See
also United States v. Catlett, 584 F.2d 864, 866-67 (8th Cir. 1978).
75. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1976 & Supp. 1 1977).
76. 638 F.2d at 183.
77. Id.
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references to the constitution. 78
The court of appeals considered the taxpayer's last two claims to be
spurious. The taxpayer alleged that the money he received whenpaid was
not legal tender or lawful money under the United States Constitution.
79
The court held that the Federal Reserve Notes with which the taxpayer was
paid were indeed lawful money.80 Defendant's "scattered" attacks on the
lower court's instructions were also held to be without merit.8 1 Therefore,
the conviction of the taxpayer was upheld.
8 2
The Tenth Circuit also upheld the conviction of an attorney for filing
false returns and tax evasion in United States v. Samara.83 The lower court
had fined the defendant $15,000 and had sentenced him to prison terms.
84
The defendant appealed.
The defendant attorney maintained a crude and inaccurate filing and
bookkeeping system. A substantial portion of the defendant's revenue was
cash or checks which were not deposited into any bank account.8 5 As a re-
sult, the accountant and the lawyer who prepared the defendant's return
had insufficient information from which to determine his actual income.
Witnesses were presented at trial who testified how much they had paid the
defendant, and further evidence showed that little of that money was depos-
ited by the defendant into a bank account.8 6 Other evidence showed that
the defendant had told one of his past secretaries not to tell the court about
his criminal work, which was in fact the defendant's major source of
income.
8 7
The defendant claimed that his tax evasion was not willful because he
had relied on his accountant and attorney. The court rejected that argu-
ment because the defendant's attorney and accountant had not been sup-
plied with the correct information.88 The court of appeals stated that an act
is willful when it involves "concealment of assets or covering up sources of
information, handling of one's affairs to avoid making the records usual in
transactions of the kind, and any conduct, the likely effect of which would be
to mislead or conceal."
'8 9
The court also discussed two evidentiary questions. Evidence from the
state court docket showing the activity of the defendant in the courts was
held to be properly admitted because it was relevant and not prejudicial.9°
The court also said that the lower court acted properly in not admitting
78. Id. at 184. United States v. Porth, 426 F.2d 519, 523 (10th Cir. 1970); see aLro Florsheim
Bros. Drygoods v. United States, 280 U.S. 453, 462 (1930).
79, 638 F.2d at 184. U.S. CONST., art. 1, § 8.
80. 638 F.2d at 184 (citing United States v. Ware, 608 F.2d 400, 402-03 (10th Cir. 1979)).
81. 638 F.2d at 184.
82. Id. at 185.
83. 643 F.2d 701 (10th Cir. 1981).
84. Id. at 702.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 702-03.
87. Id. at 703-04.
88. Id. at 703 (citing United States v. Jett, 352 F.2d 179, 182 (6th Cir. 1965); United States
v. Baldwin, 307 F.2d 577, 579 (7th Cir. 1962) (reliance on lawyer's and accountant's advice does
not negate willfulness unless all pertinent facts all disclosed)).
89. 643 F.2d at 704 (quoting Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 499 (1943)).
90. 643 F.2d at 704-05.
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expert testimony that infringed upon the right of determination by the
jury.91 The claims of the defendant were therefore struck down, and his
conviction was upheld.
VI. DEPLETION ALLOWANCE ON MINING PROCESSES
The Tenth Circuit in Ranchers Exploration & Development Corp. v. Unied
States,92 determined the issue of whether solvent extraction and electrowin-
ning of copper is a "mining process" deductible through a depletion allow-
ance. The case was appealed by the Government after the lower court
entered judgment for the taxpayers.
The court of appeals undertook a complicated factual anaysis of a rela-
tively straightforward issue: to what extent was the process used by the tax-
payer in the extraction of copper from ore a mining process?9 3 If the
extraction process is a "mining process," then the Internal Revenue Code
allows a deduction for depletion based on the company's gross income from
the mining.
94
The taxpayer operated an open-pit copper mine and had used a process
called "cementation" to extract the copper from the ore until 1968, when the
process became economically infeasible. 95
In 1968 the company began using a new process described as solvent
extraction and electrowinning.9 6 In this process the solution taken from the
heaps of ore is slightly different from that extracted during cementation be-
cause it is treated with a different acid solution. The solution from the ore is
treated in a two-stage solvent process where the impurities in the ore are
precipitated out of the solution. What remains is introduced into tanks con-
taining lead anodes and copper cathodes submerged in a copper sulfate solu-
tion. The passage of electrical current between the anodes and cathodes
causes the copper in the copper sulfate solution to precipitate and form on
the cathodes, which are removed and subsequently refined.
9 7
The district court found that the solvent extraction process was similar
to "beneficiation by concentration" and the electrowinning process was a
"precipitation process," both of which fall within the description of "mining
processes" in the Internal Revenue Code.98 The court of appeals noted that
the end product still requires refining before a commercially pure product is
produced.99 It affirmed the district court finding that the new process is a
91. Id. at 705. A witness testified regarding the credibility of other witness, which is an
issue for the jury. Id. (citing United States v. Brown, 540 F.2d 1048, 1054 (10th Cir. 1976), ceri.
drnead, 429 U.S. 1100 (1977); United States v. Ward, 169 F.2d 460, 462 (3d Cir. 1948)).
92. 634 F.2d 487 (10th Cir. 1980).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 488. I.R.C. §§ 611(a), 613(a)(b)(2)(A).
95. 634 F.2d at 488. Cementation is a process, described simply, where the copper ore is
treated with an acid while the ore is piled in heaps. The resulting runoff is a solution that, when
treated with iron, produces a copper cement which is then refined into commercial-grade cop-
per. Cementation is a "mining process." Id.
96. 634 F.2d at 489.
97. Id.
98. 634 F.2d at 490. I.R.C. § 613(c)(4)(D).
99. 634 F.2d at 491 n.3.
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mining process and that the taxpayer is eligible for the depletion
allowance. '00
VII. RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF TAX LAW
The issue of retroactive application of tax law was examined in Westwick
v. Commissioner.' 0' The taxpayer sold a duplex for a capital gain of
$12,184.44. Under section 56 of the old Internal Revenue Code, this would
not have been subject to any "minimum tax."' 0 2 However, on the date that
the sale of the duplex was closed, October 4, 1976, the President signed into
law an amendment to I.R.C. section 56.103 The amendment made the tax-
payer's sale of th( duplex subject to a tax of $327.67, which the taxpayer
contested. 104
The court of appeals held that amended section 56 did not violate due
process when applied retroactively. 10 5 It was not a new tax, but only a
change in rate, which is a valid retroactive change in taxation.
10 6
VIII. DEDUCTION OF THE VALUE OF OBSOLETE ASSETS
InJ.B.N. Telephone Co. o. United States, 10 7 the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals considered the right of a taxpayer to deduct the value of an aban-
doned asset. The taxpayer, who paid a deficiency after the IRS disallowed a
deduction taken by it, commenced suit when the IRS denied a refund
claim. The district court held that the taxpayer was entitled to the deduc-
tion and awarded a refund of $27,737.18.'08
The suit arose out of the taxpayer's agreement to purchase five small
phone companies in 1969. The telephone businesses were manually oper-
ated exchanges which the taxpayer intended to convert to an automatic dial
100. Id. at 493.
101. 636 F.2d 291 (10th Cir. 1980).
102. The exemption rule under "old" I.R.C. § 56 was the greater of $30,000 or the regular
tax liability of the taxpayer; the tax rate was 10%.
103. The Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (codified at 26 U.S.C.
§ 1 (1976)). New section 56 provides that the exclusion be reduced to the greater of $10,000 or
1/2 of the taxpayer's liability, and that the tax rate on the balance be increased to 15%. The
amendment was retroactive to December 31, 1975. Id. § 56.
104. 636 F.2d at 292.
105. Id. See Brushaber v. Union Pacific R.R., 240 U.S. 1, 20 (1916); Stockdale v. Insurance
Cos., 87 U.S. 323, 331 (1873). A retroactive tax cannot be a wholly new tax. See Untermeyer v.
Anderson, 276 U.S. 440 (1928); Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142 (1927); Nichols v. Coolidge,
274 U.S. 531 (1927).
106. The court cited Cohen v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540, 545 (2d Cir. 1930), in which
Judge Learned Hand said:
Nobody has a vested right in the rate of taxation, which may be retroactively changed
at the will of Congress at least for periods of less than twelve months; Congress has
done so from the outset .... one may indeed complain that, could he have foreseen
the increase, he would have kept the transaction unliquidated, but it will not avail
him; he must be prepared for such possibilities (i.e., the retroactive increase in tax
rates), the system being already in operation. His is a different case from that of one
who, when he takes action, has no reason to suppose that any transactions of the sort
will be taxed at all.
636 F.2d at 292.
107. 638 F.2d 227 (10th Cir. 1981).
108. Id. at 228-29.
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system. Although the taxpayer made a down payment, the actual closing of
the sale was to occur when the system was converted to automatic dial by
the taxpayer. Prior to conversion the sellers were to maintain the system's
operation and receive income from it. Any capital additions were to be paid
for by the taxpayer at the sale closing. '0 9
The taxpayer completed the conversion to automatic dial in 1971. In
1972, the taxpayer claimed a deduction of $42,014.36 for the equipment
scrapped during the conversion.10 The amount claimed for the deduction
was the amount that the taxpayer paid for the equipment at the original
sale, plus $32,014.38 which the taxpayer claimed on the basis of the "intan-
gible right to do business."'
The Government first argued that the taxpayer was not entitled to a
deduction because it had no basis in the property; abandonment had oc-
curred before ownership had vested in the taxpayer." 2 The court of appeals
disagreed with the Government and stated that the taxpayer would be enti-
tled to a deduction even if the taxpayer had intended to abandon the equip-
ment after the purchase. 13 Since the taxpayer used the equipment for some
time at least, the court determined that the equipment did have a fair mar-
ket value, even though it was abandoned soon after the sale."t 4 The court
also determined that for tax purposes, the taxpayer acquired the phone com-
panies when the down payment was made, not at the closing." 5 When the
" 'benefits and burdens' of ownership" pass, 1 6 the taxpayer has ownership
for tax purposes. Because the taxpayer in this case was responsible for any
capital expenditures and was to assume control of the operation if the seller
was unable to continue, the court determined that ownerhip had passed for
tax purposes. ' 7
The court of appeals agreed with the Government's contention that if
allowed, the deduction should have been for 1971, when the equipment was
disposed of, rather than 1972.'118 The court noted that Treasury regulations
provide that the deduction should be taken in the year the asset's useful life
ends. 119
The taxpayer argued that if the deduction should have been taken in
1971 then a refund should be allowed for that tax year under the "mitigation
provisions" of the Code.' 20 The court agreed, but noted that the taxpayer is
109. Id. at 229.
110. Id. at 230.
Ill. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 232.
114. Id. W. E. G. Dial Tel. Inc. v. Commissioner, 25 T.C.M. 233 (1966), but cf Wood
County Tel. Co. v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 72 (1968) (deduction not allowed because taxpayer
knew equipment would have to be abandoned to convert to dial system).
115. 638 F.2d at 233.
116. Id. at 232 (citing Wagner v. Commissioner, 518 F.2d 655, 657 (10th Cir. 1975)).
117. 638 F.2d at 232-33. See also Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561 (1978);
Baird v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 115 (1977).
118. 638 F.2d at 234.
119. Id. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-8, -9 (1960); see also Tanforen Co. v. United States, 313 F.
Supp. 796, 799-800 (N.D. Cal. 1970), affdper cunam, 462 F.2d 605 (9th Cir. 1972).
120. I. at 234-35. I.R.C. §§ 1311-15. If the conditions of these sections are met a taxpayer,
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required to file a claim for a refund with the Commissioner. The court sug-
gested that the district court hold the suit in abeyance until the Commis-
sioner acted upon the claim. If the refund is granted without the need for
court proceedings, the action could be dismissed. If the refund is denied,
relief could be sought in the same action without the delay of initiating a
new action. '
21
IX. GIFr TAX APPLICATION TO POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals determined that political contribu-
tions are not subject to the gift tax in Carson v. Commissioner.122 The taxpayer
made contributions totalling $209,472.25 to political campaigns during
1967, 1968, 1970, and 1971. The taxpayer did not report the political contri-
butions on his federal gift tax returns for those years. 123 The Commissioner
assessed a deficiency against the taxpayer, and the taxpayer initiated suit in
the tax court. The tax court held that political contributions are not subject
to the gift tax and granted judgment for the taxpayer.
124
The Government appealed, contending that the taxpayer received no
consideration for the contributions, that no donative intent was required,
and that Congressional intent as well as additional sections of the Internal
Revenue Code require the taxation of political contributions as gifts. ' 25 The
court of appeals did not address the issues raised by the Government, but
merely stated that political contributions "are simply not gifts within the
meaning of the gift tax law."' 26 The "purpose of the gift tax is to prevent an
avoidance of estate tax by an inter vivos transfer of property;' 1 27 therefore,
the taxpayer's political contributions were not subject to the gift tax.
X. IRS CIVIL SUMMONS
In United States v. City National Bank & Trust Co.,' 2 8 the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals upheld an IRS civil summons of the bank records of tax-
payers. The district court held that the summons could not reach the de-
posit information of the taxpayers because the IRS could determine the tax
liability of the taxpayers without the deposit information.
129
The court of appeals, in a brief opinion, overturned the trial court as to
the deposit records. According to the Tenth Circuit, it is irrelevant whether
who claimed a deduction which is disallowed because it should have been claimed in a different
year, may be granted relief.
121. 638 F.2d at 237. The court disagreed with the Second Circuit, which requires that a
completely new lawsuit be filed. See Benenson v. United States, 385 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1967).
122. 641 F.2d 864 (10th Cir. 1981).
123. Id. at 864.
124. Id. at 865.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 866 (quoting Carson v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 252, 263-64 (1978)).
127. 641 F.2d at 866 n.6 (citing Harris v. Commissioner, 340 U.S. 106 (1950); Estate of
Sanford v. Commissioner, 308 U.S. 39, 44 (1939)). The court also noted that Congress has made
the gift tax inapplicable to transfers to political organizations. 641 F.2d at 866. I.R.C.
§ 2501 (a)(5).
128. 624 F.2d 388 (10th Cir. 1981).
129. Id. at 389-90.
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the Government could have obtained the information without the deposit
information.130 The court ruled that the Government need only show that
the requested records "might throw light on the correctness of the taxpayers'
returns."' 3 1 An affidavit of the investigating agent is enough to support the
summons. 132 Since the Government had made the requisite showing the
summons was upheld.'
33
XI. TAX CONSEQUENCES OF DIVORCE SETTLEMENT
The issue of whether payments made by a husband to a wife were ali-
mony or a property settlement was determined by the Tenth Circuit Court
of Appeals in Riley v. Commissioner.134 The tax court determined that the
payments were part of a property settlement and not deductible by the hus-
band.' 35 The husband appealed.
An agreement between the husband and wife made at the time of the
divorce provided that the husband would pay his wife $36,000 in $300
monthly installments. The obligation to pay was binding on the husband's
heirs and assigns. The payments were to continue until paid in full, regard-
less of remarriage or death of the wife.'
36
The controlling factor in determining whether a payment is part of a
property settlement or alimony is the intent of the parties.' 37 In this case the
court found the following factors indicative of a property settlement pay-
ment: 1) the presence of a fixed sum, 2) the payments were not related to
the husband's income, 3) the payments were to continue without regard to
the wife's remarriage or death, 4) the wife relinquished property interests in
return for the payments, and 5) the husband's payment was secured and
guaranteed.' 38  Therefore, the payments were not deductible by the
husband.
Thomasj Wof
130. Id. at 390.
131. Id. at 389 (quoting United States v. Davey, 543 F.2d 996, 1000 (2d Cir. 1976)).
132. 624 F.2d at 389. United States v. Garden State Nat'l Bank, 607 F.2d 61, 68 (3d Cir.
1979).
133. 624 F.2d at 390.
134. 649 F.2d 768 (10th Cir. 1981).
135. Id. at 769-70. Property settlement payments are considered a division of capital and
are neither includable in the wife's gross income nor deductible by the husband. Se I.R.C.
§§ 71, 215. A district court had earlier determined in a case involving the wife that the pay-
ments were part of a property settlement. Adam v. United States, 429 F. Supp. 38 (D. Wyo.
1977).
136. 649 F.2d at 770.
137. Id. at 772.
138. d. at 774.
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UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT REVIEW
OF TENTH CIRCUIT DECISIONS
I. ALLIED CHEMICAL CORP. v. DAIFLON IN.-REVERSED
In Allied Chemical Corp. v. Daifon, Inc. ,I the Supreme Court, in a per
curiam opinion, reversed the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals' order granting
a writ of mandamus in Dai#on, Inc. v. Bohanon.2 The Court held that an
erroneous interlocutory order involving the exercise of a district court's dis-
cretion, such as the improper granting of a new trial, will rarely, if ever,
justify the issuance of a writ of mandamus.
3
The case arose out of an antitrust action in the District Court for the
Western District of Oklahoma. 4 The plaintiff, Daiflon, is a small importer of
refrigerant gas who brought an antitrust suit against all domestic manufac-
turers of the gas.5 After a four-week trial, the jury returned a verdict for
Daiflon, awarding it $2.5 million in damages.6 The trial court then granted
the defendants' motion for a new trial. 7 In its rendition of the facts, the
Supreme Court emphasized the trial court's ostensible reason for ordering a
new trial: that it had erred during the course of the trial in certain eviden-
tiary rulings.
8
The Tenth Circuit, however, had refused to accept that the trial judge
actually based his judgment on evidentiary rulings, pointing out that the
trial court never specifically identified which exhibits were erroneously ad-
mitted.9 The court of appeals found that, since the trial judge had refused to
enter the defendant's motion for a directed verdict and had indicated his
belief that liability had been established, his granting of a new trial on the
issue of liability lacked a rational basis. 10 His real reason for granting a new
trial, according to the court of appeals, was his shock at the amount of dam-
ages awarded by the verdict. 1 Thus, his decision to grant a new trial on the
issue of liability invaded the province of the jury and denied Daiflon its sev-
enth amendment right to a jury trial.
1 2
But even if the trial court's decision to grant a new trial was wrong, the
question remained whether the court of appeals should have invoked the
extraordinary remedy of mandamus, or whether it should have allowed the
1. 449 U.S. 33 (1980).
2. 612 F.2d 1249 (10th Cir. 1979).
3. 449 U.S. at 36.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 33.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. 612 F.2d at 1259. In an implied rejoinder to this point, the Supreme Court stated: "A
trial judge is not required to enter supporting findings of facts and conclusions of law when
granting a new trial motion." 449 U.S. at 36 n.3; see FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
10. 612 F.2d at 1259.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 1260.
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new trial to proceed to final judgment, and then examine the issue of the
granting of a new trial upon a regular appeal. It was on this question that
the court of appeals and the Supreme Court disagreed.
In support of its issuance of mandamus, the Tenth Circuit relied on
authority that "in exceptional cases involving a clear abuse of discretion or
usurpation of judicial power," the remedy of mandamus is appropriate.
13
The court recognized that the Supreme Court had recently held in Will v.
Calvert Lif Insurance Co. 14 that plain abuse of discretion would not justify
interlocutory review by mandamus, but found that the trial court in this case
had transcended plain abuse of discretion.' 5 The court also discussed the use
of mandamus as a means of supervision, implying that it meant to employ
mandamus in this case to rein in a wayward trial court.'
6
The court of appeals noted three federal cases in which mandamus had
been used to reverse an order granting a new trial.' 7 However, the court's
use of the reasoning of these cases was not persuasive, as each is distinguisha-
ble from Daflon; in these cases mandamus issued because of some specific
violation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in the trial court's granting
a new trial.18
The classic statement of the appropriate grounds for the use of manda-
mus is in Roche v. Evaporated Milk Assoct'ation:'9 mandamus shall issue only "to
confine an inferior court to a lawful exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction or
to compel it to exercise its authority when it is its duty to do so."' 2a Citing
Roche, Chief Justice Warren, in Will v. United States,21 commented that courts
had never confined themselves to a technical meaning of "jurisdiction" in
interpreting the Roche standard, but that it was a "semantic fallacy" to argue
that a district court judge lacked the power to enter an order that was
merely erroneous.
Thus, the question in the Daijlon case was whether the trial judge's be-
havior was outside his power. The Supreme Court held that it was not. Re-
ferring to a case in which it had held that, for mandamus to issue, a litigant's
right to mandamus must be "clear and indisputable, '22 the Court stated:
"the authority to grant a new trial, moreover, is confided almost entirely to
the exercise of discretion on the part of the trial court. Where a matter is
committed to discretion, it cannot be said that a litigant's right to a particu-
lar result is 'clear and indisputable.' "23
13. Id. at 1254 (citing Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Holland, 349 U.S. 379 (1953)).
14. 437 U.S. 655 (1978).
15. 612 F.2d at 1255.
16. 612 F.2d at 1254.
17. Id. at 1257. The three cases are Peterman v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. R.R. Co.,
493 F.2d 88 (8th Cir.), cert. denied 417 U.S. 947 (1974); Grace Lines, Inc. v. Motley, 439 F.2d
1028 (2d Cir. 1971); Kanatser v. Chrysler Corp., 199 F.2d 610 (10th Cir. 1952), cert. denied 344
U.S. 921 (1953).
18. 612 F.2d at 1257.
19. 319 U.S. 21 (1943).
20. Id. at 26.
21. 389 U.S. 90, 103-04 (1967).
22. United States v. Duell, 172 U.S. 576, 582 (1899).
23. 449 U.S. at 36.
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Following the traditional analysis, as exemplified by Roche and Will v.
United States, the Supreme Court seemed to be saying that "clear abuse of
discretion" is not the correct standard for determining whether mandamus
should issue. Rather, the proponent of mandamus must show an abuse of
indiscretion: in other words, an order by a trial judge which he had no dis-
cretion to enter. In the case of this kind of order-for example, a trial court's
violation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in granting a new trial-it
could be argued that the trial court was acting outside its power, and thus
the traditional standard would be satisfied.
In addition, the Supreme Court emphasized that mandamus in this case
violated the strong Congressional policy opposing "piecemeal review," and
stated that Daiflon had an adequate means of relief through the normal
appellate process.24 The Court thus implied that the inconvenience to
Daiflon of a new trial, without more, would not constitute a harm great
enough to justify circumvention of the normal appellate process. 25
Justices Blackmun and White dissented from the per curiam opinion, ex-
pressing dissatisfaction with the majority's peremptory handling of the
case.
26
The Daifon case is part of the Court's general trend toward restricting
opportunities for interlocutory review.2 7 The court is apparently proceeding
from the premise that piecemeal review wastes judicial resources. Though
the Court's decision in Daiflon was correct under traditional mandamus anal-
ysis, perhaps it should more closely examine whether, in this kind of case,
judicial resources can better be conserved by allowing interlocutory review
to avoid the repetition of lengthy jury trials in complex cases.
Neal Richardson
II. COMMUNITY COMMUNICA TIONS Co. v CITY OF BOULDER-REVERSED
In Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder,28 the United States
Supreme Court reversed a Tenth Circuit decision 29 in which the court of
appeals had declared that the City of Boulder was immune from antitrust
liability under the Sherman Act.
30
In 1964, the Boulder City Council granted Community Communica-
tion Company's (CCC) predecessor a twenty-year, revocable, nonexclusive
permit to operate a cable television business in the city. The permit was
24. Id.
25. Cf. 612 F.2d at 1254.
26. 449 U.S. at 37.
27. Set Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 (1978), restricting the application of
the "death knell" doctrine.
28. 50 U.S.L.W. 4144 (1982). Justice Brennan wrote the majority opinion, joined by Jus-
tices Marshall, Blackmun, Powell and Stevens. Justice Stevens filed a special concurrence, and
Justice Rehnquist dissented, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice O'Connor. Justice
White did not participate.
29. Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 630 F.2d 704 (10th Cir. 1980).
30. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
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assigned to CCC in 1966. Since then CCC has provided cable television
service to the University Hill area of the city, an area where approximately
twenty percent of the city's residents live and where for geographic reasons
broadcast television signals cannot be received well. Because of limited tech-
nology, CCC's service was restricted to the retransmission of Denver and
Cheyenne broadcasts. When improved technology enabled CCC to offer
substantially more entertainment than could be provided by local broadcast
television, CCC informed the city council that it planned to expand into
other areas of the city. At approximately the same time, newly formed Boul-
der Communications Company informed the council of its interest in ob-
taining a permit to provide competing cable service in the city. 3'
The city council responded by enacting an emergency ordinance
prohibiting CCC from expanding its business into other areas of the city for
three months. The city planned during the moratorium to draft a model
cable television ordinance and to invite new businesses to enter the Boulder
market. The purpose of the moratorium was to prevent the expansion of
CCC during the drafting of the model ordinance because it was feared that
such expansion would discourage potential competitors from entering the
market. 32 When the CCC continued building, city authorities arrested
CCC's construction crews and tore down its cables.
33
CCC filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of
Colorado seeking a preliminary injunction and alleging that the city's re-
striction on CCC's expansion was a violation of section 1 of the Sherman
Act. 34 The district court held that the state action exemption of Parker v.
Brown35 was not available to Boulder, and therefore the city was subject to
antitrust liability. 36 The city appealed, and a divided panel of the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the city was immune
from antitrust liability under Parker.
37
31. 50 U.S.L.W. at 4144-45.
32. Id. at 4145.
33. 630 F.2d at 710 (Markey, C.J., dissenting) (sitting by designation).
34. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). This section states that "[elvery contract, combination in the
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States . . . is declared to be illegal."
35. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
36. Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 485 F. Supp. 1035 (D. Colo.
1980).
37. 630 F.2d 704 (10th Cir. 1980). For a thorough discussion of the proceedings in the
lower courts and a discussion of the state action exemption, see Antitrust, Seventh Annual Tenth
Circuit Survey, 58 DEN. L.J. 249 (1981). See also Kennedy, Of Lawyers, Lighibuihs and Raisins: An
Analysis of te State Action DoctrIne under the Antitrust Laws, 74 Nw. U. L. REV. 31 (1979).
During the pendency of this appeal, Boulder decided on a districting plan whereby more
than one cable company will be operating in Boulder. The district court granted CCC another
preliminary injunction against what had become for CCC a permanent geographic limitation.
The district court granted the injunction on both Sherman Act and first amendment grounds.
Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 496 F. Supp. 823 (D. Colo. 1980). The
court of appeals held that to the extent the lower court grounded its order on the Sherman Act,
it erred because of the Tenth Circuit's earlier opinion. Community Communications Co. v.
City of Boulder, No. 80-1882, slip op. at 9 (10th Cir. Sept. 22, 1981). The court of appeals
reversed on the first amendment claim, holding that the district court erred in summarily apply-
ing the first amendment principles governing newspapers to cable operators. Id. at 15. The
appellate court remanded to the district court for a determination of whether cable television's
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The question facing the Supreme Court in Community Communica-
tions' appeal from the Tenth Circuit decision was whether Boulder was im-
mune from liability under Parker and its progeny. In Parker, the Supreme
Court was called upon to determine the validity of a program adopted by
the State of California that sought to restrict competition in the state's raisin
industry and prevented raisin producers from freely distributing their raisins
through private channels. 38 The Parker Court held that the program was
exempt from the antitrust laws, stating:
We find nothing in the language of the Sherman Act or in its his-
tory which suggests that its purpose was to restrain a state or its
officers or agents from activities directed by its legislature. In a
dual system of government in which, under the Constitution, the
states are sovereign, save only as Congress may constitutionally
subtract from their authority, an unexpressed purpose to nullify a
state's control over its officers and agents is not lightly to be attrib-
uted to Congress.
39
For over three decades the Supreme Court did not elaborate on its view
of state immunity from antitrust liability. Then, in 1975, in Goldfarb v. Vir-
ginia State Bar40 the Court struck down a minimum fee schedule established
by the Fairfax County Bar Association. The Court held that the threshold
requirement for establishing antitrust immunity under Parker is that the ac-
tivity must be required by the state in its sovereign capacity; immunity is
permitted only if the action was in fact compelled, rather than merely au-
thorized, by the state.41 Because the State of Virginia did not require mini-
mum fee schedules, the bar association enjoyed no immunity.
The following year, the Supreme Court was again faced with a state
action question. In Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co. ,42 the Court held that a public
utility's policy of dispensing free light bulbs to consumers of electricity was
subject to the antitrust laws. The Court stated that, in the absence of a state
policy regarding the regulation of the distribution of light bulbs, approval by
the Michigan Public Service Commission of the tariffs containing the distri-
bution was not a sufficient basis for immunity.
4 3
In Bates v. State Bar of Ari ona,4 4 the Supreme Court for the first time
since Parker granted a defendant immunity on state action grounds. At issue
was a state disciplinary rule prohibiting advertising by lawyers. Because the
rule was an "affirmative command of the Arizona Supreme Court,' 45 and
because the Arizona Supreme Court was given authority to govern the legal
profession by the state constitution, the court sustained the State Bar's claim
of immunity.
"unique attributes" warrant, under the first amendment, the type of regulation the city seeks to
impose. Id. at 24.
38. 317 U.S. at 344-48.
39. Id. at 350-51.
40. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
41. Id. at 790.
42. 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
43. Id. at 598.
44. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
45. Id. at 360.
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In 1978, the Supreme Court addressed the applicability of the Parker
doctrine to municipalities. In City of Lafayette V. Louisiana Power &Light Co. ,46
the Court rejected the proposition that cities were automatically entitled to
the Parker exemption. The issue in the case was whether two Louisiana cit-
ies, which owned and operated electric utility systems, could be held liable
under the Sherman Act for offenses allegedly committed in the conduct of
their utility systems. A plurality applied a test for immunity based upon the
authorization by the state of the challenged conduct. According to the plu-
rality, municipal conduct is shielded from the antitrust laws if the conduct is
engaged in "pursuant to state policy to displace competition with regulation
or monopoly public service."'47 This state policy must be "clearly articulated
and affirmatively expressed."'48 The plurality opinion stated:
Cities are not themselves sovereign; they do not receive all the fed-
eral deference of the States that create them. Parker's limitation of
the exemption to "official action directed by a state" is consistent
with the fact that the States' subdivisions generally have not been
treated as equivalents of the States themselves. In light of the seri-
ous economic dislocation which could result if cities were free to
place their own parochial interests above the Nation's economic
goals reflected in the antitrust laws, we are especially unwilling to
presume that Congress intended to exclude anticompetitive munic-
ipal action from their reach.
4 9
Chief Justice Burger concurred in the judgment on the basis that the anti-
trust laws should reach municipal action when the city is acting in a proprie-
tary capacity, but not when it is acting in its governmental capacity.
Because the City of Lafayette was engaged in the business of a public utility,
the Chief Justice would not allow them an exemption.
5 0
In Community Communi ations, the Court held that Boulder's moratorium
could not be exempt from the antitrust laws unless it constituted either the
action of the State of Colorado or municipal action in furtherance of "clearly
articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy. 15 ' Boulder argued that
these conditions were met because of its status as a home rule city.52 Because
home rule cities in Colorado have "every power theretofore possessed by the
legislature . . . in local and municipal affairs,"153 Boulder argued that its
46. 435 U.S. 389 (1978). Seegenerall Kletzke, Antitrust Liability ofMuni'pal Corporatons. The
Per Se Rules vs. The Rule of Reason-A Reasonable Compromise, 1980 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 253; Rogers,
Municipal Antitrtst Liabiliy in a Federalist System, 1980 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 305; Rose, Municipal Antitrst
Liability, 1980 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 245.
47. 435 U.S. at 413.
48. Id. at 410. A majority of the Court later adopted this test in California Retail Liquor
Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc. 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980).
49. Id. at 412-13 (citations omitted).
50. Id. at 422.
51. 50 U.S.L.W. at 4146-47.
52. Id. at 4147. The Colorado Home Rule Amendment gives cities and towns having a
population of two thousand inhabitants the power to enact ordinances relating to local matters
which "supersede within territorial limits and other jurisdiction of said city or town any law of
the state in conflict therewith." CoLO. CONST. art. xx, § 6.
53. 50 U.S.L.W. at 4147 (quoting Denver Urban Renewal Authority v. Byrne, 618 P.2d
1374, 1381 (Colo. 1980), quoting Four-County Metropolitan Capital Improvement Dist. v.
Board of County Comm'rs, 149 Colo. 284, 294, 369 P.2d 67, 72 (1962) (emphasis in original)).
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ordinance was an act of government performed by the city acting as the state
in local matters.5 4 The Court rejected this argument, stating that the city
misconceived both the letter and the spirit of the law. The Court stated that
"[o]urs is a 'dual system of government,' which has no place for sovereign
cities," 55 and quoted the dissent in the court of appeals as stating "[wie are a
nation not of 'city-states' but of States."
'56
The Court couched its opinion in terms of legislative intent, stating that
[w]hen Parker examined Congress' intentions in enacting the anti-
trust laws, the opinion noted that 'nothing in the language of the
Sherman Act or in its history. . . suggests that its purpose was to
restrain a state or its officers or agents from activities directed by its
legislature . . . . [And] an unexpressed purpose to nullify a state's
control over its ofjiers and agents is not lightly to be attributed to Con-
gress.' Thus Parker recognized Congress' intention to limit the state
action exemption based upon the federalism principle of limited
state sovereignty.
57
The Court's argument is misleading in two respects. First, it suggests that
Congress, when it passed the Sherman Act, intended to exempt state, but not
municipal, action. Given the extremely narrow definition of "interstate
commerce" at the turn of the century, 58 it is more likely that it never oc-
curred to Congress that the Act might one day be applied to government
action. Second, the majority opinion suggests that the Parker Court intended
to exclude municipal action from the exemption it created. That message
from the Parker opinion is not as clear as the majority implies. The Parker
Court stated, in examining the legislative history of the Act, that "[tihe spon-
sor of the bill . .. declared that it prevented only 'business combina-
tions.' 59 The Parker Court continued, stating that the purpose of the
Sherman Act "was to suppress combinations to restrain competition and at-
tempts to monopolize by btdividuals and corporations ,"6 and "we have no ques-
tion of the state or its munic'pality becoming a participant in a private
agreement or combination by others for restraint of trade .... ",61 The
Parker opinion simply does not support the conclusion that the Parker Court
intended to limit the scope of the exclusion.
The City of Boulder also argued that the ordinance constituted action
undertaken pursuant to a clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed
state policy, contending that by virtue of the Colorado Home Rule Amend-
54. The Court assumed, without deciding, that the ordinance fell within the scope of the
power delegated to the city by virtue of the Colorado Home Rule Amendment, that is, that the
regulation of cable television is a local matter. 50 U.S.L.W. at 4147 n. 16.
55. Id. (quoting Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. at 351) (emphasis added by Community Communica-
tions Court).
56. 50 U.S.L.W. at 4147 (quoting Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 630 F.2d at
717 (Markey, CJ., dissenting)).
57. 50 U.S.L.W. at 4147 (emphasis added by Community Communications Court) (citations
omitted).
58. See, e.g., United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1896) (sugar trust not engaged
in interstate commerce).
59. 317 U.S. at 351 (citing Cong. Rec. 2562, 2457).
60. 317 U.S. at 351 (emphasis added).
61. Id. at 351-52 (emphasis added).
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ment's guarantee of local autonomy Colorado has granted to Boulder the
power to enact the moratorium ordinance and that the legislature contem-
plated the kind of action complained of. 6 2 The Court held, however, that
the requirement of "clear articulation and affirmative expression" is not sat-
isfied by neutrality on the part of the state, stating that acceptance of the
proposition that a general grant of power to enact ordinances constitutes
state authorization to enact anticompetitive ordinances would "wholly evis-
cerate" the concepts of "clear articulation and affirmative expression" re-
quired by the Court's earlier precedents.
63
The Court went on to say that the mere finding that the Parker exemp-
tion was not available to the city did not mean that the same antitrust rules
that now apply to private persons would apply to cities. The Court stated
that "[i]t may be that certain activities, which might appear anticompetitive
when engaged in by private parties, take on a different complexion when
adopted by a local government. '"64
In a vigorous dissent, Justice Rehnquist described the majority's deci-
sion as a "novel and egregious error"65 and expressed concern that it would
"impede, if not paralyze" 66 the efforts of local governments to protect the
public health, safety, and welfare.
The dissent argued that the majority erred in characterizing the Parker
decision as one involving exemption from the Sherman Act, arguing instead
that it involved preemption. Because the presumptions utilized in exemption
analysis are quite different from those used in preemption analysis, the dis-
sent argued that failure to distinguish between the two led the Court to the
wrong conclusion. According to Justice Rehnquist, preemption analysis in-
volves "the interplay between the enactments of two different sovereigns-
one federal and the other state."'6 7 Under the supremacy clause, 68 when
there is a conflict between the laws of the federal government and those of a
state or local government, 69 or where the federal government has occupied a
field exclusively, the state or local enactment must fall. Because of federal-
ism concerns, there is a presumption against preemption that can be over-
come only by a clear manifestation by Congress of an intention that the
federal act should supersede the police powers of the state.70
Justice Rehnquist argued that exemption, on the other hand, does not
involve the interplay of enactments of different jurisdictions, but rather the
interplay of enactments of a single sovereign. The question under exemption
62. 50 U.S.L.W. at 4147.
63. Id. at 4147-48.
64. Id. at 4148 n.20.
65. 50 U.S.L.W. at 4152 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 4149.
67. Id. (quoting Handler, Antitnst - 1978, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1363, 1379 (1978)).
68. U.S. CONST. art vi, cl. 2, states in pertinent part:
This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursu-
ance thereof. . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land ....
69. The Supreme Court has never made a distinction between states and their subdivisions
with regard to the preemptive effects of federal law. 50 U.S.L.W. at 4151 (Rehnquist, J., dis-
senting). See City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973); Huron
Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960).
70. 50 U.S.L.W. at 4149 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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analysis is whether one law was intended to relieve a party from the necessity
of complying with a prior enactment, and the presumption is that there was
no such intent.7 '
The dissent predicted a number of problems to be encountered in the
future due to the majority's application of the antitrust laws to municipali-
ties. These problems include a determination of whether the per se rules of
illegality 72 will apply to municipal defendants in the same manner as they
are applied to private defendants, and whether cities will be liable for treble
damages for enacting anticompetitive ordinances.7 3 The major problem
foreseen by the dissent, however, is the application of the "rule of reason" to
municipalities. Under the rule of reason, as applied to private defendants,
restraints may be defended only on the basis that the restraint has no unrea-
sonable effect on competition or that its pro-competitive effects outweigh its
anticompetitive effects. 74 For example, in National Society of Professi'onal Engi-
neers o. United Slates,75 which dealt with a provision in the Society's ethical
code prohibiting competitive bidding, the Court held that an anticompeti-
tive restraint could not be defended on the basis of a private party's conclu-
sion that competition is itself unreasonable. The Communit Communt'at'ons
dissent questioned whether the same rule would apply to municipalities, that
is, whether municipalities would be foreclosed from arguing that the benefits
to the health, safety, and public welfare outweigh the anticompetitive effects
of the ordinance. Justice Rehnquist stated that "[i]f municipalities are per-
mitted only to enact ordinances that are consistent with the pro-competitive
policies of the Sherman Act, a municipality's power to regulate the economy
would be all but destroyed."
76
On the other hand, he argued, if the rule of reason were modified to
permit a municipality to defend its regulation on the ground that its benefits
to the community outweigh its anticompetitive effects, the Court would be
called upon to engage in the same wide-ranging, standardless inquiry into
local regulation that it did during the Lochner era.
77
If the problem were analyzed as one of preemption rather than one of
exemption, argued the dissent, these problems would be avoided. 78 Instead
of a sweeping review by federal courts, the courts would be confronted with
the simpler question of whether the ordinance enacted is preempted by the
Sherman Act. Moreover, because a municipality does not violate the anti-
trust laws when it enacts legislation preempted by the Sherman Act, deter-
71. Id.
72. Under the per se rules, some kinds of conduct are considered unreasonable as a matter
of law, and there will be no inquiry into their reasonableness. United States v. Socony-Vacuum
Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) (price fixing).
73. Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides that "any person who shall be injured in his
business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws . ..shall recover
threefold the damages by him sustained." 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
74. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
75. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
76. 50 U.S.L.W. at 4151 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
77. During the "Lochner era," the Supreme Court invalidated a great amount of social and
economic legislation on the ground that it violated the due process clause. See, e.g., Lochner v.
New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
78. 50 U.S.L.W. at 4151 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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mining the remedy is not a problem-the preempted legislation is simply
invalid and unenforceable.
Finally, the dissent warned that the majority's decision effectively de-
stroys the "home rule movement," through which local governments have
garnered some autonomy over matters of local concern. 79 The impact of this
decision will be felt most by those municipalities having the greatest auton-
omy because they will be least able to avail themselves of the protective
mantle of the state.
The impact of this case is far from certain, and the resolution of the
problems forecasted by the dissent will not be simple. Perhaps a better reso-
lution of the case would have been to adopt the preemption analysis of the
dissent in Community Communications and Chief Justice Burger's concurrence
in City of Lafayette, in which he argued for a distinction between proprietary
and governmental functions.8 0 Under this analysis, municipal activity is not
subject to the antitrust laws if the activity is governmental and not pre-
empted; municipal activity is subject to the antitrust laws if the municipality
is engaging in proprietary activity or governmental activity that is
preempted.
Local governments should not be hamstrung in their ability to protect
the health, safety, and public welfare of their citizens; nor should they, when
engaging in a proprietary activity, be permitted to avail themselves of an
"exemption" from the antitrust laws, thereby putting themselves in a posi-
tion superior to that of their private competitors. In the absence of a clear
manifestation by Congress of an intent to preempt local government action,
such action should not be subject to the antitrust laws.
Kingsly R. Browne
III. MITCHELL v D.R. -VACATED AND REMANDED
In Mitchellv. D.R. ,81 the Supreme Court vacated and remanded for fur-
ther consideration in light of Harris v. McRae8 2 and Williams v. Zbaraz,8 3 the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in D.R. v. Mitchell.8 4 The court
had held that a Utah statute,8 5 which prohibited the expenditure of public
assistance funds for abortions except where the operation was necessary to
79. Id. at 4152.
80. Admittedly, this is not always a clear distinction. For example, in the Tenth Circuit's
Commumni Communziations decision, the majority felt that the regulation of cable television was
an exercise of governmental authority, 630 F.2d at 707, while the dissent claimed that the ordi-
nances are, "in fact and intent," contracts, reflecting a proprietary interest. 630 F.2d at 719
(Markey, CJ., dissenting). The city was not, however, engaging in the operation of a cable televi-
sion business, in which case it would be involved in proprietary activity; instead, it was involved
in the regulaiton of the cable television business, a governmental activity.
81. 449 U.S. 808 (1980).
82. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
83. 448 U.S. 358 (1980).
84. 617 F.2d 203 (10th Cir. 1980).
85. Utah Code Ann. § 55-15a-3 (Supp. 1979).
[Vol. 59:2
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
preserve the mother's life, was unconstitutional. Three Supreme Court Jus-
tices86 dissented and adopted the reasoning set forth in the dissenting opin-
ions of Harris and Wilh;ams. On remand, the Tenth Circuit8 7 affirmed the
district court's decision,8 8 concluding that the Utah statute restricting abor-
tion funding did not deny the plaintiff equal protection and due process of
law.
At the time the abortion was sought, the plaintiff, an unmarried mother
of one, was a recipient of Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC),89 a program which entitled the plaintiff to receive medical care
under the Medicaid Assistance Program. °' Upon discovering her preg-
nancy, the plaintiff consulted with her doctor about securing an abortion
and the doctor determined that an abortion was appropriate medical treat-
ment.9 ' Thereafter, plaintiff attempted but was denied admittance to the
University of Utah Medical Center on the grounds that the Center would
not be reimbursed for services rendered because of a recently enacted Utah
statute.
92
The Utah statute provision for abortion funding is similar to the fund-
ing criteria established by the Medicaid Assistance Program as amended by
the "Hyde Amendment." 93 In addition to providing funding for abortions
where a mother's life is endangered, the legislative policy of the Utah law
indicates that funding should be given for cases of rape and incest.
94
The plaintiff brought an action in federal district court seeking to estab-
lish that the Utah law is unconstitutional and that an abortion is medical
treatment which the plaintiff was entitled to receive under the appropriate
statutes and regulations. 95 The trial court disagreed, holding that the Utah
statute does provide public assistance for abortions which are therapeutic,
and that the standard for determining when an abortion is therapeutic is
clearly articulated. 96 After reviewing recent Supreme Court decisions, 97 the
trial court concluded that a state has the power to favor childbirth over
abortions by the allocation of funds so long as the state's action does not
directly interfere with a protected activity. Therefore, the statute, which
does favor childbirth by limiting abortion funding to cases where a mother's
86. 449 U.S. 808 (Blackmun, Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
87. D. R. v. Michell, 645 F.2d 852 (10th Cir. 1981).
88. 456 F. Supp. 609 (D. Utah 1978).
89. 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1976).
90. Id. § 1396.
91. 456 F. Supp. at 610.
92. Utah Code Ann. § 55-15a-3 (Supp. 1979).
93. The Hyde Amendment is an appropriation measure passed each year since 1977 under
which Congress has restricted the use of federal funds to certain types of necessary abortions.
Departments of Labor and Health, Education, and Welfare Appropriations Act, 1977, Pub. L.
No. 95-205, § 101, 95 Stat. 1460.
94. This policy would authorize expenditures in cases where the Hyde Amendment, de-
pending on the year in question, does not provide federal reimbursement. See 456 F. Supp. at
625 n.2.
95. 456 F. Supp. 609 (D. Utah 1978).
96. I. at 623. In the court's opinion, therapeutic abortion means an abortion which is
necessary to save a mother's life. Id.
97. Maherv. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Bealv. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977); Poetker v. Doe, 432
U.S. 519 (1977).
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life is endangered but which does not prevent a woman from exercising her
right to have an abortion, is valid.
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that the trial court's
interpretation of therapeutic was too narrow, since "therapeutic" can in-
clude abortions necessary to preserve a mother's health--even though her
life may not be endangered. 98 The court noted that the Supreme Court
cases relied upon by the trial court related to nontherapeutic abortions and
did not address the issue of which abortions are actually included in the term
therapeutic.
The Supreme Court, in a memorandum decision, vacated and re-
manded the court of appeals' decision in light of two recent opinions. 99 In
Harris v. McRae ioo the Supreme Court held in part that provisions governing
the Medicaid Assistance Program 1° ' do not require states to fund certain
types of abortions for which federal reimbursement is unavailable. The
Court further noted that restrictive federal funding for abortions does not
impinge upon a woman's choice to terminate her pregnancy, and therefore
does not violate the due process and equal protection clauses of the fifth
amendment. Four Justices dissented, ' 0 2 concluding that the state's interest
in protecting potential life does not justify excluding needy women from ob-
taining medical assistance for medically necessary abortions which may in-
clude instances other than where the mother's life is endangered. The
restrictions place on abortion funding, therefore, are invalid.
A companion case to Harrs, Williams v. Zbaraz,10 3 addressed the issue of
whether an Illinois statute prohibiting medical assistance for abortions, ex-
cept for those abortions where the mother's life is endangered, violates the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. The Supreme Court
adopted the reasoning stated in Hars and held that a state does not have to
provide public funding for medically necessary abortions when federal reim-
bursement is unavailable. The Court also found that the Illinois statute does
not deny a plaintiff equal protection of the law, even though it provides
medical assistance for medically necessary procedures generally but not for
medically necessary abortions. Four Justices dissented, 1° 4 and adopted the
dissenting opinion of Hams.
On remand, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court's decision wherein the court had held that the Utah statute did not
deny the plaintiff due process and equal protection of the law. '0 5 The plain-
tiff on the second appeal, however, contended that the statute violated the
supremacy clause because Utah's eligibility requirements are stricter than
those under the federal statute. The court of appeals dismissed the claim,
finding that the class for which the plaintiff argued had never been properly
98. 617 F.2d 203 (10th Cir. 1980).
99. Mitchellv. D. R., 101 S. Ct. 53 (1980).
100. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
101. 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1976).
102. 448 U.S. 297, 329, 349 (Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, JJ., dissenting).
103. 448 U.S. 358 (1980).
104. Id. at 370 (Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, JJ., dissenting).
105. 645 F.2d at 853.
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certified by the trial court. The appeal, therefore, was dismissed.' 0 6
Nancy L. Cohen
IV. MERRION v. JICARILLA APACfiE TRIBE-AFFIRMED
In Merion v. Jican'lla Apache Tribe, 10 7 the United States Supreme Court
affirmed a 1980 Tenth Circuit decision wherein the court of appeals recog-
nized the right of Indian tribes to impose a mineral severance tax on non-
Indians producing oil and gas under leases on executive-order reservation
lands.' 08 The Court, in its lengthy opinion, generally adopted the reasoning
of the court of appeals. The economic repurcussions of this significant deci-
sion will be felt throughout the western United States.
The Jicarilla Apache tribe resides on an executive-order Indian reserva-
tion in northwestern New Mexico.' 0 9 Pursuant to the tribe's constitution,
10
which provides that the tribal council may enact ordinances to govern the
development of tribal lands and natural resources, the tribal council adopted
an ordinance imposing a severance tax on oil and gas production from tribal
lands.II' The Secretary of the Interior approved this ordinance in 1976.112
Petitioners, operating under federal leases granted prior to enactment of
the ordinance, produced oil and gas from wells located on the Jicarilla
Apache tribe's reservation. In federal district court, these lessees sued the
tribe and the Secretary of the Interior seeking a declaratory judgment and
an injunction that would prohibit enforcement of the severance tax. After
making findings of fact, the trial judge held that: 1) neither tribal sover-
eignty nor federal legislation empowered the Jicarilla Apaches to enact the
tax; 2) Congress granted to the State of New Mexico the exclusive right to
106. Id. at 854.
107. 50 U.S.L.W. 4169 (1982). Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court. Justice
Stevens, with whom the Chief Justice and Justice Rehnquist joined, filed a dissenting opinion.
108. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 617 F.2d 537 (10th Cir. 1980) (en banc). Judge
Logan delivered the opinion of the court of appeals, 617 F.2d at 539, with Judge McKay spe-
cially concurring, 617 F.2d at 549. Chief Judge Seth filed a dissenting opinion, 617 F.2d at 551,
as did Judge Barrett, 617 F.2d at 556. For a thoughtful analysis of the Tenth Circuit's opinion,
see Lands and Natural Resources, Seventh Annual Tenth Cirait Survy, 58 DEN. LJ. 415,416-22 (1981).
109. The Jicarilla Apache reservation was established in 1887 by the executive order of
President Cleveland. The Court noted that the fact that the reservation was established by
executive order rather than by treaty or statute should not affect the analysis because an Indian
tribe's sovereign power is not affected by the manner in which its reservatioi was created. 50
U.S.L.W. at 4170 n.l.
110. The Jicarilla Apache tribe is organized under the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934,
ch. 576, § 16, 48 Stat. 987, 25 U.S.C. § 476 (1976), which authorizes any tribe residing on the
same reservation to organize for its common welfare and to adopt a constitution and bylaws,
subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior. The tribe's first constitution was ap-
proved by the Secretary in 1937, and a revised constitution was approved in 1968.
111. The tax is imposed on lessees of mineral leases on the reservation at the time of sever-
ance. The tax rate, assessed at the wellhead per barrel of crude oil and per million Btu of
natural gas sold or transported off of the reservation, is payable monthly. Oil and gas received
by the tribe as in-kind royalty payments from lessees are ;xempted from the tax. 617 F.2d at
539.
112. Id.
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impose severance taxes on minerals extracted from executive-order reserva-
tions; and 3) the tax discriminated against and constituted a multiple bur-
den on interstate commerce in violation of the commerce clause.,
13
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, reversed the deci-
sion of the lower federal court." 4 Writing for the majority, Judge Logan
determined that the tribe has "the inherent power to levy a privilege tax on
the occupation of severing oil and gas from reservation land even though the
tax falls on nonmembers." ' 1 5 In a scholarly review of the law, Judge Logan
discussed the limitations imposed upon Indian tribal sovereignty by the fed-
eral government." 6 The court of appeals resolved that Indian tribes may
act only when such action does not impinge upon the superior rights and
interests of the United States. Finding that the Jicarilla Apache's mineral
severance tax did not interfere with any federal right, 1 7 the court of appeals
concluded that the taxing power was one of those inherent attributes of sov-
ereignty retained by the Indian tribe."18
In finding that taxation is an inherent power retained by the Indians,
the Tenth Circuit was persuaded by Supreme Court decisions holding that
the tribe's retained powers have at least some elements of territoriality., 19
113. Id. at 540.
114. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 617 F.2d 537 (10th Cir. 1980) (en banc). See note
108 supra.
115. 617 F.2d at 544. The Tenth Circuit was in accord with the trial court's finding that no
treaty or act of Congress specifically authorizes the Jicarilla Apache's imposition of the sever-
ance tax. Id. at 541.
116. Id. The Court recognized that although Indian tribes were once self-governing polit-
ical nations, they no longer possess the full attributes of sovereignty. Oliphant v. Suquamish
Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978); The Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
As a consequence, certain powers are denied to the tribes because exercise of these powers would
infringe upon the superior rights of the federal government. Se, e.g., Johnson and Graham's
Lessee v.M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823) (Indian tribes, though rightful occupants of
the soil, may not convey it at their will, superior title having vested in the United States); The
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17-18 (1831) (Indian tribes may not deal with
foreign nations because of the interest of the United States in protecting its external bounda-
ries); Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978) (Indian tribes have surrendered
the power to exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians because of the overriding interest of
the United States in protecting its citizens from unwarranted intrusions on their personal
liberty).
117. 617 F.2d at 541-52. The court of appeals determined that the federal taxing power was
in no way impinged by the Indian's tax, reasoning that the federal government can tax non-
Indians or Indians within the reservation regardless ofwhether the tribe levies the severance tax.
Id. Neither did the tax violate the protections afforded by the fifth and fourteenth amend-
ments, because, in the court's opinion, the tax was not so severe as to constitute a deprivation of
property. Id at 542.
118. The Tenth Circuit recognized that the Indian tribes possess certain inherent powers of
self-government. Significantly, the court of appeals found that the Indian tribes' powers are
retained, ie., they are derived from the tribes' original status as independent sovereign nations.
E.g., United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322-23 (1978). The majority of the court of ap-
peals rejected the contention that the Jicarilla Apache tribe's authority to act was dependent
upon affirmative enabling legislation by Congress. 617 F.2d at 542. Such a conclusion is consis-
tent with the Supreme Court's determination that Indian tribes are much more than private,
voluntary associations. See United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975). But see 617 F.2d
at 553-54 (Seth, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that the Jicarilla Apache tribe's property rights were
little different from those of any other socio-religious group).
119. See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959) (state court without jurisdiction to hear action
brought by nonmember against an Indian concerning contract formed on the reservation);
Johnson and Graham's Lessee v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823) (voluntary transac-
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The court of appeals reasoned that such territoriality permits the tribes to
levy a tax that falls upon nonmembers doing business on the reservation,
particularly when the nonmembers are extracting and removing mineral re-
sources from Indian territory.' 20 Moreover, the court of appeals found im-
plicit congressional approval of this territoriality concept in regard to
taxation. Judge Logan noted that Congress was aware of an Eighth Circuit
decision upholding the right of Indian tribes to impose taxes upon non-Indi-
ans doing business within Indian reservations 12' when it set forth the sover-
eign powers of the tribes in section 16 of the Indian Reorganization Act of
1934. With such knowledge, Congress made no effort to limit the Indians'
exercise of their taxing power.' 22 Further support for the court of appeals'
interpretation was found in an opinion of the Solicitor of the Department of
the Interior, issued shortly after passage of the 1934 Act, wherein the Solici-
tor concluded that "chief among the powers of sovereignty recognized as
pertaining to an Indian tribe is the power of taxation."'' 2 3 The court of ap-
peals reasoned that this contemporaneous interpretation of the meaning of
section 16 of the 1934 Act, by the agency charged with its enforcement,
should be given great weight.
124
In considering whether the severance tax violates the commerce clause,
the court of appeals determined that although the commerce clause does not
preclude the Indian tribes' power to tax, this constitutional provision limits
the taxation authority of the tribes as well as the states.' 25 The court further
held that the standard to be used in applying the commerce clause to Indian
action is "whether a tribe's tax legislation infringes upon the national inter-
est in maintaining the free flow of interstate trade."' 26 Rejecting the conclu-
sions of the trial court, Judge Logan found that the severance tax did not
discriminate against interstate commerce 2 7 nor did it impose a multiple
tions between nonmembers and members of tribe within the confines of the reservation subject
nonmembers to the laws of the tribe). But see Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S.
191 (1978) (Indian tribes cannot exercise criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers who commit
criminal acts on reservation land).
120. Chief Judge Seth based his dissent upon the particular history of the Jicarilla Apache
tribe and its nomadic nature. 617 F.2d at 551. Judge Seth stated that the Jicarilla Apaches
never exercised territoriality over a specific geographic area and noted that the location in New
Mexico to be occupied by the Jicarilla Apaches changed several times through the promulga-
tion and revocation of executive orders. id. at 553. The Chief Judge therefore concluded that
the Jicarilla Apaches never exercised the territoriality necessary to justify imposition of a sever-
ance tax. Id.
121. Buster v. Wright, 135 F. 947 (8th Cir. 1905), appeal dmissed, 203 U.S. 599 (1906).
Accord, Morris v. Hitchcock, 194 U.S. 384 (1904); Barta v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 259 F.2d 553
(8th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 932 (1959).
122. 617 F.2d at 544.
123. 55 Interior Dec. 14, 46 (1934).
124. 617 F.2d at 544.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 545.
127. Id. The court found no discrimination in the ordinance's exemption for oil and gas
taken by the tribe as in-kind royalty payments. Judge Logan concluded that subjecting royalty
products received by the tribe to its own tax would be "a fruitless and wasteful act." Id. In
addition, the court perceived no per se discrimination against interstate commerce. The court
stated that "it is settled that an occupation or privilege tax on the mining or severing of natural
resources, although closely connected with interstate commerce, is a local activity properly sub-
ject to local taxation . . . even though the severed product is destined for immediate entry into
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burden on such commerce.'
28
The Tenth Circuit also rejected the district court's determination that
Congress preempted the exercise of the tribe's power to levy a severance tax
by specifically authorizing the states to impose severance taxes on oil and gas
production from executive-order reservations.' 29 The court of appeals ap-
plied the canon that statutes passed for the benefit of the Indian tribes
should be construed liberally, so that all ambiguities are resolved in favor of
the Indians.' 30 Judge Logan found that neither the language nor the legisla-
tive history of the act granting taxing authority to the states evidenced a
congressional intent to preempt tribal taxation.' 3' The court also empha-
sized that despite the comprehensive federal regulation of mineral leasing on
Indian lands, Congress expressly has provided that tribes like the Jicarilla
Apaches may, by proper constitutional and legislative means approved by
the Secretary of the Interior, set terms and conditions for operations of min-
eral leases. 1
32
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the Ji-
carilla Apache tribe has the authority to impose a severance tax on oil and
gas produced from the tribe's reservation lands, and, if so, whether the tax
imposed by the tribe violates the commerce clause. 133 Affirming the decision
of the Tenth Circuit, the Court held that the tribe has the inherent power to
impose the severance tax as a necessary attribute of its powers of self-govern-
ment.' 34 The Supreme Court also ruled that the severance tax did not im-
pose a burden on interstate commerce.'
35
The Court began its reasoning with the assertion that "the power to tax
interstate commerce ... and even though the cost of interstate commerce is increased." Id. at
545-46 (citations omitted).
128. Id. at 546. The court of appeals rejected the lessee's argument that because New Mex-
ico also imposes an oil and gas severance tax, the Jicarilla Apache tribe's tax constitutes a multi-
ple burden on interstate commerce. Judge Logan held that New Mexico's ability to impose an
identical tax on lessees "does not implicate the federal interest in maintaining the flow of inter-
state commerce at all." Id. Rather, the court of appeals raised without deciding the possibility
that, absent the express congressional authorization to the states to tax minerals extracted from
executive-order Indian reservations, New Mexico's tax might interfere with the federal interest
in regulating Indian affairs. Id. *Such dicta may be unsettling to those states imposing severance
taxes on minerals removed from Indian reservations created by statute or treaty because there is
no federal legislation expressly authorizing state taxation of minerals extracted from such In-
dian lands. See Comment, Te Casefor Exrcust'e Tribal Power to Tax Miteral Lessees of Int'an Land,
124 U. PA. L. R. 491, 507 (1975), wherein the author discusses the proposition that state taxa-
tion of Indian reservation mineral lessees is invalid. But see Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Texas
Co., 336 U.S. 342 (1949), wherein the Court held that states may tax lessees' income derived
from mineral production activities on reservation leaseholds, even though the taxation might
interfere with royalty payments due to the tribe.
129. 617 F.2d at 547-49. 25 U.S.C. § 398c (1976) authorizes the states to impose taxes upon
the mineral output of lessees upon land in executive-order Indian reservations. There is no
similar statutory authorization for state taxation of lessees severing minerals from Indian reser-
vations created by treaty or statute.
130. Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 392 (1976).
131. 617 F.2d at 547. Based upon a study of the legislative history, the court stated that
Congress did not consider the issue of Indian tribal taxation during the passage of the legislation
authorizing state taxation.
132. 25 U.S.C. § 396b (1976).
133. 449 U.S. 820 (1980).
134. 50 U.S.L.W. 4169 (1982).
135. Id. at 4175-76.
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is an essential attribute of Indian sovereignty because it is a necessary instru-
ment of self-government and territorial management."' 36 Justice Marshall,
speaking for the Court, emphasized that the power to tax is not derived
solely from the Indian tribes' power to exclude non-Indians from tribal
lands. 13 7 Agreeing with Judge McKay's observation that the tax is necessary
to enable the tribe to carry out the municipal functions approved and man-
dated by Congress, 1 38 the Court found that lessees who avail themselves of
the governmental services provided by the Indians ought to be required to
contribute through the payment of taxes to the general cost of such
services. 139
Justice Marshall next asserted that even if the tribe's power to tax was
derived solely from its power to exclude non-Indians from the reservation,
the severance tax would be valid.' 40 The Court's rationale for this conclu-
sion was that because the Indians have the power to exclude non-Indians
from reservation lands, they have the lesser power to tax or place other con-
ditions on the non-Indians' conduct or continued presence on the reserva-
tion. Furthermore, the Court found that a non-Indian who enters tribal
jurisdiction remains subject to the risk that the tribe will later exercise its
sovereign power. 14
1
As to the question of whether federal legislation preempts imposition of
the severance tax by the Indians, the Supreme Court was in accord with the
Tenth Circuit's finding that neither federal regulation of leasing on Indian
lands nor the congressional authorization to the states to impose taxes on oil
and gas produced from executive-order reservations deprives the tribe of its
authority to impose the severance tax. 142 Beyond its adoption of the Tenth
Circuit's rationale, 43 the Supreme Court pointed to the fact that Congress
has recognized Indian-imposed taxes as one of the costs that may be recov-
ered under federal energy pricing regulations in support of its conclusion
that imposition of the severance tax would not contravene federal policy or
law. 144
Although the Court concurred with the Tenth Circuit's conclusion that
there was no commerce clause problem with the Jicarilla Apache tribe's sev-
erance tax, Justice Marshall used a different analysis. The Court noted that
state or Indian taxes may violate the "negative implications" of the com-
136. Id. at 4171.
137. Id.
138. 617 F.2d at 550 (McKay, J., concurring).
139. 50 U.S.L.W. at 4171.
140. Ad. at 4173.
141. Id. The Court concluded, therefore, that the fact that the tribe chose not to exercise its
power to tax when it first granted the petitioners' leases did not divest the tribe of its authority
to impose a tax on the severed minerals.
142. Id. at 4174.
143. Id. The Court emphasized that the Secretary of the Interior had approved both the
tribe's constitution, which authorized tribal council regulation of natural resources, and the
severance tax ordinance itself. In the Court's view, this demonstrated federal accord with the
tribe's actions. In addition, the Court approved the Tenth Circuit's reasoning that the act per-
mitting state taxation of mineral leases on executive-order reservations did not divest the tribe
of its taxing power.
144. Id. at 4175.
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merce clause by unduly burdening or discriminating against interstate com-
merce and that judicial review is intended to ensure that such taxes do not
disrupt or burden commerce "when Congress' power remains unexer-
cised."1 4 5 Once Congress acts, however, courts are not free to review state or
Indian regulations. Justice Marshall stated that when Congress has struck
the balance it deems appropriate, the courts are no longer needed to prevent
a burdening of commerce, and "it matters not that the courts would invali-
date the state tax or regulation . . . in the absence of congressional ac-
tion."'146 The Court concluded that Congress has acted affirmatively by
providing a series of federal checkpoints that must be cleared before a tribal
tax can take effect and, in this case, the severance tax was enacted in accord-
ance with this congressional scheme. 147 The Court adjudged that it was im-
proper "to strike down a tax that has traveled through the precise channels
established by Congress, and has obtained the specific approval of the Secre-
tary [of the Interior]."'
48
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 4176.
148. Id. The Court noted that if judicial scrutiny had been warranted in this case, the
severance tax would survive such scrutiny. Id.
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